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ABSTRACT 
 
Valentina Otmacic 
Resisting division along ethnic lines: a case study of two communities 
who challenged discourses of war during the Yugoslav conflict 1991-
1995 
 
Keywords: 1. Conflict in the former Yugoslavia. 2. Croatia. 3. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 4. Group identity. 5. Dominant discourses of violence. 6. 
Counter-discourse. 7. Ethnic co-existence. 8. Gorski kotar; 9. Tuzla; 10. Non-
violence 
 
There is a generalized perception on the 1991-1995 war in the former 
Yugoslavia as an ethnic conflict caused by longstanding antagonisms among 
homogenous ethnic groups inhabiting its territory. In such a worldview, which 
became part of the dominant discourse, inter-ethnic violence in Croatia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina was inevitable and the division of the population along 
ethnic lines was needed to stop the violence.  
In this thesis I problematize the dominant discourse on the ethnic nature 
and inevitability of violence, as well as on the ethnic fracturing as a solution, 
by exposing the experiences of two largest communities that remained 
ethnically mixed and preserved communal peace throughout wartime – the 
community of the region of Gorski kotar in Croatia and the community of the 
city of Tuzla in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
By documenting and analysing their discourses and practices, and by 
contrasting them with the dominant discourses of war in these two countries, I 
provide evidence that these two communities were oases of peace which 
developed a counter-discourse and resisted violence by preserving their multi-
ethnic character, promoting multiple identities, cherishing inter-ethnic 
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cooperation and ensuring equality and good governance for all their citizens. 
Their narratives challenge the well-established «truths» about the war in the 
former Yugoslavia and add to the complexity of collective memories of its 
peoples. 
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«Today the highest level of courage consists in stating that you 
don’t hate anyone and that you don’t want to kill anyone»  
(Srdjan Dvornik, peace activist from Croatia, in Modric, 1993) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This work is dedicated 
    to the citizens of Tuzla and Gorski kotar, 
for having the courage not to hate,  
 
 
and to my mother and my father, 
my personal heroes. 
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PREFACE 
 
The awakening of my interest, which gradually evolved into a passion for 
the areas of peace and human rights dates back to the time of violent 
dissolution of the country where I was born, the former Yugoslavia. The year 
1991, the initial year of my university studies of Spanish and French languages 
and literature in Zagreb, was characterized by the beginning of war in Croatia, 
my home Yugoslav republic. My family and friends, my colleagues and 
teachers, all of us suddenly found ourselves caught in the whirlwind of an 
abrupt armed conflict.  Dramatic events started succeeding each other at a 
vertiginous speed. It was difficult to understand what was happening, but it 
wasn’t difficult to figure out what was the right thing to do in the given 
circumstances. I soon realized that my priorities needed a drastic change. 
Leaving my readings of Voltaire, Rousseau, Cervantes and other authors 
temporarily aside, in early 1993 I joined a Spanish NGO assisting refugees 
and displaced persons in Croatia. This was the beginning of a journey and a 
life-long vocation in which I would combine praxis and academic study in the 
areas of human rights and conflict transformation, a journey which would take 
me to four different continents in the coming twenty-five years.  
Although this study is about the former Yugoslavia, the initial idea of this 
enquiry was born in – Lebanon. I had been living and working in Lebanon for 
several years, and returning regularly to this country which I consider my 
second home. During one of the endless conversations with my close friend 
Mona, in the living room of her apartment in Ein-el-Mreisse in central Beirut, I 
found out that in that same four-storey building there were tenants, and good 
acquaintances of Mona, of Shiite, Sunnite, Christian and Druze faith. Intrigued 
by such diversity, I asked Mona about the tenancy situation during the 
Lebanese war, a twenty-five years long violent conflict characterised by 
widespread inter-ethnic (there called sectarian) divisions and cruelties. I was 
surprised when Mona replied that the tenancy situation back than was – 
exactly the same. She further explained that in most of the Ein-el-Mreisse area 
of Beirut citizens did not divide along ethnic lines; moreover, they were 
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supporting and protecting each other against violence throughout that long and 
difficult period.  
This sparked my curiosity and opened a new and exciting page in my life.  
While, like most other researches and practitioners, in the past I was focusing 
on the effects of war and violence and on the support to their victims, this 
insight – that there was an entire area in Beirut city that resisted divisions along 
sectarian lines despite widespread identity-based violence in the rest of the 
country – appeared as a discovery well worth exploring. Mona gladly organized 
informal conversations with the tenants of the apartments in that building and 
other inhabitants of Ein el Mreisse, which opened a whole new world to me – 
the extraordinary world of preserved humanity, civic courage, defiance to 
divisions, inter-sectarian support, alternatives to ethnic or sectarian group 
identity; a universe of narratives, experiences and learnings that could perhaps 
help nurture non-violent conflict transformation in so many other places in the 
world. The idea of this research was born.  
I began to search for similar communities in my own country, Croatia, as 
well as in neighbouring Bosnia-Herzegovina. These two former Yugoslav 
republics, now independent states, were strongly affected by widespread 
violence during the break-down of Yugoslavia, which, just like the violence in 
Lebanon, was tagged as «ethnic» or «sectarian», meaning group identity-
based. The quest led me to several larger or smaller communities which 
offered resistance to ethnic divisions during wartime. Unfortunately, most of 
them succumbed under the pressure of violence and dominant discourses 
promoting inter-ethnic fears and resentments. Nevertheless, despite all odds 
and against all currents, two communities of significant size challenged the 
discourses of war and succeeded in preserving inter-ethnic communal peace 
throughout and till the end of the wartime. This is their story. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
The 1991-1995 violent conflict in the former Yugoslavia, which resulted in 
the dissolution of this country, is often characterized as an «ethnic conflict». 
There is a generalized perception that the territory of Yugoslavia was inhabited 
by rather homogeneous ethnic groups and that the war was caused by ancient 
interethnic antagonisms or even hatreds. In such a worldview, divisions along 
ethnic lines, entailing the voluntary or forceful grouping of the population 
according to people’s ethnic identity, are widely seen as the only effective way 
to stop the bloodshed and solve the problem.  
Looking at the cases of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina as two of the 
former Yugoslav republics which were most affected by the 1991-1995 war, in 
this study I consider this generalized view on the inevitability of divisions along 
ethnic lines as only one of the possible narratives about group identification 
processes and inter-group relations in the former Yugoslavia. I also argue that 
this narrative became part of the dominant discourse which, as I try to 
demonstrate in the main body of the research, contributed to violence rather 
than to peace.  
Yugoslav society was highly diverse, with numerous, evolving and often 
overlapping social identification processes and complex inter-group 
relationships which had episodes of conflict but also of cooperation. This study 
tries to make a modest contribution to the understanding of those complexities, 
by problematizing the discourse of ethnic conflict and by indicating that the 
attempts to create ethnically homogeneous states or territories despite 
heterogeneous social realities did not reduce violence, but actually instigated 
it.  
Ethnic or national identity was only one of numerous group identities of the 
people in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was often made salient and 
abused for the political and economic interests of the elites. This assumption 
is supported by contrasting the experiences of two communities that remained 
ethnically mixed during the 1991-1995 war with the realities in the rest of 
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Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Although ethnic fracturing took place in most 
of these two countries, the inter-ethnic coexistence and cooperation were 
preserved in some of their communities. Two of the largest among them, the 
community of Gorski kotar in Croatia and the community of Tuzla in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, are explored in this study. 
The study seeks to make a contribution to knowledge by addressing the 
question: in what ways did these two ethnically mixed communities in the 
former Yugoslavia present a challenge to dominant discourses of war during 
the 1991-1995 violent conflict? To answer this question, after reviewing the 
pertinent literature (Chapter 2) and describing the conceptual framework and 
the methodology of this research (Chapter 3), I first look back into the past 
experiences and narratives of the population which is in the focus of this study 
(Chapter 4), broadly grouping those narratives around three key themes which 
emerged from my analysis, namely: i) group identification processes; ii) inter-
group relations and iii) governance. I then attempt to identify the dominant 
discourses that contributed to the preparation, eruption and mobilization for 
violence, including ethnic fracturing, in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(Chapter 5). I look into some of the key counter-discourses to dominant 
discourses of war at a supra-local level (Chapter 6), to then immerse deeply 
into the local experiences of the communities of Gorski kotar and Tuzla 
(Chapters 7 and 8), answering the question how the resistance to ethnic 
divisions and violence evolved, prevailed and persisted during the entire war 
period in these two areas of ethnic coexistence, which I name oases of peace. 
Finally, I offer a comparative analysis of the two case studies and draw 
conclusions in Chapter 9.  
The final goal of this study is to contribute to knowledge by identifying and 
examining the narratives of two communities whose experiences add to the 
complexity of understanding of wartime events and challenge some 
«generalized truths» about the war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. By 
adding to the complexity of collective memories through bringing to light these 
very concrete experiences of inter-ethnic cooperation, I ultimately hope to 
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contribute to reducing the risk of future identity-based violence in this territory 
and elsewhere.  
This introductory chapter sets the context for this study by introducing the 
former Yugoslavia before its breakdown, and then narrowing the focus to two 
of its republics – Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The notions of ethnic 
fracturing as a form of violence and ethnic co-existence as an element of 
resistance to violence are introduced to present the phenomenon under 
investigation: the experiences of two communities which resisted ethnic 
divisions throughout the 1991-1995 war.  
 
1.1. Yugoslavia and its discourses: understanding the context 
 
Administrative map of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (ICTY, 2017) 
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1.1.1. Yugoslavia 1929-1991: integration and disintegration of the state of the 
South Slavs  
The beginning of Yugoslavia - literally meaning the land of the South Slavs 
– dates back to 1929, when the former Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 
established in 1918 was renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. That Yugoslav 
Monarchy collapsed under the assault of Nazi Germany and its allies in 1941. 
However, during World War Two (WWII) the (re)making of Yugoslavia, first 
named the People’s Federal Republic and later on renamed the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), took place under the leadership of 
Josip Broz Tito and his Communist Party.  
The SFRY was composed of six Socialist Republics, namely Slovenia, 
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia (including the autonomous regions of 
Vojvodina and Kosovo), Montenegro and Macedonia. In the year before its 
breakdown, the country had approximately 23.5 million inhabitants. The 
country’s population has always been characterized by high diversity and 
heterogeneity, in terms of national or ethnic belonging and religious affiliations, 
but also economic and social characteristics. In this study I argue that 
dominant discourses which were imposing homogeneous political spaces over 
heterogeneous social spaces contributed to violence and war.  
According to its 1974 Constitution, Yugoslavia was the union of equal 
nations and nationalities. In addition to six identity-based groups recognized 
as nations (Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins, Macedonians and 
Muslims, the last group being recognized as a nation only in 1974), it had a 
number of narodnosti (nationalities, minorities or ethnic groups), the biggest 
one being Albanians, Hungarians and Italians. With regard to religious 
affiliation, most of the population was at least formally or also substantially 
affiliated to the Roman Catholic Church, Eastern Orthodox Church or Islam.   
The new Yugoslavia was (re)born during WWII under the leadership of Tito 
and with support of a broad grassroots movement. The slogan inviting all 
citizens of Yugoslavia to celebrate «brotherhood and unity» of its constitutive 
nations and ethnic groups soon turned into key Yugoslav official discourse. 
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There was hope that past inter-group challenges would be overcome by a 
positive joint future celebrating diversity. In the international arena, Yugoslavia 
stood at the very front of the Movement of Non-aligned Countries, promoting 
the idea of non-alignment as «broad neutrality between the capitalist and 
Soviet powers» (Tepavac, 2000, p. 70). Internally, the economic system of 
socialist self-management was introduced, the League of Communists of 
Yugoslavia (LCY) assumed political and social leadership and Tito was 
declared president-for-life of both the state and the LCY. Despite several 
internal tumults, until 1980 the country enjoyed a certain level of stability, 
including relatively high levels of economic and social wellbeing of its 
population.  
However, although another one of the popular slogans was claiming «Even 
after Tito – Tito», soon after the death of the country’s leader in 1980 the state 
started collapsing. As argued by Ramet (1999), the collective leadership which 
was to guide the country after Tito’s death proved unable to reach a consensus 
on fundamental economic and political issues and incapable of enforcing its 
decisions. The malfunctioning of the institutions was coupled with the 
polarization and rise of nationalist voices. 
When, on January 22, 1990, the Slovene and Croatian delegations 
abandoned the Fourteenth Extraordinary Congress of the LCY, the chairman 
of that Congress, Momir Bulatovic, had no choice but to call for a fifteen-minute 
break which, as he later stated, «lasted throughout history» (Silber and Little, 
1995, p. 86). As a culmination of several years of mounting tensions in 
Yugoslavia, this was certainly one of the crucial moments in the dismantling of 
Yugoslavia and the prelude to violent conflict that would ravage its republics, 
causing the death of thousands of people, massive displacements of 
population and many other calamities, which will be outlined in the following 
section.  
 
1. 1. 2. Break-up of Yugoslavia: the violence 
The declaration of independence of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 was soon 
followed by the military attacks of the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA) on those 
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two states-to-be. The conflict spread to Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992, very 
soon after this republic declared its own independence. Macedonia and 
Montenegro knew a relatively peaceful transition to independent states. The 
last episode of the fracturing of the former Yugoslav territory was related to the 
independence of Kosovo. As an autonomous province of Serbia, Kosovo 
experienced serious escalations of violence since the 1980s, followed by an 
armed conflict in 1998-1999 and finally the declaration of its independence in 
2006.     
There is still a number of on-going debates and controversies about the 
causes and dynamics of the conflicts that affected several of the former 
Yugoslav republics during the 1990s. The role of ethnic identity, unresolved 
inter-ethnic disputes or «ancient ethnic hatreds» (Ramet, 1999, Babic, 2004, 
Gagnon, 2004, Sekulic et al., 2006), the nature and effectiveness of action and 
inaction of the international community during the war (Campbell, 1998, 
Woodward, 2000) and the role of the media (Balas, 2000, Wilmer, 2002, 
Kurspahic, 2003) are among some of the contested issues related to this topic. 
This study will build on those debates and attempt to contribute to 
knowledge related to the pre-war and war time realities in Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina. However, adopting the social constructionist approach to reality 
and knowledge, it will not attempt to uncover the «true» or «real» causes of 
the violent conflicts in question, but will rather examine the interplay between 
discourses and violence or non-violence in those conflicts.  The term discourse 
will be used in its broader meaning of «form of social practice» (Fairclough, 
1989).  
Several authors (Silber and Little, 1995, Campbell, 1998, Gagnon, 2004) 
point at the links existing between the processes of preparation, eruption, 
spreading and exacerbating of the violence in the former Yugoslavia and the 
dominant discourses which were at the time emanating from those who had 
the narrative authority (Campbell, 1993) or the power to control the public 
discourse and the public mind (Dijk, 2008) in the country and in the 
international community. 
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Such links between discourses and violence are possible because, as 
argued by Foucault, there is an intimate relationship between knowledge, 
discourse and power, and «each society has its regime of truth, its general 
politics of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes be 
as true» (Foucault, 1980, p. 131). What we usually call knowledge simply 
refers to the discourse which has received a «stamp of truth in our society» 
(Burr, 2003, p. 68), while there are «other alternative versions of the same 
event representing it in a different way to the world» (Burr, 2003, p. 48), which 
tend to be marginalized.  
Building on those conceptual frameworks, my study examines the dominant 
discourses in pre-war and war settings in the former Yugoslavia, focusing on 
the functions of those discourses in stimulating violence. Discourses of political 
leaders and the media, as the ones with the highest influence on the conduct 
of the masses, will be at the centre of my research, combined with institutional 
texts and history textbooks. In addition, my study will look into several of the 
alternative discourses and enquire about their role in challenging the 
discourses of violence. The identified alternative discourses or counter-
discourses vary from critical media texts and public appeals to the persistence 
of ethnic coexistence as a counter-discourse to the violence of ethnic divisions. 
Geographically, the study will be limited to two of the former Yugoslav 
republics, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. This selection is based on two 
reasons: firstly, these are the two former Yugoslav republics which were the 
most heavily affected by violence, and secondly, I have direct experience of 
living and working in both of them. This is why I have personally witnessed the 
highly problematic ethnicization of their political and social realities outlined in 
the subsequent section.  
 
1.1.3. Violent conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991-1995: 
problematizing the dominant discourses of ethnic conflict 
As pointed out by social psychology and several other disciplines, 
perceptions play a key role in our ways of dealing with conflict and violence. 
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The conflict itself can be defined as a phenomenon in which one person or a 
group perceives the other person or a group as a threat, regardless of how 
objective or «real» that threat is.  
In his «problematization of the ethnicization of the political field in Bosnia», 
Campbell (1998, p. xi) warns that the perception of the nature of the problem 
of Bosnia, or the way the problem was posed, determined the solutions that 
were proposed for it. A similar conclusion can be applied to Croatia. Bar-Tal 
(2011) further develops on the importance of perceptions in conflict situations 
by claiming that in many cases the use of violence is perceived as necessary, 
almost inevitable, by the groups in conflict. He points at the role of the societal-
political systems in providing rationales and justification for the violence, and 
more particularly at what he names a socio-psychological infrastructure, 
defined as «the configuration of shared central societal beliefs that provide a 
particular dominant orientation to a society at present and for the future» (Bar-
Tal, 2011, p. 11).  
Prior to and during most armed conflict situations, the political leadership 
and other entrepreneurs of violence strongly influenced societal beliefs and 
attempted to turn them into ideological and violence-supporting beliefs. By 
handling the information in a selective, biasing and distorting way, they 
promoted a so called tunnel vision of reality, with a tendency to «close minds 
and stimulate tunnel vision which excludes incongruent information and 
alternative approaches to conflict» (Bar-Tal, 2011, p. 13). 
The primary assumption of my study is that the discourses of several key 
actors in the societal-political systems in the former Yugoslavia, including 
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, provided a «rationale» for the outbreak and 
the intensification of the violence that ravaged those two countries during the 
1991-1995 conflict. As will be shown in the study, the ways in which different 
power holders were defining the problem, as well as the ways in which they 
were dealing with it, actively promoted violence. Among other consequences, 
dominant discourses from nationalist political and other elites triggered and 
supported polarization and inter-ethnic diffidence and hostility between citizens 
of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina of different ethnic origins, manipulating 
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with fear, spreading the belief that the members of the opposite groups were 
«the enemies» and that violence was the only option for survival of one’s own 
ethnic group or nation.  
Those who were in a position to influence the information provided and the 
worldviews developed by different groups of people prior to and during the 
conflict, and consequently stimulate their attitudes and behaviours, were 
mainly the persons from the elites and the mass media. Therefore, it was 
important to critically review their discourses influencing the behaviours of the 
populations in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in relation to the 1991-1995 
conflict, starting from the historical evolution of discourses on specific key 
themes. The key themes that emerged from the study of those discourses 
include group identification processes, inter-group relations and governance. 
As will be shown in the next sub-heading, depending on the aims that their 
authors wanted to achieve, the discourses related to those three themes had 
the potential to lead towards ethnic fracturing and violence, or to support ethnic 
coexistence and cooperation.  
 
1.1.4. Ethnic fracturing and ethnic coexistence during the war in Croatia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Ethnic fracturing as a multiple form of violence 
What struck me just as many other people on the eve of and during the 
violent conflicts  in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, is what Kain Hart (2004, 
p. xvii) names «a sudden and violent reconfiguration of social life» and «a 
radical reinterpretation of the world that was played out by power politics on 
peoples’ identities, bodies and homes». One of the most salient aspects of this 
violent reconfiguration of social life was the abrupt fracturing of the territory 
and population along ethnic lines.  
People of different ethnic groups who were living together for centuries got 
“grouped” territorially along ethnic lines, either by the direct use of force (forced 
displacement) or by use of some other, less visible form of violence (threats, 
loss of jobs for being from the “wrong” side, feeling of exclusion, 
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marginalization by the majority group and similar reasons).  Witnessing the 
developments and events, one could observe that those ruptures along ethnic 
lines were strongly encouraged and justified by the dominant discourses, 
supported by a strong and omnipresent feeling of confusion of the populations 
facing the collapse of state structures and exposure to uncertainty at different 
levels. 
As a result of those factors, while the violent conflict supported by hostile 
dominant discourses was raging in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Croatia, the 
great majority of citizens sooner or later got divided along ethnic lines. While 
attempts of some level of resistance to ethnic divisions were noted in a number 
of communities, such attempts were soon crushed by the dominant discourses 
coupled by the use of violence. Taking into account that ethnic identity was 
used by the political leadership of all sides as one of the main agents of 
mobilization of the population for the war, it was clear that any sort of inter-
ethnic coexistence at community level would represent a threat to that 
mobilization effort, as well as a challenge to the “logic” of war. Nevertheless, 
in two communities, the inter-ethnic coexistence and cooperation was 
preserved throughout the war. As elaborated below, after the war I got strongly 
intrigued by the existence, persistence and experience of such oases of peace. 
  
Ethnic co-existence as a form of counter-discourse and resistance to violence: 
practical examples of oases of peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia 
Despite all the surrounding violence and the discouraging context, the inter-
ethnic coexistence and cooperation were preserved in the region of Gorski 
kotar in Croatia, as well as in the city of Tuzla in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The 
region of Gorski kotar in western Croatia is a mountainous area with some 
25.000 to 30.000 inhabitants living in several towns or in scattered villages. 
The population is mixed of ethnic Croats and ethnic Serbs. The city of Tuzla in 
north-eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina has some 130.000 inhabitants from three 
ethnic groups: Bosniaks (Muslims), Serbs and Croats.  
 11   
 
 
 
Region of Gorski 
kotar 
 
Position of the two oases of peace 
 
 
City of Tuzla 
In the above oases of peace different ethnic groups not only remained living 
together during the entire war, but also protected and supported each other, 
sometimes in very difficult circumstances. My attempts to find out more about 
the preserved peace in those communities from the existing literature were 
unsuccessful. Seemingly, these plausible exceptions did not attract the 
attention of scholars or other members of the public. I then realized that there 
was an important gap in the knowledge that needed to be addressed.  
While studying identity-influenced politically-driven conflicts, researchers 
from different disciplines tend to focus on the study of inter-ethnic violence, 
while disregarding the study of cases of resistance to such violence and 
examples of inter-ethnic coexistence and cooperation, such as the ones 
observed in the areas in the focus of this research. This means that our 
knowledge and understanding of past events remains limited to only a certain 
number of discourses and practices, mainly the most powerful, dominant and 
violent ones, while alternative discourses and practices (or counter-discourses 
and counter-practices) remain marginalized and disregarded. This study is an 
attempt to address this gap in the knowledge by exploring the phenomenon 
described below.  
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1.2. The phenomenon under investigation 
In order to address the mentioned gap in the knowledge, I decided to 
explore the experiences of the two communities which I identified as living in 
the oases of peace during the 1991-1995 war: the community from Gorski 
kotar in Croatia and the community from Tuzla in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I 
consider them being oases of peace because the communal peace at all three 
levels - direct, structural and cultural level – was preserved in them, a will be 
shown in Chapters 7 and 8. I believe that the analysis of discourses from these 
oases of peace related to the themes of group identity, inter-group 
relationships and governance, as well as their contrasting against the 
dominant discourses on the same key themes in Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina of the 1990’s, is particularly relevant for understanding the 
resistance to ethnic divisions and to violence taking place within these 
geographic areas. By collecting and analysing data related to the key themes 
in the two oases of peace, l try to identify in what ways they presented a 
counter-discourse and a challenge to the power of dominant discourses during 
the war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
As emphasised by Campbell (1993), the purpose of such work is not to offer 
the true account that would pierce the veil of official propaganda or other 
dominant narratives. The aim is, rather, to foster a critical review of the existing 
knowledge and understanding of the war events, which are summarized in the 
next heading, as well as to contribute new insights and offer alternative 
narratives filling the gap in the knowledge. The ultimate hope is that these 
alternative narratives or counter-discourses will positively influence future 
actions at a local, but also at a broader level.  
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Chapter 2: Literature review and research framework 
 
The aim of this chapter is to identify the key aspects of the existing literatures 
pertinent for this work, as well as the gaps in the literature that will be 
addressed in the study. In the second part of this chapter I outline the structure 
of the study, define primary and secondary research questions and elaborate 
on the importance and implications of this investigation. 
 
2.1. Literature review 
The pertinent existing literatures in the investigated field can be grouped 
thematically as follows: 
2.1.1. Theoretical work on social constructionism and discourse analysis 
Adopting a social constructionist approach to my study, I examine, analyse 
and compare different discourses that emerged in the pre-war period but also 
during the war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the focus being on the 
dominant discourses of war on the one hand, and on the counter-discourses 
(or the discourses challenging the dominant discourses of war) on the other 
hand, considering the oases of peace as physical examples of a counter-
discourse. 
From the initial contacts with the inhabitants of the two oases of peace, as 
well as from the very limited secondary data available on them, I could 
immediately observe that the worldviews of those communities, which 
undoubtedly influenced their behaviour, were significantly different from the 
dominant worldviews and prevailing models of knowledge in Croatia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina during the war. Providing an insight into the ways in which 
those communities perceived the realities and acted in them is one of the main 
aims of my work. A social constructionist approach, which considers that 
knowledge is not derived from the nature of the world but versions of 
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knowledge are fabricated through the daily interactions between people in the 
course of social life (Burr, 2003), was chosen as the most relevant theoretical 
orientation for my study.  
In my enquiry I am drawing on the work of Burr (2003), Danziger (1997) and 
other scholars advocating a social constructionist approach to research. The 
focus of my study being on the discourse and social construction of meaning, 
I am further building on the work of Foucault (1972, 1980), particularly on his 
analysis and understanding of the relationships between discourse, knowledge 
and power.  
 
2.1.2. Theoretical work of social psychology on conflict-related issues  
Social psychological perspectives are particularly relevant  for my study as 
they «do not try to describe what the “real course” of the conflict was, but rather 
to analyse what people think and feel in this situation, as this is extremely 
important for the understanding of why they act in a particular way» (Bar-Tal, 
2011, p. 4). In that endeavour, Social Psychology often adopts the social 
constructionist approach and discourse analysis as a tool, looking at how 
language influences our perceptions and our social interactions (Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987). 
Making use of a larger body of the existing literature of Social Psychology 
dealing with conflict-related topics, my study particularly benefits from the work 
of Daniel Bar-Tal (2001, 2004, 2011), notably from his conceptual framework 
dealing with shared societal beliefs and collective emotional orientations in 
intractable conflicts, as well as from his in-depth work on the collective 
memories and their relation to conflict and violence.  
Concerned with the characteristics and implications of collective memories 
of war-torn societies, Bar-Tal (2011) warns of the possible consequences of 
simplified and emotionally loaded collective memories of past violent conflicts.  
Bar-Tal further highlights that complex experiences of violence are often 
transmuted into simple narratives of collective ethnic victimization, which 
become a permanent source of fear and mistrust between ethnic groups. In 
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cases of violent conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, there is an 
increasing body of literature looking into the influence and use of collective 
memories for instigating violence among ethnic groups. My study will 
contribute to the literature by investigating dominant discourses, but also 
counter-discourses related to collective memories, and their influence on the 
behaviours during conflict. 
The body of knowledge from within the field of Social Psychology will be 
used in approaching the key themes of my study, namely: group identification 
processes, inter-group relations and governance.  In addition to the work of 
Bar-Tal, in the framework of the above themes my study will also draw on the 
writings of several other scholars in Social Psychology, such as Kelman, 
(1997), Brewer (2003, 2011) and others.  
 
2.1.3. Theoretical work on conflict and violence 
Even if the conceptual debates on violence are still on-going, nowadays 
there is a general consensus that violence includes not only acts of physical 
destruction against others’ bodies or property, but also unjust structural 
conditions and their justification through culture or ideology (Berghof 
Foundation Operations GmbH, 2012). This approach to violence is further 
elaborated by Johan Galtung, one of the most prominent scholars in the field 
of Peace Studies. Galtung (1990) distinguishes three types of violence: direct, 
structural and cultural violence. While direct violence, usually having the form 
of physical or verbal aggression, is easily perceived and recognized as such, 
the other two types of violence are often overlooked although they create 
conditions for direct violence to happen. Structural violence is related to the 
structure of the relationships that allows direct violence to happen. It includes 
non-egalitarian and discriminatory practices which are usually built into the 
very structure of the society, not permitting certain persons or groups within 
the society to meet their needs or to make decisions that affect their lives. 
Cultural violence is based on principles and beliefs - including prejudice and 
stereotypes - that are used to justify or legitimize direct and structural violence.  
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My analysis of the interplay between discourses and violence in Croatia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina will take into account all three types of violence described 
above. Ethnic segregation, which is at the centre of my research, can be 
viewed and will be analysed as an example of the combination of the three 
types of violence, and ethnic co-existence and cooperation as the absence of 
any of the three types of violence, or peace. This approach will allow me to 
observe the dominant discourses on ethnic divisions during war in the former 
Yugoslavia from a new perspective.  
The work of Vivienne Jabri (1996), uncovering the discursive and 
institutional processes which generate and reproduce war and violent conflict, 
will further inform my study, providing it with very significant insights into the 
interplay between discourses and violence. She also draws our attention to the 
importance of counter-discourses during violent conflict, by highlighting that: 
«The discourse of war aims at the construction of a mythology based on 
inclusion and exclusion. […] Any representation which blurs the 
inclusion/exclusion boundary breaks down certainties constructed in the 
name of war and forms a counter-discourse which deconstructs and 
delegitimizes war and thereby fragments myths of unity, duty and 
conformity» (Jabri, 1996, p.7).  
It is in that sense that the oases of peace are observed in my study as a de 
facto counter-discourse to the discourses of war in the former Yugoslavia, 
because their existence and experiences are deconstructing the myth of ethnic 
unity and denying the division of in-groups and out-groups exclusively along 
the ethnic lines, as will be seen from the case studies in Chapters 7 and 8. 
Taking into account that the ethnic aspect of identity and its relations to 
conflict and violence in the former Yugoslavia are at the very centre of my 
research, the conceptualization of ethnic conflict and ethnic violence will 
receive particular attention. The main debates related to this field of study 
(Horowitz, 1985; Huntington, 1996; Lake and Rothchild, 1998; Petersen, 2002; 
Sen, 2006; Cordell and Wolff, 2009; Elcheroth and Spini, 2011) will be taken 
into account in light of their role in the dominant discourses (or resistance to 
such discourses) linked to the violence in the former Yugoslavia. 
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A debate on the concept of ethnicity and the question of causal relationships 
between ethnicity and violence are among the most significant current 
discussions in the field, highly relevant for the key themes of my study. Several 
authors highlight the extreme flexibility of the concept of ethnicity. Slack and 
Doyon (2001, p. 139) even claim that «the identifier of ethnicity can be 
anything», indicating that it is a «membership of the group based on the 
presumption of a shared trait or traits, that can be anything from genealogy to 
dressing habits».  
Campbell (1998, p.88) explains the difference between two main positions 
on ethnicity: the primordialist position and the instrumentalist or constructivist 
position. The primordialist position holds that «ethnicity is “a brute social fact” 
expressing the essential or innate character of the group», while the 
instrumentalist / constructivist position holds that the ethnicity is a «response 
to particular circumstances», a «resource created by members of a community 
to bring people together and to mobilize them». This indicates that the salience 
of ethnicity depends on the circumstances and increases in the times of crisis, 
which is a phenomenon that I will explore in the context of crisis in the former 
Yugoslavia. Cordell and Wolff (2009, p. 14) argue that «it is generally agreed 
that constructivism has developed into the more prominent discourse on 
ethnicity [than primordialism] and that there is no longer much debate 
questioning which of the two schools offers the more credible approach to the 
study of ethnicity». However, even if there is evidence of a significant shift in 
the academic approach to the question of ethnicity, my research will attempt 
to demonstrate that the primordialist approach remains dominant in the 
discourses and practices not only of the national elites, but also of the key 
international actors in their ways of problematizing the war and post-war 
realities in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
Elcheroth and Spini (2011, p. 176) further discuss the malleability of 
ethnicity as an analytic category, which can be used to differentiate groups by 
a variety of dimensions. Moreover, they warn that «ethnicity has the potential 
to form a mythical narrative for a community», and that it «actually functions 
as a practical meta-category, grouping together a rather diverse set of social 
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dimensions used to make sense out of collective antagonisms and violence». 
In my study I show how several aspects of ethnicity as analytic category 
evolved and were abused for instigating violence.  
Brubaker and Laitin (1998, p. 426) highlight a growing trend of labelling 
different types of conflicts as ethnic conflicts. They claim that «a pronounced 
“ethnic turn” has occurred in the study of political violence», as those instances 
of collective violence that cannot be framed as the war between nation-states 
or revolutionary acts or counter-colonial violence, are now commonly labelled 
as ethnic groups fighting ethnic wars. They also observe the flexibility of the 
concept of ethnicity, considering that it is that flexibility which makes the 
concept so handy and attractive to conflict analysts. Concurring with the views 
of these authors, in this research I problematize the labelling of the conflict in 
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina as ethnic conflict.  
An interesting debate which is very relevant for my research developed 
recently around the interplay between ethnicity and violence. While in the past 
there was a tendency to consider ethnic identity and ethnic animosities as 
causes of violence, a new and growing body of literature is developing around 
the idea that ethnic identity and the related inter-ethnic relationships are 
actually shaped by the violence, during and after the violent conflict. Gagnon 
(2004, pp. 11-12) claims that «violence may be constitutive, that is, its goal 
may be to construct actors or meanings or relationships that did not previously 
exist». He further argues that «the ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia 
were an attempt to force a reconceptualization of ethnicity itself for political 
ends». In the specific case of violent conflict in Croatia, Sekulic et al. (2006, p. 
797) provide evidence that dismisses the common views of ethnic hostility as 
a cause of violence in Croatia and find strong support for concluding that «the 
events of the war itself and especially elite manipulation of public images of 
these events are strongly implicated in rising intolerance during the war». In 
this study I build on the work of these scholars and examine the cause-effect 
interplay between ethnic identity and violence in Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina.  
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2.1.4. Country-specific literature on the history, society and violent conflict in 
the former Yugoslavia 
My review of the country-specific literature has two main aims. On the one 
hand, the literature produced by scholars, journalists and others on the pre-
war and war times in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina is a rich source of 
information and data related to the dominant discourses and counter-
discourses of that period, which I use jointly with other relevant social texts. 
On the other hand, this literature in itself is a constitutive part of different 
discourses on the pre-war and war-time events, and as such it had and it still 
has a force for producing consequences.  
The social constructionist approach to my enquiry allowed me to critically 
review the existing literature and the key debates dealing with the history, 
society and violent conflict in the former Yugoslavia, with a particular focus on 
the literature which became part of the dominant discourses or of major 
counter-discourses in different academic fields, such as Political Science, 
International Relations, History, etc. Internationally recognized authors such 
as Ramet (1992, 1999), Bringa (1995), Campbell (1998), Udovicki and 
Ridgeway (2000), Wilmer (2002), Gallagher (2003), Gagnon (2004), and 
others were studied in parallel with the most prominent scholars from the 
former Yugoslavia, such as Banac (1995, 2001, 2006), Babic (2004), (2000), 
Kurspahic (2003), Sekulic et al. (2006), Hromadzic (2013) and many others. 
The literature produced by renowned journalists, such as Kaplan (1993), Silber 
and Little (1995) or Glenny (1996), as well as influential diplomats, such as 
Owen (1996), was given particular importance due to the nature of this study.  
As elaborated in detail in Chapter 5, many works of the country-specific 
literature contributed to generalized views on the group identification 
processes and inter-group relations on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, 
which was often referred to as the Balkans. Due to their positions and roles in 
the society, their authors had what Campbell (1993) names the narrative 
authority, therefore their discourse was trusted and influential. 
The analysis of the literature revealed that one of the generalized views, or 
stereotypes, promoted in most of the literature is that the people living on the 
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territory of Yugoslavia were divided into ethnically homogeneous groups. Most 
literature on the violence conflict in Yugoslavia contains maps indicating which 
ethnic group was in majority on which territory, which disregards the 
malleability and the diversity of group identities of the population.   
Furthermore, many influential diplomats, renowned journalists, policy 
makers and respected academics contributed to and promoted the stereotypes 
on the Balkans and its people as barbaric and prone to inter-group conflict. 
Lord David Owen, a British diplomat who served as EU peace negotiator in the 
former Yugoslavia in 1992-95, serving alongside the UN peace negotiator 
Cyrus Vance, wrote a personal account on his experience in the book titled 
Balkan Odyssey. The very title of this book is noteworthy, transmitting a sense 
of adventure and peril in which he, as a hero, had to show some extraordinary 
bravery to survive. Robert Kaplan, the American journalist whose book Balkan 
Ghosts became a best-seller and allegedly had significant influence on the 
position of President Clinton with regard to the war in the former Yugoslavia, 
equally transmitted a number of simplified, stereotypical and often dangerous 
ideas about this part of the world, culminating in his accusation of the Balkans 
for «inventing» Nazism and inspiring Hitler: 
«Twentieth-century history came from the Balkans. Here men have been 
isolated by poverty and ethnic rivalry, dooming them to hate. Here politics 
has been reduced to a level of near anarchy that from time to time in 
history has flowed up the Danube into Central Europe. Nazism, for 
instance can claim Balkan origins. Among the flophouses of Vienna, a 
breeding ground of ethnic resentments close to the southern Slavic world, 
Hitler learned how to hate so infectiously» (Kaplan, 2005, p. xxiii) 
Furthermore, selected writings produced by several members of the elites 
of the former Yugoslavia, which had often provided a foundation for their public 
discourses and strongly influenced the public in the country, were reviewed in 
detail for the purposes of this research. Instances of such works include the 
writings of Franjo Tudjman, the first president of Croatia, whose work Bespuca 
povijesne zbiljnosti (Wilderness of historical reality) attracted a lot of attention 
in the former Yugoslavia,  mainly due to his attempt to revise the official death 
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count for the WWII Croatian death camp, Jasenovac, whose principal victims 
had been Serbs (Stitkovac, 2000). Another work that was revised is the 
Memorandum on current social issues drafted in 1985 by the Serbian 
Academy of Sciences and Art, portraying Serbs as the great victims of Tito and 
communist rule and accusing Croats and Albanians of alleged “genocidal” 
policies and actions against ethnic Serbs (Ramet, 1999). On the other hand, I 
also identified several writings of the political leadership in the two oases of 
peace, such as the work of the Tuzlan mayor Selim Belsagic The city and its 
man and the book written by Josip Horvat, the head of the Crisis committee in 
Delnice, in Gorski kotar, named Oasis of peace. These works are analysed in 
detail in the body of the research, as they significantly contribute to addressing 
the gaps in the literature described below.  
 
2.1.5. Gaps in the literature 
Despite the existence of a significant body of literature analysing causes, 
dynamics and consequences of violent conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the 
scholarly work in this area appears to be focusing almost exclusively on 
different aspects and manifestations of violence during war times, while 
marginalizing or disregarding those discourses and practices which were 
opposing or resisting violent practices. Although there was a number of 
initiatives at different levels opposing direct, structural and/or cultural violence 
in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, including discourses and acts of 
resistance to ethnic divisions and segregation, at present there is no 
substantial body of research that focuses on counter-discourses to the 
dominant discourse of war and ethnic divisions, and this is the main gap in the 
literature that my research will attempt to address.  
More generally, there appears to be no systematic documentation of the 
experiences of communities which inhabited the areas of ethnic coexistence 
during war times. Filling this gap is of utmost importance for a number of 
reasons: in addition to increasing and complementing the body of knowledge 
on the history of the region of concern, it can also contribute to better 
understanding human behaviour in conflict situations, challenging the 
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prejudice and myths on «innate interethnic hatred» and the «inevitability of 
violence», as well as contribute to the prevention of future violence. Looking at 
the experiences of two oases of peace in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina as 
a counter-discourse to dominant discourses of war, my study tackles only a 
limited number of aspects of that broad area of research, but it certainly opens 
the gate to new perspectives and further enquiry in this field. 
In its attempt to address the described gaps in the knowledge, the study is 
organized in nine chapters, responding to one primary and three secondary 
questions presented in the continuation of this chapter.  
 
2.2. Research framework 
2.2.1. Research questions 
Primary research question:  
 In what ways did two ethnically mixed communities in the former 
Yugoslavia present a challenge to dominant discourses of war during 
the 1991-1995 violent conflict? 
Secondary research questions: 
 Which were the dominant discourses that contributed to the 
preparation, eruption and mobilization for violence, including ethnic 
fracturing, in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina? 
 How did the resistance to ethnic divisions and violence in the two areas 
of ethnic coexistence evolve, prevail and persist during the entire war 
period?  
 To what extent were the dominant discourses of violence challenged by 
the persistence of those two areas of ethnic coexistence, and how? 
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2.2.2. Structure of the research 
My research has the following structure:  
o Chapter one 
Introduction 
o Chapter two 
Literature review and research framework 
o Chapter three  
Conceptual framework and methodology of research  
o Chapter four 
Grounded in the past: tracing the emergence of key discourses and 
practices influencing group identification processes, inter-group 
relations and governance on the territory of Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
o Chapter five 
On the road to violence: identification and analysis of dominant 
discourses which supported violence in Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina in 1991-1995 
o Chapter six 
Alternative voices: an overview of the evolution, key characteristics 
and influence of selected counter-discourses opposing war 
o Chapter seven 
Ethnically mixed communities as a counter-discourse (I) Case study 
from the region of Gorski kotar in Croatia  
o  Chapter eight 
Ethnically mixed communities as a counter-discourse (II) Case study 
from the city of Tuzla in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
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o Chapter nine 
Comparative analysis, conclusions and research implications 
 
2.3. The importance and the implications of the investigation  
This study contributes to research on the violent conflicts in Croatia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. I aim to enhance the body of knowledge on the interplay 
between discourses and violence that occurred during those conflicts, and 
specifically on the continued ethnic co-existence as a form of counter-
discourse and resistance to violence. 
By identifying and analysing the evolution of dominant discourses which 
supported violence through Chapter 5, the study attempts to contribute to 
answering what Elcheroth and Spini (2011, p. 190) consider «the relevant 
question» for the analysts of political violence. They argue that this question 
«is not why the majority is driven by destructive motives, but how a minority 
managed to convince the majority that there was no viable alternative to their 
particular way of defining the group, its struggle, its enemies and its means». 
In the cases of violent conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina this 
question remains largely unanswered and my study can add to the body of 
literature dealing with this problem.  
Building on their research, my study directly responds to the invitation of 
Brubaker and Laitin (1998, p. 426), who insisted on the crucial distinction 
between conflict and violence and urged scholars «to take violence as such 
more seriously in the studies of ethnic and nationalist conflict» and to «seek 
specific explanations for occurrence – and nonoccurrence – of violence in 
conflictual situations». This thesis attempts to contribute to this aim by seeking 
to establish the links between different discourses and the occurrence – as 
well as nonoccurrence - of violence in the specific settings in Croatia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
In particular, I explore and analyse the cases of two ethnically mixed 
communities where the inter-ethnic violence did not occur during the 
 25   
 
supposedly “inter-ethnic” conflict in the two countries of concern. By this 
means I also challenge the links established in the studies of several scholars 
(Vanhanen, 1999, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005) between ethnic 
diversity and ethnic violence. According to Elcheroth and Spini (2011), the 
general conclusion of those studies is that more ethnic heterogeneity leads to 
higher risk of violence. The oases of peace studied in this research are an 
obvious counter-discourse to such a conclusion. 
Similarly, the study of the two oases of peace defies the discourses on the 
“ancient hatreds” and “innate antagonisms” among different ethnic groups in 
the former Yugoslavia. Such claims got deeply rooted both in the popular 
discourse and in the political discourses at national and international level, as 
well as in some significant scholarly discourses. Challenging those discourses 
can be of central importance for the present and future relations of the 
communities of the concerned region. 
  Such relations are also strongly influenced by collective memories of past 
events. Building on Bar-Tal’s conceptual framework related to collective 
memories of conflict and violence, Elcheroth and Spini (2011) highlight the 
nature of the narratives of ethnic victimization. They claim that in those 
narratives interethnic violence is remembered while intraethnic violence and 
«in-group» resistance or desertion is forgotten.  They also suggest that such 
systematic «gaps» in the memory, which they name «directed forgetting», 
facilitate simplifications in the representation of out-group conduct and 
intentions. My study seeks to add complexity to the collective memory of the 
1991-1995 events in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina by exploring and 
exposing narratives which are usually a matter of «directed forgetting». Those 
narratives include testimonies of intra-ethnic cooperation during war times, as 
well as accounts of other types of identification and resistance to dominant 
discourses of war. 
Finally, the power of selected counter-discourses in the cases of Croatia 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina is analysed, in terms of their contribution to violence 
reduction and conflict transformation in the two countries. Additional research 
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on this specific aspect could further contribute to the understanding and use of 
counter-discourses for violence reduction purposes.  
As presented above, I hope that the theoretical and practical implications of 
my study will be multiple. The overall desired significance of my work could be 
summarized in the following argument put forward by Gagnon (2004, pp. xx-
xxi): 
«How we think about the causes of ethnic conflict is not just a matter of 
observation or analysis from a distance, but has direct feedback into the lives 
of people in the region. In this calculus, scholars are far from being merely 
neutral analysts, but are integral parts of how these kinds of wars, and this set 
of wars, in particular, have been and are being constructed in the minds not 
only of their students and academic colleagues, but also policy makers and 
the general public».  
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Chapter 3: Conceptual framework and methodology of research 
 
This chapter examines the key concepts, as well as theoretical and 
methodological approaches used in this study. It presents the social 
constructionist approach of this research and elaborates on the knowledge 
understood as socially constructed meaning and a key motivator of action. 
Clarifying the difference between conflict and violence, this chapter further 
explains why war is never the only option available to address conflict. Drawing 
from the field of social psychology, it looks into the influence of shared beliefs 
and shared emotions, particularly fear and hope, in mobilizing people for 
violence or for peace. Finally, it examines the concept of group identity in 
general, and ethnic identity as one of its types in particular, and the links 
between group identities and inter-group relations in the context of conflict. 
The methodology of this research is presented in the second part of this 
chapter and discourse analysis introduced as a method of choice. Processes 
of data generation, collection and analysis are described in detail, and 
complemented by the examination of challenges, ethical issues and other 
concerns that were addressed throughout the research period.  
 
3.1. Conceptual framework of the research  
3.1.1. Conceptualizing knowledge as a socially constructed meaning and a 
motivator of social action 
In my research, as well as in my overall understanding of the world, I adopt 
the approach in which knowledge is considered as something that «people do 
together» (Burr, 2003, p.9), something created through the social practice and 
interactions, rather than a reflection of the reality or an objective truth. The 
observation of Jorgensen and Phillips (2002), who note that our knowledge 
shapes our worldviews within which some forms of action become natural and 
others unthinkable, is particularly important for this study. The worldviews 
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shaped by dominant discourses (Chapter 5) and by their counter- discourses 
(Chapters 6-8), and their link to violent or non-violent behaviours, are at the 
very centre of this study. 
Furthermore, my approach is largely based on the social constructionist 
view on knowledge, considering that the ways of understanding the world do 
not come from objective reality but from other people (Burr, 2003, p. 7). 
Consequently, what we know today about the war in the former Yugoslavia 
includes the knowledge constructed and transmitted by a range of people, from 
witnesses and actors in the war-time events, to the media, scholarship and 
other sources. 
Knowledge about that war is also created and transmitted by scholars, who 
conduct research about it and present their views to the public. As stressed by 
Gagnon (2004), scholars largely contribute to the ways in which different 
groups of people understand specific conflicts. Moreover, scholars are among 
the people with the utmost «narrative authority», a term used by David 
Campbell (1993) to describe those who have influence over others. This 
reminds us that, as scholars, we carry an enormous responsibility. Throughout 
my thesis I will also critically review some of the scholarly work produced prior, 
during and after the war in the former Yugoslavia and reflect on its possible 
influence on different actions that have been shaping the lives of the population 
living on its territory. 
One of the main sources of my motivation for conducting this research is 
the observed partiality of the knowledge and understanding of the wartime 
events. I felt the need to add to the complexity of the overall understanding of 
that war, and to put under scrutiny some broadly accepted «truths», such as 
the ethnic nature of this war. I was particularly motivated to do so when getting 
acquainted with the inhabitants and the experiences of the areas with 
preserved interethnic coexistence, which by their very existence seemed to 
challenge some widely accepted ideas on this war, such as its supposed 
interethnic nature. In the terminology of David Campbell (1998), I felt the need 
to «problematize the problem», or to question the very basics of the broadly 
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accepted understanding of what the problem was, through the examples of 
experiences which oppose and challenge this overall understanding.  
My work took place with the awareness that «versions of knowledge 
become fabricated through the daily interactions between people in the course 
of social life» (Burr, 2003, p.4), and that different understandings of the world 
lead towards different social actions.  The link between knowledge and action 
is central to my work in two aspects, the first one being related to the past and 
the second one looking at the future. 
 Firstly, my research findings confirmed my initial assumption that the kind 
of actions undertaken by the communities living in the two oases of peace, 
differing from the actions that were taking place in the rest of Croatia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, were influenced by a different interpretation in those 
communities of the conflict itself, including the existing threats and the possible 
solutions. The socio-psychological perspective adopted in my work supported 
this assumption, explaining that «various past experiences and acquired 
knowledge [also] have determinative influence on the manner in which a 
collective acts in a conflict situation[…] Thus, also a possibility of peace 
building must be initiated in human minds first» (Bar-Tal, 2011, p. 4).  
This leads me to the second aspect of my work which is linking knowledge 
and action, this one referring to the collective memory and the future of the 
areas affected by the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. As defined by Schuman 
and Scott (1989), collective memory is a widely shared knowledge of past 
social events that may not have been personally experienced but are 
collectively constructed through communicative social functions. Collective 
memory can be transmitted directly, through oral transmission of events, or 
through cultural memory, encompassed in education and commemoration. Liu 
and Hilton (2005) warn that collective memories are a symbolic resource that 
can be mobilized politically to legitimize political agenda for the present and 
future. They further specify that collective memory of past conflicts has a 
motivational function for collective behaviour, and it is often used as 
justification of violent actions.  Indeed, my research findings support that 
collective memories, as selective knowledge on specific episodes of the past, 
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were widely used prior to and during the war in the former Yugoslavia to 
instigate violence based on ethnic belonging, as elaborated in Chapter 5. 
However, as can be perceived from Chapters 7 and 8, positive collective 
memories provided a strong foundation for preserving inter-ethnic peace in the 
two oases of peace subject of this study.  
Starting from Chapter 4, throughout my work I identify and critically review 
collective memories on specific aspects of the history in former Yugoslavia. 
Additionally, with my scholarly work on this topic and by exposing the 
narratives gathered in the oases of peace, I hope to contribute to the 
complexity of understanding of the events that took place during the 1991-
1995 war. By adding to the complexity of memory, I hope to contribute to the 
reduction of future political and other manipulation with the past.  
 
3.1.2. Distinguishing between conflict and violence. Conceptualizing war as 
one of the options available as conflicts emerge  
The well-established and widely used distinction between conflict as an 
interaction of persons or groups who perceive each other as a threat to 
satisfying one’s own needs or reaching one’s own goals, and violence as acts 
that aim to inflict harm (Burton, 1990, Galtung, 1998), is crucial for this study. 
Despite the prevalent popular view that violence is sometimes inevitable, when 
conflicts emerge parties that are involved in them always have a choice. They 
choose from a variety of approaches and options that can be applied in trying 
to resolve their conflict, and resorting to violence is only one of their options.  
As conflicts are universal, there is no doubt that they were present in all 
areas of the former Yugoslavia during 1991-1995, including in those that were 
not affected by armed violence. It is important to note that in both oases of 
peace there were clear immediate threats to the lives of the population, as will 
be elaborated in Chapters 7 and 8. However, while in most of Croatia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina the conflict turned into violence with strong ethnic 
overtones  (not always in the form of armed violence, but also in other forms 
of direct, structural and cultural violence, such as dismissing individuals of 
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specific ethnic group from their jobs, evicting them from their homes or 
exposing them to humiliation and harassment),  in the two oases of peace the 
prevailing type of violence, i.e. violence among groups of different ethnic origin, 
did not take place. As elaborated in Chapters 7 and 8, structured efforts were 
made in those areas to prevent the three forms of violence.  
When identifying and analysing discourses of war, parallel to several of their 
counter-discourses, it is the concept of violence that draws the distinguishing 
line between those two types of discourse. While both types of discourse were 
taking place in the broader context of violent conflict occurring on the territory 
of the former Yugoslavia, it is important to note that the discourses of war were 
inviting to, fomenting or justifying violence, while their counter-discourses were 
directly or indirectly questioning the use of violence and promoting alternatives 
to violent «solutions», as will be seen from the subsequent chapters.  
Furthermore, the notion of perceived threat which characterized the 
individuals or groups in conflict is another concept which is key to this study. 
The definition and description of the nature and the source of the threat by key 
influencers is crucial for the perception of the threat in the population. It can 
vary among different actors and observers, and challenging the perceptions 
defining entire ethnic groups as a threat is the basis of the counter-discourses 
presented in this study. In the same context and logic, the concept of parties 
in conflict should be observed with special attention, because it can vary, and 
it did vary in the discourses of war and their counter-discourses in the former 
Yugoslavia. As clarified by Jabri (1996, p. 16) «how we define parties to a 
conflict may also be a reflection of dominant discourses around a particular 
conflict situation which legitimise or render visible the claims of one while 
delegitimising those of the other». 
The terms war and violent conflict are used in this study interchangeably, as 
war can be observed as organized violence (Jeong, 2000). However, it is 
important to stress that war and discourses of war in this research are not 
observed only in their relation to direct physical violence, such as destruction 
and killings which were taking place on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, 
and which makes the more visible and the most studied form of violence. 
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Following the conceptual framework of Galtung (1990, 1998), the study  
equally looks at the discourses that were fomenting or justifying structural and 
cultural violence, and the counter-discourses that were opposing them.  
The deliberate nature of violence and war is considered in my study. 
Although war is often commonly understood and thought of as an «accident» 
that occurs in human relations, this is rarely the case. Most often resorting to 
war is a deliberate choice, it is «the outcome of sequences of actions and 
decisions carried out by defined decision-makers» (Jabri, 1996, p. 21) 
Moreover, war is a choice that requires acceptance and support from a 
significant number of people. As pointed out by the organization War Resisters 
International (2017), wars will cease when men [and women] refuse to fight.  
The processes of generating acceptance and support for the option of war 
in the former Yugoslavia are in the focus of Chapter 5. Discourses and 
discursive practices are at the core of such processes. Jabri (1996, p. vii) 
explains that «human conduct and discursive and institutional continuities 
within social systems are mutually constitutive processes implicated in the 
reproduction of violence as an aspect of social and political life». She 
conceptualizes conflict as constructed discourse, stressing that the linguistic 
constructs used to provide versions of conflict by parties and observers are not 
peculiar to that conflict alone, but derive from pre-existing discursive models 
which are implicated in the construction of the conflict and have wide 
consequences.  Recalling and critically reviewing some of the key discourses 
and practices from the past around the broader themes of group identity, inter-
group relationships and governance (Chapter 4), I then proceed to analyse the 
influence of the discourses and the relationships between discursive practices 
and human conduct both in the reproduction of violence (Chapter 5), but also 
in the reproduction of non-violence and co-existence, as witnessed in the 
oases of peace (Chapters 7 and 8).  
Thus, I conceptualize war as «an option that is available to states and 
communities as conflicts emerge» (Jabri, 1996, p. 1), keeping in mind that it is 
never the only option, as we can observe from the example of the communities 
living in the oases of peace.  
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3.1.3. Understanding the relationship between discourse and power. 
Conceptualizing dominant discourse and counter-discourse in the context of 
violent conflict  
Not all discourses in a given society are equally powerful. The relationship 
between knowledge and power was analysed by Foucault (1980), who 
understood power not necessarily as repressive, but as a productive force 
which constitutes discourse and knowledge.  Power is responsible for creating 
the social world, but also for the ways in which this social world can be talked 
about. Foucault (1980) further noted that every social discourse which involves 
a politically generated truth-claim encounters a counter-discourse that 
challenges the original discourse’s legitimacy. Truth, he claimed, is relative to 
power struggles and discourses created within those struggles. Such power 
struggles, perceived in the tensions between dominant discourses of violence 
and counter-discourses of peace during wartime in the former Yugoslavia, are 
analysed in this study.  
Van Dijk (2008) defines social power in terms of control – the one over the 
discourse of the others, but also control over peoples’ minds. He specifies that 
«control does not only apply to discourse as social practice, but also to the 
minds of those who are being controlled, that is, their knowledge, opinions, 
attitudes, ideologies, as well as other personal or social representations […] 
Those who control discourse may indirectly control the minds of people. And 
since people’s actions are controlled by their minds, mind control also means 
indirect action control» (Van Dijk, 2008, p.9). This is highly relevant for my 
study which looks into the role that dominant discourses had in controlling the 
minds and consequently the actions of wider population in the former 
Yugoslavia.  
The control of the dominant discourses over people’s minds and actions is 
often closely linked to their control over what Campbell (1998) calls the 
«emplotment» in the narratives. Building on the work of the historian Hayden 
White, Campbell (1998, p. 35) points at the fact that «[…] narratives are a 
performance. Through the operation of «emplotment» facts are structured in 
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such a way that they become components in a particular story […]  any given 
set of real events can be emplotted in a number of different ways, can bear the 
weight of being told as any number of different kind of stories». How things are 
told, what constitutes part of the narrative and what is omitted, gains particular 
importance prior to and during the conflict. Changing narratives over the same 
events are observed throughout the recent past in the former Yugoslavia, 
producing different and sometimes opposing «versions» of the truth, 
sometimes contributing to peace and on other occasions instigating violence 
among ethnic groups.  
To help understand the relations of power between different discourses and 
their consequences, Fairclough (1992) elaborated on the concept of ideology.  
Fairclough understands ideologies as constructions of meaning that contribute 
to the production, reproduction and transformation of relations of domination 
(Fairclough, 1992, p. 87). This means that in every society there are ongoing 
processes of negotiation of meaning and power relations are reflected in the 
discursive practices: while dominant discourses mostly intend to maintain the 
existing social order, they are confronted by specific counter-discourses that 
«challenge the dominant meanings and equip people with resources for 
resistance» (Jorgensen and Phillips, p. 76). In the context of my study, I 
observe discourses of war as an order of dominant discourses which 
introduced or legitimized the “logic” of violence among people in the former 
Yugoslavia. The main aspects and the evolution of those discourses are 
analysed in Chapter 5.  Several discourses which opposed to the «logic» of 
violence during the war in the former Yugoslavia are analysed as counter-
discourses or discourses countering the “logic” of war in Chapters 6-8. Even 
though they did not turn into dominant discourses on the overall territory of the 
former Yugoslavia, at certain localities those counter-discourses challenged 
the discourses of war. The extent and the nature of that challenge is examined 
in this study. 
This capacity of dominant discourses is explored by Fairclough (1992), who 
claims that power in discourse (or dominance) is the ability to control or 
constrain the contributions of non-powerful participants. This claim is 
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reinforced by van Dijk (2008), who defines social power in terms of control of 
one group over the discourse of the other group. Van Dijk further explains that 
«control does not only apply to discourse as social practice, but also to the 
minds of those who are being controlled, that is, their knowledge, opinions, 
attitudes, ideologies as well as other personal or social representations» (Van 
Dijk, 2008, p. 9).  
Furthermore, adopting the notion of power in terms of preferential access to 
or control over public discourse (Van Dijk, 2008), and taking into consideration 
that mass media is one of the most potent tools for influencing the broad public, 
my study is looking into the role of mass media both in promoting discourses 
of violence (Chapter 5) and in promoting counter-discourses (Chapters 6-8).  
While analysing the relations between discourses, power and social 
practices in war-time Yugoslavia, I build on the fact that decisions to initiate 
the war are taken by a few persons who have the power, while the 
consequences are felt by a great number of people, mostly having less power. 
As explained by Jabri (1996), discourse is what renders the destructive 
element of human violence legitimate and acceptable to those who perceive 
war in strategic terms. Such perceptions of the war in the former Yugoslavia, 
and their spreading among the overall population, are discussed in this study. 
Jabri’s recommendation to look into linguistic resources and repertoires 
associated with the legitimation of war, as well as to look into a possibility of 
constructing new forms of discourse as a means towards establishing non-
violence as a norm in the resolution of conflict, are both addressed in the study, 
the first one in relation to the dominant discourses of war, and the second one 
in relation to the counter-discourse opposing to see the war as a solution.  
Discourses on the role of ethnic identities and the dominant discourse on 
the “ethnic nature” of the conflict played an extremely important role in war-
time Yugoslavia. They influenced the distribution of political power, which was 
given to ethnic leaders as the only representatives of the people. This 
disempowered other, alternative voices, such as the voices of the women or 
citizens’ initiatives, as their contributions were not taken as «representative». 
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This is why the dominant discourses on the «ethnic nature» of the conflict in 
former Yugoslavia are given particular attention in this study. 
 
3.1.4. Understanding shared beliefs and shared emotions in the context of 
intergroup conflict. Fear as the key motivator of violence.  
While discourse analysis is used as the analytical framework of this study, 
a complementary theoretical framework is applied from the field of social 
psychology. This is mainly because the study attempts to establish links 
between discourses and social practices and analyse how discourses 
contributed to specific attitudes and behaviours at individual or group level, 
either violent or non-violent. To be able to understand this contribution, it is 
important to understand the role of beliefs and emotions in that process. The 
social-psychological perspective of intergroup conflicts brings important 
insights in the area of what Bar-Tal names shared beliefs or societal beliefs. 
They often serve as a basis for group formation, influence the behaviour of 
groups and serve to distinguish one group from another (Bar-Tal, 2011). The 
processes of group formation and group identification, and the role of 
discourses in those processes, are one of the key themes explored in this 
study. 
The close link between societal beliefs and ideology is particularly relevant 
for this research. Building on the work of van Dijk, Bar-Tal and Halperin (2011), 
I consider ideology as a closed system of systematically formulated beliefs 
which guide reality perception and behaviour, and, as such, reduce openness 
to information and its processing. Societal beliefs are mostly rooted in the 
histories and myths. Therefore, discourse plays a very important role in their 
formation. Those beliefs make part of the cognitive world of the parties in 
conflict, and as such are crucial for understanding the dynamics of a specific 
conflict. Shared beliefs could be considered as a shared knowledge and 
understanding of specific groups on specific issues. As different discourses 
influence the creation of knowledge and understanding, starting from Chapter 
4 onwards, my study attempts to make visible the link between discourses and 
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their possible influence on the perceptions and behaviours of different groups 
of people prior to and during the war in the former Yugoslavia.  
Linking the discourse and the societal beliefs, and building on Bar-Tal 
(2011) who claims that societal beliefs can often become rigid  and turn into a 
kind of ideological conflict supporting beliefs, I consider that dominant 
discourses in the former Yugoslavia also produced dominant societal beliefs, 
which tended to accept and justify violence, as elaborated in Chapter 5.  Bar-
Tal (2011, p. 15) further noticed that «observation of the serious, harsh and 
violent conflicts indicates that it is much easier to mobilize society members to 
participate in them then to persuade them to embark on the road of peace 
making.» This proved to be accurate also in the former Yugoslavia, and my 
study looks into two opposed types of discourses: those which mobilized 
people for violence, and those which mobilized them for non-violence, 
analysing the persuasion methods in both cases. 
The mobilization of members of society during conflict is closely linked and 
highly influenced by personal and shared emotions. One of the most salient 
emotions with a strong mobilization effect is fear. There is an extensive body 
of research on the interplay between fear and conflict. On the individual basis, 
fear can be defined as a natural alarm following the perception that one or 
several of persons’ needs or interests is threatened. Fear can take a variety of 
forms. If it reaches high levels, it launches the aggressive capacities of the 
human being in order to enable him or her to quickly respond to a specific 
problem, either by attacking or by escaping. Violence is one option that can be 
used to deal with the conflict, by inflicting harm on the enemy.  
There is an on-going debate on the link between emotions and rationality. 
Some, such as Svendsen (2008), disagree that emotions such as fear 
represent a threat to rationality, claiming that an absence of emotions would 
also lead to irrationality. Many others (Farre Salva, 2004) claim that higher the 
levels of emotions such as fear, the rational capacities of the persons and 
groups decrease, which is an excellent opportunity for manipulation with the 
fear for political purposes and instigation of violence. Examples of such 
manipulation will be presented in Chapter 5. In the context of conflict, reducing 
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fear is considered as a first step towards violence reduction and constructive 
conflict transformation, as will be confirmed in the case studies from Gorski 
kotar and Tuzla. Therefore, the cases of instigating fear by dominant 
discourses, and fear reduction through counter-discourses, will be analysed in 
the main body of this study. In both cases it is the perception of a threat that is 
crucial for understanding the way in which the conflict is dealt with.  
Marina (2006) claims that one of the most common tactics of political control 
through fear is “closing the ways out” – convincing people that there are no 
other solutions to the problem then giving control over their lives to the political 
“saviour” who will rescue them. This is what Bar-Tal (2011) names tunnel 
vision, which is often promoted by political leaders, as illustrated by numerous 
examples in Chapter 5. 
Bar-Tal (2001, 2011) confirms that, when met with conflict or threatening 
conditions, a society that experiences fear as a collective emotion is likely to 
act violently.  However, he also introduced the idea of collective hope as a 
potential mobilizing force leading towards peace. As a secondary emotion 
requiring «higher mental processes of vision, imagination, setting goals and 
consideration of alternatives – all of which require openness, creativity and 
flexibility» (Bar-Tal, 2001, p. 620), hope can become a counter-balance to fear. 
This idea is explored in my study particularly in reference to the two oases of 
peace. There is no doubt that these oases also experienced communal 
conflicts during 1991-1995. However, their communities approached those 
conflicts in a constructive and non-violent way, with strong hope and a clear 
vision of better future.  
 
3.1.5. Understanding identity in the context of conflict and violence. 
Conceptualizing ethnic identity as a type of group-based social identity 
There is a growing interest of scholarship and a wide range of research on 
the role of group identities in violent conflicts. Social psychology offers a 
framework for the study of group identification processes, based on social 
identity theory by Tajfel and Turner (1979). Jenkins (2008, p. 5) introduces the 
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notion of identity by claiming that, «[a]s a very basic starting point, identity is 
the human capacity – rooted in language - to know ‛who is who’ (and hence 
‛what is what’). This involves knowing who we are, knowing who others are, 
them knowing who we are, us knowing who they think we are, and so on: a 
multi-dimensional classification or mapping of the human world and our places 
in it, as individuals and as members of collectivities». As indicated by Jenkins 
(2008), language plays a crucial role in identity formation, therefore discourse 
analysis can contribute very important insights in this area of research. 
Discussing the motivational theories of social identification, Brewer (2011, 
p. 125) states that social identity «involves the attachment of one’s sense of 
self and self-interest to the collective as a whole. When a group identity is both 
important and salient, the individual is motivated to enhance group welfare and 
protect group interests, including defending the group boundaries from 
encroachment, protecting group values from dilution and preserving group 
integrity». Brewer (2011) further points to the idea that group identities meet 
fundamental needs for reducing uncertainty and achieving meaning and clarity 
in social context. She stresses that there is compelling evidence that 
identification and in-group bias increase under conditions of high cognitive 
uncertainty, when the function of group membership and identities is to provide 
self-definition and guidance for behaviour in otherwise ambiguous social 
situations. However, the author also recognizes that group identity is only one 
of many possible modes of reducing social uncertainty, while roles, values and 
laws can serve the same purpose. The war in the former Yugoslavia was 
certainly the time of highest uncertainty for its inhabitants: social, political and 
economic systems were falling apart in the midst of generalized violence, and 
there was no clarity on the future of the people and the territory. This is why 
the processes of group identification and related inter-group relations played a 
key role in influencing the behaviour of the population, and as such they are 
included as two core themes of this study. 
An additional characteristic of identity important for this study is that identity 
is a process taking place through social interactions, not a predetermined 
feature that people have. This distinguishes the primordialist view on identities, 
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still very common in general discourse but also in part of the academia, from 
the constructivist view adopted in my study. In fact, the case of Yugoslavia, 
where millions of people have been “changing” their ethnic, religious, political 
and other identities over relatively short periods of time, as shown later in this 
study, is in itself an evidence of flexibility and malleability of ethnic and other 
group identities, thus challenging the primordialist view on group identity as 
fixed and “eternal”. The influences of primordialist views on the processes of 
identification and consequently on the ways the violent conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia was understood and managed, are also explored, particularly in 
Chapter 5.  
Abdelal et al. (2009) defined social identity as a social category that varies 
along two dimension: content, as a meaning to collective identity, and 
contestation, as a degree of agreement within a group over the content. The 
content of social identity may take form of four non mutually exclusive types: i) 
constitutive norms or informal and formal rules that define group membership; 
ii) social purposes or the goals shared by the members of a group; iii) relational 
comparison referring to defining an identity group by what it is not and 
establishing the way it views other identity groups; and iv) cognitive models or 
worldviews in terms of a framework that allows members of a group to make 
sense of social, political and economic conditions. This analytical framework 
for the study of identity is used in my study, and the four types of group identity 
are explored in terms of their relevance for the behaviour of social groups prior 
to and during conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Furthermore, as each person 
has multiple and overlapping identities, the variable of salience or the intensity 
of identification with specific group is being considered. This is particularly 
important because, as further pointed by Abdelal et al. (2009), specific 
contexts are said to increase the salience of one identity over another.   
As could be perceived from the above conceptual frameworks, identities are 
central to how people make sense of the world and how they behave in it. 
Moreover, as argued by the theory of self-categorization and expressed by 
Turner et al. cited in Coutant et al. (2011, p. 42), identities are also crucial in 
the process of group formation, because, «individuals can and do cognitively 
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divide their social world into groups and categories around in-groups and out-
groups. The categories are formed by paying attention to specific 
characteristics that separate individuals». This differentiation of in-groups and 
out-groups is particularly important in times of conflict, and it forms the basis 
of inter-group discrimination. Among different group identities existing in the 
former Yugoslavia, it was the ethnic group identity that gained specific salience 
and underwent significant content changes.  In that context, the concept of 
othering, establishing one’s identity though opposition to the “other”, often 
accompanied by the process of stereotyping and dehumanization of that 
“other” and the propensity for violent inter-group interaction between “us” and 
the “others”, is central to this research. Jabri (1996) warns that once the 
concept of “otherness” takes root, the unimaginable becomes possible: the 
relationship becomes defined by the destruction of the enemy, which is 
perceived as necessary. These processes of dehumanization of the out-
groups which contributed to the legitimation of violence in the former 
Yugoslavia are identified and analysed in Chapter 5.  
The framework exploring the interplay between group identities and conflict 
is further developed by Jabri (1996), who considers that the problem becomes 
salient when inter-group differences get highly institutionalized and 
ideologically legitimated, and discriminatory practices become habitual. This 
type of governance got widespread in former Yugoslavia, when discriminatory 
practices became habitual and not perceived as violence. However, these 
practices did not take root in the oases of peace, due to alternative types of 
governance and adherence to the rule of law, which are analysed in Chapters 
7 and 8.  
The hypothesis being explored in this study is that, although there is no 
doubt that most inhabitants of the oases of peace belonged to one of the ethnic 
groups, other forms of group identification were not sacrificed and coexisted 
together with ethnic identification. The hypothesis is taking into account the 
important fact - often overlooked in the texts on so called ethnic conflicts - that 
ethnic identity is only one of many types of group identities, although it can get 
very salient during conflict. As explained by Citrin and Sears (2009) and other 
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authors, in modern society individuals belong to several, usually overlapping 
groups, including national, regional, ethnic and professional groups – hence, 
the familiar assertion that individuals have multiple identities. The number, 
nature and relative significance of these varied social identities change with 
life circumstances and political events. 
 While some authors consider that the salience of the ethnic identity is one 
of the main causes of violent conflict, others perceive its increased salience as 
a consequence of the violent conflict. High levels of salience of ethnic identities 
help plant the seeds of ethnocentrism, which if a worldview in which one’s own 
ethnic group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated 
with reference to it (Brewer, 2003).  Referring to the level of salience that 
makes the ethnic identity appear as the singular group identity that 
overshadows all other types of identity, Sen (2006, p.2) writes: «violence is 
fomented by the imposition of singular and belligerent identities on gullible 
people, championed by proficient artisans of terror».  
Ethnicity and ethnic identity are contested concepts that can include or 
exclude almost an unlimited number of factors. This is why there is a number 
of different definitions of ethnic groups. For the purpose of this study I am 
adopting Bar-Tal’s definition (2011, p. 2)  indicating that «ethnic societies or 
groups refer to collective whose membership is determined on the bases of 
perceived common past, common culture, common language and common 
destiny». Although they were being considered and referred to as ethnic 
groups by outsiders, it is important to note that members of those groups in 
the former Yugoslavia very rarely used the terms «ethnic groups» when 
referring to themselves. They were rather using the term “nation” (“narod” or 
“nacija” in the local language(s)).  
The concept of the nation has a number of definitions and is benefiting from 
an increasingly rich academic interest. In his seminal work, Anderson (1991) 
defines nations as imagined, limited and sovereign communities. Jabri (1996) 
emphasises that the nation is the location of discursive and institutional 
practices which at one and the same time generate legitimation and exclusion. 
She observes national identity as a self-perception based on history, 
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mythology, tradition, language and culture. Importantly, this self-perception 
relies on the sense of collective identity which binds individuals across class, 
gender, income levels and other forms of division or types of group identity.  
The concepts of national identity, nation and nation-states played a 
significant role in the construction of dominant discourses. In fact, when 
referring to their reference groups, Croatian and Serbian leaders were very 
eloquent on national issues and national priorities. In that context, the 
constructivist approach to nations as imaginary communities and constructions 
of human categorizations, is adopted.  However, the study also focuses on the 
consequences of the essentialist and conventional approaches to nations, 
which are considering nations as a historical continuity and the «natural order 
of things». As will be presented in Chapter 5, this approach was promoted by 
a number of dominant discourses and was often used to justify violence as the 
only means to realize the «historical dreams of particular nations to have their 
own state». In this context, Hobsbawm (1993) points at the social manipulation 
element in the creation of the nations. He confirms Gellner’s view that 
nationalism - as a principle according to which the political and the national 
units should be congruent – precedes the nations, and not vice versa.  
Wehler (2005) defines nationalism as a system of ideas, a doctrine, a 
worldview that serves for the creation, mobilization and integration of a larger 
solidarity group (called nation), but first and foremost for the legitimation of the 
modern political power. National identity can be perceived as another type of 
group identity, which in many aspects overlaps with the ethnic identity. Both 
ethnic identity and national identity being elusive concepts, among the 
scholars there is a variety of ideas on their main differences and overlaps. As 
one of the main differences Wehler (2005) stresses the fact that nations 
consider their territory to have a sublime character, to be “sacred”. This type 
of discourse, whereby not only the territory but also the war was sacred, was 
often used by leadership of Croatia and Serbia. Hobsbawm (1993) considers 
that ethnic groups can be perceived as protonations, but also notes that ethnic 
groups are not necessarily pursuing what is a “must have” of every nation – 
the state. However, this was not the case in the former Yugoslavia, where 
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leadership of most ethnic (and national) groups pursued the creation of their 
nation-states, which were considered as the only solution to the problem of 
dissolution of Yugoslavia, at least in the dominant discourse of Serbs and 
Croats.  
Smith (2004, p. 302) observed that identities are among the most 
normatively significant and behaviourally consequential aspects of politics. 
Indeed, what makes the collective action possible are the shared group 
memberships. To lead a set of people to define themselves as belonging to a 
common social category is to «create social power through mobilizing people 
to act together» (Reicher et al., 2010, p. 626). Such mobilization is often used 
by those who seek to shape social reality, so called entrepreneurs of identity, 
«whose skill involves constituting as a single category the audience which the 
entrepreneur wishes to mobilize, constituting the project which the 
entrepreneur wants to achieve as an instantiation of the norms, values and 
priorities associated with this category and constituting the entrepreneur 
himself/herself as prototypical of the category» (Reicher et al., 2010, p. 627). 
This type of leadership and governance will be explored in Chapter 5 and 
contrasted to the governance in the oases in peace, described in Chapters 7 
and 8. 
In cases of violent conflict, the skills of entrepreneurs of identity gain great 
significance. How will people be grouped (who will become “us” and who will 
become “them”), which of the social identities will become most salient for most 
people and how much they will be willing to sacrifice for their groups’ aims and 
purposes, will often become a determinant factor in the course of the conflict. 
In such contexts, identities often become weapons in the hands of 
entrepreneurs of violence. When used for pernicious purposes, identities are 
frequently turned into agents of polarization, serving to fracture the social fabric 
and mobilize for violence. My study explores how such abuse of ethnic identity 
for violent purposes has been systematically made by the elites in Croatia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, resulting in the fracturing of almost all of their territory 
along ethnic lines. At the same time, it looks closely into the two areas where 
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such fracturing did not happen, exploring the means of their resistance which 
allowed them to remain ethnically diverse. 
 
3.2. Methodology of research  
3.2.1. Conceptualizing discourse as a form of social practice and introducing 
discourse analysis as a method of choice. Reasons for using discourse 
analysis as a theoretical and methodological approach of this study 
In this study I am looking into different versions of knowledge and meaning 
created in the context of Yugoslav war. Knowledge and meaning are 
transmitted through the language, which is part of the society. Therefore, 
linguistic phenomena are social phenomena, as «whenever people speak or 
listen or write or read, they do so in ways which are determined socially and 
have social effects» (Fairclough, 1989, p.23).  
Addressing the research questions of my study required paying particular 
attention to the linkage between knowledge, meaning (“truth”) and social 
action, which was identified by Michel Foucault (1972, 1980), the author who 
established the basis for the modern studies of discourse. His main views and 
concepts related to discourse are used as a framework orienting my study. 
Foucault claims that discourses generate knowledge and «truth» and therefore 
shape the world. In other words, discourses systematically form the object of 
which they speak. The processes of systematically forming specific “objects” 
through dominant discourses prior and during war in the former Yugoslavia – 
such as the processes of shaping the very nature of the “problem” in ethnic 
terms (through discourse on ethnic conflict) and consequently determining the 
nature and characteristics of the “enemy” (the ethnic other) and “possible 
solutions” (ethnic fracturing) – are analysed in Chapter 5. The two case studies 
in Chapters 7 and 8 expose the counter-discourses with alternative views on 
nature of the problem – parties in conflict – possible solutions, which were key 
in preserving peace in the two studied communities.  
Furthermore, Foucault established that discourses speak about the persons 
who are using them and that, for specific modes of discourse, some people 
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had more “right” to speak then others. This is how he established the link 
between discourse, authority and power. Because certain types of discourse 
allow specific types of individuals to «speak the truth», or to be largely believed 
when speaking on specific issues, discourses also give these individuals 
degrees of social, cultural, and political power. This power is often used to 
silence or marginalize opposing discourses or counter-discourses in order to 
maintain the existing social order. This is particularly relevant for my study, as 
I explored a number of discourses in the former Yugoslavia that were 
proposing different and sometimes opposing approaches to the “problem” in 
the country. As elaborated in Chapter 6, most of those discourses were 
silenced or marginalized.  
Jorgensen and Phillips (2012) further elaborate on the concept of discourse 
as social practice by specifying that discourse contributes to the construction 
of social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge and meaning. 
Discussing the links between discourse and social action, they note that 
«different discourses each point to different courses of action as possible and 
appropriate» and «changes in discourse are a means by which the social world 
is changed» (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2012, p. 18). This link between 
discourses and different social actions is explored in my study, contrasting the 
experiences of the two oases of peace with the experiences on the rest of the 
territory of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. To be able to understand different 
discourses and their influence on the social realities during the wartimes on 
the territory of former Yugoslavia, I used discourse analysis, a multidisciplinary 
method of analysis in social sciences which has a variety of approaches.  
While considering the role of discourses in the social practices during 
wartimes in the former Yugoslavia, I remained aware that social practices 
related to the armed conflict could not be fully understood exclusively on the 
basis of the analysis of discursive practices, because social practices include 
both discursive and non-discursive elements. However, the scope of my study 
is limited to the contribution of discursive practices to the broader social 
practices, particularly to the practices of violence or non-violence explored in 
Chapters 5-8. 
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Overall my research was informed by the field of social psychology, looking 
into specific concepts such as attitudes, behaviours, identity and social conflict, 
which are all very relevant for my study. Focusing on social interactions, social 
psychology points out that «people use language like a tool to get things done» 
(Potter and Wetherell, 1987, pp. 17-18). This means that people use discourse 
in order to accomplish forms of social action in particular contexts of 
interaction.  
Analysing discourse as a social practice and as a tool to influence and 
persuade people is highly relevant for this study for a number of reasons. While 
discourses play an important role in considering possible and appropriate 
courses of action in any situation, in the conflict situation their role is even more 
crucial.  Consequently, discourses played an important role in the legitimation 
of war on the territory of former Yugoslavia, as well as in the mobilization of 
support for that war. As indicated by Jabri (1996, p. 21), social practices 
through time and across space render war an institutional form that is largely 
seen as inevitable and at times acceptable form of human conduct. This 
phenomenon was also observed in the former Yugoslavia and one of the main 
aims of my research is to try to understand the social processes which 
generated that acceptance and support for violent human interaction. 
With that aim, in Chapter 5 I attempted to uncover some of the key 
discourses which contributed to the institutionalization and spirit of inevitability, 
acceptability and desirability of violence.  At the same time, in Chapters 6-8 I 
closely looked into specific counter-discourses which opposed that spirit, 
considering the practice of oases of peace as unique social counter-practices, 
or as counter-discourse per se, as by their very existence the oases of peace 
challenged the dominant discourse of inter-ethnic intolerance and violence. 
  
3.2.2. Data generation, collection and analysis 
In this study I apply the qualitative approach to research, characterized by 
flexible research design and the use of documentary analysis and interviews 
as main data collection and data generation techniques.  
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Following the observation of Dijk (2008), who maintains that institutional 
texts, political discourse, media discourse and textbooks are among the most 
powerful types of discourse due to their scope and reach, I put these types of 
text in the focus of the main body of my research.  I selected the texts from the 
relevant literature, documents and records such as recordings of the speeches 
of key political actors, TV and radio materials. In terms of the time when they 
were produced, the texts and talks selected for the purposes of the analysis of 
discourses of violence and the two case studies were chosen in accordance 
with the following criteria: either they were related to the period around the 
beginning of the war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, or they were related 
to the key events occurred during wartime. Texts from the initial moments of 
the armed conflict (1991 in case of Croatia and 1992 in case of Bosnia-
Herzegovina) were selected because they played a major role in how the 
relationships were shaped in the new context. As indicated by Reykowski and 
Cislak (2011, pp. 247-248), «initial reactions may shape the conflict resolution 
dynamics and affect final settlement[…] Automatic negative emotional 
responses generated by conflict that once started tend to continue via negative 
reciprocity». The beginning of the armed conflict influenced the development 
of new norms, relations and worldviews, therefore it was crucial to analyse the 
contribution of discourses to the developments at the very beginning of the 
war, as well as those related to major events occurred throughout the wartime.  
Two key themes crucial for understanding the evolution, nature and impact 
of discourses of violence on the one hand, and their counter-discourses on the 
other, emerged from the initial readings, pointing at the complexity and 
importance of the processes of group identification and intergroup relations. 
The third key theme, focusing on governance, emerged at the later stage of 
the research process when from the gathered materials I could clearly identify 
the elements of the governance practices that contributed to the peace in the 
two oases, and which were challenging the governance practices in the rest of 
the two countries. 
 Through my enquiry I found out that the historical evolution of the three key 
themes and related narratives had the potential to contribute to inter-group 
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conflict and violence, but also the potential to support peace and cooperation 
of different groups on the territory in the focus of this study, depending on the 
selection of narratives and the orientation of the person or group with narrative 
authority. In Chapter 4 the three key themes are explored historically, focusing 
on the key moments in the past and collective memories and narratives 
relevant for each theme. In the subsequent chapters, broadly following the 
same three themes, the discursive practices will «depart» in two opposite 
directions: I will show how the narratives about the past were used by dominant 
voices to promote 1990s violence, but also how they were (counter)-used by 
advocates of non-violence to support cooperation in the oases of peace. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the discourses of violence and Chapter 6 brings 
examples of selected counter-discourses at supra-local level. As in the 
following Chapters 7 and 8 which are discussing the cases of two specific 
communities, the focus is on the discourses that were setting the tone and 
exerting strong influence on the behaviour of the population.  
 Two community case studies were conducted and their results presented 
and analysed in Chapters 7 and 8. The two case studies contain features of 
ethnographic research, involving in depth work with selected members of the 
two communities, exploring the social phenomena of their past behaviour and 
analysing the different aspects of their resistance to ethnic fracturing. The case 
studies refer to the communities in the city of Gorski kotar in Croatia (Chapter 
7) and in the region of Tuzla in Bosnia- Herzegovina (Chapter 8). These two 
communities were selected as the largest communities in the two countries 
where inter-ethnic cooperation was preserved throughout the war period. 
Although several other communities in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
attempted to preserve their multi-ethnic character, under extreme pressure of 
entrepreneurs of violence almost all of them ended up dividing along ethnic 
lines at some point during wartime. My research was interested in those 
communities where multi-ethnicity was preserved until the end of the war and 
which had a significant proportion of at least two ethnic groups.  
At the beginning of my enquiry it seemed that there were scarce texts and 
talks occurred immediately prior to and during the wartime which could be used 
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for analysing discourses in Gorski kotar and Tuzla related to my research 
questions. This is why I initially believed that the interviews would be my main 
source of data, while I was aware that the lapsed time since the war – almost 
25 years – would significantly influence the data generated through those 
interviews. However, throughout my fieldwork and mostly thanks to the 
intensified contacts and established trust with many members of the 
communities of the two oases of peace, I managed to gather a significant 
number of very valuable written and recorded texts produced immediately prior 
to or during the wartime, including personal writings, local media pieces, 
authentic speeches, press releases and even private recordings of meetings.  
As the authentic materials occurred prior to or during wartime, over which 
myself or my informants had no further influence, were the most adequate type 
of information for my research, I decided to use them as the main source of 
data, while interviews got a supporting role in complementing or illustrating the 
information gathered through analysis of “real-time” materials. 
For the purpose of the two case studies, semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with selected inhabitants of the two oases of peace, as part of the 
fieldwork in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Croatia. Focusing on the local 
accounts of the 1990-1995 wartime period, I interviewed 21 persons, including 
9 respondents in Gorski kotar and 12 respondents in Tuzla. The strategy 
chosen for the selection of interviewees was dimensional sampling. The 
interviewees were selected based on several categories that I had created in 
advance. Firstly, as my research is focusing on the discourses that were able 
to influence the behaviour of the population during wartime, I only selected the 
interviewees who themselves had high or at least medium level of influence 
over the population of their communities during wartimes. Furthermore, I made 
sure that my respondents had different types of influence, and created the 
following categories for that purpose: political, military/police, media, religious 
and civil society. As the inter-ethnic relations during wartime were in the focus 
of my study, I made sure to include interviewees from all relevant ethnic groups 
in each community. I also paid attention to the gender diversity among my 
interviewees. Finally, in the region of Gorski kotar I included the criteria of 
territorial coverage and worked with interviewees from different villages and 
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towns located in those areas which were most at risk of armed conflict. The 
table of interviewees from the two communities is available in Appendix 1. 
At the beginning of my fieldwork, which was conducted during several 
intervals between early 2014 and mid-2016, I applied the snowball sampling 
approach, initiating my enquiry with the pre-established contacts in the two 
communities. These contacts helped me to identify and approach more 
respondents from the population of interest, and this is how my network of 
informants kept growing during my visits to the two oases of peace.   
For the primary data generation, I developed a semi-structured interview 
guide, consisting of two parts. The first part of the interview followed the form 
of an oral history interview, inviting the respondents to share their life stories 
during war times and depict the past in their own words, following their own 
sense of what was important (Arksey and Knight, 1999). The second part of 
the interview was structured and aiming to cover a set of aspects that were 
crucial for addressing my research questions. Those questions were arranged 
thematically. The analysis of the data collected during the first round of 
interviews revealed some aspects that I had not considered initially, which 
crystalized as key for addressing the research questions. This is why I 
conducted a set of follow-up interviews with 9 interviewees, as many as four 
interviews with some of them. All interviews were conducted in the local 
languages (Croatian, Serbian, Bosnian), which are very similar. All initial 
interviews were conducted in person and most of them took place in the house 
of the interviewee and without presence of other people. The initial interviews 
were recorded and the recordings stored safely. Four of the follow-up 
interviews were also conducted in person, and other four were conducted by 
phone and one was conducted by Skype.  
During my first contact with the respondents, I verbally provided them with 
clear information on the purposes and methods of my research, the benefits it 
might have, but also on the potential risks that it entailed. I made sure that the 
information about the research was transmitted in a clear and easily 
understandable way and that enough information was given so the participants 
could take an informed decision about joining the study. All the participants 
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identified as potential respondents agreed to be interviewed, although one of 
the respondents was clearly reserved in his answers. 
The verbal consent of the interviewees was recorded prior to the interviews. 
All participants were offered the possibility to withdraw their consent at any 
time, by orally informing me of that decision. None of the participants decided 
to withdraw from the research. As part of the consent seeking and consent 
giving process, I guaranteed the participants that the recorded media and the 
transcripts would be stored under lock. I also took the responsibility of 
destroying the tapes and shredding the transcripts immediately after the study 
was finalized. I guaranteed confidentiality to the interviewees by ensuring that 
they would not be named or otherwise identifiable in the study.  
A set of categories related to the key themes, key concepts and research 
questions was developed and used for coding of the data collected from pre-
existing documents and records, as well as of the data generated through 
interviews. I applied a thematic approach to systematize the data by those 
categories.  
As proposed by Potter and Wetherell (1987), the analysis of the data had 
two main phases. Firstly, I searched for patterns, both in the form of variability 
(differences in the content or in the form of accounts) and in the form of 
consistency (identification of features shared by accounts). Secondly, I 
analysed the data in terms of functions and consequences of the discourse, 
and formulated hypotheses about these functions and effects searching for 
linguistic evidence.  The immersion in the data collected during the first round 
of interviews revealed the existence of additional aspects that were not 
covered by the initial categories. Therefore, I developed new categories that 
were used in the second round of interviews. 
Finally, in the last chapter of this study I attempted the cross-case synthesis 
in order to interpret my findings across the two different case studies, analysing 
commonalities and differences, and indicating the potential direction of further 
study. 
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3.2.3. Challenges and ethical concerns 
Already at the stage of designing my research I have identified and reflected 
on several potential challenges and envisaged the strategies to address them. 
Prior to engaging in the fieldwork, I prepared and submitted the Research 
Ethics Application Form, which was reviewed and approved by the Committee 
for Ethics in Research of the University of Bradford. 
Several of the expected challenges materialized during the research, while 
some others did not. As expected, my origin as a Croat national, my own set 
of values and my background as a peace and human rights worker put me in 
a specific position vis-à-vis the research and the respondents. During war my 
family and I were not affected by direct violence, nor did I lose any of my friends 
due to armed violence. Although I am a Croatian national, I consider my 
national group identity to be of low salience. However, as a peace and human 
rights advocate I do have strong feelings against war and other human rights 
violations, including divisions based on ethnic identity. Aware of my own strong 
appreciation for the communities which challenged ethnic divisions and 
remained ethnically heterogeneous, throughout the research I kept alert of this 
fact as a possible source of my own biases as a researcher. This is why 
whenever I identified such potential biases, I made sure to triangulate the 
information or my own observations.  
I further observed that my Croatian ethnic origin did cause a certain level of 
caution in one of the respondents of Serb ethnic origin in Croatia. I linked that 
caution to the political events which took place just two days before our 
interview, and during which inter-ethnic tensions in Croatia were again 
stimulated. I respected the decision of that respondent to give me short and 
general answers, without really sharing his own views or experiences. I also 
got the consent of the respondent to come back to him with follow-up questions 
and observed that he was slightly more open during our follow-up interview. 
The topic of the research being related to hardships experienced during 
wartime as well as to complex and often sensitive inter-ethnic relationships, I 
remained aware of the emotional harm that might be triggered by narrating 
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(which is, in a way, reliving) some of the painful experiences. Even though the 
communities in the oases of peace did not engage in communal violence, they 
were affected by violence in the rest of the country, e.g. losing family members 
in other areas, not being able to travel or to communicate with the rest of the 
world, suffering scarcity, etc. This is why I cautioned the participants in 
advance about the potential risk of emotional harm, while I was explaining the 
structure and nature of the interview process. I also kept the contacts of 
professionals who could provide specialized help in case of emergency. 
Indeed, several of the respondents got emotional during the interviews, and I 
was sensitive and empathetic while talking to them, offering support and time 
to process own emotions. Only in one case I observed that the interviewee 
was experiencing a strong reaction while going through own wartime 
experiences. I offered to postpone our interview, but she decided to carry on. 
After the interview this respondent, just like several other respondents, told me 
that narrating their experiences brought them the feeling of relief. Also, most 
of them were very proud of the experience of their communities preserving 
positive inter-ethnic relations and expressed hope that those experiences 
would be documented and shared for the benefit of future generations.  
While defining the methods of data generation for my research, I have 
initially considered the use of focus groups. Nevertheless, after carrying out a 
risk assessment, I realized that some sensitive information that might be 
disclosed or uncovered during focus groups could put the participants of those 
group interviews at risk of political or social ostracism. Therefore, I abandoned 
the idea of using group interviews and concentrated on individual interviews 
only, making sure that informed consent, anonymity and confidentiality 
procedures were strictly followed and respected.  
Taking into account that my research was approaching the communities in 
the oases of peace as a counter-discourse and practices of resistance to 
violence, I also expected the respondents’ potential bias in the form of the «the 
good bunny syndrome», when the respondents try to offer answers that they 
judge the researcher wants to hear (Robson, 2002). I mitigated that risk 
through the targeted selection of respondents, including those which were in 
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favour of violent solutions, and by approaching the respondents in a way that 
did not insinuate my own views on the issue. I also explained to my 
respondents that my aim was not to establish the “true” or “real” account of 
events, but to hear their own experiences and perspectives. 
 Throughout my research I remained aware that different versions of reality 
or truth can be told through the operation of “emplotment”, thought which the 
facts are always structured in such a way that they become a component in a 
particular story. With its innumerable facts, history is always subject to 
selective interpretation. In this context, the selection of some facts and 
omission of others is particularly important because their sequence results in 
different stories with different cause-effect logic. This became evident to me 
as I was observing the selection of war-related facts and events by different 
authors, where actions of specific groups were usually explained and 
sometimes also justified as a reaction to the previous action of another group 
(e.g. the Serbs attacked due to fear of mounting Croatian nationalism, or 
Yugoslav National Army was attacking due to the premature recognition of 
independence of Slovenia and Croatia, etc.). It is important to keep in mind 
that the focus of this study is not on the causalities of the violent conflict. I 
rather focus on the contributors to violent conflict – discourses that fuelled 
violence and promoted it as the (only) solution to the problem. Also, my study 
adds several actors and events that are usually omitted in conventional 
narratives on the wartime events, therefore it adds complexity to the wartime 
(hi)story. However, I am aware that the narratives emplotted in my study, 
particularly the ones related to the two oases of peace, are equally a result of 
my own selection and interpretation of events, and therefore are only one of 
the many possible versions of the past.  
As a researcher adopting a social constructionist approach, I tried to offer a 
new perspective and my own meta-narrative of specific aspects of war times 
in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. My meta-narrative is based on my own 
interpretation of different discourses and counter-discourses, with the specific 
novelty of introducing into the “plot” the voices of the people who are usually 
excluded from it, such as the people from the oases of peace. Locating my 
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work within the framework of Social Psychology and using the method of 
discourse analysis, my research was guided by the arguments of Potter and 
Wetherell (1987), eminent social psychologists who argue that the validity of a 
discourse analysis can be determined by focusing on coherence and 
fruitfulness or the explanatory potential of the analytical framework, including 
its ability to provide new explanations and to present new problems.  
  
3.2.4. Other methodological considerations  
The English translation of all the texts gathered in the local languages was 
done by myself. This includes several books originally written in English which 
were available to me only in Croatian. Throughout the study I have been 
introducing italic to highlight specific parts of text that I found particularly 
relevant. Therefore, the italic in the quotes is also my own, and not of the 
original authors. 
When referring to the armed violence in the former Yugoslavia, in the 
research I sometimes use singular (war) and sometimes plural (wars). While 
some scholars consider that it was one war (the war of dissolution of 
Yugoslavia), others discuss about several wars (war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
war in Croatia). The views on this issue mostly depend on the perceptions of 
the dynamics of armed violence in the former Yugoslavia, which are not 
relevant for this study.  
In the selection of terminology referring to the overall experience of the two 
researched communities, I was initially considering two possible terms: oases 
of coexistence or oases of peace. The term coexistence had the benefit of 
putting in the focus the resistance to ethnic divisions in the two researched 
communities, but did not encompass some other aspects of their experiences 
beyond inter-ethnic cooperation. The term oases of peace had the benefit of 
reflecting also some additional aspects of positive peace in the two 
communities, as absence of direct, structural and cultural violence emanating 
from within those communities, but seemed to be somewhat inaccurate as the 
peace of the two communities was disrupted from outside. This was 
particularly the case of Tuzla, as the city was exposed to extensive direct 
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violence from its surroundings, such as shelling, disrupted provision of food 
which caused hunger, etc. Interestingly, without me prompting this discussion, 
both in Gorski kotar and in Tuzla several respondents and other citizens 
mentioned that they disliked the term coexistence, because it made them feel 
as if they were living one next to the other, while they felt that they were living 
– together. Respecting and strongly valuing the views of my respondents on 
the experiences of their communities, I decided to opt for their preferred term 
and refer to their communities as oases of peace. Many of their narratives were 
grounded in the collective memories of the past, which will be thematically 
addressed in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 4: Grounded in the past: tracing the emergence of key 
discourses and practices influencing group identification processes, 
inter-group relations and governance on the territory of Croatia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 
 
«(H)ere one sees the Bosnian peasant of Orthodox faith drop his 
contribution into the cup of a blind Mussulman who squats, 
playing his goussle1, at the entrance of a mosque. Glancing at 
the peaceful little stalls where Christians, Mussulmans and Jews 
mingle in business, while each goes his own way to cathedral, 
mosque or synagogue, I wondered if tolerance is not one of the 
greatest of virtues». (Lester Hornby, quoted in Malcolm, 1994) 
 
Recalling the observation of Jorgensen and Phillips (2002), who noted that 
our knowledge shapes our worldviews within which some forms of action 
become natural and others unthinkable, this chapter aims at setting the context 
and helping understand the historical evolution of selected areas of knowledge 
as socially constructed meaning and motivator of action in the former 
Yugoslavia. The three key themes which emerged from the analysis of the 
available data as strongly influencing the attitudes and behaviours of the 
population prior to and during 1991-1995 conflict include: group identification 
processes, inter-group relations and governance.  
The analysis also indicated that there is a variety of past discourses and 
events, as well as related collective memories in those three areas, which 
could be used to support violence, but also to support peace, mainly depending 
on the aim of those selecting and awakening specific collective memories. This 
is why the same three key themes will be broadly orienting the structure of the 
subsequent chapters, indicating how some past discourses and practices 
identified here evolved into discourses promoting ethnic fracturing and war 
                                                          
1 Traditional instrument in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
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(Chapter 5), and how others evolved into promoting inter-ethnic cooperation 
and peace (Chapters 7 and 8).  
The purpose of this chapter is to trace the emergence of key discourses and 
practices which supported either violence or non-violence during the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia, helping to respond to the secondary research 
questions on the evolution of dominant discourses of violence and counter-
discourses which were challenging them. Using the existing literature, this 
chapter explores and refers to the most powerful types of discourses identified 
in Chapter 3, namely institutional texts, political discourse, media discourse 
and textbooks.  
 
4.1. Group identification among South Slavs: a complex and 
continuously evolving process 
4.1.1. Group identification dynamics prior to the 19th century 
The arrival of South Slavs to the western part of the Balkans, which would 
much later become Yugoslavia, took place in the sixth and seventh century. 
Slavs are «the most numerous ethnic and linguistic body of peoples in Europe» 
(Encyclopædia Britannica, 2014). They are commonly divided into three main 
groups: East Slavs (Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians); West Slavs 
(Poles, Czech, Slovaks); and South Slavs - the group which is in the focus of 
this study - including Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, Slovenes, Macedonians, 
Montenegrins, but also Bulgarians.  The main connector of the Slavs is the 
language. Belonging to the Indo-European group of languages, Slavic 
languages are divided into the same three groups specified above: northern, 
western and southern Slavic languages.  As will be discussed later in the text, 
the notion of the common language as an aspect of common identity would be 
at the very heart of the political movement in the late 19th century that set the 
grounds for the establishment of the common state of the South Slavs – 
Yugoslavia.  
When arriving to the territory of the Balkan Peninsula, the Slavs - including 
Croats and Serbs - were pagans. The autochthone population that the Slavs 
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encountered on the Balkans was called Illyrians, and they were the oldest 
known population living on the territory of the current Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina for which there is written and material vestige.  
Upon arrival on the territory of the Western Balkans, Croats and Serbs came 
across a significant political dividing line: the one that had been fracturing the 
Roman Empire into its Western and its Eastern side. The Croats settled on the 
western side of the line, which side also included the major part of Bosnia. The 
Serbs settled on the eastern side of that dividing line, and progressively spread 
also into the area of Herzegovina.  Since the arrival of the Slavs to the Western 
Balkans, many different dividing lines and borders would be traced on this 
territory. As claimed by Udovicki (2000, p. 14) «few of the fault lines were of 
local making. Most had formed through the designs of outside powers, whose 
intersecting Balkan interests fragmented the fabric of indigenous life in a 
pattern contradicting the vital needs of the Balkan peoples, and leaving among 
them a thick haunting deposit of tensions and mutual suspicions». However, 
as will be elaborated later in this chapter, there were also numerous attempts 
to build trust and promote unity and harmony among South Slavs, particularly 
as a way of protecting own group identity and interests against external 
influences. 
The Ottoman invasions that began in 14th century left an indelible mark on 
the history and society of the Slavs in the region. Luketic (2013) rightly 
observes that the modern discourse on the Ottoman empire – both in the 
territories subject of this study, particularly their Christian parts, but also in 
other European territories - is silent on many important historical facts about 
the Empire, such as religious tolerance that often prevailed in it, acceptance of 
diversity, cultural advances of the Ottoman era, diplomatic relations and 
similar. The overall perception of the Ottoman era is almost entirely negative, 
it is represented as the dark time of repression, killing, kidnapping and dying, 
which resulted in «an exclusively negative discourse on the “Turks” throughout 
Christian Balkans, and, in general, in the creation of the “imaginary Turk” as 
our greatest enemy» (Luketic, 2013, p. 146). This perception played a very 
important role during the 1991-1995 armed conflict, within the «renewed» 
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national identity of Serbs and partially also of Croats, which was promoted by 
the elites to instigate and justify violence against Bosnian Muslims.  
The Ottoman army conquered the Kingdom of Bosnia in 1463. The 
Islamization of the large proportion of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
remains one of the key features of the Ottoman rule in that area. A number of 
discourses related to this process were analysed by Malcolm (1994), who 
comes to several important conclusions. Firstly, he confirms that there was no 
massive or forcible change of religion in Bosnia, as the policy promoted by the 
Ottomans was not focused on changing people’s religion but on drawing out 
financial, human and other resources for the benefit of the rulers. Malcolm 
shows how the main reasons for passing from Christianity to Islam in Bosnia 
were of economic and social nature: in order to avoid specific taxes or have 
the opportunity to make a career in the apparatus of the Ottoman state, one 
had to be Muslim. This is an important insight which points at the 
instrumentalist rather than primordialist nature of group identity, including 
religious group belonging, which will be confirmed on numerous occasions 
throughout the history of this territory. 
Secondly, Malcolm shows evidence of the interconnection of different 
beliefs in Bosnia, which were often not based on the religious texts but on pre-
Christian traditions and mystic. There is vast evidence that religious syncretism 
was prevailing among the inhabitants of medieval Bosnia, with habits being 
often «borrowed» from one religious group to another, indicating that limits 
between different religious (or ethnic) groups were rather permeable, contrary 
to the generalized perception and primordialist claims. Moreover, it is important 
to recall that even though the religion was claimed by 1990s dominant 
nationalist voices as one of the indispensable and everlasting aspects of 
national identity of national groups in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, this 
claim is challenged by the analysis of past discourses and practices that will 
be presented in the next section.  
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4.1.2. Social identity discourses in the service of South Slavic unification: 
the cases of Illyrianism and Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 
Having experienced the rule of a number of foreign powers, in the 
nineteenth century the South Slavic elites considered their linguistic ties and 
their common origin as a factor prevailing over their differences. This can be 
linked to motivational theories of group identification, explaining that group 
formation and group identity meet fundamental needs for reducing uncertainty 
and achieving meaning and clarity in social contexts (Hogg and Mullin, 1999). 
The in-group identification is closely related to the perceived or realistic threat 
presented by the out-groups. In the Western Balkans context of mid-nineteenth 
century, this translated into a perception of threat for several small ethnic 
groups or nations to become dominated by culturally and linguistically bigger 
groups such as Austrians/Germans, Hungarians or Italians. This might explain 
the parallel evolution of two types of group identification processes – the 
national integration processes, which were undertaken by Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes concurrently with the process of political unification of South Slaves 
into one state.  It is important to note that the struggle for the national (ethnic) 
identity came hand in hand with the idea of creating Yugoslavia as a union of 
different Slavic nations (ethnic groups), and that several key political leaders 
were pursuing the common aspects of identity of South Slavs, rather than 
insisting on their differences.  
The South Slavs’ political unification process was neither simple nor without 
opponents. However, the prevailing stream was the one which saw the 
unification of South Slavs into a single state as means of overcoming the rule 
of foreign powers and secure the survival of small and disadvantaged nations 
in the international arena. The 1990s dominant discourses that were portraying 
the protection of national identity and Yugoslavia as two mutually excluding 
concepts, and which were often used by the political leaders to justify the 
violent Yugoslav dissolution, remained silent about the beginnings of 
Yugoslavia during which these two categories were complementing, and not 
excluding each other.  
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Illyrianism as a step towards modernism also took part in Serbia, where it 
involved a revolt against conservative clerical leadership. The secularization 
of Serbian national feeling was one of the contributions of a philologist Vuk 
Karadzic, who promoted the national feeling based on the language, not 
religion. This and other experiences clearly demonstrate that what is 
considered as an important trait of identity, or what becomes salient and what 
doesn’t, greatly depends on the leadership and its agenda. Furthermore, the 
group identity aspects which are made salient can be used to unify people (e.g. 
language) or do divide them (e.g. religion), to appeal for violence or to promote 
cooperation, and those aspects are clearly not fixed or pre-determined. 
 In the case of Croatia, Banac (2001) claims that the approach to Croatian 
national movement was a careful balance between political Croatian feeling 
and cultural Illyrian feeling (later on Yugoslav feeling), in which religion played 
almost no role. It is highly important to note that religion, which was promoted 
as one of the core aspects of national identities in the 1990s and even 
proclaimed as one of the main causes of violent conflicts during break-up of 
Yugoslavia, was considered as nearly irrelevant during previous national 
movements. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Malcolm (1994) observes that 
prior to the WWI many renowned inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina publically 
referred to themselves a “Croats of Muslim religion” or “Serbs of Muslim 
religion”, mainly reflecting their feeling of cultural identification. These 
examples confirm that collective identities can have a number of similar forms 
(ethnic, political, cultural, national, etc.), which are not clearly delimited and 
include or exclude a number of different aspects. These examples also 
illustrate the conceptual framework exposed in Chapter 3, which proposed that 
«the identifier of ethnic identity can be anything» (Slack and Doyon, 2001, p. 
139). 
When the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later renamed to 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia) was created in 1918, its Constitution described Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes as «three tribes of the same nation», adding even more 
complexity to the group identification terminology.  In his review of the history 
textbooks used in the time of the Kingdom, Petrungaro (2009) observes the 
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predominance of the auto-stereotype over the hetero-stereotypes. While in the 
post-Kingdom period the history textbooks would contain a number of 
predominantly negative hetero-stereotypes about «the others», mostly other 
ethnic groups from the region, the textbooks of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia 
were focusing on the auto-stereotype, which subject was the «Yugoslav 
person» - the one who was to embody the new Yugoslav national identity. 
«The characteristics of that person were loyalty to the governing dynasty, 
inclination to coexistence with other Yugoslav nations, fidelity to the new state» 
(Petrungaro, 2009, p. 42). This is an example of top-down interventions into 
the social identification processes that will become very common on the 
territory of Yugoslavia, as will be shown in this and next Chapter.  
Petrungaro (2009) further points at the strategy of the Kingdom’s authorities 
promoting intentional forgetting, whereby the citizens were requested to stop 
looking at the past and only look towards the future.  In the attempt to promote 
the «new», Yugoslav group identity, the King himself asked the population to 
erase from their minds anything that happened before his dictatorship. 
Attempts to deny or ignore the past for the sake of unity, rather than efforts to 
understand the past and deal with it, would also become a pattern that would 
be repeated throughout Yugoslav history, discouraging critical thinking and 
empoisoning relationships among different identity groups. The top-down 
interventions into the social identities, including the manipulation with the past, 
will continue throughout 20th century, as we shall see in the next sub-heading.  
 
4.1.3. Evolution, complexity and multiplicity of social identification prior to 
the break-up of Yugoslavia: ethnicity, nation(hood), citizenship and other 
categories 
A number of factors related to the Yugoslav context must be taken into 
account to unfold the complexity of social categorization in the country, which 
had major implications on the war-time discourses and behaviours. The first 
one of those factors that is analysed below is the terminology used in the three-
level system of national rights introduced after WWII. 
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Nations, national minorities and ethnic minorities 
In the nascent 1945 Yugoslavia the terms narod and narodnost were given 
specific meanings that would play an important role in the political discourse 
and significantly influence the group identification processes in Yugoslav and 
post-Yugoslav times. As described by Bringa (1993, p. 85) «(a) key concept 
within socialist nationality policies is represented by the terms "nation" (narod 
or nacija in Croatian / Serbian) and "nationality"2 (nacionalnost). Both terms 
are most commonly translated as "ethnic group" in Western literature». 
Hromadzic (2014, p. 264) warns against seeing collective identity in pre-war 
Bosnia-Herzegovina through the prism of the Western idioms of group identity, 
because «transplanting Western terminology to the Balkan context tends to 
flatten and assimilate different forms of local collective identity into the Western 
models of nation and ethnicity». As elaborated in Chapter 5, I concur with 
Hromadzic and argue that the perception of the Balkans, including its group 
identities, through the Western lenses and without taking into account the 
specificities of local group identification processes contributed to discourses 
and practices of violence during 1991-1995 conflict.  
As mentioned before, when the new Yugoslavia was born in 1945, after 
WWII, it was defined as a federation of republics with three-level system of 
national rights, assigned to nations, national minorities and «other nationalities 
and ethnic groups». Initially five groups were recognized as nations: Slovenes, 
Croats, Serbs, Macedonians and Montenegrins. Bosnia-Herzegovina was an 
exception – it was the only republic without a majority of a single nation, and 
this fact would play an important role during the break-up of Yugoslavia. In 
addition to Serbs and Croats, Bosnia-Herzegovina was also inhabited by 
Muslims. Being a group defined by religion, Muslims were initially considered 
                                                          
2 While it is challenging to adequately translate the concepts that were loaded with ideological and 
popular meaning specific for Yugoslavia, and although in some other contexts the most adequate 
translation for narodnost might be nationality, I would still argue that the more appropriate translation 
of narodnost in the Yugoslav context is national minority (or ethnic minority), because the main 
difference between narodi (nations) and narodnosti (national minorities) resulted from Yugoslavia 
being or not being their main homeland. If one of the Yugoslav republics was its main homeland, the 
group was recognized as a constitutive nation of Yugoslavia, while if the majority of the members of 
that group lived elsewhere, outside of Yugoslavia, that group got the status of narodnost - a national 
minority. 
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as a national minority. They got the status of a nation at an advanced stage of 
Yugoslavia, in 1971, which is another evidence of the changing character of 
group identity politics in Yugoslavia.  
Albanians and Hungarians were the two largest national minorities in 
Yugoslavia, among eight others who were all granted a number of language 
and cultural rights. Thirdly, there was the categorization of ethnic groups, but 
it was reserved only to those groups who lacked their own kin-based states, 
such as Roma. Therefore, the understanding of the term ethnic group in the 
Yugoslav context was different to the one granted to the same term by Western 
discourse.  
The complexity of group identities in Yugoslavia was further characterized 
by distinction between one’s national belonging and one’s citizenship. I was a 
citizen of Yugoslavia of Croatian nationality. While citizenship reflected the 
state of residence (Yugoslavia), the choice of nationality or belonging to an 
ethnic group was personal. As clarified by Bringa (1993, p. 85) «[…] in the 
multi-ethnic socialist state national identity is different from and in addition to 
citizenship. On an individual level it leaves room for manipulation and choice, 
since self-ascription and self-identification are the ultimate decisive factors. It 
is not necessarily a question of a person's state or place of residence. It is, in 
short, an identity a person can either inherit or adopt». 
 However, while it was leaving room for personal decision on national or 
ethnic group belonging, the state was the one defining which groups would get 
what status. This is why Bringa (1993) highlights that when considering the 
relationship between ethnicity and nationality, the literature often ignores the 
active role of the former socialist multi-ethnic states (such as Yugoslavia or 
USSR) in defining nationalities by conferring nationality status to some ethnic 
groups within their borders and contesting it to others. So «while in the West 
ethnic and national identities might be imagined and manipulated by 
individuals and communities, in socialist regimes it is the state that does the 
imagining» (Bringa, 1993, p. 85).  
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Changes in the administrative categories creating social identity uncertainty 
During Yugoslavia, the heterogeneous social space was promoted and 
celebrated using the notion of brotherhood and unity. The changing nature of 
administrative identity categories in the country should be taken into account 
as another Yugoslav specificity. The list of administrative categories kept 
evolving with every census, which was held approximately every ten years. 
This certainly had an impact on the self-perception of the population as well as 
on their self-designation for administrative purposes. While in Croatia those 
changes had less effect, in Bosnia-Herzegovina they were more complex and 
significant.  
The large number of changes that have occurred in the administrative 
categorization of the people living in Bosnia-Herzegovina is best illustrated by 
Bringa’s (1996) description of the case of a man by the name of Atif. Born in 
the 1920s, throughout his life Atif was registered in the following categories 
defining his national belonging: «undefined», Croat, Yugoslav, Serb and 
Muslim. If Bringa would to repeat her study nowadays, and if Atif was still alive, 
it is very likely that today he would be «categorized» in the «newest category» 
- as Bosniak.  
As observed by Jovic (2013), usually the nations decide on their leaders, 
but in this case the leaders were deciding on their nations. However, as rightly 
pointed out by the same author, the evolution of identity terminology is not 
some general, political category, but it deeply encroaches upon personal lives 
of individuals. Fundamental group identity issues were put in front of the 
citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina and influenced their lives. Although further 
research would be needed to gain deeper insight into the levels and 
consequences of this phenomenon, there is no doubt that continuous changes 
of identity terminology have been creating a sort of social identity uncertainty 
among the population.  
In such context, and taking into account the examples such as the one of 
Atif, it becomes evident that the widespread reductionist approach of 
considering Bosnia-Herzegovina as home of three ethnic groups with clearly 
defined and deeply internalized ethnic identities, was largely inaccurate. 
 68   
 
Nevertheless, it was the main basis for pursuing the political arrangements and 
crafting the future of the country during 1991-1995 conflict. 
As explained above, during Yugoslavia the census categorization kept 
changing, mostly affecting the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina of Islamic 
religion. Since 1971 they were given the possibility to declare as Muslims in 
the national sense3, in addition to Croats, Serbs, Yugoslavs and other nations 
and nationalities, and in the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution they were confirmed 
as a nation. Sarac-Rujanac (2012), Jovic (2013) and other authors relate this 
change in identity terminology and recognition of Muslims as a nation to 
various context-related issues. These include the role of Yugoslavia in the 
Non-aligned movement comprising numerous Islamic countries and the 
related attempt by Tito to portray himself as «a friend of muslims» by giving 
more visibility to Muslims in Yugoslavia. 
Analysing several identity-related studies and surveys carried out in Bosnia-
Herzegovina in the 1980s, Sarac-Rujanac (2012) informs that they clearly 
indicated that the inhabitants of that republic were against artificial 
identifications and changes in identity. This only confirms that the individual 
and collective identity feelings had little in common with the administrative 
changes made in terminology, as the changes were continuously imposed top-
down by the elites.  In that context, one of the surveys showed that less than 
two per cent of the surveyed population in 1980s supported the newly 
introduced idea to change the name of their group identity from Muslims to 
Bosniaks. Nevertheless, in 1993 in the midst of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Bosnian political, academic and religious elites decided to implement this 
change. Filandra (2012) considers that this decision was an attempt to 
increase the national character of the group until then called Muslims, to make 
them look less as a religious group and more like a nation. This is another 
example how group identities have been manipulated by the elites in 
                                                          
3 To mark a difference between religion and national belonging, when the term Muslim was 
introduced to designate national belonging, it was written in the local language with upper-case initial 
letter (Muslim), while religious belonging was written with the lower-case initial letter (muslim). It is 
not hard to imagine how much confusion this symbiosis, but also a possible differentiation of national 
and religious identity, was creating to large parts of the population. For example, one could be of 
Muslim nationality and an atheist at the same time. 
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discrepancy with and largely ignoring the identity feelings of the population, 
which was under continuous pressure to keep «adjusting» to the new identity 
terminology. The resistance to such pressure and other factors supported the 
development of some more «popular» self-categorization terms, such as 
Yugoslavs or Bosnians. 
 
Yugoslavs and Bosnians: two examples of supra-ethnic national identities  
The possibility to declare as Yugoslav as national identity category was 
included for the first time in the 1953 census. Its formal description stated that 
this category would be used by nationally undeclared persons. In relative 
numbers, by 1981 census the number of Yugoslavs was highest in Croatia and 
Vojvodina (8.2% of the total population) and in Bosnia-Herzegovina (7.9%), 
while it was lowest in Slovenia (1.4%) and Kosovo (0.1%). 
Discussing the interethnic relations in the former Yugoslavia, Sekulic (2001, 
p. 167) considers that «periods of interethnic peace start to melt the limits of 
the groups. In Yugoslavia that process is marked by the increasing number of 
individuals who declare themselves as Yugoslavs. The growing number of 
Yugoslavs in Croatia was blurring in the nationalist minds the clearly 
established lines between Croats and Serbs, establishing a transitional 
category which, instead of discontinuity, created continuity between national 
groups. When in the 1981 census the number of Yugoslavs increased 
significantly, and mostly in Croatia, this created a feeling of discomfort not only 
among open nationalists, but also among the “communist party” cadres».  
Opting for Yugoslav identity as a supra-ethnic type of group identity can be 
seen as an act of resistance to national(ist) options and adoption of the project 
of common destiny. Research by Sekulic et al. (2004) identified several 
characteristics prevailing in the group of persons identifying themselves as 
Yugoslavs: they were mostly urban population, often from mixed marriages 
and with higher level of political participation.  
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The other supra-ethnic type of identity is reflected in the term Bosnian 
(Bosanac)4. Bosnian was a very common term in Yugoslavia referring to all 
inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina, regardless of their ethnic or national 
belonging. It was «a republic-wise, territorial identity» (Hromadzic, 2014, p. 
266), which common use clearly demonstrates the interconnectedness and 
shared culture of different ethnic groups that were living in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The 2013 census in Bosnia-Herzegovina showed that this type 
of self-categorization is still very popular among the population of this country, 
as we shall see in Chapter 9.  
  
4.2. Inter-group relations among South Slavs: long-term coexistence 
interrupted by several episodes of politically driven violence 
In this section I examine several key moments influencing the relations 
among different social identity groups on the territory relevant for this study, 
focusing on discourses and practices of either cooperation or of violence 
among ethnic and national groups. The analysis indicates that, contrary to the 
claims about «ancient inter-ethnic antagonisms», during most of the time spent 
on the common territory different groups of South Slavs lived together in 
peace, forming a heterogeneous society. No armed conflict between them was 
recorded before WWII. Some of the political discourses and practices, such as 
the ones of Illyrianism in the nineteenth century and the one of Yugoslav 
Communists during and after WWII, proactively supported inter-group 
cooperation and insisted on the factors uniting different groups. However, 
other political discourses, such as the ones of pro-Nazi regimes of Ustashas 
or Chetniks during WWII or the ones of nationalist leaders in the late 1980s 
and 1990s, promoted resentments, fear and salience of exclusive national 
identities, which fomented violence.  
The analysis indicates that it was the variety of political discourses, rather 
than the existence of bottom-up movements, that was guiding the behaviours 
of the population towards violence or towards inter-ethnic peace. Narratives of 
                                                          
4 Not to be confused with the more recent term Bosniak, also written Bosniac (Bosnjak), introduced 
since 1993 to define the Muslims from Bosnia.  
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both types of behaviour existed in the collective memories, and could be 
awaken to instigate peace or to instigate violence. Fear of being dominated by 
others was one of the most salient common denominators of the studied social 
identity groups, but the strategies of addressing this fear varied significantly, 
as we shall see in the next section.   
 
4.2.1. Uniting to protect own national identities and interests 
The peoples who inhabited the territory that would become Yugoslavia had 
experienced a long history of foreign domination: from Greeks and Romans, 
to Ottoman, German, Italian, Austrian-Hungarian, French and other rulers. 
Living on the crossroads of many dividing lines and having experienced a 
number of external rules, in the early nineteen century their elites began to 
consider the idea of South Slavic unification as a strategy to protect their 
national identities and interests. This idea named Illyrianism appeared in the 
context of the collapse of two empires, the Ottoman and the Austro-Hungarian 
ones. As we have seen in the previous sections, national feeling and the 
protection of different groups’ identities (national or ethnic identities), which will 
later be claimed by many as the main reason for the break-up of Yugoslavia, 
were actually at the very heart of the idea of the creation of Yugoslavia. In other 
terms, the same reasons which were invoked for the creation of Yugoslavia 
were given for its violent dismantling.   
Although the Constitution of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 
described Serbs, Croats and Slovenes as “three tribes of the same nation”, 
neither the force of the state machinery and official discourse nor the strength 
of South Slav unitarian spirit succeeded in forging a genuine nation out of these 
three “tribes” (Prpa-Jovanovic, 2000). The Kingdom never became a nation 
state, and the political tensions appealing to group identity interests would be 
recurrent throughout Yugoslav history. However, these political tension were 
mostly present at the governance level and almost never translated into 
intolerance at the level of common people. On the contrary, high levels of 
interaction and cooperation among citizens of different religious identity were 
often observed, as described in the quote opening this Chapter. 
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The first tensions in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes would start 
soon after the adoption of a new constitution in 1921, which institutionalized 
the domination of the majority – in practice this meant Serbs - and installed a 
highly centralized state. The exceedingly centralized model provoked 
resistance from Croatian and Slovenian representatives5. The political 
tensions led to violence in 1928, when three deputies of the Croatian Peasant 
Party were shot in the Yugoslav parliament by a radical deputy from 
Montenegro. A popular Croatian leader Stjepan Radic was among the victims. 
His death certainly radicalized the Croatian national movement and 
aggravated the Serbian-Croatian political relations. On top of that, King 
Alexander took advantage of the situation and dismissed the National 
Assembly by a coup d’état. He suspended the constitution and set up a 
dictatorship, suppressing all forms of democratic activity in the name of 
Yugoslavism (Prpa-Jovanovic, 2000). He called himself a “unifying king” and 
also renamed the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes into the Kingdom 
of Yugoslavia. Under the excuse that there should be no intermediary between 
the king and the people, he introduced the authoritarian rule and divided the 
country into provinces named after major rivers. This was an attempt to remove 
the historical boundaries and promote the Yugoslav identity, but also to settle 
the ethnic tensions by denying their existence. However, this strategy will 
prove ineffective, as we shall see from the following section  
 
4.2.2. Extremist leadership in Croatia and Serbia committing group identity-
based atrocities during WWII 
Despite recurrent tensions, no armed conflict ever broke between Croats 
and Serbs until WWII. The same applies to Bosnians and other identity groups 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There was a history of political tensions – which, as 
previously explained, would mostly occur and remain at the level of political 
                                                          
5 As noted by Prpa-Jovanovic (2000, p.52), «Croatian Yugoslavism, the current that triumphed during 
World War I over Croatian ultranationalism, gradually lost its sense of optimism and enthusiasm in 
clash with real-life Yugoslavism. The Croatian public came to view the formula of three tribes in the 
constitution as a mask for Serbian expansionism and as the assimilation, if not the destruction, of the 
Croatian people». This view and this feeling would become a significant aspect of the Croatian 
national identity agenda, pursuing self-determination as a way out of subjugation. 
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leadership - as well as a history of cooperation and common goals and 
aspirations. However, several extremist movements that gained power during 
WWII and whose members committed widespread atrocities targeting specific 
ethnic groups would leave deep scars in the inter-ethnic relationships of the 
people living in Yugoslavia. These would serve so many times in the future as 
justification for new episodes of violence. The two main extremist movements 
were the Ustasha movement in Croatia and the Chetnik movement in Serbia, 
both of which also spread into Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
On April 10, 1941, the German regime proclaimed the Independent State of 
Croatia (ISC, in Croatian Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska or NDH) which also 
included all Bosnia-Herzegovina. ISC was a puppet state and one of the most 
cruel and barbarian satellite regimes of the Nazi Germany. It was run by 
Ustashas, extremist wing of the Croatian nationalist movement. The regime 
was based on the principles of racism and intolerance, and proposed the ethnic 
cleansing of the Croatian territory by removal of Serbs, Jews and Roma as one 
of its key goal. This was evident not only from the practices, but also from the 
formal discourse of Ustasha regime, including its mass media.  
Goldstein (2009, pp. 31-32) illustrates this with quotes of several Ustasha 
leaders published in the national media. Among other, they stated: «Serbs 
have spread among Croats all the bad habits that are inherent to the Serbs, 
such as immorality, gambling, alcoholism, fighting and stealing»; or «Serbs left 
us with a terrible, disgusting, unwanted heritage, which we have to eradicate 
immediately, because the Croatian nation is one of the bravest guardians of 
the western heritage». The discourse was equally radical towards Jewish 
people and the Roma.  
The radial discourse of ISC leadership was operationalized through orders 
and acts. The law on racial belonging and protection of Aryan race was 
proclaimed in April 1941. The official newspaper Croatian people (Hrvatski 
narod) published the definition of an Aryan and forbade marriage between 
Aryans and non-Aryans. Catholic and Muslim Croats were considered Aryans, 
while orthodox Serbs and other population was considered as non-Aryans. 
Ustasha regime also prohibited the use of Cyrillic alphabet, mostly used by 
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Serbs, as well as the use of the words which were not «in the spirit of the 
Croatian language». Serbs and Jews were told to move out of their houses, 
and were forcibly evacuated in case they disobeyed. 
History textbooks followed the political orientation of the new regime. The 
“new” national history was written, based on the «radical de-yugoslavisation of 
the Croatian national history» (Petrungaro, 2009, p. 72). The repertoire related 
to the cooperation and complicity among Yugoslav groups was replaced by 
the repertoire of violence, particularly between Croats and Serbs. The attempts 
to present the Ustasha regime as a logical continuation in the Croatian history, 
the inter-ethnic relationships as characterized by tensions and conflicts, as well 
as the continuous desire of Croats to have their own independent state, are 
clearly reflected in the 1944 history textbook. «It took full 839 years for the old 
Independent State of Croatia to get its full sovereignty. Generations and 
generations have dreamt about it and from time to time actively pursued it, but 
what nobody achieved in those 839 years was finally achieved by the 
Poglavnik, dr. Ante Pavelic [head of ISC], with the help of his mighty allies» 
(Srkulj, 1944, p. 262). Fifty years later, similar discourse would be used by 
Croatian president Franjo Tudjman, who often spoke about a thousand years 
old dream of Croatian nation coming true in the new Croatian state proclaimed 
in 1990.  
Both Ustashas and Chetniks were justifying their own violence by presenting 
it as a response to the violence committed by other groups, and a similar 
pattern would be used during 1990s armed conflict. The use of symbols and 
insignia of Ustashas and Chetniks by some of the wings of the parties in 
conflict during 1991-1995, and affirmative references to those regimes made 
by the key political leadership in that period, will greatly contribute to the 
massive perception of threat by large number of people, based on negative 
collective and individual memories of past atrocities.  
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4.2.3. Brotherhood, unity and national equality: positive inter-group relations 
promoted in Tito’s Yugoslavia  
While Ustashas and Chetniks were promoting ethnic intolerance and 
committing atrocities based on ethnic identity, they were opposed by a new 
movement that evolved during WWII. It was the antifascist movement led by 
the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, which called for an armed resistance to 
Nazi and Fascist occupation of the country. Its members opted for the guerrilla 
type of war and called themselves Partisans. They attracted a significant part 
of the local population which was terrified by the atrocities committed by 
Ustashas and Chetniks, as well as by Italians in Dalmatia and Istria. The 
Communists opposed the fratricidal war based on ethnic identity and promoted 
the notion of brotherhood and unity, as well as the concept of national equality. 
The movement soon gained popularity in all parts of Yugoslavia.  
The new notion of equality of the nations, as well as several other key 
elements of the discourse that would prove critical in the socialist Yugoslavia, 
such as their right to self-determination and separation of the nations, were 
introduced in the Declaration following the second session of Anti-Fascist 
Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AFCNLY), held in 1943 in 
Jajce, Bosnia-Herzegovina6. Most scholars agree that the promise of 
federalism was an attempt to overcome nationalisms, to establish national 
equilibrium and to overcome challenges faced in the past, particularly by 
guaranteeing to the non-Serbs that the centralized approach, which favoured 
Serbs in the past, would not be repeated. On the other hand, the right to self-
                                                          
6 Article 2 of the Declaration states: «One of the most important sources of power of our struggle for 
the liberation of nations lays in the fact that the unique movement for the liberation of nations of 
Yugoslavia, as well as its army of national liberation, evolved from the liberation movements of all 
our nations. To initiate their struggle against the occupying forces, the nations of Yugoslavia did not 
need of any agreements on equality, or anything similar. They took arms, started liberating their 
country and consequently not only acquired, but ensured for themselves the right to self-
determination, including the right to separation and unification with other nations. All the forces that 
participate in the movement for national liberation recognize these rights to all our nations. This is 
why the nations of Yugoslavia got closer together and established links in their joint struggle. During 
two and a half years of heroic struggle against the occupier and its allies, in the overall population of 
Yugoslavia the remnants of the great-Serbia hegemonic politics were destroyed, just like the attempts 
to disseminate hatred and discord. At the same time, the remains of the reactionary separatism were 
defeated. This created not only material and political, but also the moral conditions for the creation of 
the future brotherly, democratic and federal union of all our nations, the new Yugoslavia, based on 
the equality of rights of all its nations». 
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determination of the nations, which was maintained throughout the time of 
existence of Yugoslavia, would be claimed in 1990 in several republics, initially 
in Slovenia and Croatia, and would become the basis for the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia.  
 
4.2.4. Raise of nationalism after the death of Tito 
After Tito’s death, major tensions and an increasing nationalist tone were 
first exacerbated in the autonomous province of Kosovo. The fact that a large 
number of Serbs left Kosovo in the 1980s - for economic reasons or in search 
of personal safety, or often for a combination of the two - was astutely used by 
Slobodan Milosevic, the ascending Serbian politician, to portray himself not 
only as a protector of the oppressed Serbs, but also as «the only one capable 
to protect them». His address to the crowd gathered at Gazimestan, a historical 
place in Kosovo, in June 1987, will be remembered as one of the key interludes 
into the war in Yugoslavia. During the day-long event marking the 600th 
anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo (1389), during which medieval Serbian 
state was defeated at the hands of the Ottoman Empire, Milosevic pronounced 
the well-known sentence alluding to his violent plans:  
«Six centuries later, again we are in battles and quarrels. They are not 
armed battles, though such things should not be excluded yet» (Silber 
and Little, 1995, p. 77) 
As observed by Udovicki and Torov (2000), Milosevic appeared as the only 
politician who was sensitive to the plight of the Serbian public highly frustrated 
by the apparent indifference of the regime to the fate of Kosovo Serbs. With 
the help of media, particularly the highly popular daily Politika and the official 
television, as well as by one part of the Serbian Academia, Milosevic portrayed 
himself as the «saviour» of Serbs and their only hope. As will be seen in the 
rest of this Chapter and in the following one, promoting the tunnel vision and 
the role of the political leader as a saviour will become characteristic for the 
nationalist governance in the 1990s. 
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In addition to the political leaders, specific circles in the academia 
significantly contributed to the evolution of discourses of violence from the 
1980s. The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SASA) played a 
significant role in the launch of a virulent discourse that would invade the public 
discourse and exacerbate the climate of fear and hostilities in the 1990s. In 
1985 SASA created a committee which was tasked with preparing a 
Memorandum on «current social issues». The draft document was allegedly 
leaked to the media and immediately triggered a scandal due to the severity of 
its tone and content. As observed by Udovicki and Torov (2000, p. 89), «the 
Memorandum launched a new and virulent vocabulary, which in the next few 
years imbued the public discourse». It spoke of Serbia as a victim of 
«continuous anti-Serbian coalition» of forces including Slovenia and Croatia, 
but also all other republics of Yugoslavia. Describing Serbia as a victim of 
discrimination in Yugoslavia and Serbs as victims of disintegration, the text 
goes as far as naming the situation of Serbs in Kosovo as a genocide that 
requires «revolutionary struggle», «open confrontation» and «defeat of the 
aggression». 
 As observed by Milosavljevic (1995), the active role of the intellectual elite 
in the elaboration of this document was leaving the perception of objectivity, of 
a professional rather than political discourse, and in this sense its importance 
and weight was heavier than the one of clear political propaganda, even if the 
content was the same. Despite criticism from many actors, SASA never denied 
the contents of the Memorandum. Its discourse turned into a victimization 
storyline of Serbian leadership and a justification for violence against other 
national groups.  
The SASA Memorandum propelled Milosevic and his so called «anti-
bureaucratic revolution», the wave of popular unrest and «organized 
spontaneous protests» orchestrated by Milosevic. The pressure from Serbia 
got its response in Croatia, also in the form of nationalism.  Dissatisfaction of 
the broader population with the rapidly deteriorating economic situation and 
the menacing discourse coming from Serbian leadership served as a wind into 
the sails of the Croatian political groups promoting the idea of full Croatian 
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independence. A similar process took place in Slovenia, and the swift 
departure of the two delegations, the Croatian and the Slovenian one, from the 
Congress of Alliance of Communists of Yugoslavia taking place in Belgrade in 
January 1990, would mark the beginning of the formal break-down of 
Yugoslavia. Several characteristics of the systems that had been put in place 
to manage Yugoslav communities and inter-group relations highly contributed 
to the violent nature of this break-down, as we shall see in the next section. 
 
4.3. Managing communities for peace or managing them for violence: 
South Slavs and Governance 
The third theme that arose from my immersion in the literature and collected 
data is governance or systems that were being historically put in place to 
manage the communities in the focus of this study. My analysis revealed 
several characteristics of those systems which played an important role in the 
evolution of discourses and practices of violence, as well as in the 
development of their counter-discourses. Systems that were being put in place 
to manage the intergroup relations and relevant group identities were in the 
focus of my interest, and pointed at a historical diversity of state-driven policies 
and strategies addressing intergroup dynamics. Those strategies varied from 
promoting inter-group cooperation and equity to fostering ethnocentrism and 
hostility towards «the others». The evolution of these two approaches towards 
discourses of war or counter-discourses of nonviolence will be explored in 
Chapters 5-8. The analysis of the above strategies is complemented by the 
examination of several additional aspects of governance which influenced the 
attitudes and behaviours during 1990s, such as generalized acceptance of 
unlawful behaviour in some areas, lack of democratic experience, cult of the 
leader or scarcity of critical media on the territory inhabited by South Slavs, 
among others.  
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4.3.1. Beginnings of statehood among South Slavs 
The initial sense of national identity of several groups of South Slavs – 
including Bosnians, Serbs and Croats - was built around the period of medieval 
prosperity and statehood that preceded foreign rule. Those periods of 
independence and prosperity took place in different times for different groups, 
and were preserved in myths, legends and folk songs important for the 
development of national identity including national pride.  
Serbs created their state at the beginning of 9th century, but it soon fell under 
Bulgarian rule. The medieval Serbian state was at its peak in 14th century, 
during the rule of emperor Dusan. For Croats, the year 925 remains «at the 
heart of the Croat national consciousness to this day» (Udovicki, 2000, p.14). 
This was the year when Croatia was granted autonomy under King Tomislav.  
For Bosnians, the year 1180 marks the beginning of the Bosnian medieval 
independence and power, which was characterized by three important rulers: 
Kulin ban, ban Stjepan Kotromanic and king Stjepan Tvrtko. Under the second 
ruler, Bosnia expanded to the territory of Herzegovina, while under the third 
one, in 14th century, Bosnia reached the maximum of its territory, including 
parts of today’s Croatia. Despite many voices claiming the opposite, some 
prominent scholars insist that Bosnia has been a coherent entity for centuries 
(Donia and Fine, 1994), and that Bosnian territorial state developed a strong 
identity within its borders.  
An important characteristic of the territories that were named after the ethnic 
groups residing in this part of the world, such as Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and 
similar, is that throughout history these territories were frequently changing 
size and borders. This characteristic would be exploited by the nationalist 
Serbian and Croatian leaderships during 1990s, as they would challenging the 
borders established during Yugoslavia and claiming the right to the maximum 
of the territories that their states ever had. 
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4.3.2. Vojna Krajina – territory of agreed unlawfulness and in continuous state 
of war 
In Croatia, the Ottoman invasions triggered the establishment of the so 
called Military Frontier (Vojna Krajina), one of the most important dividing lines 
that would have a strong influence on the political and social developments in 
Croatia ever since. Since 1102 Croatia was part of the Hungarian Kingdom. 
Vojna Krajina was established in 1578 and designed as a human shield area 
protecting Europe from Ottoman incursions. It was a buffer zone spreading in 
the form of arc from north-east to south-east of Croatia. As the land of Vojna 
Krajina was mainly devastated by Ottoman incursions, the offer was made by 
the ruling elites to members of the group called Vlachs (later on called Serbs), 
who fled the Ottomans from other areas and who were showing so called high 
military potential, to inhabit that land and protect Europe in exchange for 
certain privileges, such as exemption from paying taxes, formal land property 
titles and enjoyment of local autonomy.  Evidence shows that the mentioned 
groups of Vlachs developed a rigid military mentality, which was fostered by 
the imperial authorities. From the moment of its establishment up to date, the 
area of Vojna Krajina remained one of the poorest areas of Croatia. 
Importantly, south-eastern part of the region of Gorski kotar, which is in the 
focus of the case study presented in Chapter 7, made part of the area of Vojna 
Krajina.  
Bearing in mind that the armed violence in 1991 Croatia began in the area 
of Vojna Krajina, where the majority of Croatian Serbs lived, several aspects 
related to the establishment of Vojna Krajina are particularly relevant for this 
study. Firstly, setting up of Vojna Krajina was the first time that the Croatian 
Parliament lost (or, more correctly, gave up) its jurisdiction over one part of 
Croatia, which was consequently divided into Civil Croatia, ruled by the local 
elites, and Military Croatia, ruled directly by Vienna. Secondly, as noted by 
Goldstein (2003, p. 128),  «Military Frontier was a safeguard for Croatia, but at 
the same time for that territory it meant a continuous state of war – a constant 
“low intensity conflict”, generalized insecurity and risk of travel, as well as 
undeveloped economy. Irregular payment of salaries of the defenders 
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encouraged robbery and created a state in which stealing on one or another 
side of the Frontier became generalized and morally acceptable way of living».  
While recognizing the inter-dependence of Croats and Serbs related to 
Military Frontier, Udovicki (2000) considers that this arrangement fomented 
distrust and tensions between the two groups. «The resentment that Serbs, 
who were seen as intruders, encountered among all strata of the Croatian 
population merely strengthened their internal cohesion and militancy, and their 
belief that “home” was in Serbia», claims Udovicki (2000, p. 20) and concludes 
that «had Vienna never formed the Krajina in an effort to keep Europe out of 
the Ottomans’ reach, the history of Croat-Serb relations may have turned our 
rather differently». 
 
4.3.3. State-induced violence against members of other ethnic groups: 
poisoning the inter-group relations during WWII 
During WWII the foreign rulers enjoyed support from local allies whose 
governance was particularly appalling because it included state-driven 
promotion of violent discourses and practices against members of other ethnic 
or national groups.   The Ustasha regime in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
was particularly outrageous for its concentration camps. Some 26 
concentration camps existed during the Independent State of Croatia (ISC), 
the most notorious being Jasenovac. The number of persons who died at 
Jasenovac is still a matter of dispute, just as many other aspects of this 
disgraceful episode of the Croatian history. The estimated number of deaths 
is ranging between 60.000 and 100.000 persons.  
Ustasha regime also ruled in Bosnia-Herzegovina, committing atrocities 
against Serbs in a number of places, while considering Muslims as fellow 
Aryans. Over time the widespread violence practiced by ISC leadership 
encountered indignation and modest attempts of resistance in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Several resolutions were written in 1941 in major towns of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, mainly by religious leaders, objecting to atrocities. In 
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addition to resolutions from Mostar and Bijeljina, one such resolution was sent 
from Tuzla, one of the oases of peace explored in Chapter 8 of this study7.  
The Head of ISC Ante Pavelic was placed above the law and the individual 
rights were «replaced» by collective rights, making ISC a notorious example 
of non-democratic rule. It is important to note that Pavelic was making efforts 
to present himself as a successor of Croatian national leaders such as Radic 
and Starcevic, and portraying ISC as a continuum of the aspirations of Croatian 
people for independent state. At the same time, ISC was all but independent, 
because it fully depended on Germany and Italy. The same claim of continuity 
would be heard at the beginning of the 1990s from Franjo Tudjman, the first 
president of post-Yugoslav Croatia. His attitude towards ISC remained very 
ambiguous, significantly contributing to the ethnicization of the conflict in 
former Yugoslavia, as will be elaborated in the next chapter. The use of 
symbols and rhetoric from ISC during 1990s would exacerbate fears of the 
Serb population in Croatia and encourage them to join the rebellion 
orchestrated by Slobodan Milosevic.  
In Serbia, a collaborationist regime was also set up, under the name of 
Chetniks. The Chetnik movement had been initially established during the 
period preceding the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Although re-established in 1941 
as a resistance movement, Chetniks turned into another collaborationist and 
racist group particularly hostile towards Croats and Muslims. The founder of 
Chetnik movement Draza Mihajlovic proclaimed that the political aim of 
Chetniks was the restauration of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the creation 
of great Yugoslavia consisting of great Serbia - spreading all the way to 
Slovenia, including all Bosnia-Herzegovina - and small Croatia consisting only 
of its current north-western part (Dizdar, 2009). Serbian nationalism was at the 
                                                          
7 Sent to the leadership of ISC in December 1941, Tuzla resolution protested against lack of order, due 
to which many Serbs were upset and willing to revenge. The resolution asked for political measures 
and punishment of those responsible for disorder. Interestingly, some 50 years later this same 
tendency towards order and justice, coupled with the capacity of the local authorities to ensure them 
despite chaos prevailing in their surroundings, would become one of the major contributors to the 
preservation of inter-ethnic coexistence and cooperation in that city during the 1990s war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.   
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very heart of Chetnik movement, and it denied all non-Serbs the right to their 
own group identity.  
The Chetniks’ programmatic document was written by Stevan Moljevic in 
1941, entitled «Homogeneous Serbia». Moljevic propagated the idea of Great 
Serbia as «unification of all territories inhabited by Serbs». In words of Chetnik 
leader Draza Mihajlovic, «wherever there are Serbian tombs, it is the Serbian 
land». The same idea would be later promoted by Slobodan Milosevic, under 
pretext that Serbs are not safe in the areas where they don’t rule. The atrocities 
committed by Chetniks were not fully documented thus the number of victims 
is not known up to date, but the list of known victims amounts to some 50.000 
Muslims and Croats killed in the period of 1941-1945. 
 
4.3.4. Post WWII Yugoslavia: the attempts to make nationalism irrelevant 
The governance systems that promoted hostility towards specific ethnic and 
national groups found opposition in the Communist Party members and the 
AFCNLY, which was constituted in 1942. During its second session held in 
1943, AFCNLY became the supreme executive and legislative body of 
Yugoslavia. It took several decisions that would mark the future of Yugoslavia:  
it decided to establish Yugoslavia as a federation of republics, based on the 
right to self-determination of southern Slavic nations: Serbs, Croats, 
Macedonians, Slovenes and Montenegrins; it proclaimed equity of the nations 
and national minorities as one of its key principles; its leader Josip Broz Tito 
was proclaimed Marshal and Prime Minister of Yugoslavia; King’s Petar II 
Karadjordjevic return to the country was banned and the government in exile 
revoked.  
A number of military successes and the recognition by the Allies made the 
Communists win the war on the territory of Yugoslavia.  However, starting from 
the 1944, there were massive revenge operations of Tito’s Communists 
against the so called «enemies of the people» – those who had collaborated 
with the occupying forces, as well as the «class enemies», including 
bourgeoisie, clergy and all others who might have been still willing to support 
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the old regime (Goldstein, 2013). Enemies and potential enemies were being 
persecuted without trial, forcibly evicted and killed. 
On November 29, 1945, the Federal National Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FNRY) was declared under leadership of Tito and the League of Yugoslav 
Communists (LYC). For 35 years Tito would remain the head of the Yugoslav 
state8. The massive support that Tito and Yugoslav leadership enjoyed from 
the people from all walks of life was certainly strongly influenced by the hope 
that violence would be overcome by tolerance and solidarity. Tepavac (2000, 
p. 65) claims that «Tito’s slogan “Brotherhood and Unity”, which today is 
frequently an object of scorn, was not empty demagoguery in a country where 
one million seven hundred thousand men, women and children had lost their 
lives, many because of ethnic hatred. The slogan reflected new hope in a 
population that had undergone a catharsis». Indeed, this was a new attempt 
to establish governance system that would help overcome the inter-group 
tensions and build trust and cooperation.  
Drawing on the lesson learned from the past, Tito and his Communist Party 
leadership adopted a new approach to national identities in Yugoslavia. While 
in between the two wars the Yugoslav unitary policies were attempting to 
“create” one Yugoslav national culture out of the three “constitutive tribes”, the 
Communist Party attempted to supersede the national culture by ideology. 
This means that rather than trying to discourage the political participation 
based on national identity, Tito and the communists attempted to establish a 
political system that would be above the national identity, to create a 
supranational culture. Hodson et al. (1994) consider that many in the Yugoslav 
regime were convinced that modernization and the increasing importance of 
institutions of more rational character would weaken the existence of national 
identities. In such scenario, there was hope that an efficient educational 
system, mobility of the population, increased communications and commerce 
                                                          
8 The period of Tito’s rule could be broadly divided into 3 intervals: i) the 1945-48 interval of strong 
Soviet influence; ii) the 1949-74 interval of centralized state with intense political and economic 
reforms, and iii) the 1974-80 interval of decentralization. 
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would undermine the national feelings and lead towards the ethnic origin 
becoming irrelevant.  
During the initial post-WWII years the Communist leadership focused on the 
creation of a unitary and centralized state under strong Soviet influence. The 
nationalization of private businesses and collectivization of agriculture were 
introduced as a way towards social justice and socialism as a new political 
order. Stalin’s attempts to control Yugoslavia were received with a lot of 
concern in the political leadership and rejected in 1948, when «a historic, 
courageous and resounding no had been delivered to Stalin, with the 
overwhelming support of the Yugoslav people» (Tepavac, 2000, 67). Although 
some authors question such development considering that it was actually 
Stalin who excluded Yugoslavia from the Comintern (Malcolm, 2011), most 
scholars agree that Yugoslavia was the first communist country that openly 
and successfully opposed Soviet control. This event was of crucial importance 
for the creation of a freer and richer society in the communist Yugoslavia 
(Goldstein, 2013) when compared to the countries behind the iron curtain.  
 
4.3.5. Yugoslavia: high standards of living, lack of freedom of speech and 
critical media 
Indeed, as a consequence of the independence from the Informbiro and the 
Soviet Union, the overall levels of human rights and freedoms in Yugoslavia 
were much higher than in the countries of the “Soviet Bloc”. However, there 
were also serious restrictions and breaches in a number of civil and political 
rights including major limitations in the freedom of speech. Any attempt of 
challenging the official authorities was supressed and sometimes severely 
punished. Most of the political prisoners were sent to an isolated island called 
Goli otok (literal translation: Naked Island), where they were subjected to 
forcible works while being “re-educated”. According to Goldstein and Goldstein 
(2015) some 15.000 people were imprisoned on Goli otok, and some 400 of 
them died there.   
The lack of freedom of expression severely affected the media in the 
country. Kurspahic (2003) explains that the Yugoslav press law prohibited a 
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very broad scope of activities and punished spreading «false information that 
threatened the national interest». He further elaborates that «such a general 
description of “threats” to and “enemies” of the state, combined with the 
unlimited power of the Party apparatchiks at all levels – local, regional, 
republican and federal – to interpret and implement the “law” in a way that 
would protect their privileges and authority, imposed on all Yugoslav media a 
climate of self-censorship and reliance on exclusively official sources» 
(Kurspahic, 2003, p.7). The media environment that was created in such 
conditions would have direct long-term consequences not only on the media 
workers, but also on the public consuming media contents. As will be 
elaborated in Chapter 5, lack of freedom of speech combined with the lack of 
tradition of critical and independent media will have very negative effects 
during 1990s violent conflict.  
The levels of economic and social rights in Yugoslavia were relatively high. 
As expressed by Tepavac (2000, p. 71) «Yugoslavia was the only country that 
was well off, indeed rather comfortable, under Communism, and above all in 
regard to its living standard. Many inside and outside the country thought 
Yugoslavia had succeeded in finding an original road to socialism». For many 
years Tito managed to navigate between the Soviet and the Western models, 
with a high level of pragmatism and ensuring economic growth largely 
supported by foreign aid, developing the cult of leader, as elaborated below.  
 
4.3.6. Yugoslavia: cult of leader, culture of fear and incapacity to deal with 
national issues 
The educational system and all other aspects of public life in Yugoslavia 
were strongly characterized by the cult of the leader – Tito. At least one city or 
town in each republic received his name, as well as one of the main streets or 
squares in each city. Tito’s birthday on May 25 was declared a national holiday 
celebrated as «the day of the youth», with a number of rituals culminating in a 
major event taking place in Belgrade. A number of songs praising Tito were 
composed, one tiof the most popular ones stating: «Comrade Tito, we swear 
that we shall not deviate from your path» and «Comrade Tito, white violet, you 
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are loved by the entire homeland». As will be seen from the subsequent 
chapters, the tradition of uncritically following the leader in a one-party system, 
including the lack of opposition or critical civil society, will be one of the key 
factors contributing to the unhindered spreading of dominant discourses of 
violence in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, promoted by new, nationalist 
leaders.   
Internally, Tito combined his discourse on peace with the continuous 
reminders to the Yugoslav citizens on the threats and enemies, both internal 
and external. «We should operate as if we were to live one hundred years in 
peace, but we should prepare as if tomorrow there would be war» was one of 
his popular statements repeated on numerous occasions. Another slogan that 
Tito and Communist Party leaders commonly used was: «The enemy never 
sleeps». Aware of the internal fragility of the innovative system established and 
adjusted on different occasions, and of the “disturbance” that Yugoslavia 
presented as a nonaligned country in the divided world, Tito and the 
communist leadership certainly had good reasons to be concerned. However, 
there is evidence that they were spreading the culture of fear among the 
population of Yugoslavia with the aim of consolidating their role as rescuers 
and the only true providers of safety.  
Confirming that assumption, Sekulic (2004, p. 27) observes that «recalling 
the horrors of the civil war, the fear of tumults was promoted and the perception 
was being created that the existing regime was the only guarantee of peace 
and stability». As presented in Chapter 3, numerous scholars including 
Galtung (1990, 1998) explored the relations between fear and group violence 
and concluded that, while fear is a natural and often beneficial reaction, its high 
levels decrease our rational capacities, which can benefit different political 
agendas. The strategy of fomenting fear of enemies of different types, which 
sets the ground for violence and often weakens any opposition to the regime, 
was used as a governance approach in Yugoslavia. It was also adopted by the 
leadership of several new states in post-Yugoslav times, fomenting inter-group 
suspicions and strongly contributing to the 1990s violence.  
 88   
 
The highly centralized approach and the initial hope of Tito and his 
leadership that the national voices would be gradually silenced in the socialist 
society and lead towards a generalized supra-national identification did not 
give desired results: more and more claims for decentralization and recognition 
of national categories were appearing from the 1960s. According to Banac 
(2001), Tito himself felt that the unitarism was undermining the national 
equality in the country and opted for a higher level of national freedoms for 
Croats, Albanians and Bosnian Muslims.  
The tendencies towards decentralization of Yugoslavia initiated in the 1960s 
were coupled by students’ movements taking place in the Eastern Europe, and 
particularly inspired by the 1968 Prague spring in Czechoslovakia, requesting 
political liberalization of that country. A movement encompassing a variety of 
ideological and social tendencies, named Croatian spring, would develop in 
Croatia and culminate in 1971. The movement had two streams: one with a 
tendency towards an antifascist and democratic identity of Croatia with more 
independence within Yugoslavia, and the other one based on national 
exclusivism, which in many aspects previewed to build on the tradition of the 
pro-Nazi Independent State of Croatia (Goldstein, 2013). Both streams were 
protesting against the unfair treatment and economic abuse of Croatia within 
Yugoslavia, requesting significant reforms in the political and economic 
system.  
Banac (2001) claims that Tito was unable to deal with the national issue and 
tried to solve it with a number of unsuccessful measures. Goldstein and 
Goldstein (2015) confirm that Tito was in general indecisive and partially 
confused in that matter. He first tried to understand and cooperate with the 
leadership of the movement, but slowly his discourse became more 
threatening to end up stating that «Croatia became a major problem in terms 
of wild nationalism», and «under the masque of the national interests all sorts 
of devils gather there, nationalism, contrasting opinions, even the 
counterrevolution» (Goldstein and Goldstein, 2015, p. 673).  
Tito’s attempts to keep the balance and cooperate with the new stream in 
Croatia failed and slowly his approach turned into a real purge of the Croatian 
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Communist leadership. In early 1972 the entire Croatian leadership was forced 
to resign, several thousand of persons were arrested and many intellectuals 
were imprisoned after fake judicial processes. Those promoting critical thinking 
in the media were accused of «falling under international influence», a serious 
accusation in communist terminology (Kurspahic, 2003).  Tepavac (2000), who 
was serving as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia at that time, 
remembers that, after taking a decision to crush the unrest in Croatia and the 
related demands for reform, Tito said the prophetic words: «If you saw what I 
see for the future in Yugoslavia, it would scare you». Requests for democratic 
reforms were similarly repressed one year later in Serbia. Several authors 
claim that Tito was simply unable to allow for the democratization of the 
country. Instead, he was accumulating power and what was once Titoist 
Yugoslavia became nothing more than Tito’s Yugoslavia, with him as the only 
functioning institution. He was not any more the head of the state, but the state 
itself (Tepavac, 2000). For Banac (2001), the violent ending of Croatian spring 
meant for Croats a national humiliation which, in retrospective, also marked 
the end of Croatian Yugoslavism.  
 Yugoslav leadership made several efforts to overcome the challenges of 
the centralized state, which made the political and economic functioning of the 
state increasingly difficult. In an attempt of decentralization, the 1974 
Constitution – the fourth and last constitution of Yugoslavia - gave increased 
powers to individual republics, confirming the 1971 Amendments that were 
giving sovereign rights to the federal units, i.e. republics. Republics and 
provinces were given veto power in the federal assembly and the right to 
manage their own economies. The attempt was made to keep the national 
issues within the Communist party, avoiding the rise of nationalism through 
traditional nationalist groups. With the 1974 Constitution the republics acquired 
many aspects of the states (Goldstein, 2013). This would become the basis for 
the claim of independence of Slovenia and Croatia in 1990. 
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4.3.7. Decomposition of the state system after Tito’s death: sliding into 
nationalism  
Rarely any citizen of the former Yugoslavia will forget the TV breaking news 
announcement on the 4 of May 1980, when the highly distressed speaker 
pronounced the sentence: «Dear comrades, comrade Tito passed away». The 
derby football match between Hajduk from Split and Crvena Zvezda from 
Belgrade, two of the most successful football teams of Yugoslavia, was 
interrupted as the players and referees broke into tears, and the tens of 
thousands of supporters spontaneously started singing a popular song 
«Comrade Tito, we swear to you that we shall not deviate from your path». 
However, the deviations from «Tito’s path» started very soon after his death 
and the 1980s in Yugoslavia were characterized by the political and economic 
crisis, break-down of the socialist ideology, loss of authority of the Communist 
party and the general decomposition of the state system. The so called rotating 
collective leadership of the state, whereby one representative from each 
republic and autonomous province were rotating as heads of the state each 
year, was established to fill the leadership vacuum left after Tito’s death. 
Nevertheless, this structure proved incapable of reaching consensus on any 
important issue. The political impasse was worsened by the economic crisis 
with increasing foreign debt and shortage of imported products, such as 
gasoline and coffee. The austerity measures contributed to the increasingly 
heated debates over the economic relations of the republics and autonomous 
provinces. It became clear that the long-term strategies of support to the poorer 
republics, such were Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and 
Kosovo, which were to ensure equal opportunities for development, did not 
yield desired results. In such circumstances, the tensions among political elites 
were mounting, and the decomposition of the state seemed unavoidable. 
Several authors, such as Malcolm (1994) and Goldstein (2013), emphasise 
that a federal or a multinational state can only function if based on truly 
democratic institutions, which was not the case of Tito’s Yugoslavia. Goldstein 
adds that, while there were many good intentions and the feeling that what was 
being done was «fair», one major aspect that was lacking in Yugoslavia was 
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the open debate and a democratic freedom to express opinions on the most 
pressing issues. This was not allowed in Tito’s system, which proved fatal 
particularly with reference to national grievances. The lack of space for 
addressing them helped nurture extreme nationalism. Tito’s lack of 
understanding of democratic debate is well illustrated in his statement: «They 
say that there is no criticism in our country, while I am myself the greatest critic 
of anything bad» (Tepavac, 2000, p. 75).  
Sekulic (2004) draws attention to the process of decentralisation of 
Yugoslavia which allowed to the Communist League of each Republic to get 
monopoly over their territory. This process, resulting from the 1974 
Constitution, created a fragmented political structure with centrifugal tendency 
that was kept under control during Tito’s life. The same author further indicates 
that the dissolution of Yugoslavia was triggered by the changes in the broader 
political environment and loss of internal legitimacy. He points out that the 
legitimacy and domination of a ruling class in a specific state is not necessarily 
based on ideology, but often on the perceived threat from some other group, 
that the governing class uses to present itself the “guarantee of order”.  
In Yugoslavia, the perception of the threat from the East, i.e. from URSS, 
was one of the main basis of legitimacy of the Yugoslav ruling class. This threat 
disappeared with the new geopolitical context and European integration 
process. Sekulic (2004) therefore considers that with disappearance of the 
bipolar world the forces that kept Yugoslavia together also disappeared. This 
was coupled with nationalism which was used strategically by the communist 
ruling elites in different republics in order to maintain power by presenting 
themselves as a «guarantee or order». In an interview given as early as in 
1981, a renowned dissident and theorist Milan Djilas predicted the break-up of 
Yugoslavia and warned that what its peoples were faced with was not a 
classical nationalism but a more dangerous, bureaucratic nationalism built on 
economic self-interest.  
During 1980s Yugoslavia was facing a severe degradation of the economic 
situation. An attempt to deal with that problem was made by Ante Markovic, 
economist and Yugoslav prime minister who took office in early 1989. He 
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embarked on the reform of the Yugoslav economic system and gained large 
scale popularity by bringing inflation from 2800 per cent down to 4 per cent 
(Udovicki and Torov, 2000). However, his economic programme was openly 
sabotaged by the leadership of Slovenia, Serbia and Croatia, which had 
already embarked on the process of disintegration of Yugoslavia.  
 
4.3.8. Multiparty elections in a non-democratic environment: prelude to war 
First multiparty elections since WWII took place in the formerly Yugoslav 
republics in 1990. Many authors consider that those elections indirectly 
supported the spread of violence, due to the victory of nationalist parties or 
coalitions in most republics. I believe that this assertion should be considered 
in the context of lack of democratic tradition, limitations on freedom of speech 
and lack of critical media, among others.  
In Croatia, Parliamentary elections were held in March and April 1990, in a 
highly tense atmosphere. The politically strategic use of fear, analysed in 
Chapter 2, was made and the fear instigated from two sides. The Serbian elites 
were spreading fears among Serbs living in Croatia by promoting the idea that 
their lives and wellbeing would be threatened if the country got full 
independence. At the same time, the Croatian elites were contributing to those 
fears by using nationalist and discriminatory discourse, including insignia from 
ISC and division of Croats and non-Croats into different «levels» of citizens. 
During election CDU won some 40 per cent of the votes, which in the existing 
electoral system secured to this party almost two thirds of the seats in the 
Parliament. That summer, Croatian tourist season was interrupted by a 
growing number of roadblocks installed by paramilitary forces of ethnic Serbs 
on the key roads connecting the coast of Croatia with the inland. The spiral of 
distrust, discontent and violence would escalate during the referendum on the 
independence of Croatia, held in May 1991. Serb leaders called for the boycott 
of the referendum. To the question: «Are you in favour that the Republic of 
Croatia, as a sovereign and independent state which guarantees cultural 
autonomy and all civil rights to the Serbs and members of other national 
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minorities in Croatia, can enter into association with other states?», over 93 
per cent of the voters answered positively.  
The Parliamentary elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina were held in November 
1990, six months after the Croatian ones, with three nationalist parties – those 
formed by Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats - winning the majority in most places. 
While the war was ravaging in Croatia in 1991, most citizens of Bosnia-
Herzegovina were still hoping that they would not be reached by the same 
calamity. However, at the same time when its independence was declared in 
April 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina would also slide into armed violence that 
would take over 100.000 lives of its citizens, tearing its multicultural society 
into pieces. The occurrence of the widespread violence was neither inevitable 
nor prompted from the grassroots levels. It was, as will be elaborated in the 
next chapter, instigated and driven through dominant discourses of the elites 
in the outburst of what Djilas rightly named a bureaucratic nationalism built on 
economic self-interest.  
 
4.4. Tracing the emergence of key discourses in the three selected 
themes: conclusions 
In this chapter I attempted to trace the emergence of the discourses and 
practices relevant for understanding the evolution of dominant discourses of 
1991-1995 violence and some of their counter-discourses. The chapter was 
structured around three themes that were confirmed in the process of 
gathering and analysis of relevant data, namely group identification processes, 
inter-group relations and governance. 
The findings of the chapter point at very high levels of complexity and 
malleability of group identities on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The 
tracing and analysis of group identification processes presented above clearly 
contradict primordialist views on ethnic and national groups as «fixed», 
«bounded entities» or «natural order of things». They confirm the accuracy of 
constructivist and instrumentalist views on group identities, showing that those 
identities are flexible, open to frequent modifications of name, content and 
salience of specific traits, as well as suitable for adaptation to specific political 
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agendas. This can be clearly perceived from numerous changes in the group 
identities analysed in this chapter, including appearance and disappearance 
of specific identity groups, continuous changes in the group identity definitions 
used during census, sudden major shifts in self-perception of own group 
identity traits, sudden top-down changes in the names of specific groups, etc. 
 Therefore, one of the main conclusions of this chapter discusses the ethnic 
identity paradox in the case of dealing with the 1991-1995 conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia: while the main strategies of dealing with this conflict were based 
on the assumption that ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia were 
homogenous and defined by fixed traits, evidence shows that group identities 
were not static and that groups were largely heterogeneous. In the subsequent 
chapters I will elaborate on how the discourses on Yugoslav ethnic groups or 
nations as bounded entities became part of the dominant discourse supporting 
violence, while in the oases of peace multiple group identification processes 
were maintained and promoted to support cooperation and peace.  
The historical analysis of key inter-group relations shows that South Slavs 
have been living together for many centuries, establishing different types of 
alliances, which were interrupted by several episodes of top-down instigated 
violence. Therefore, the repertoire of collective memories on inter-group 
relations contains both narratives of inter-group complicity and cooperation, 
such as at the times of Illyrian movement or Yugoslavia, as well as memoirs of 
group identity-based atrocities, the most outrageous ones having been 
committed during WWII under the pro-Nazi regimes of Ustashas and Chetniks. 
The analysis further shows the diverse range of strategies of governance 
applied on this territory. In terms of state-driven policies addressing inter-group 
dynamics, the outcomes of the analysis indicate that managing the inter-group 
relations was often very challenging, but also that governance discourses and 
practices were crucial in orienting the members of different groups towards 
inter-group cooperation or inter-group hostility. Several additional aspects 
broadly or more closely related to governance – such as low levels of 
democracy, tradition of cult of leader combined with recurrent spreading of fear 
of “enemy”, severe restrictions on freedom of speech, lack of independent 
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media – were identified as contributors to future behaviours of the population 
during 1991-1995 conflict.  
In the next chapter I will follow the evolution of several of the identified 
discourses into dominant discourses of violence, in combination with additional 
discourses of war identified during data collection, generation and analysis.  
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Chapter 5: On the road to violence: identification and analysis of 
dominant discourses which supported violence in Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina in 1991-1995 
 
«Literal and figurative death of complex histories and hybrid 
identities has been reluctantly pronounced in Bosnia […] With 
ethnic partition in place, nationalist parties victorious, populations 
increasingly homogenized, and ethnic cleansing still in operation, 
there seems little alternative to unhappy resignation about the 
lost possibilities». (Campbell, 1998, pp. 209-210) 
 
Any attempt to uncover the genesis of a war as a social phenomenon must 
incorporate discursive and institutional continuities which render violent conflict 
a legitimate and widely accepted mode of human conflict (Jabri, 1996, p. 1).  
The aim of this chapter is to uncover some of the discursive continuities 
through which the war(s) in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Croatia became widely 
accepted and legitimized option(s). In this attempt I am focusing on those 
discourses that had the power to influence the ways in which the problem and 
its potential solutions were shaped, i.e. the discourses that significantly 
influenced the knowledge, feelings, actions and interactions of people in those 
two republics of the former Yugoslavia.  
 As elaborated in Chapter 3, the most influential discourses comprise 
institutional texts, political discourses, media discourses and textbooks. In the 
case of media and political discourses, in this Chapter I am making further 
distinction between international and local versions of those discourses – 
distinguishing the views from abroad and the views from within the war-
affected territories – as I consider that they played different although 
complementary roles and had different levels of influence on the wartime 
events and developments. 
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The analysis of the dominant discourses of violence is broadly oriented by 
the three key themes adopted in Chapter 4, i.e. group identification processes, 
intergroup relations and governance, which are closely interlinked. The origins 
of some of the dominant discourses of violence could be traced in the past 
discourses presented in Chapter 4, while others were of the more recent 
making. A schematic outline of dominant discourses of violence and their 
counter-discourses is presented in Appendix 3. 
In the following section I will explore some of the discourses about the 
territory and society in the focus of my study that got generalized and dominant 
in the international arena. I argue that those dominant discourses strongly 
contributed to the widespread violence at direct, structural and cultural level, 
as they shaped the perception of the international community on the causes 
and proposed solutions for the 1991-1995 conflict. 
 
5.1. The Balkans: «take a walk on the wild side»? 
Balkan, or the Balkans, is primarily a geographical term. From the 19th 
century it refers to the peninsula limited by the Adriatic sea on the west, Black 
sea on the east, Aegean sea on the south, while its northern limits are defined 
either by the rivers of Soca, Sava and Danube, or by the Alps. However, as 
pointed out by Luketic (2013, p. 19), «over the past two centuries Balkans 
turned from the geographical term into a strong metaphor; the term reached 
such a semantic weight that it can’t be used any more in a value-neutral 
sense». The author refers to the widespread perception of the Balkans as a 
place of endless, deeply rooted hatreds and conflicts, while people who live on 
the Balkans are seen as irrational, cruel and barbarian. The fantasies on the 
wild Balkans «can go so far to consider the violence as some sort of Balkan 
genetic substance, a permanent deviation of the people from this territory, to 
which sometimes paranormal, monstrous and vampire levels are ascribed. 
The origin of those fantasies is in the understanding that specific territories 
merit specific people, specific type of behaviour and even specific destiny» 
(Luketic, 2013, p. 21).  
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The widely spread international perception of the Balkans as a territory of 
irrational and barbaric people played a crucial role in the context of the 1991-
1995 violent conflict. Firstly, due to such perception, the 1991-1995 violent 
conflict was largely perceived in the international arena as inevitable. It was 
seen as yet another one of the numerous wars among the small but 
homogeneous barbaric tribes in an area that was infested for centuries with 
violence. Silber and Little (1995) observed this phenomenon already at the 
earliest stages of the war, noting the international mediators behaved as if the 
war had no structural causes whatsoever, as if the cause of the conflict was 
some vague but often cited Balkan temperament, or some southern Slavic 
cultural or genetic tendency towards a fratricidal war.  
Referring to the influential figures in the international arena, Gagnon (2004, 
p.1) notes that «they have resorted to the language of the premodern: 
tribalism, ethnic hatreds, cultural inadequacy, irrationality; in short: the Balkans 
as the antithesis of the modern West». This argument is supported by 
Campbell (1998, p. 90), who finds that «generalizations, encompassing 
characteristic that are all equally applicable to other circumstances, serve to 
mark the Balkans as backward, foreign, barbaric, uncivilized, fundamentally 
different – any of the significations that can be applied to “our” orientalised 
others».  
The stereotypes on the Balkans, its group identification processes and inter-
group relations, largely influenced the views of the international community on 
the violent conflict in the former Yugoslavia, as well as its attempts to manage 
the conflict under auspices of the United Nations and European Community. 
Understood as the war caused by animosities of three homogeneous ethnic 
groups, the conflict was often treated as fundamentally unresolvable, and the 
solutions, when sought, were considering ethnic leaders as the only 
counterparts in that effort.  
The generalized perception of inevitability of violence on the Balkans 
significantly influenced the actions (or the lack of action) of the international 
community during the war, but also the self-perception and the actions of the 
populations inhabiting this geographic area. The widely adopted fatalistic 
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approach of the local population towards the mounting violence can be at least 
partially explained by the generalized negative image of the area. The external 
consideration of the population as irrational and barbaric became part of its 
self-image.  
The widespread international view that in the Balkans violence was common 
and inevitable also strongly supported the legitimation of violence and helped 
the political leadership in the former Yugoslavia in the process of mobilization 
for violence. In that regard, the political discourse of warlords in the former 
Yugoslav republics and the international diplomatic and media discourse were 
mutually reinforcing, all pointing out that violence was the only option. In such 
context, the voices calling for non-violent solutions to the conflict remained 
isolated and lacked political and social support that would help them overturn 
the dominant discourse of (inevitable) violence, as will be seen in Chapters 6-
8.   
Furthermore, the generalized perception of the Balkans and its inhabitants 
played a significant role in the construction of national identities on the territory 
of the former Yugoslavia. For the Croatian society, the term Balkans was 
directly associated with the enemy. While the dominant discourse and the 
political elites refused the idea of Croatia ever being part of the Balkans, 
«getting away» from the Balkans was one of the basis in the creation of the 
«new Croatian identity». This meant being different from the neighbours and 
getting into the «right club» - the Europe. Anecdotally, even the renowned 
cinema Balkan placed in the center of Zagreb was renamed to - Cinema 
Europa.  
The situation was even more complex in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where there 
were several official discourses, and the attitude towards the Balkans varied. 
In Serbia prior to the war the term Balkans had negative connotations related 
to the religion, the notion was linked to the Muslim influence of the «Turks» 
and as such despised as cruel and primitive. Interestingly, as noted by Luketic 
(2013), in a reaction to the sanctions and criticism of Milosevic’s politics by the 
western European states, the narrative of Europe as mean and unjust was 
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reaffirmed, while the narrative on the Balkans as carrier of authentic spiritual 
and cultural values was built in Serbia.  
The stereotypical views of the Balkans also involved the widely spread 
problematic idea that its territory was inhabited by small but homogeneous 
groups who have been in violent conflicts for centuries and had static group 
identities, reflecting primordialist views on group identities. In line with this 
stereotype, the adjective «ethnic» was immediately attributed to the conflict in 
the former Yugoslavia by the international community, without too much 
thought on other potential causes of the conflict. This is also why the choices 
of solutions to the conflict were limited to the formation of ethnically coherent 
states. It is worth to note that the conflict was almost never referred to as 
«ethnic» by the population of the area where it was taking place, where it was 
rather named aggression, defensive war, homeland war, etc. 
The simplistic and stereotypical views of the Balkans, which were 
perpetuated by the media and political discourses and adopted by the 
academia and the general public, facilitated the reductionist perception of the 
conflict as an ethnic one and distracted the attention from the more complex 
analysis that might have led to different kind of (re)actions from the 
international arena. The nationalist leaders in the former Yugoslav countries 
welcomed, embraced and reinforced the discourse on homogeneous national 
groups in need of their own nationally coherent states, as will be elaborated 
under the next heading. This approach greatly helped them achieve their 
personal goals. 
 
5.2. Ethnicizing identities to ethnicize the violent conflict and its 
proposed «solutions» 
5.2.1. Pinned to the wall of ethnic identity: imposing ethnic and national 
identification as «the only choice» 
One of the main characteristics of the late 1980s and early 1990s in the 
former Yugoslavia was the sudden salience of ethnic and national 
identification, which overshadowed all other types of group identities. In this 
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context, a renowned journalist and writer Slavenka Drakulic (1993, p. 51) 
observed: 
«Along with millions of other Croats, I was pinned to the wall of 
nationhood—not only by outside pressure from Serbia and the Federal 
Army but by national homogenization within Croatia itself. That is what 
the war is doing to us, reducing us to one dimension: the Nation. The 
trouble with this nationhood, however, is that whereas before I was 
defined by my education, my job, my ideas, my character—and, yes, my 
nationality too—now I feel stripped of all that. I am nobody because I am 
not a person any more. I am one of 4.5 million Croats». 
The national belonging, which was an optional identity trait in the past - the 
one that a person could adopt and change deliberately, as we have seen in 
Chapter 4 – became the exclusive way of defining and grouping people. In 
words of Drakulic (1993, pp. 51-52):  
«What has happened is that something people cherished as part of their 
cultural identity –an alternative to all-embracing communisms, a means 
to survive - has become their political identity and turned into something 
like an ill-fitting shirt. You may feel the sleeves are too short, the collar 
too tight. You might not like the colour, and the cloth might itch. But there 
is no escape; there is nothing else to wear». 
Parallel to the enforcement of ethnic or national identity, discourses on 
ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia, entailing the idea that ethnicity was 
the cause of conflict and violence, were adopted and promoted by many 
actors. They were largely embedded in the stereotypes comprising the idea 
that «ancient ethnic hatreds» existed among irrational ethnic groups living on 
the Balkans, as we have seen under the previous heading. However, it should 
be highlighted that there is no evidence of any “long-term supressed” hatred 
among ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia. On the contrary, analysing the 
data collected in 1985, 1989 and 1996 in Croatia, Sekulic et al. (2002) 
demonstrate that ethnic intolerance did not increase before the war. The levels 
of intolerance significantly increased only after the war, indicating that 
intolerance was a consequence, rather than a cause of conflict.  
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In the analysis of variables that influenced the inter-group relationships, 
Sekulic et al. (2002) found a close link between increasing levels of intolerance 
and the homogenization of the population, including the sharp decrease in the 
mixed marriages. Describing the effects of the dominant discourses on the 
social norms in Croatia, the authors conclude that the overall framework in the 
perception of the «others» of Croats changed under the influence of those 
discourses. With the salience of nationalism, intolerance became not only 
acceptable but the «obligatory» type of social behaviour. Applying the 
framework of Abdelal et al. (2009), we can say that it became a new norm 
within the «renewed» content of social identities of national groups 
As the war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina was being portrayed as 
ethnic, the ethnic identity was becoming increasingly salient. This was 
necessary to mobilize the population for war, as the degree of identification 
with a specific group and incorporation of the group identity into one’s personal 
identity play an important role in person’s willingness to engage in the conflict. 
Hence, by defining the political violence in the former Yugoslavia as «ethnic», 
space was made for the «ethnicization» of the conflict. Searching for protection 
and safety, the populations in both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina re-
prioritized different aspects of their own social identities, giving salience to the 
ethnic belonging at the expense of other group identities which got ignored as 
secondary or irrelevant at that moment. The discourse on ethnic violence 
helped create new realities and supported new divides along ethnic lines.  
Being Croat, Serb or Muslim/Bosniak suddenly became extremely 
important. Furthermore, in their relational comparisons ethnic groups became 
increasingly closed and exclusive, which presented severe challenges to the 
pre-existing inter-ethnic relations. Oberschall (2000, p. 993) explains that 
«according to several informants, when politics became contentious, it strained 
friendships across nationality. Either one avoided discussing public affairs and 
politics with a friend in order to remain friends, or one stopped being friends, 
and turned for discussion of such matters to a fellow ethnic with whom 
agreement was likely. In either case, exchange of political views across ethnic 
boundaries is impoverished. Each group becomes encapsulated; dialogue and 
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understanding cease». This encapsulation was one of the new traits of ethnic 
identities, which are explored in the next section.  
 
5.2.2. New traits of the «renewed» ethnic identities 
The repositioning of the ethnic identity and its salience prompted new 
developments in what Abdelal et al. (2009) identify as four types of content of 
social identity, i.e. constitutive norms, relational comparisons, social purposes 
and worldviews of in-groups. With regards to constitutive norms as rules 
defining what is appropriate and what is not, a major change occurred in the 
levels of acceptance of violence committed by members of own group towards 
the members of the out-groups, particularly those belonging to the «enemy» 
ethnic group. Massive expulsions of civilians from the territory «pertaining» to 
a specific ethnic majority, evictions from homes or from workplace purely 
based on ethnic belonging, as well as other violations of human rights, were 
taking place with the vocal or silent acceptance of the masses, which were 
often not making any difference between the civilians and the combatants of 
the «enemy group». Almost overnight violence against the “others” turned into 
a normality, as long as it was committed in an apparent interest of own group. 
In the same spirit, unconditional loyalty to the key social purpose of the 
group, which was defined as establishing of own state or state-like sovereign 
territory was expected from each member of the ethnic group, regardless of 
the price of that sovereignty. Patriotism was defined in terms of readiness to 
die and kill for the territory imagined by the political leadership, therefore 
according to the new social purposes the territory was valued more than a 
human life. 
In terms of new relational comparisons, Freud’s notion of narcissism of 
minor differences applied to the ethnic groups which invested their efforts in 
the search for differences and denial of common identity aspects. This was 
reflected, among other, in the forcible changes in the language, whereby 
several ethnic groups tried to «purify» their «own» language by denouncing 
and expelling the terminology or syntax that appeared as originating from other 
groups. The linguistic puritanism was promoted at all levels and created a lot 
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of debate and confusion. Religion, which as we have seen in Chapter 4 played 
marginal role in the group identification processes in the past, suddenly 
became salient as the principal aspect of differentiation among different 
groups. Catholic and Orthodox churches, as well as Mosques, suddenly got 
invaded by the «new believers».  
The prevailing worldview, as explained above, was that the violence was 
inevitable ad the only mean of securing the survival and wellbeing of own 
ethnic group. In such context, the communication with members of others 
group was judged as treason. Attempting to ignore or deny the common Slavic 
origin, a joint state and the common language that in Yugoslavia was called 
Serbo-Croatian, the ethnic groups started developing the portfolio of own 
uniqueness. This entailed additional changes in their worldviews, including 
major shifts in their interpretation of the past events.  
It is important to note that with political changes and war-related 
uncertainties many people demonstrated a surprising capacity to deny or alter 
numerous aspects of own group identities. Jovic (2013, p. 148) observes that 
«(t)he previous Us, which now becomes an Enemy Other, has a constitutive 
function for the new identity. For many individuals a ritual and public rejection 
of previous identity often was a condition for being accepted in the new Us 
group». This might explain why so many people suddenly claimed that they 
were religious when in the past they were not, that they have never been 
members of the Communist Party when many of them actually were, etc. It 
appears that the memories of people were modified in function of the 
construction of new identity.  
There is ample evidence that in the dissolving Yugoslavia nationalisms were 
imposed top-down, promoted by the elites, and not originating in the 
grassroots. Peer pressure was put on ordinary people as members of ethnic 
groups to “prove” their ethnic affiliation by cutting their ties with members of 
the “enemy” ethnic group, by using nationalist symbols etc. In case of ignoring 
such expectations, they were exposed to ostracism and suspicion. As 
observed by Oberschall (2000 p. 996) «ordinary people could not escape 
ethnic polarization». Except, I would add, in very rare cases where the local 
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leadership was unfavourable to such polarization, like in the cases of the oases 
of peace explored in Chapters 7 and 8.  
 
5.2.3. Dominant discourses ethnicizing the “solutions” of the conflict: 
legitimizing direct violence and consolidating structural and cultural violence 
Stiks (2010, p. 78) recalls the common way in which the president of Croatia 
Franjo Tudjman used to open his speeches. Tudjman would usually exclaim: 
«Croatian women and men, citizens…». Using such discourse, he was making 
it clear that he was leading a country which made a difference among the 
citizens who were of Croatian ethnic group and all the others. In the case of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina a similar «order» was installed by the Constitution of the 
country, which firstly lists Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats as constitutive nations 
and only then mentions the citizens.  
For President Tudjman and the leadership in Croatia, the Croatian 
independence was a realization of «one thousand years old dream of Croats» 
to have a sovereign state, but also an opportunity to seize its outstanding 
financial gains. In his well know book Bespuca povijesne zbiljnosti (Wilderness 
of historical reality) Tudjman expressed a view that violent changes such as 
the ones performed after WWII had twofold consequences: while on the one 
side they deepened historical gaps, on the other side they led towards ethnic 
homogenisation of  specific nations, to major harmony in the composition of 
the population and state boundaries of specific countries, which can have 
positive effects on the future developments, in the sense of decrease in the 
causes of new violence and triggers for new conflicts (Tudjman, 1994).  In that 
context, homogenization of Croatia was a desired outcome for its President, 
and it entailed the departure of Serbs as a «price» of lesser problems in the 
future. Milosevic’s aggression in the framework of his project of Greater Serbia 
helped Tudjman in portraying all ethnic Serbs as enemy. 
The search for solutions to a specific problem is very much dependant on 
the way the problem has been posed. In the cases of Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina, it can be argued that the solutions adopted presumably with the 
purpose of reducing direct armed violence implicated new sources of structural 
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violence, such as discrimination of minorities, as well as cultural violence in 
terms of strengthening prejudice and stereotypes among ethnic groups.  
Moreover, on several occasions the proposed solutions even intensified direct 
violence, i.e. when triggering expulsions of specific ethnic groups after the 
announcements of ethnic divisions of territory.  
As indicated by Campbell (1998), in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina the 
most prevalent problematization involves the ethnicization of the political field, 
which «has helped organize Bosnia into an «intractable» problem such that 
the apartheid politics of partition could be proposed as the most «realistic» 
solution. In bowing to the force of conceptual determination, those who 
operated in such terms replicated and reproduced the strategies of violence 
they ostensibly sought to ameliorate» (Campbell, 1998, p. xi). In other terms, 
the idea that specific national community requires the nexus of demarcated 
territory and fixed identity was not only insufficient to enable the response to 
the Bosnian war, but also complicit and necessary for the conduct of the war 
itself (Campbell, 1998, p. 13). 
 Kurspahic (2003, pp 114-115) gives examples of how the proposed 
solutions contributed to violence instead of reducing it. He observes that «in 
March 1992, when the European Community negotiator from Portugal, Jose 
Cutileiro, introduced his proposal for a Bosnia divided into three ethnic 
cantons, there was no sizable town I the country that could be claimed as 
Muslim, Serb or Croat. The proposal nevertheless gave Serb ultranationalists 
an excuse for “ethnic cleansing” in the territories they claimed belonged to the 
Serbs. When in January 1993 British Lord David Owen and former American 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance introduced the next set of maps dividing 
Bosnia into ten ethnically-based provinces, Croat ultranationalists undertook a 
“cleansing” of their own in Herzegovina and Central Bosnia». In such context, 
the Muslim political leadership also gradually shifted from its initial idea of 
multi-ethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina towards exclusive preoccupation with Muslim 
interests and territories. In other words, the proposed solutions entailing long-
term structural violence were often a trigger of new direct violence.  
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The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
popularly known as the Dayton agreement because it was brokered by the 
USA and reached in Dayton, Ohio, was signed by Alija Izetbegovic, Franjo 
Tudjman and Slobodan Milosevic in Paris on December 14, 1995. The greatest 
benefit of this agreement was stopping direct armed violence in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The preamble of the Agreement states that it was made out of 
desire to promote enduring peace and stability. However, the nature of this 
framework for peace has often been challenged, not only by the opinion-
makers and the academia, but also by the realities in the post-agreement 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
The highly problematic basis of this agreement is that it legitimized the 
outcomes of the widespread direct violence translated into killings and mass 
expulsions of population of specific groups from different areas of the country. 
The agreement divided Bosnia-Herzegovina into two entities that were shaped 
by means of violence – the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Srpska 
Republic. The first entity, with some 51% of the overall territory of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, is inhabited mostly by Bosnian Croats and by Muslims/Bosniaks. 
It is further divided into 10 cantons, divided along ethnic lines. Srpska Republic, 
populated almost exclusively by Bosnian Serb, occupies some 49% of the 
territory. As highlighted by Hromadzic (2013, p. 263) «the fact that Dayton 
agreement reinforced and cemented an ethno-nationalist (di)vision of Bosnia-
Herzegovina is crucial, since this generated a particular “spatial 
governmentality” – an ideological, political and social mechanism of territorial 
segregation and disciplining of ethnically conceived peoples in Bosnia-
Herzegovina». The socially heterogeneous space has been forcibly 
transformed into politically and ethnically homogeneous, following a 
problematic assumption that the ethnic heterogeneity was a cause of violence 
and that ethnic homogeneity would be a source of peace.  
Unfortunately, the peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina was conceived in a one-
dimensional way, as a simple absence of immediate armed hostilities. The 
Agreement did not preview tackling the sources of structural violence (e.g. 
position of minorities within ethnicized territories) and cultural violence 
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(deepening stereotypes and prejudice due to lack of contact), but actually 
contributed to those sources. By “redressing the mismatch” between people 
and territory along ethnic lines, Dayton agreement caused «flattening and 
suffocation of trans-ethnic sensibilities» (Hromadzic, 2013, p. 263). It forcibly 
reduced the complexity of social identities to one dimension – the ethnicity. In 
this way, it took away the relevance and the power from supra-ethnic 
categories and political views.  
Hromadzic (2013, p. 263) further notes that «the war-orchestrated 
annihilation of the “common house” was reified through the state-building 
model, creating a sanitized political context in B-H. This installation of socio-
political segregation under the banners of multiculturalism, coexistence and 
“tolerance” works in practice to cement, naturalize and culturalize ethnic 
animosity (…). The excess, institutionalization and territorialisation of ethnic 
nationalism led to the ethnicization of ordinary life». Indeed, the ethnicization 
of identities preceded by a number of ethnicity-based negative war 
experiences, became a source of inter-ethnic animosities as a consequence 
of war. These animosities translate into cultural violence that is the basis of 
potential future direct violence.  
The segregation of territory and ethnically conceived people was 
accompanied by introduction of the consociational model of democracy into 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, a model based on power sharing of elites from different 
ethnic groups, usually applied in so called deeply divided societies (such as 
Lebanon or Northern Ireland). This model unavoidably entails transfers of 
people, either through massive violence or in a more organized way, but 
transfers which are ethically very questionable and that remained largely 
unquestioned as they were often perceived as unavoidable.  
As emphasised by Campbell (1998, p. 117) «the international diplomacy has 
been a conduit through which the tension between the objectified culture of 
nationalist projects and the lived experience of Bosnia has been resolved in 
favour of the nationalists». The same author points at the need to seriously 
question the conceptualization of «multi-ethnicity» that was apparently 
attached to the new structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina. He stresses (p. 142) that 
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«seemingly the sheer presence of more than one ethnic group within the 
external borders of the state, even if those groups were in their own spaces, 
was sufficient for the polity to qualify as multi-ethnic». 
 No strategies that would result in the pluralization of possibilities of being 
together on the same territory were considered, nor did the non-nationalist 
local initiatives, such as the one in Tuzla, receive particular attention or 
support. Campbell (1998, pp. 209-210) therefore concludes that «literal and 
figurative death of complex histories and hybrid identities has been reluctantly 
pronounced in Bosnia», as indicated in the quote opening this Chapter. 
However, the persistence of counter-discourses, such as the truly multi-ethnic 
Tuzla city, shows that identities imposed by the elites are not always adopted 
by the population, which is sometimes ready to struggle for continued 
heterogeneous social spaces. Unfortunately, spaces like Tuzla became an 
exception on the territory where nationalist leaders were determined to achieve 
the “perfect match” of population and territory, as will be presented under the 
next heading.  
 
5.3. From heterogeneous social spaces to homogeneous political 
spaces: nationalism in the service of «redressing the mismatch» in the 
association between population, territory and destiny 
5.3.1. Nation-states as «the only solution» and cultural pluralism as non-
imagined community 
Space can be conceived in geographic terms, but also as a social and 
political phenomenon. Social space is always heterogeneous, which can 
become problematic to formal politics because they require a certain level of 
homogeneity. As a result, as indicated by Hobsbawm (1993), the rise of the 
modern state brought the construction and imposition of homogeneous 
political space on top of the heterogeneous social realities.  
The time of the war in the former Yugoslavia was also the time of creation 
of new political spaces on top of very complex social realities. New states were 
being declared based on the Constitution of Yugoslavia which was granting 
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the right to self-determination to its republics. The legitimation of violence by 
ruling elites was closely linked to the fact that, as indicated by Jabri (1996, p. 
97), war is «naturally» seen to be the preserve of the state, either in its original 
formation or in its continuity. This is confirmed by Tilly (1985), who puts 
emphasis on the constitutive role of violence in the emergence of states and 
elaborates on the constitutive relationship between war-making and state-
making. 
In the case of Yugoslavia, acceding to violent, armed «solutions» was used 
as a pretext both for state preservation and for state creation purposes. 
Violence was first used as a justification of efforts to ensure the continuity of 
the state (Yugoslavia), by the leadership of YNA, in close cooperation with 
Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic. In parallel, violence was also used and 
justified as part of the process of state-making.  In fact, both Milosevic and 
Tudjman tried to «re-create» the geographic space of the republics of former 
Yugoslavia by using the ethnic commonality, attempting to form states that 
were of larger size than the original republics of Croatia and Serbia, as they 
would include parts of other republics inhabited by Croats and Serbs.   
Those territorial aspirations were never overtly communicated, but were 
rather hidden under the pretended defence of lives and other rights of own 
ethnic brothers and sisters in other republics. However, in practice Milosevic 
was promoting the idea first attributed to the Chetnik leader Draza Mihajlovic, 
considering that «wherever Serbian graves are found, it is Serbian land». Even 
less overtly, Tudjman attempted to achieve the same objective by intervening 
in the political space of the sovereign state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, trying to 
take control over and then annex parts of that country inhabited by ethnic 
Croats. Although both leaders used the rhetoric of victimization of own ethnic 
group as justification, their attempts fully correspond to Gellner’s (1993) 
definition of nationalism as a political principle holding that the political and the 
national unit should be congruent.  
Nationalism typically attempts to create a compelling association between a 
population, a territory and a destiny. Furthermore, Sekulic (2001, p. 158) 
describes the Croatian Democratic Union type of nationalism as integral 
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nationalism, by which he understands «the ideology according to which all the 
activities in the society, from individual longings to each group activity, must 
be at the service of the nation, its politics and aims defined at the national level. 
Such nationalism is usually characterized by hostility towards the principles of 
liberalism and pluralism, because it perceives the nation as an organic 
community that principles of political and cultural pluralism divide artificially 
(…) [In such type of nationalism] nation and state are not tools for reaching a 
goal, they are the supreme goal itself». This approach was confirmed on 
numerous occasions by the Croatian President Tudjman, who often used the 
motto «(We shall give) everything for Croatia, (we shall not give away) our only 
and eternal Croatia for anything in the world». In such context, giving a life for 
the nation-state was perceived as the maximum expression of loyalty to the 
nation and its leadership, while promoting cultural pluralism and cooperation 
with other nations was seen as treason. These were some of the key traits of 
the «new» Croatian social identity, leading towards negative inter-group 
relations. 
The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina was largely different. It was the only 
republic in Yugoslavia which did not have one national group as its «owner», 
therefore it did not have the implicit idea of nation-state during Yugoslav times. 
Filandra (2012) and other authors indicate that, when faced with the risk of 
dissolution of Yugoslavia in the late 1980s different groups within the 
communities of Bosnian Muslims were unison in one thing: desire for the 
survival of Yugoslavia. They did not wish nor did they feel ready for the break-
down of the Yugoslav Federation, and once it happened they found 
themselves facing a great challenge of how to preserve their identity and the 
lives of their group members.  
Despite the desire of many to maintain the unity of Yugoslavia, in the 1990s 
the heterogeneous society in Yugoslavia was sacrificed to the idea of 
homogeneous states, or in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina state-like 
structures within one larger state. In that context, Serbian and Croatian 
nationalists were pursuing the idea of independent homogeneous states 
«adding» a portion of Bosnia-Herzegovina with Serb and Croat population to 
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their own territory. With regards to the leadership of the Muslims, or Bosniaks 
as they got called from 1993, during the initial year of the war their elites led 
by Alija Izetbegovic, who was also serving as the wartime President of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, gradually shifted their approach from the struggle for inclusive 
and heterogeneous Bosnia-Herzegovina towards the nationalist approach and 
discourse.  
Jovic (2013, p.145) emphasises that «the 1993 decision to remove the 
name Muslim and accept the name Bosniak was a result of numerous 
circumstances, among other of the shifting of the Bosniak political leadership 
from the statehood towards national idea, i.e. from the idea of treating Bosnia-
Herzegovina as a unique three-national state of all its citizens and nations 
towards the idea of exclusive representation of separate Bosniak interests». 
The same shift can be traced in Izetbegovic’s public discourse, in which he 
adopts a nationalist discourse justified by lack of alternatives and violence 
against Bosniaks/Muslims. In his address at the convention of his Party of 
Democratic Action, on March 25, 1994, Izetbegovic said: 
«In one of our respectable newspapers I read that our soldiers are dying 
for co-existence, dying so we could live together. Living together is a nice 
thing, but I think I can freely say that it is a lie that our soldiers are dying 
for such cause. If anybody had illusions about living together, then it was 
us. But things cannot be based on lies and we cannot lie to our nation. 
Our soldier up there, who suffers in the mud, does not do that so he can 
live together, but in order to defend this piece of land that others want to 
take away from him. He risks his life to defend his family, his land, his 
nation». (Izetbegovic, 1995, pp. 77-78).  
Clearly, the priorities of Izetbegovic shifted from living together to defending 
own families, land and nation. Just like in the discourse of Croatian leadership, 
territory became more important than human life. The president of Bosnia-
Herzegovina abandoned the idea of heterogeneous society in his country as 
an illusion, a lie. The same happened at the sub-national level in most of the 
country. However, in Tuzla the mayor and his team, along with the citizens of 
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that town, would not abandon that “illusion” but would rather prove that it could 
become a reality, as described in Chapter 8.  
Different categories were used by national leaders in describing the war, 
often in the attempt to justify own use of violence. All leaders used the 
dichotomies aggression – defence, as well as occupation - liberation. In such 
framework, each one of them claimed to be defending his people and liberating 
territories, while it was always the “Other” who was the aggressor and the one 
occupying it.  In Croatia, the most common term was homeland war, which is 
still used and indicates that the final aim of that war was the creation of a 
sovereign state home of one nation, the Croats. Tudjman also often used the 
term imposed war, masking his own accountability and stressing its 
«unavoidability». He further used the term just war. According to the just war 
doctrine, «war undertaken in the name of specific values or as punishment for 
aggression is considered as a positive good, particularly in terms of territorial 
integrity and political sovereignty» (Jabri, 1996, p.106). Such dominant 
discourses contributed to an atmosphere in which the war became normal or 
even desired.  
This was further reinforced by the use of religious terminology, which gave 
to the war an aura of sublime action, and to the leader a role of Messiah who 
resurrects and makes miracles. Religious terminology was very often used by 
President Tudjman: 
«By resurrecting – in the crucial electoral time – the silenced and hurt 
national consciousness and the fettered pride of the Croatian people, as 
well as the misplaced hope of all citizens of Croatia, we have instigated 
the enthusiasm of revival» (Franjo Tudjman in his address to the Croatian 
Parliament on May 30, 1990, quoted in Pavkovic, 2008, p.47) 
«In this difficult moment when we are on a historical crossroad, I call upon 
you, brothers and sisters, to fulfil your sacred duty of the defence of the 
homeland. (Franjo Tudjman in his appearance on Croatian National TV 
on October 5, 1991) 
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Jabri (1996, p. 136) observes that «the concept of the nation and the 
national identity upon which it is based is so deeply embedded and pervasive 
across time and space that the division of humanity into a world of separate 
nation-states seems to be the natural order of things (…)Through the 
naturalization of what is a political construct, the “nation”, as a bounded entity, 
is reified at the expense of other models of representation, and the interest of 
particular dominant groups in society are defined as being in the general 
“national” interest». This is how some of the very particular interests of the 
elites, such as remaining in power or own enrichment, were legitimized simply 
because they were the only representatives of the ethnic groups or nations. 
This is also one of the main reasons why, although well-articulated, some of 
the alternative voices were not given adequate attention. For the international 
community they were not representative enough, they did not have the 
narrative authority as they were not representing the ethnic groups that were 
supposedly in conflict, but other groups which were treated as irrelevant. 
Giving the power of representation exclusively to the leaders of ethnic/national 
groups clearly contributed to the violence in the former Yugoslavia, as other 
voices from the affected communities could not find the space to be heard. 
This was very convenient to the elites in power, as it helped them marginalize 
alternative voices and views both in Croatia and Serbia, as will be exposed in 
Chapter 6. 
As the nation-states were «imagined» as the only solution, the ethnicities 
were perceived as a problem that needed to be solved and cultural pluralism 
was seen as an anomaly. In such context, the outcomes of direct violence were 
solidified by further structural violence, as presented in the following section.  
 
5.3.2. «Othered» by institutional texts: constitutions reshaping inter-group and 
intra-group relations by legitimizing structural violence. The case of 
constitutional nationalism and ethnic engineering 
Changes in the constitutions of both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as 
well as of several other formerly Yugoslav states, included a major paradigm 
shift in the organization of the state and the relations between the state and its 
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citizens. The impact that this change had on the population of these two 
countries is multifaceted – from the psychological and behavioural, to the 
political one. In both cases the new states started their independent life by 
«belonging to some of their citizens more then to the others», in comparison 
to how they were institutionally defined before. In Croatia this was achieved by 
defining the Republic of Croatia as:  
«the nation state of the Croatian nation and the state of the members of 
its national minorities: Serbs, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, Hungarians, 
Jews, Germans, Austrians, Ukrainians, Rusyns, Bosniaks, Slovenians, 
Montenegrins, Macedonians, Russians, Bulgarians, Poles, Roma, 
Romanians, Turks, Vlachs, Albanians and others who are its citizens 
and who are guaranteed equality with citizens of Croatian nationality 
and the exercise of their national rights in compliance with the 
democratic norms of the United Nations and the countries of the free 
world» (Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, 1991) 
While the defenders of this formulation claim that there is nothing 
problematic in distinguishing the nation to which the Republic is a nation-state 
from all the national minorities, because it is clearly stipulated that they all have 
equal rights, those who oppose such formulation consider that the Serbs were 
«downgraded» from being a «constitutive nation» in the Republic of Croatia 
during Yugoslav times into becoming one of the multiple national minorities. 
They base their claim on the following text of the 1974 Constitution of the 
Socialist Republic of Croatia: 
«The Socialist Republic of Croatia is the nation state of the Croatian 
nation, the state of the Serb nation in Croatia and the state of the 
nationalities [national minorities] who live in it» (Ustav Republike 
Hrvatske, 1974) 
The opponents of the mentioned formulation in the new Croatian 
constitution further claim that this «downgrading» has put the Serbs in the 
category of «all the others» despite the fact that they constituted a significant 
portion of Croatian citizens (12.2% in 1991), being a much larger group than 
any other «minority». This instigated fears of the Serbs from Croatia about their 
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status and future in the new Croatian state, despite the guarantee of equality 
stipulated in the Constitution.   
Another important aspect of the Constitutions and citizenship legislation of 
most post-socialist countries, highlighted by Stiks (2010), is the privileged 
status that those countries awarded to the members of their ethnic majority 
who were living abroad. Jovic (2013) informs that this also happened in Serbia, 
which opened the doors for the Serbs from Bosnia-Herzegovina to apply for 
citizenship in Serbia as well as to participate in constituting Serbia as their 
nation state. 
 Analyzing the citizenship laws of post-socialist countries, including Croatia, 
Stiks (2010) identified three categories of people: the included, the excluded 
and the invited. While due to the newly established administrative rules many 
non-Croat inhabitants of Croatia found severe obstacles in obtaining 
citizenship, forming the group of excluded, other Croats, particularly those from 
Bosnia-Herzegovina but also from oversees, were invited and supported in 
obtaining Croatian citizenship. Stiks (2010, pp. 80-81) concluded that «such 
constitutional redefining of the state and adoption of new laws on citizenship 
on that basis often create a situation in which those who were until recently the 
citizens – like in the case of former multinational federations – were turned into 
foreigners or “second class citizens”, and those who were foreigners (actually 
national minorities in neighboring countries or descendants of those who live 
abroad for economic or political reasons) promoted into legal citizens, with 
more rights than those who live (and pay taxes) within the confines of the 
state». This type of actions was in the service of what Stiks (2006) names 
ethnic engineering, or the intentional policy of the elites through which the laws 
and the administrative practices were used to influence the ethnic composition 
of the population, in benefit of the ethnic majority group.  
Based on an analysis of the constitutions in the formerly Yugoslav republics, 
Hayden (1993, p. v) forged the term constitutional nationalism to describe 
«constitutional and legal structure that privileges the members of the majority 
(ethnic) nation over the minorities in each state», warning that such 
arrangements are very likely to instigate instability and war. Viewed within the 
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framework of Galtung’s theory on violence, constitutional nationalism amounts 
to the institutionalized structural violence, which increases injustice and 
promotes direct violence. Indeed, as we shall see in Chapters 7 and 8, the 
experiences of the oases of peace confirmed that discourses and practices of 
local authorities treating all inhabitants as equal citizens, rather than as 
members of majority or minority, played critical role in maintaining communal 
peace in those communities.  
While the new Croatian constitution contained a long list of national 
minorities, the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina reduced the national 
structure to the three constitutive nations, while all the rest of the population 
was considered as Others. The Preamble of the Constitution of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (1995) states: 
«Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs, as constituent peoples (along with 
Others), and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina hereby determine that 
the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is as follows»  
It is important to note that the constituent nations (peoples) are put at the 
first place and then followed by the notion of «citizens», implying some type of 
division between inhabitants belonging to constitutive national groups and the 
group of citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina, of which the first one is considered 
to be more important.  
Furthermore, the political power in Bosnia-Herzegovina was distributed 
along ethnic lines, as the key political functions were reserved only for the 
constituent nations, making the “Others” politically irrelevant, unable to accede 
to specific functions, thus overtly discriminated and exposed to structural 
violence. In that context, one can conclude that the constitution of Bosnia-
Herzegovina is also characterized by high level of constitutional nationalism, 
but instead of privileging one, it privileges three nations.  
The constitutional nationalism and the uncertainty created by it undoubtedly 
supported the fears of different ethnic groups in Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and their consequent additional approaching to and closing into 
their ethnic identity groups. It became clear that the new states were not ready 
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to protect the rights of all citizens equally, therefore some citizens needed to 
search protection elsewhere, mostly within their ethnic identity groups. This is 
how Serbs from Croatia started relying on the Serbs from Serbia, while Croats 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina sought help from Croats in Croatia, etc. This resulted 
in major changes in the social norms and behaviors of members of different 
groups, and supported the ethnocentrism of majorities, translated into their 
widespread attitude of «this is our state, if the others are not satisfied here, 
they are free to leave». As described by Stiks (2010 p. 80), although the 
Constitutions offered them the usual democratic rights, the minorities were 
considered as “historical guests” on the territory belonging to the 
“autochthonous” ethnic group. And when laws and constitutions are used to 
institutionalize discrimination, violence is, unfortunately, a logical 
consequence. Its instigation will be further supported by the abuses of specific 
collective memories, as elaborated in the next section of the study. 
 
5.4. Uses and abuses of collective memories: history in the service of 
violence 
5.4.1. A difficult relationship with the past 
Social groups such as ethnic groups and nations rely for their legitimacy on 
a remembered past of that particular community. As will be elaborated in this 
and subsequent chapters, the memories of the past inter-group relationships 
can be used to mobilize communities for cooperation and peace, but also for 
violence.  
The nation, as explained by Jabri (1996, p. 137) is «built upon an imagined 
distinctive history and culture, containing a symbolic order that is utilised in 
times of adversity to mobilize entire collectivities against other bounded 
communities». Additionally, the relationships with the past are very important 
in terms of the role that narratives of wars play in the collective behaviour. Jabri 
(1996, p. 140) further clarifies that «war is a constitutive element of collective 
identity reproduced in collective memory through national narratives of past 
glories in the face of threats against national sovereignty and survival. (…) 
 119   
 
Nations are constructed around narratives of war, the heroes of which acquire 
symbolic significance in the reproduction of a national identity based on war».  
Jabri’s explanation is highly relevant for the nations that were inhabiting 
Yugoslavia. Analysing different studies and writings on the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Campbell (1998, p. 84) warns that most of them «suggest that 
the conflict was constituted in history, which implies that the hostility has an 
identifiable point of origin and is transmitted from generation to generation until 
it reaches the present». This approach – the linear history - makes the tragic 
nature of the present look inevitable and restricts the solutions to repression of 
the ancient hatreds until they reappear again, not leaving any room for 
imagining and constructing better future. However, Campbell confirms Jabri’s 
view that history is a resource of the contemporary struggle and the questions 
of history are violently deployed in the present for contemporary political goals. 
There is broad evidence that over decades the political leaderships on the 
territory of Yugoslavia were making use of history to promote their own political 
and economic goals. The study of history school textbooks in Yugoslavia and 
the countries that succeeded it clearly confirms this.  
The history textbooks during Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav times were 
characterized by linear and black-and-white approach. Petrungaro (2009) 
observes that the 1990s history textbooks in Croatia inherit the structure and 
the non-critical approach of the socialist textbooks, but significantly change the 
content. They were subject to «de-yugoslavization», in a sense of strong 
reduction of the content related to Yugoslavia, and the change of tone whereby 
Yugoslavia was portrayed as a deviation from the original Croatian idea of full 
independence, and Tito was depicted in negative light, as a dictator who, 
although himself a Croat, served the Serb interests. Once again, the history 
was extremely simplified, with dualistic historical interpretations which 
prevented the students from any deeper or critical considerations towards 
historical events, but this time the emphasis was on the Croatian state and 
those who served it, who were celebrated as heroes. From WWII the focus 
shifted towards Homeland war. Once again the war took a major part of the 
content of history books with detailed descriptions of its most cruel aspects. 
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Croats were portrayed as victims, mostly of the Serbs, and the history of the 
neighbouring countries was so reduced that «students learned more about the 
history of Japan than of the history of Serbia» (Petrungaro 2009, p. 97). The 
approach characterized by selective remembering and intentional overseeing 
of specific parts of history, combined with ideological and non-critical attitudes, 
was used in the textbooks, but also in other types of public discourses and 
public life, significantly contributing to the cultural and structural, and 
consequently also to the direct violence on the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia. 
 
 
5.4.2. Selective remembering and directed forgetting as contributors to 
violence.  
Jabri (1996) warns that the ability to consolidate and reproduce authoritative 
power is dependent on the capacity to manipulate the memory traces of a 
community and control information gathering and dissemination which 
generate and reproduce the discursive institutional continuities which “bind” 
societies. This ability can be traced in the discursive power of different 
authorities on the territory of Yugoslavia. As described above, the information 
gathering and dissemination was controlled during and after Yugoslavia 
through history textbooks, among other means.  
The memory traces that were highlighted during Yugoslavia were those of 
mutual cooperation of ethnic and national groups inhabiting the country, 
constituting the “brotherhood and unity” discourse which was at the very basis 
of the creation and raison d’être of Yugoslavia. As presented in Chapter 4, the 
narrative and the ideology of brotherhood and unity was often constructed at 
the expense of directed forgetting of the episodes of violent or non-violent 
conflict among leadership or representatives of different ethnic and national 
groups, which at several occasions culminated in atrocities9. The directed 
                                                          
9 I remember my own confusion in the late 1980s and early 1990s when narratives and insignia related 
to the Independent State of Croatia (ISC) started appearing in the public space. I felt puzzled because I 
didn’t remember learning about those events at school or hearing about them from any other sources. I 
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forgetting was supported by repression of nationalism and other dissenting 
voices in the country, and discouragement of any critical thinking, including 
critical media. In my view, it is this lack of space for and habit of critical thinking 
which significantly contributed to the swift replacement of one ideology 
(socialism) by another one (nationalism), leading to the 1991-1995 violence.  
All of the sudden, in the late 1980s, the insignia from ISC and the songs 
about some of its leaders appeared in the public discourse in Croatia as part 
of the growing independence movement. At the same time, alarms were being 
raised in Serbia over that discourse, relating it to the deaths of many Serbs 
during ISC. Episodes of WWII with details of Ustasha crimes against Serbs 
found plenty of space in Serbian media in the late 1980s and were intertwined 
with the ongoing political events. What is more, with support of Serbian 
Orthodox Church, the bones of the persons killed by Ustasha regime were 
excavated in many villages, carried around and then reburied in inflamed 
ceremonies making the menacing links between the past and the present. At 
the same time, Chetnik insignia was sold on the street in Belgrade as early as 
in 1985, and the preoccupation with Kosovo mythology was high in the public 
discourse (Kurspahic, 2003, p. 27). 
Invoking WWII imagery was particularly popular among the elites in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. Considering the independence of Croatian state as 
the ultimate goal, and showing readiness to disregard the methods that would 
allow for the realization of that goal, in 1990 Tudjman pronounced his 
frequently quoted opinion that ISC was not only a quisling formation and a 
fascist crime, but also an expression of political aspirations of the Croatian 
people for their independent state. With the re-adoption of the Croatian flag 
checkboard used during ISC, the nationalist songs celebrating leaders of ISC 
becoming extremely popular and the history textbooks embellishing ISC and 
portraying it as the realization of the Croatian nation dream (Petrungaro, 2009), 
the non-Croat population got concerned about their future in the newly 
                                                          
had a vague idea that «something bad» happened in Croatia in the early 1940, but there was a certain 
veil of mystery around those events. The simplified storyline that was promoted during my childhood 
in Yugoslavia was that the peoples of Yugoslavia have always been and would always be living in 
harmony, as this storyline was at the very heart of the idea of Yugoslavia. 
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independent Croatia. With his apologetic approach to ISC, Tudjman helped 
Milosevic look credible in the eyes of his Serbian fellows whom the president 
of Serbia claimed to be protecting. And vice versa, Milosevic’s nationalist 
politics were supporting Tudjman’s idea of urgency of forming an independent 
Croatian state where Croats would finally feel protected.   
The changing narratives about the past could be also observed in the 
changes of names of towns, streets, squares, etc. during the breakdown of 
Yugoslavia. The name of the town of Titova Korenica (Tito’s Korenica) in 
Croatia was changed into simply Korenica. The names of most of the streets 
in Belgrade which were related to socialist times were also changed. The 
Square of Victims of Fascism, one of the main squares in Zagreb, was 
renamed into the Square of Great Croats. The name of the Highway of 
Brotherhood and Unity, connecting several former Yugoslav capitals – 
Ljubljana, Zagreb, Belgrade and Skopje - disappeared together with the 
ideology carrying that name.  
With the aim of de-constructing the Yugoslav political space, the elites in 
Croatia and Serbia turned the Yugoslav storyline upside down, and all of the 
sudden the population of Yugoslavia «discovered» that the narrative of 
brotherhood and unity was «false» and that in Yugoslavia most national groups 
felt oppressed, discriminated, prevented from expressing their national identity 
feelings, etc. The collective memories of the past violent conflicts and their 
relation with national identities started (re)appearing, and the history of 
cooperation of the national groups was «cornered» and sent to the «forgotten 
side» of the history in Croatia and Serbia. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, as the only 
republic which did not have one national group as the “owner”, the discourse 
of unity was maintained in many places in parallel with the collective 
grievances of Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. 
With the emerging discourses of ethnic or national grievances, the ethnic 
diversity of the former Yugoslavia stopped being a symbol of pride and became 
a perceived source of problems. In 1989 on Kosovo Polje Milosevic would yell: 
«Never again would Islam subjugate the Serbs!» (Volkan, 1997), while 
Tudjman would scream in his 1991 speech on Zagreb main square: «The time 
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when the Croatian destiny was decided upon in Vienna, in Budapest or in 
Belgrade, is over!». 
The cult of own group victimization was revived and other ethnic groups 
started being portrayed as sources of problem, which strongly affected the 
inter-group relations. When conflicts are perceived and defined as inter-ethnic, 
the narratives of those conflicts start being eloquent on the instances of 
violence between the two ethnic groups and silent about at least three other 
types of interactions between or within those groups. Firstly, instances of 
intragroup (intra-ethnic) violence tend to be forgotten or ignored. Gagnon 
(2004) points out at a number of instances when Serbs have attacked other 
Serbs, Croats killed other Croats and Muslims fought against other Muslims in 
former Yugoslavia. Such instances have been systematically overlooked by 
ethnic leaders, but also by internal and external observers as they tended to 
«complicate the plot», or blur the myths of unity and conformity.  A similar kind 
of oblivion concerns in-group resistance or desertion, so no narrative on the 
1991-95 war in the former Yugoslavia includes the experiences of draft 
evaders that were numerous in all ethnic groups. For example, some 200,000 
Serbs preferred to flee Serbia and hide abroad, enduring severe negative 
consequences including financial hardship and stigmatization of their families, 
to avoid being drafted and sent to fight on the side of the Serbs in Croatia. 
Furthermore, the narratives on alleged interethnic conflicts are systematically 
silent on the aspects of inter-group (inter-ethnic) cooperation prior to, during 
and after the conflict. Communities preserving ethnic coexistence, such as the 
ones explored in the two case studies in this thesis, are just one type of such 
cooperation during war, but there are infinite examples of intermarriage, 
friendship and cooperation among ethnic groups that disrupt the theory of 
ancient ethnic hatreds.   
In this context, in the late 1980s and early 1990s the collective memories 
experienced a very significant politically driven transformation10. This was also 
                                                          
10 I recall feeling very confused with the sudden shift in the narratives of collective memory, which 
were sometimes directly opposed to my personal memories. This includes narratives claiming that the 
communist party in Yugoslavia banned all public aspects of religion, while my family was attending 
mass and celebrating Christmas and Easter every year; or narratives claiming that people were forced 
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observed by Oberschall (2000), who introduces the concept of double 
cognitive frame, claiming that the ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia had 
specific cognitive frames (or cognitive models) for regular times, different from 
the cognitive frames for crisis times, the latter being based on the negative 
experiences in times of past wars. The same author further claims that «Tito 
had wanted to eradicate the crisis frame, but it simmered in the memories of 
older people, the families of victims, intellectuals and religious leaders. 
Milosevic, Tudjman and other nationalists did not invent the crisis frame: they 
activated and amplified it» (Oberschall, 2000, p. 989). Evidence shows that the 
crisis frame includes acceptance of violence by large parts of the population, 
as violence is often pursued in the mistaken belief that some greater good will 
come of it (Curle, 1995).  
In relation to the above, and adopting a definition of the collective memory 
of the past conflict as a widely shared knowledge of the past social events that 
may not have been personally experienced but are collectively constructed 
through communicative social functions, Bar-Tal (2011) warns that complex 
experiences of violence are often transmuted into simple narratives of 
collective ethnic victimization, which become a permanent source of fear and 
mistrust between ethnic groups. As will be observed from the analysis in the 
next section, such narratives became a very useful tool for instigating fears 
and mobilizing people for violence.  
 
5.5. Cult of ethnic self-victimization: linking past with present and using 
defensive war discourse to legitimize own violence 
5.5.1. Ethnic self-victimization as justification of own group violence 
Prior to the break-up of Yugoslavia, both Serbian and Croatian leadership 
started invoking centuries-old grievances and sufferings caused by “the 
others”. The most striking example is the Serbs’ mourning over the Kosovo 
Polje battle in 1389, which 600th  anniversary was used by Milosevic to reignite 
the dormant collective trauma and to mobilize masses for revenge. To 
                                                          
to join the communist party, which was not the experience of my parents or their friends, and similar 
examples of «memory shifts». 
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stimulate the reigniting of the collective memory, the organizers of the 
commemoration made sure that the remains of prince Lazar were placed into 
a coffin and taken on a tour around all towns and villages in Serbia11.   
Although the political elites in Serbia attempted to portray the reigniting of 
collective memory as a spontaneous movement, there is clear evidence that 
key events were carefully orchestrated. The Serb example of self-victimization 
was the most extreme one, however it was not isolated. Debating about the 
concentration camp of Jasenovac, where during WWII thousands of people 
were killed by Croatian ISC authorities, Franjo Tudjman suggested that the 
main victims of Jasenovac were - Croats. Tudjman (1996) insisted that Croats 
were victims of accusations of having killed more people than they actually did. 
Although he theoretically recognized that even if only six people were killed, 
and not some sixty thousand according to his estimations, it would still be a 
horrible and huge crime, Tudjman (1996) switched the paradigm and 
transformed the Croats into victims of conspiracy of those who were attempting 
to define them as a «genocidal people».  
The cult of own group victimization was reinforced by the renewal of the 
memories of WWII. Creating synergies between the past and the present, a 
specific type of mythical consciousness was created, which was preventing 
people from distinguishing between the mythology and the reality of the times 
they were living in (Skopljanac Brunner, 2000). The self-victimization approach 
was used to link the past sufferings with the events taking place during the 
1991-1995 armed conflict. As noted by Campbell (1998, p.8) «all parties to the 
violence in Bosnia, both inside and out, have at one time or another invoked 
the image of the Holocaust and its context to justify their actions and make 
                                                          
11 Linking the developments of 14th and 20th century, a monument was erected with the inscription of 
prince Lazar’s threatening curse: 
 
«Whoever is a Serb and of Serb birth 
And of Serb blood and heritage 
And comes not to the Battle of Kosovo, 
May he never have the progeny his heart desires! 
Neither son nor daughter 
May nothing grow that his hand sows! 
Neither dark wine nor white wheat 
And let him be cursed from all ages to all ages!» 
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demands on others for a response». This placed them on the side of victims 
in the past, and was extended to the ongoing events as a “proof” that once 
again they were victimized. Furthermore, several layers of self-victimization 
could be observed during the 1991-1995 conflict. In addition to considering 
themselves as victims of other ethnic groups, parties to violence also invoked 
being victims of the «Western politics», «inaction of the world», a number of 
«conspiracies» and other factors. The narratives of self- victimization that were 
often used to justify own group violence have had a strong influence on the 
behaviours of group members. 
Analysing how seeing the self as the victim places the in-groups on the 
moral high ground and at the same time serves to justify inflicting harm on the 
out-groups, Brewer (2000, p. 135) highlights that the victimization can become 
part of the shared belief system and «the remembered victimization can be 
activated at any time to mobilize feelings of vulnerability, in-group defence and 
moral righteousness in response to perceived contemporary threats», even 
when the perpetrator is not the same. Volkan (1997) introduces the notion of 
«chosen trauma» to refer to the collective memory or a shared mental 
representation of a calamity that once befell a group’s ancestors, which is 
transmitted from one generation to the next one. He further elaborates on this 
by claiming that «a political leader may re-ignite a dormant group memory that 
affects collective thinking, perceptions, and actions. When such a shared 
mental representation of the original injury is reactivated, it may distort a large 
group’s perceptions. New enemies involved in current conflicts may be 
perceived as extensions of an old enemy from a historical event» (Volkan, 
1997, p. 46). 
This was certainly the case of the «chosen trauma» of Serbs related to the 
battle on Kosovo Polje. For the understanding of the violent events in the years 
that followed its 600th anniversary commemoration, it is important to note that 
the rage over the defeat in the battle on Kosovo Polje was addressing 
Ottomans from the past, and Bosnian Muslims were perceived as an extension 
of the Ottomans, and therefore exposed to revenge. Volkan (1997, p. 67) 
claims that «under Ottoman rule Serbs became perennial mourners […] The 
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Serbs held on to their victimized identity and glorified victimization». Dobrica 
Cosic, writer, academic and one of the instigators of Serbian nationalism, 
made a clear link between self-victimization and justification of own violence 
in 1970, during his inauguration as member of Serbian Academy of Science 
and Arts. On that occasion he claimed that the Serb nation has always been 
winning in war and losing in peace. His statement was clearly praising violence 
as a tool for meeting Serbian interests. Cosic is one of the co-authors of SASA 
Memorandum from 1986, which, as we have seen in Chapter 4, is «a list of 
Serbian grievances against “the others” from ancient times to present-day 
Yugoslavia, and a battle cry to rectify those grievances» (Kurspahic, 2003, p. 
33).  
 
5.5.2. Defensive war discourse and its consequences 
For all parties involved the 1991-1996 armed conflict, the war was a 
defensive one. YNA was defending Yugoslavia, as per their mandate; Serbian 
leadership was defending the interests of the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Croatia and preventing a repetition of atrocities that they suffered in ISC. 
Croats were defending their own land and people in Croatia, as well as the 
interests and lives of their fellow Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Muslims in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina were struggling for the very survival of their community in 
that country. No party considered oneself as aggressor, attacker or conqueror. 
The self-defence discourse in the framework of win-lose narrative often served 
as justification of own group violence and was largely supported by the media. 
Furthermore, there was a generalized perception that at some point violence 
became inevitable, that no other means were left to protect the population, 
which got engulfed in a circle of violence. As the armed conflict was growing, 
violence was being perceived as the only choice and a duty of every person 
caring for own community and homeland. Describing the avalanche of violence 
which placed some very challenging choices in front of many individuals in 
Croatia, Ostric (2010, pp. 32-33) observes: «Croats were not “called” into the 
war, the war was dropped on them. Bombs started falling on their houses, the 
lives of their beloved ones were threatened (…) In such situation, many people 
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who were against the war and many critics of the authorities changed their 
mind and joined the army (…) In this tragic situation everybody has to make 
their own, individual, existential choice, there are no general ethical principles 
which would tell us what to do». 
The self-victimization of different ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia 
opened the room for group homogenization on the one hand and for the de-
humanization of the opponent groups on the other. Jabri (1996) observes that 
the discourse of war aims at the construction of mythology based on inclusion 
and exclusion. The categorization sharply contrasts the insiders from the 
outsiders who are the “others” or the deserving enemy, the development also 
observed among ethnic groups in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina as we have 
seen in the analysis of «new» ethnic identities in the initial part of this Chapter. 
Jabri (1996, p.7) further expands on this by stating that «once violent 
destruction of the enemy and its valued resources comes to define a 
relationship, the rules of the game or the rules of “everyday life” change. 
Behaviour that is unacceptable in peace-time becomes legitimate in time of 
war. Specifically killing, torture, rape, mass expulsions, ethnic cleansing and 
the creation of concentration camps are explained by such terms which 
essentially state that while war goes on we must expect such occurrences, or 
simply not be surprised by them». 
 This is precisely the discourse and practice that was promoted by the 
leadership of different ethnic groups during 1991-1995 war. This change in the 
social norms was prompted by coupling the discourse of «we are victims and 
they are victimizers» with the discourse «the only way that we could save 
ourselves is by defeating them», presenting violence as the only option and 
condition for own group survival. As argued by Elcherot and Spini (2011, p. 
186), «narratives of collective victimisation tend to portray the suffering of “in-
group” members not only as a common fate, but also a unique or exceptional. 
In other words, the suffering of “others” is forgotten or downplayed». This was 
confirmed during the 1991-1995 war. Analysing the Belgrade daily Politika, 
Skopljanac Brunner (2000, p. 140) observes that «the victims of the “other 
side” were never mentioned. The “others” even when civilians, were not victims 
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but enemies who wanted to “eradicate everything Serbian”». Moreover, 
victimization of own group was contrasted by the vilification of the other group, 
often using exaggerated messages and transferring the meaning from political 
to mythological level. For instance, the vilification of Croatian army by Serbian 
media was represented in the recurrently used image of Croatian soldiers 
making necklaces of the fingers of Serbian children. Such discourses 
contributed to the feelings of fear, rage and desire for revenge against the 
«ethnic enemy». They were instigated by the elites, who were presenting 
themselves as the only ones able to save their nation.  
 
5.6. The situation is critical and the threat is imminent, but your 
leadership is here to save you: political elites as «saviours» and 
nationalism as the new principle of governance and legitimacy 
When in 1987 Milosevic stepped out of the meeting room to respond to the 
crowd’s cry for help and exclaimed «No one is allowed to beat you!», he 
became a Serbian hero. The saviour of mistreated Serbs in Kosovo got in the 
focus of all media with his promise to bring back safety and dignity to his 
terrorized compatriots.  
The strategic approach to securing own legitimacy by self-portraying 
themselves as saviours and «the only guarantee of safety and order» was 
systematically used by the ruling elites during the breakdown of Yugoslavia. 
This approach was also used as an effective tool for de-mobilization of 
opposition forces which were advocating for democratization of Croatia and 
Serbia, as described by Gagnon (2014) and other authors. The so called tunnel 
vision of the situation, which concept was presented in Chapter 4, was 
fomented in such way, narrowing the prism through which members of society 
interpreted reality and excluding non-violent approaches to the conflict.   
The zero-sum discourse on the conflict, whereby the interests of the ethnic 
groups were portrayed by the elites as mutually exclusive, and armed solutions 
of annihilation of the enemy presented as the only possible solutions, strongly 
contributed to the acceptance of violence by most population. Those who were 
struggling against this severe reduction of the prism, calling for 
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democratization and non-armed, win-win solutions, were quickly labelled as 
«the enemies of the nation», «anti-patriots», «servants of foreign interests», or 
simply bad Croats, Serbs or Muslims, as we shall see in Chapters 6-8. Through 
such denigration they were often successfully demobilized.  
It can be observed that similar tactics of keeping the power by preventing 
democratization and denigrating opponents were used by Tito during 
Yugoslavia and by the leaders of the states emerging from Yugoslavia, such 
as Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia or Franjo Tudjman in Croatia. As for Alija 
Izetbegovic, he gradually turned from defender of multi-ethnic character of the 
state of Bosnia-Herzegovina into the «saviour» of his ethnic group, using 
Muslim-centred discourse and denouncing initiatives for multi-ethnic Bosnia-
Herzegovina as pure «romanticism». In his address to the convention of Party 
of Democratic Action (PDA) in March 1994 he states:  
«Of course, as they say, diplomacy is just the embellishment of the 
military situation. Our political victory, and we should not forget that, is a 
result of military efforts, result of the military situation that enabled it (…) 
» (Izetbegovic, 1995, p. 69) 
From using the non-ethnic terminology, such as the terms Chetniks or 
Yugoslav army, to describe the enemy, Izetbegovic gradually started using 
ethnic terms, sending a message that all members of that ethnic group were 
the enemy and contributing to inter-ethnic mistrust and violence:  
«I am wondering if the Serbs are going to fool the world once more. They 
have succeeded to pull its leg several times» (Izetbegovic, 1995, p. 76). 
Finally, just like Milosevic and Tudjman, Izetbegovic started «worrying» also 
about the members of his ethnic group in other republics and playing the role 
of their saviour, too. Referring to the region of Sandzak in Serbia, which has a 
large community of Muslims, he states:  
«There will be no lifting of sanctions [imposed on Serbia] until there is 
just peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and until our brothers in Sandzak get 
their rights. And, speaking of Sandzak, I would like to mention that we 
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consider the Muslim national council of Sandzak as the only legitimate 
representative of the people of Sandzak» (Izetbegovic, 1995, p. 77). 
In order to remain in power, political elites needed to prevent the peaceful 
transition from one-party system to democratic governance. In the post-
communist era, they needed a new principle of legitimacy and they found it in 
the ethnonationalism.  
Furthermore, radical groups in complicity with national authorities started 
creating parallel local military and governance structures, which were 
becoming de facto authorities. In order to seize power radical groups would 
use militias and purge the regular and other moderate local authorities, 
disseminating fear among local population. This was possible in the situation 
of breakdown of the state, sending a clear message to large parts of the 
population that the state was no longer ready or capable to protect them12.  
The parallel structures often operated in complicity with the ruling elites from 
the national level, as they were contributing their political and economic goals. 
This new patter of governance and a turning point towards violence was 
observed throughout Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. As will be seen from 
Chapters dedicated to the two case studies, preventing the appearance of 
para-military and para-governance structures was crucial for preserving 
positive inter-group relationships in the two oases of peace.    
Both Serbian and Croatian leadership managed to channel people’s 
dissatisfaction with the deteriorating standard of living into the idea of 
inequality and discrimination of their nation in Yugoslavia, coupled with 
resentment towards other nations. As observed by Kurspahic (2003, p. 66) 
«each group’s nationalism played into the hands of the other. Milosevic’s threat 
of Serb domination awakened the “thousand-years-old dream” of Croatia’s 
independences. Tudjman’s takeover, based on his Croatia-to-Croats promise, 
                                                          
12 For example, in eastern Croatia such major shift occurred when in the city of Osijek parallel 
governance was installed by radical Croatian right wing structures. Its aim was to instigate violence 
between Croats and Serbs and seize properties and power in that region. In order to achieve this aim, 
radical forces killed the head of the police in Osijek Josip Reihl-Kir, who was a moderate Croat 
promoting cooperation and non-violence between Croats and Serbs.  
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gave an excuse for the Serbs to rebel and declare autonomy. That, in turn, 
served as a perfect pretext for the CDU’s mass purge of all public institutions 
and services of all those considered unreliable or unpatriotic».  
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, three nationalist parties – those claiming to 
represent Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats - agreed to promote each other 
amongst voters prior to the 1991 elections, in order to ensure the defeat of the 
non-nationalists. Ethnic nationalists from all groups were playing into the 
hands of each other to seize or maintain power, while at the same time the 
dominant discourses were speaking of inter-ethnic violent conflict, mistakenly 
presenting ethnic diversity as a source of conflict in the former Yugoslavia. As 
we shall see in the next section, most media wholeheartedly supported such 
dominant discourses and contributed to violence. 
 
5.7. Media in the service of war: spreading fear, fostering divisions and 
instigating violence 
Media discourses play crucial role in shaping the realities and strongly 
influence the actions of the population in any country. It is important to recall 
that Yugoslav media was controlled by the Communist Party, first centrally and 
then, after the process of decentralization in the 1970s, from the republics’ 
capitals. As presented in Chapter 4, in Yugoslavia there was no tradition of 
free and independent media, the news were regularly filtered and the self-
censorship omnipresent in the country where criticism of the system would 
most often lead to the declaration of the author as the «internal enemy». In 
such a context, the majority of editors and journalists were accustomed to 
perceive media as means of information or a service for ruling party 
propaganda and not a truth-seeking institution. Accustomed to follow the 
political directives without questioning and probing, most media workers simply 
switched loyalty from communist party to the new nationalist leaderships and 
got into the service of a nationalist propaganda.   
In Serbia, Milosevic established close collaboration with key media outlets, 
controlling some 90 per cent of all information available to Serbs. The Belgrade 
daily Politika, once a highly respected and prominent daily paper, played a 
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special role in Milosevic’s mission to establishing Greater Serbia. Founded in 
1904, Politika was the oldest and the most widely read daily paper in 
Yugoslavia. Udovicki and Torov (2000, p. 89) highlight that «Politika was a 
paper the public identified with the country’s best liberal traditions. Unlike any 
other daily or weekly, it had always enjoyed the aura of a national treasure. At 
the same time, on a more intimate level, common readers saw it as an 
inseparable part of their household life, a cherished family friend». Kurspahic 
(2003) considers that as of 1987 Politika became the mouthpiece of Serb 
nationalism. The author particularly points at the newly establish rubric 
«Echoes and reactions», which was formally introduced as the part of the 
paper which was «edited by the people», in principle transmitting letters and 
views of the common people, but was actually used to attack any opponents 
to Milosevic’s political aims. Gradually the list of enemies was extended and 
Politika turned into «an unrestrained eruption of not only cheap homely 
pseudo-patriotism, chauvinism and uncontrolled political gossip, but also the 
eruption of blind hatred towards Albanians, Croats, Muslims, Slovenes, 
Macedonians… and “Serb traitors”» (Kurspahic, 2003, p. 46).  
Reviving the negative memories of the past and linking them to the feeling 
of present threat was one of the main roles of the Serbian mainstream media. 
As an illustration, on August 25, 1991, Politika wrote that Croatian President 
Tudjman was planning to kill off Serbs in his republic adding that the genocide 
would be carried out «silently and without any realization by the world public 
about what is happening in Croatia» (Ramet, 1992, p. 225). There are 
numerous other examples of news fabrication, with Serbian media being the 
most exaggerated, reaching such extremes as the Politika headline on 
October 3, 1991, stating: «Croatia is getting ready to produce and atomic 
bomb». After the Croatian town of Vukovar was completely destroyed and 
most of its population killed or expelled by the Serbian forces, Serbian TV 
reported that Vukovar was «levelled but free». Another common feature of 
media fabrication was justification of atrocities of own group by stating that the 
opposing group was purposely killing their own members simply to blame the 
others. For instance, Belgrade media claimed that Muslims organized a 
marketplace massacre in Sarajevo simply to denigrate the Serbs.  
 134   
 
A similar scenario of the key media being seized by the nationalists took 
place in Croatia. This was possible thanks to the process of privatization, 
during which media outlets changed owner and from social property turned 
into state property. During the privatization process the ruling party made sure 
to get control of the most important business, including media outlets. They 
were purged from all professionals considered as «unreliable». For example, 
in September 1991 more than 300 employees of Croatian national television 
were told that their entry passes were no longer valid – most of them were of 
Serb nationality or had Serb spouses or opinions not supporting the ruling 
party.  
Oberschall (2000, p. 987) claims that «the media unleashed the war of 
words and symbols before the war of bullets». In this war distortions, 
fabrications and pure lies were commonly used to such extent that they belied 
peoples’ personal experiences. For discerning the influence of the media on 
the behaviour of groups and individuals during break-up of Yugoslavia several 
important aspects of the Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav context need to be taken 
into account. Firstly, it is important to keep in mind that there was a lack of 
critical approach to the media, inherited from the socialist times, as explained 
in Chapter 4.  
The second aspect to be taken into account is the generalized loss of 
professional standards among media professionals in Serbia and in Croatia. 
The standards were «sacrificed to the national cause», which led not only to 
the uncritical nationalist discourse but also to the high levels of falsification of 
news. While serving the goals of the leadership of their ethnic group, many 
influential media workers disregarded all ethical and other professional norms 
and dedicated to fabrication of lies. The truth and objectivity were sacrificed at 
the altar of the homeland, transforming media into propaganda with agitating 
purposes. Fabricating news and lying became a norm required by the patriotic 
call to duty. As a plastic example of blind patriotism, Kurspahic (2003, p. 182) 
quotes a young female Croatian TV journalist who proudly announced on the 
air: «I am ready to lie for my homeland!».  
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The lack of critical approach and the high level of trust of the population to 
some of the key media outlets, combined with the loss of professional 
standards in those outlets, made the influence of the media strongly harmful. 
Serbian and Croatian leadership used similar methods to influence media 
outlets – they privatized them and seized control over them. In Croatia, the 
three key daily papers – Vjesnik, Vecernji list and Slobodna Dalmacija – 
became the voices of the regime.  
Unlike in Croatia and Serbia, in Bosnia-Herzegovina a number of media 
outlets remained loyal to the tradition of inter-ethnic tolerance. The most 
influential paper promoting responsible journalism was daily Oslobodjenje. 
After their premises were set afire from Serb positions, they continued 
publishing from a shelter underneath their building. The magazine Dani was 
another example of independent and critical medium in the country.  
According to Kurspahic (2003), the constant line of the Bosnian media in the 
months preceding wartimes was their opposition to war. However, during the 
war several media outlets – such as the magazine Ljiljan and the weekly Zmaj 
od Bosne – started promoting violence against non-Muslims. The a priori 
suspicion of Serb neighbors and the negative speech against so called mixed 
marriages were some of the key characteristics of extremist Muslim media. For 
example, Ljiljan was denouncing the mixed marriages as result of «ideological 
abuses» of the communist era and called the children of those marriages 
«disoriented» (Kurspahic, 2003, p. 117). 
A few media outlets in Serbia and Croatia refused to be manipulated and 
maintained integrity and high ethical values challenging the discourses of war. 
Their characteristics and influence will be explored in Chapter 6. 
 
5.8. Dominant discourses of violence: conclusions  
The above analysis of dominant discourses in Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina during 1991-1995 conflict indicates that national and international 
discourses of the ethnic nature of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia 
prevailed despite a number of voices providing clear arguments against such 
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understanding. Conceiving the conflict in ethnic terms legitimized ethnic 
fracturing as the only «imaginable solution» in the European context of nation 
states and nation state-like territories as homogeneous political spaces with a 
match of population, territory and destiny. 
Such «solution» disregarded the rich and complex history of group 
identification processes on the territory of the former Yugoslavia and continued 
imposing top-down identity categorization as had been the case also in the 
past. In the context of the dissolution of Yugoslav state, nationalist elites used 
and fomented the fears of the population in order to meet their own interests 
and goals. The salience of ethnic identities was instigated and other ethnic 
groups portrayed as enemies, with help, among other, of negative collective 
memories of inter-ethnic hostilities, which were revived to foster the feeling of 
unsafety.  
With support of the nationalist media and international community, ethnic 
leaders imposed themselves as saviours and succeeded in portraying violence 
as necessary and justified and promoting it among the population. Ethnic 
group identities developed new traits in which violence against out-groups was 
largely accepted and persons with insufficiently high levels of ethnic 
identification exposed to ostracism. All this supported the process of 
ethnicization of the violent conflict which several alternative voices tried to 
challenge and stop. Their efforts will be analysed in the next chapter of this 
study.  
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Chapter 6: Alternative voices: an overview of the evolution, key 
characteristics and influence of selected counter-discourses opposing 
war  
 
«The honesty of a nation reflects, among other, in its readiness 
to admit the atrocities which were committed in its name. That 
might be the highest level of the national feeling, the most noble 
and the most difficult at the same time» (Matvejevic, 1993) 
     
In this chapter I identify and explore some of the most prominent counter-
discourses at supra-local level to the discourse of war in the former Yugoslavia.  
As seen in Chapter 3, counter-discourses are defined by Jabri (1996, p. 7) as 
«those representations that deconstruct and delegitimize war» and thereby 
«fragment myths of unity, duty and conformity». My identification and analysis 
of counter-discourses does not pretend to be exhaustive, but rather illustrative. 
It aims at looking into several examples and key characteristics of counter-
discourse to the discourse of war at supra-local level before undertaking in-
depth analysis of two community experience of counter-discourse at local level 
in the oases of peace. Oriented by the three key themes of this study, I will 
analyse the «alternative social worlds» that these counter-discourses were 
proposing in terms of group identification, inter-group relations and 
governance.  
Alternative voices opposing discourses and practices of war in the 1990s 
disintegrating Yugoslavia originated mainly from the civil society movements 
and anti-war oriented media. In addition, numerous individuals with different 
levels of power, including a large number of draft evaders, stood up against 
pretended military solutions to the conflict in the country. Finally, specific 
communities, such as the two in the focus of Chapters 7 and 8, lived the 
experience of anti-war discourse as they rejected the discourse on the ethnic 
causes of the conflict and therefore opted for solutions which did not involve 
inter-ethnic fracturing and violence. I will first explore some of the key initiatives 
coming from the civil society organizations.  
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6.1. Civil society mobilizing against discourses and practices of war 
As we have seen in Chapter 4, in the former Yugoslavia there was a lack of 
critical civil society organizations. One-party system of governance and lack of 
freedom of expression prevented the evolution of political and other pluralism. 
Nevertheless, following significant changes in the political arena, civil society 
movements started developing in the 1980s, and some of them will play critical 
role in mobilizing citizens against massive organized violence in Croatia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.    
 With regard to the civil society counter-discourse in Serbia, one of the main 
voices of resistance to the discourses of violence came from the activists’s 
group Women in Black. Opposing militarism, war and masculine violent politics 
of Serbian leadership, this group organized its first action on October 9, 1991, 
starting a series of protest that would last throughout the war, but also after it. 
Inspired by similar movements in other parts of the world, such as Israel and 
Italy, Women in Black organized weekly vigils, which were charged with 
symbolism around three notions: black, silence and body. Every Wednesday 
from 1991 to 1996, they protested against violent events that were taking 
place, such as the aggression of the Serbian regime in Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the violent mobilization of men for war, the exodus of the Serbian 
civilian population from the region of Krajina in Croatia, and many others.  
As explained by Zajovic (2007), the symbols that Women in Black used were 
anti-patriarchal, alternative, subversive and rebellious. Black was used as a 
symbol of mourning for all the victims of war and violence in the former 
Yugoslavia. As quoted in Bilic (2015, p. 138), in 1992 Women in Black 
declared: 
«We are a group of women who stand in silence and dresses in black 
every week to express our disagreement with this war. We decided to 
show the women’s side of the war. In our countries women dress in black 
to show grievance for those who are close to them. We dress in black for 
all the victims of war. We dress in black because people are evicted from 
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their homes, because women are raped, because cities and villages are 
burnt down and destroyed»  
Silence was used to condemn those who produced war and violence. 
Zajovic (2007, p. 8) states: 
«We chose silence because we do not have the words to express the 
tragedy, suffering and pain produced by war and violence. We choose 
silence because we do not have the words to express our bitterness 
towards the state-organized crimes of the Milosevic regime (…) Silence 
is an invitation to understand and to listen to oneself and others». 
Silence was also used as a means of non-violent defense and a line dividing 
Women in Black from passers-by, as activists were making all efforts not to 
respond to the provocations from numerous observers. The third symbol 
Women in Black used was a body. The activists were using own bodies to 
protest in silence and were very often exposed to criticism, insults, threats and 
other forms of verbal and physical violence. With their bodies Women in Black 
have been literally and symbolically creating the space of freedom and 
empathy, space for alternative political views which were rejecting the culture 
of destruction and death.  
Nurturing dialogue among women from all warring sides, Women in Black 
were promoting group identification based on gender above ethnic group 
identification. They combined solidarity among women with solidarity among 
all those who were rejecting violence, in which effort they supported and were 
supported by male individuals and groups. As an example, during six months 
between October 1991 and February 1992, they joined citizens’ initiative 
holding daily antiwar candlelight vigils in front of the Serbian Presidency 
Building against the forced mobilization of men in Serbia, using the slogan 
«solidarity with all those who rebel against the war». They were proactively 
supporting conscientious objectors and draft evaders in Serbia, whose 
numbers reached tens of thousands.  
Protesting against atrocities orchestrated by Serbian authorities, Women in 
Black were a continuous reminder to the society in Serbia of all the evils that 
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were being committed «in their name». They challenged the concept of inter-
ethnic conflict and were systematically exposing the atrocities committed or 
instigated by their own government and requesting its accountability. As such, 
they were portrayed as traitors of own nation, often threatened and banned. 
The black color they were dressing was often associated with «dark and 
obscure powers». They were stigmatized, followed by police and the 
organization was exposed to court cases. However, throughout the war and 
after it, they remained a mirror of the Serbian society and – although protesting 
in silence - turned into one of the loudest counter-discourses to the discourse 
of violence in Serbia.  
The context in Croatia had many similarities, but also many differences 
when compared to the Serbian civil society resistance to violence. The key 
difference is clearly expressed by Ostric (2010, pp. 31-33), who was wondering 
how to be a pacifist in an attacked country. Analyzing the difference in the 
contexts of Croatia and Serbia, Ostric explains:  
«The war was taking place on others’ territory, nobody was threatening 
Serbia. The number of draft evaders (in Serbia) is high, they come out 
publically. The ethical dilemma is simple. But for the majority of Croats, 
this war was something very different. They were not called into the war, 
it came uninvited to them, to their towns and homes (…) Maybe at an 
earlier stage something could have been done differently, but the 
moment came when armed resistance was the only remaining choice».  
Although faced with such a dilemma, Croatian civil society did develop a 
counter-discourse to the discourse of violence, mostly gathering around the 
Anti-War Campaign initiated in Zagreb in July 1991. The Campaign initiated 
by a few people gradually grew into a network gathering local and international 
volunteers, working on a number of issues such as consciousness objection, 
support to refugees and displaced persons, education for peace, gathering 
data on war crimes, etc. A number of solid NGOs still operating in Croatia were 
born within the Anti-War Campaign, which was also publishing a paper titled 
ARK-zin. In Jankovic and Mokrovic (2011, p. 225), Bilic summarizes the work 
of the Anti-War Campaign in Croatia:  
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«Although they have never denied to their co-citizens the right to self-
defense, the activists of Anti-War Campaign struggled against the 
generalized militarization of the Croatian society, which would use the act 
of aggression as an excuse for the limitation in human rights. A lot of 
energy was invested into the preservation of communication channels in 
the region (…) which offered and alternative perspective and acted 
against the homogenization of the society based on the national issue». 
As a dissenting voice daring to propose non-violent solutions in the times 
when Croatia was under attack, and as such disrupting the homogenization 
based on ethnic belonging, activists of Anti-War Campaign were often exposed 
to harassment and criticism. Challenging the idea of courage as readiness to 
kill or die for the Homeland, Srdjan Dvornik (in Modric, 1993), one of the peace 
activists, pronounced the sentence used as the opening quote of this study: 
«Today the highest level of courage consists in stating that you don’t hate 
anyone and that you don’t want to kill anyone». 
The gender-related aspects of counter-discourses to the discourse of war 
merit to be stressed. The share of women’s participation in anti-war movement 
and women’s groups among all groups protesting against armed violence in 
most Yugoslav republics was very high. In Serbia, in addition to Women in 
Black, there were movements such as Women against War, the Women’s 
Antiwar Caucus and the Women’s Parliament (Torov, 2000). In Croatia, 
mothers of the young men who were serving their military service in the 
Yugoslav National Army (YNA) in 1991 launched an appeal to the leadership 
of Yugoslavia and its army trying to prevent that their sons are sent into a 
fratricidal war. On January 18 and 19, at the main square in Zagreb, they 
collected over 64 000 signatures to that appeal and handed them over to Stipe 
Mesic, Croatian member of presidency of Yugoslavia.  
In late August 1991, forming the movement named Mothers for Peace, they 
organized a March for peace with thousands of people walking to Belgrade 
with a clear request to the YNA leadership: «give us our sons back!». 
Thousands of mothers from Croatia, but also from Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Macedonia, Serbia and Kosovo, marched to Belgrade to meet with the YNA 
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leadership. Their positions and expectations were clear: by marching together, 
they rejected in practice the view on the ethnic nature of the conflict. By 
requesting that their sons are released from the army, they rejected the idea 
of their sons dying for any political aims. However, they were not received by 
army officials and returned disappointed on October 30th, 1991. On the same 
day a massive antiwar protest was organized in front of the office of the 
Command of the fifth military region of YNA in Zagreb. 
Antiwar protests as a counter-discourse to violence were organized also in 
other republics. A series of demonstrations against the war took place in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, culminating in the major protest organized in Sarajevo 
on April 5, 1992. Between 50.000 and 100.000 citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
of all nationalities (Malcolm, 1994) gathered to protest against violence and 
divisions. Sniper fire was opened on the protesters from Holiday Inn hotel, 
which was under control of Serbian Democratic Party. Two female students, a 
Muslim and a Croat, were among six victims that were killed by nationalists in 
Sarajevo that day, announcing the horrors that this city and its citizens would 
go through in the years to come. In Serbia, the demonstration of solidarity with 
people of Sarajevo gathered a column of 150.000 citizens carrying a black 
ribbon in silence through downtown Belgrade. 
Many actors of resistance (including the communities in the oases of peace) 
offered alternative views on the parties in conflict through insisting on the 
concept of citizenship, civic life and civilization. One of those actors was the 
organization Serb Civic Council (SCC), which supported the sovereignty of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and opposed the ethnicization of Bosnian politics. In a 
proclamation issued to the Serb people in Bosnia in July 1995, quoted by 
Campbell (1998, pp 46-47), the Council calls on the Serbs in Bosnia-
Herzegovina to return to their anti-fascist traditions and respect the legitimate 
authorities of the country which guarantee equal human and civil rights for all 
citizens, irrespective of their ethnic belonging. This message resume some of 
the key characteristics of the anti-war discourse: it was building on the grounds 
of Yugoslav experience of anti-fascism described in Chapter 4, as opposed to 
neo-fascist tendencies of new nationalist leaders; it was insisting on equality 
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of citizens as opposed to de facto inequality based on minority/majority 
dynamics; it was inviting citizens to respect the legitimate authorities, as 
opposed to supporting parallel civil and military structures that were being put 
in place by nationalists. The ideas promoted in this proclamation will prove to 
be some of the key characteristics of the counter-discourse to the discourses 
of violence in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as will be seen through the 
examples of oases of peace in the continuation of this document.  
This was also the political agenda of the Union of Reform Forces (URF), the 
non-nationalist political party in Bosnia-Herzegovina which had very little 
electoral success, winning majority only in the city of Tuzla in the 1990s 
elections. The general term that was used in Tuzla and more broadly in Bosnia-
Herzegovina opposing to nationalism and tribalism was the term «citizens’ 
option». This was and remains an important alternative view on the group 
identities and the war. As a Bosnian army commander, quoted by Campbell 
(1998, p. 47), stated: «(the war is) about civilization. It’s not an ethnic war; it is 
a war of ordinary people against primitive men who want to carry us back to 
tribalism».  
The voices of the anti-war civil society movements were echoed by several 
independent anti-war oriented media outlets, which will be analysed below. 
 
6.2. Anti-war media defending professional and ethical standards 
As we have seen in Chapter 4, in Yugoslavia there was no tradition of critical 
media. Accustomed to serve as means of propaganda for the ruling party, most 
media outlets simply switched from communist to nationalist owners, joining 
and supporting their nationalist goals. However, a few media outlets refused 
to become part of the war propaganda and, at great personal and institutional 
sacrifice, defended professional standards and ethical values above the 
patriotic call of duty (Kurspahic, 2003). The examples of such outlets include 
daily papers Borba in Serbia and Slobodna Dalmacija in Croatia at the very 
beginning of the war. Apart from their anti-violence approach, they have in 
common the method by which they were silenced by the nationalist elites – 
through “privatization”, by imposing new nationalist editors and editorial politics 
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that made the professional journalists resign and join or form new, independent 
outlets.  
Already in the late 1980s, years before the outbreak of armed violence, 
Borba was loudly warning about dangers of rising nationalism and 
demagoguery of the Serbian regime. It attracted top level journalists who were 
abandoning other media to join this prestigious paper. Milosevic tried several 
methods to silence Borba, including by causing artificial shortages of printing 
paper and supplies. Several Borba’s journalists were kidnapped in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The pressures culminated with the annulation of the privatization 
of Borba by the public prosecutor in 1994 and imposition of the new, regime-
controlled editor, after which the majority of journalists left Borba, and some of 
them formed a new daily called Nasa Borba (Torov, 2000).  
Slobodna Dalmacija, an influential daily paper published in the city of Split 
in Croatia, denounced in 1991 Croatian violations of the human rights of Serbs 
– an issue that no other media in Croatia dared to deal with (Balas, 2000). The 
political leadership in Croatia decided to solve this “problem” by privatizing the 
paper through issuance of stock, after which it imposed an editor obedient to 
the nationalist elites. Just like in the case of Borba in Serbia, most quality 
journalist left the paper. Several of them then formed what would become a 
journalistic masterpiece of resistance to violence and human rights violations, 
a politico-satirical weekly Feral Tribune.  
Published in June 1993, in the midst of the war in Croatia, the first issue of 
Feral Tribune proclaimed that the aim of the magazine was «mobilization till 
the final victory of reason in the Homeland war». By indicating that «only if you 
laugh from ear to ear, you can actually show that you are armed to teeth», the 
editors announced their goal to oppose violence and madness by combining 
humor with the top level political and social analysis. One of the most important 
contributions of this magazine was in revealing the hidden objectives of the 
ruling elites, warning about their existence and questioning their justness. The 
magazine has been informing about the progressive enrichment of the elites 
including president’s family, who were profiting of the process of privatization 
of state properties taking place in the chaotic war-time circumstances and 
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characterized by the highest levels of corruption. In this way, the magazine 
was challenging the dominant discourse about parties in conflict and the aims 
of the «Homeland» war.  
When in his famous speech, held on the central square in Zagreb in 1992, 
the Croatian president Tudjman exclaimed: «We have our own Croatia! It’s 
ours and it will be the way we want it to be!», the message was mainly 
understood as reaffirming Croatian sovereignty and independence. However, 
the evolving socio-political situation in the country raised concerns about the 
meaning of the terms “we” and “ours” in Tudjman’s statement and the potential 
unveiled objectives of the Croatian political leadership and elites, camouflaged 
under the discourse of Croatian autonomy.  
Furthermore, Feral Tribune was unveiling the involvement of the Croatian 
political and military elites in the partition of the territory of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The major shift in the Croatian politics, from the defensive war 
in Croatia to the aggressive war with hegemonic aspirations in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, strongly challenged the positive self-image of Croats as victims 
of the armed conflict. That self-image was further challenged by Feral’s 
systematic denouncing of serious human rights violations of Serbs and other 
minority groups in Croatia, through forced evictions, dismissal from work and 
other forms of abuse. Through its work Feral Tribune provided an alternative 
approach to patriotism, courage and loyalty to the nation, which was also 
reflected in the work of Women in Black in Serbia, and can be summarized in 
the words of Predrag Matvejevic in the opening quote of this chapter. 
Challenging the dominant discourse on the parties in conflict as “Croats 
versus Serbs” with a counter-discourse on the parties in conflict as “Rational 
people versus Irrational people”, considering as true patriots all those who 
stood up against violence or rejected to participate in it, in opposition to the 
“false” patriots who were using the war to attain their own economic and 
political interests, Feral Tribune was a source of relief and strength to many 
citizens. The manifestation of its power is clearly reflected in the fact that 
dominant elites in Croatia invested numerous efforts to close the paper down. 
From the imposition of special taxes, through the court cases against its 
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journalists, to drafting of one of the editors into the army and directly 
threatening its staff, many attempts were undertaken by the elites to shut Feral 
Tribune down. However, not only did the magazine survive war and post-war 
period, but for many citizens it became a daily «source of mental hygiene», as 
observed by Dinka Corkalo Biruski in a documentary film «A Mirror of Evolving 
Society» (Gariwosa, 2012). Like a true mirror, Feral Tribune was making its 
readers face many unpleasant truths, but also encouraging them to think 
critically and act as responsible citizens, which was a unique endeavour of 
great intellectual, practical and moral weight. 
The media that maintained integrity against all odds during war in the former 
Yugoslavia also included monthly Republika and Radio B92 in Serbia. In 
Croatia, regional Novi list published in Rijeka maintained a moderate and non-
nationalist approach. Zagreb-based Radio 101 was another voice of freedom. 
It irritated the nationalists in power to the extent that it took mass street protests 
of citizens in 1996 – with some 120.000 people attending the protest – to 
prevent the authorities from closing it.  
In Bosnia-Herzegovina the mass media environment was different, because 
the key media outlets including Sarajevo Radio and Television as well as the 
daily paper Oslobodjenje managed to maintain independence from nationalist 
parties.  Kurspahic (2003, p. 96), the former editor of Oslobodjenje, recalls:  
«The SDP regularly charged that we were anti-Serbian, CDU that we 
were anti-Croat, and SDA that we were anti-Muslim. “We wouldn’t be so 
good if we were not so bad!” Oslobodjenje answered the criticism, 
borrowing from an ad for a controversial New York radio station and 
finding the attacks by nationalists in power the best investment in our 
credibility».  
The struggle of nationalists against the anti-war media included destruction 
of transmitters of Sarajevo Television. Most media workers were under 
constant threat of armed violence. In addition to that, Oslobodjenje and other 
print media were struggling with the shortage of newsprint. Despite all odds, 
they continued publishing and struggling for a truly multi-ethnic Bosnia-
Herzegovina. In addition to Oslobodjenje, magazines such as BH Dani and 
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Slobodna Bosna were amongst the most influential wartime print media 
maintaining a critical view against nationalism. Despite all their efforts, just like 
in Croatia and Serbia, the media outlets in Bosnia-Herzegovina offering critical 
and independent views and denouncing widespread violence had only limited 
influence on the course of the events in the former Yugoslavia. 
 
6.3. «Narod» («people») versus «politika» («politics)»: the use of the term 
«narod» as a counter-discourse and an alternative view on group 
belonging and parties in conflict 
The great complexity of social identification processes in Croatia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina was explored in Chapter 4. Several supra-ethnic terms 
evolved (such as Yugoslavs, Bosnians), complementing or substituting the 
ethnic classification of citizens. An additional concept which is worth exploring 
and will be analysed because it became part of the counter-discourse to the 
discourse of ethnic conflict, is a polyvalent term «narod».  
 This multi-functional notion is used in a variety of meanings. In 
administrative terms and in the framework of dominant discourses, the term 
refers to the «nation». However, in the popular discourse it is used to describe 
«common people», «peoplehood» or «folk», implying a different type of group 
identity. This popular meaning can be illustrated with a quote from the news of 
Radio Delnice in Gorski kotar emitted on the 17 of September 1991, when the 
term «narod» was used four times in two sentences, while informing on the 
arrival of the new commander of the Yugoslav National Army to Delnice:  
«The fact that he came to Delnice in a very crucial time – after departure 
of the commander whom narod trusted, was the first topic of our 
conversation, together with his own attitude toward narod, toward his 
military duties, the infrastructure that narod built and offered to its army. 
The people of Gorski kotar, all the narod of Delnice, lived until recently 
together with the soldiers from all Yugoslavia». 
During the 1991-1995 war the evolution of the two-fold meaning of the term 
«narod» reached highly opposing meanings. In its meaning of «nation» the 
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term became highly exclusive, following the rise in the salience of national 
identities and their increasingly restrictive constitutive norms described in 
Chapter 5. At the same time, the same term «narod» remained highly inclusive 
when referring to common folk. Hromadzic (2014, p. 266) describes the later 
use of this term as «unsettled, non-threatening and apparently apolitical notion 
to provide a space for solidarity and “popular politics”». She further observes 
a discursive mechanism that opposes «narod» to «politika», i.e. peoplehood 
from the political elites which implied injustice, corruption and immoral force of 
the politics, beyond and above ethnic divisions. In this context she notes: 
«Narod is thus excluded from the benefits of the war and financial gains, which 
renders it “clean” of dirty political agendas, yet marginal and victimized, and 
contributing to its own oppression» (Hromadzic, 2014, p. 266).  
I found evidence of such use of the term «narod» in the interviewees 
conducted in the two oases of peace. 
«Narod would never destroy all those resources…. But it was in the 
interest of representatives of ethnic corpuses!» (Interviewee 13, from 
Tuzla) 
«Narod was easily fooled, they were receiving confusing messages from 
different sides, but those up above were pulling the strings» (Interviewee 
4, from Gorski kotar) 
  As we can see from the above, the term «narod» was used as a counter-
discourse to the discourse of ethnic divisions, as resistance to ethnic 
classification and sign of solidarity among ethnically divided people. Such use 
of the term «narod» is clearly supporting an alternative perception of 
opponents in the 1991-1995 violent conflict. The prevailing view about the 
conflict among different ethnic groups is challenged by the idea that the parties 
in conflict were political elites from all ethnic groups, as equally corrupt and 
self-interested, on the one side, and narod from all ethnic groups, who was 
paying the price of their political agendas, on the other side. However, this type 
of counter-discourse remained of low influence while the ethnic discourse 
prevailed and remained dominant. The imposition of the ethnic partition of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina by local nationalist projects and international policies has 
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flattened the multi-layered social identity discourses (Hromadzic, 2013) and 
directed the discussion on the causes and possible solutions of the Bosnia-
Herzegovina problem towards ethnic identity. A similar process took part in 
Croatia, reducing the variety of social identities to a single dimension - the 
ethnic one. 
 
6.4. Silenced or marginalized: limited influence of alternative voices on 
the course of events in the former Yugoslavia 
As indicated by Jabri (1996, p.5), in wars «[a]ffiliation and identity come to 
be defined in terms of exclusionist social boundaries. To be a dissenting voice 
is to be an outsider, who is often branded as a traitor to the cause and, 
therefore, deserving of sacrifice at the mythical altar of solidarity. What would 
previously have been blurred social boundaries become sharpened primarily 
through a discursive focus upon features, both symbolic and material, which 
divide communities to the extent that the desire for destruction of the enemy is 
perceived to be the only legitimate or honourable course to follow».  
Indeed, alternative voices in the former Yugoslavia challenging the 
legitimacy and the widespread acceptance of violence, uncovering a variety of 
aspects of violence and proposing a different discourse on its causes, actors 
and aims, or simply proposing non-violent solutions to the existing problems, 
were regularly blamed as traitors and their efforts were frequently undermined. 
Different pejorative terms, such as «foreign mercenaries», «Yugo-nostalgics», 
«enemies of the Homeland» and others, were used to discredit them in the 
larger public.  
Jabri (1996, p. 97) further explains that mobilization of support for war is 
built upon representations of grievance, whereby sectional interests usually 
applicable to the elites are represented as grievances applicable to the entirety 
of the community. This is why there are two aspects of discourse of war that 
need to be closely looked into with a critical eye: who are the parties in conflict, 
and what is the issue over which the conflict is fought. Different alternative 
voices and counter-discourses to the discourse of war posed these two 
questions and most often were either disregarded or exposed to public 
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criticism because, as Jabri (1996) explains, nonconformity or dissent is 
conceived as treachery against not simply the leadership, but the community 
as a whole, and any contradictions are either directly prevented from reaching 
the political agenda or are negated in the name of a mythical solidarity against 
a constructed common enemy.  
In that context, alternative voices in the former Yugoslavia were often a 
target of hostility and stigmatization by the dominant discourse. As they were 
not representing the national elites, they were subjected to suspicion of 
representing some illegitimate interest which were a threat to the national 
interest. This is well reflected in the words of Franjo Tudjman, who was furious 
after his return from USA in 1996 when he found out that 120.000 Croatian 
citizens protested against the closure of Radio 101, the only critical voice in 
the electronic media. Tudjman’s words reflect well his perception of the 
«alternative voices» in Croatia: 
«We will not let those remnants of the Yugo-Communist system, nor 
those of the Yugo-Serbian one, (…) nor to those political amateurs, 
headless scatter-brains, who don’t see what is really at stake today in 
Croatia and in the world with all sorts of regional plans (…). We will not 
allow those who tie themselves even with the black devil against Croatian 
freedom and independence. Not only to the black, but also to green and 
yellow devils (…)» (Franjo Tudjman at Zagreb airport, November 1996).   
Moderate and alternative voices in the former Yugoslavia were marginalized 
and silenced by a variety of methods applied by the dominant nationalist 
forces. Their electoral defeat in most of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and great part of Croatia was largely due to the nationalists persuading the 
population that splitting the «ethnic vote» would expose them to a threat by the 
opposite ethnic group. Furthermore, despite many efforts of the civil society in 
most republics to organize massive protests against the mounting violence, 
the lack of tradition of civil disobedience in the former Yugoslavia turned out to 
be a major handicap and took a huge toll on the antiwar movement, which 
remained fairly isolated and unable to inspire the support of wider populations. 
Coupled with that, the lack of experience and limitations to the influence of 
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critical, independent media should be taken into account. Although among the 
wartime media there were alternative voices that were antinationalistic, critical 
and ethical, most of them were of limited reach and the nationalistic outlets 
were much more vocal. For instance, Milosevic had control over 90 per cent of 
Serbian media, and even used the existence of the alternative media as proof 
of free press in Serbia. Tudjman also got into control of all major media outlets 
in Croatia, which enjoyed his political and economic support.  
In addition to political pressures, anti-war movements and independent 
media outlets were exposed to economic hardship. While the official press 
under control of the authorities was state-subsidised, the independent media 
had to face the challenge of economic crisis which was affecting both their 
ability to publish in combination with the readers’ declining standard of living 
including capability to continue buying and consuming independent media. 
Furthermore, court cases against independent media with severe economic 
consequences were another tool often used to silence the counter-discourse. 
Kurspahic (2003) further explains that the success of the nationalists in 
silencing alternative media should be observed in the context of the public that 
had been unused to critical media of different sources: the Yugoslav public had 
only been exposed to the communist-controlled media, which was now 
replaced by nationalist-controlled media. The lack of tradition of independent 
media caused a lack of critical approach to the media contents. 
Furthermore, journalists from the independent media were often targeted by 
the warring sides. Several Borba journalists were kidnapped by Bosnian Serbs 
in 1992. Just like all other groups and individuals opposing war methods, they 
were publically denounced as anti-patriots, traitors and foreign mercenaries. 
As many initiatives related to independent media and anti-war discourse were 
funded by Soros Foundation, hostility towards that foundation developed top-
down. Those working on projects funded by them were tagged with a pejorative 
term “Soros’s people” (Sorosevci), which implied that they were not patriot but 
sold themselves to the foreign power. 
As summarized by Gagnon (2004), conservative forces in Serbia and 
Croatia used strategies of demobilization of alternative, non-violent forces to 
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avoid fundamental economic and political changes. «By using the image and 
discourse of injustices being perpetrated against innocent civilians by evil 
others defined in ethnic terms conservative elites managed successfully to 
divert attention away from the demands for change (…) The violence served 
to reconstruct political space at home, in Serbia and in Croatia, by disqualifying 
anyone who disagreed with the president or the ruling party as enemies of 
justice, as either dupes or tools of the evil forces responsible for these 
injustices, as traitors» (Gagnon, 2004, pp. 181-182). In such circumstances, 
the dominant discourses of war gained widespread acceptance, imposing 
violence as inevitable, legitimate and effective way of «solving the problem». 
 
6.5. Alternative voices: conclusions  
In this chapter I presented and analysed a selection of counter-discourses 
to the discoursed of war, originating from Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Serbia. The analysis of those counter-discourses shows that several of them 
attempted to problematize the problem, i.e. challenge the way the problem of 
violence in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina was conceptualized, questioning 
its ethnic «nature». They often recognized and warned about nationalism as a 
main cause of conflict. In this context they opposed ethnic identification with 
the group identification category of citizens, as a supra-ethnic category of 
equal individual right-holders in a specific state. This distinction between 
nation-state or nation-state-like territory as a «war trophy» and a state as an 
organized community equally accountable to all its citizens, proved as a key 
difference in the conceptualization and consequent actions of nationalists and 
non-nationalists.  
 By unveiling the hidden agendas of the political elites, the counter-
discourses proposed different classification of inter-group relationships and 
parties in conflict. Their «alternative versions of truth» included strong 
evidence that relevant inter-group relations in the conflict included «politicians 
versus the folks», «rationality versus irrationality» or «tribalism versus 
civilization». Many anti-war initiatives, particularly those initiated by groups of 
women, engaged members of different ethnic groups in demanding peace, 
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therefore showing in practice that members of different ethnic groups had 
common goals. 
All counter-discourses challenged the ways in which the problem in Croatia 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina was being addressed, i.e. they protested against the 
widespread violence and other types of massive human rights violations and 
requested that solutions to be found in constructive manner. Rejecting the 
generalized idea about inevitability of violence, they were requesting 
accountability of the governing bodies and respect for the rule of law. With their 
own actions, they were fighting for freedom of speech and critical media as 
prerequisites of democratic societies.  
Although alternative voices to the discourse of violence were present in all 
former Yugoslavia, their influence on the evolution of the situation in Croatia 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina remained limited. Further research would be needed 
to determine the scope of effects that they had on the societies affected by 
conflict. The existing analysis shows that dominant discourses overrode them 
by spreading inter-group fear and imposing the narrative of the ethnic conflict 
as «the truth». In such context, ethnic group leaders imposed and were 
accepted by international and local communities as the only ones with 
narrative authority, marginalizing the counter-discourses. In addition to that, 
the elites in the new post-Yugoslav countries made systematic efforts to 
silence counter-discourses. They were sanctioned in different ways for not 
serving the «patriotic duty» of spreading nationalism - they were regularly 
tagged as traitors, suffered threats, financial cuts, attempts of military 
mobilization, etc.  
In addition to the initiatives coming from the civil society or media, alternative 
discourses in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina included community based 
type of resistance to ethnic fracturing and violence. In many villages, towns 
and cities local communities attempted to resist to the dominant narrative on 
the ethnic nature of the war. Nevertheless, this resistance was successful till 
the end of the war in only two major communities, the one of Gorski kotar in 
Croatia and the one of Tuzla in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Their experiences are 
documented and analysed in the following two Chapters.  
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Chapter 7: Ethnically mixed communities as a counter-discourse (I): case 
study from the region of Gorski kotar in Croatia 
 
«Our Serb neighbours, most of them, stayed with us here; our 
destinies remained interconnected, without blooded hands, 
arson and conflict. The displaced persons, who came to our 
place “for a short time” from their regions, with plastic bags full of 
memories, and stayed forever, often looked with reservation at 
our different approach to the situation. For them we might have 
been the people with insufficient Croat-hood, with lack of 
motivation for the war. But today they recognize and tell us: you 
did what had be done to save us all».  (Nada Glad, in Horvat, 
2003, p. 151) 
 
In this chapter I will analyse the discourses and practices that prevailed in 
the region of Gorski kotar in Croatia during wartime, focusing on the three key 
themes of this study, namely group identification processes, inter-group 
relations and governance. My analysis is based on the gathered pre-existing 
texts and on the interviews with nine citizens of that region conducted between 
2014 and 2016.  
As explained in Chapter 3, the discourses which are central for this study 
include institutional texts, political discourses, media discourses and 
textbooks, therefore these types of discourses are central to this chapter. The 
period in the focus of this chapter includes the initial months of the war in 
Croatia in the second half of 1991, when the overall tone was set, and the time 
of several key events occurred during the war, which in the case of Gorski 
kotar include the departure of Yugoslav National Army (YNA) from the town of 
Delnice in 1991, holding of the meeting of Croat and Serb communal leaders 
in September 1992 and the establishment of the Peace school in August 1994.  
In the initial section of this chapter I will elaborate on several historical and 
social aspects relevant for the evolution of the community resistance to ethnic 
fracturing and other types of violence in Gorski kotar.  
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Administrative map of Gorski kotar, Croatia (Coprnicka hisa, 2017) 
 
 
7.1 Gorski kotar in context: the region that connects people 
Even the shortest texts on the Croatian region of Gorski kotar bring attention 
of the reader to its significant role of a junction of several roads connecting 
central Europe and northern Adriatic (Markovic, 2003). The monography 
Gorski kotar (1981, p. 7) presents the region as «a significant territory of 
contact and connection» between the Croatian coast and the interior. Situated 
in Western Croatia, on the border with Slovenia, this region extends over some 
1270 square kilometres, covering approximately 2.2 per cent of the territory of 
the Republic of Croatia. The large proportion of the region, approximately 63 
per cent, is covered by forests. The limits of the region of Gorski kotar are only 
partly defined. Drawing a parallel between these physical characteristics of 
Gorski kotar and the ways in which its inhabitants preserved peace during 
the1991-1995 war, one could observe that Gorski kotar is characterized by 
connectedness and inclusiveness.  
 156   
 
According to the 2001 census, Gorski kotar had around 27,000 inhabitants. 
Administratively, the region is part of the Primorsko-Goranska County of 
Croatia. The centre of the region is the town of Delnice. The nine municipalities 
of Gorski kotar include Brod Moravice, Ravna Gora, Mrkopalj, Skrad, Fuzine 
and Lokve (see map).  
The geographical characteristics of Gorski kotar, including scarcity of fertile 
land and rough mountain climate with abundance of rain and snow, made this 
area less attractive for settling then the neighbouring Adriatic coast and other 
nearby locations. Furthermore, parts of this area were inhabited and de-
habited on several occasions due to important historical developments. One 
of those was the expansion of the Ottoman Empire in the 16th and 17th 
centuries, which caused the departure of large proportions of autochthonous 
population towards safer areas13. When safety levels increased in the 17th and 
18th centuries, many of their descendants returned to Gorski kotar, bringing 
back a wealth of cultural influences, including the extraordinary linguistic 
variety maintained until present.  
As elaborated in Chapter 4, in order to protect the population from the 
incursions of the Ottomans, from 16th century the authorities of Habsburg 
Monarchy start forming a special cordon area called Vojna Krajina or Military 
Frontier. South-eastern parts of Gorski kotar, including the municipalities of 
Mrkopalj and Vrbovsko, made part of Vojna Krajina, which strongly influenced 
their demographic structure. Fleeing the Ottoman territories or attracted by the 
privileges offered by the Habsburg authorities in exchange for their military 
services against Ottomans, a high number of Vlachs moved to the area of 
Military Frontier. Many of them remained in Gorski kotar, as its inhabitants of 
Orthodox religion. According to Markovic (2003, p. 30), «at the beginning of 
the 19th century they embraced the Serbian national feeling and since then 
stopped being called Vlachs». 
                                                          
13 Ottoman intrusions were not carried out by the ethnic Turks, but by the population called Vlachs, 
described in Chapter 3. They were mostly, although not exclusively, of Orthodox religion, which they 
adopted after the 1054 Great Schism, together with the Serbs. During the Ottoman expansion to 
Serbia, many Vlachs joined the Ottoman forces as members of their armed personnel, performing 
intrusions into different areas, including into parts of Gorski kotar. 
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The history and social development of Gorski kotar were strongly influenced 
by the construction of the roads. Three important roads that transformed 
Gorski kotar into a significant transit area were built in the 18th century, during 
the French rule. Furthermore, following the construction of the railway line 
between Zagreb and Rijeka, a significant number of people arrived to the area 
of Gorski kotar in search of employment. Horvat (2003) stresses the high levels 
of education of a large share of that population, observable among other in the 
high number of libraries that were operational in a very small geographical 
area. Additionally, Horvat notes that the incoming population brought the 
culture of social activities, making Gorski kotar a place where some of the first 
civil society organizations promoting cultural and other activities in Croatia 
were formed. He further points at the fact that the characteristics of the 
geographic space – particularly its very small habitable surface – did not allow 
for the separation of people along ethnic lines.  
Although in Gorski kotar there are several villages with large majority of 
Croats or of Serbs, these villages situated in the same narrow geographic area. 
This might have contributed to the development of «an autochthonous 
mentality of Gorski kotar, impregnated by more or less strong influences of 
those groups. Taking into account the way it was formed, the main common 
characteristic of that mentality includes tolerance towards a newcomer, 
accompanied by the tendency to adopt new ideas» (Horvat, 2003, p. 18). All 
indicates that the features of the geographic space influenced the shaping of 
the social space in Gorski kotar and contributed to its people’s tendency 
towards inclusiveness and tolerance. 
The variety of origins of the inhabitants of Gorski kotar is clearly reflected in 
their linguistic diversity. There is no other place in Croatia where so many 
dialects and different accents co-exist on such a small territory. Without any 
difficulties in understanding each other, many people still keep their dialects 
and small linguistic diversities reflected in their speech. This diversity can be 
observed sometimes even in the smallest hamlets, where neighbours speak 
with different accents. In my view, this indicates that people of Gorski kotar do 
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not have a tendency to assimilate others but rather maintain and cherish their 
diversity, respecting and valuing their differences.  
Noting that in the past several imaginary lines of defence were passing 
through Gorski kotar, Horvat (2003) points at some negative impacts of the 
geostrategic importance of this area. Due to its mountainous topography and 
limited accessibility, the region was found to be propitious for storing large 
amounts of weaponry and other war-related items. During Ottoman empire 
Gorski kotar was the border area of the Military Frontier, during WWII the line 
dividing Italy and Independent State of Croatia (ISC) was passing through its 
centre, while during the time of Yugoslavia the YNA deposited large amounts 
of artillery in the area of Delnice, which became a major threat to the local 
population in 1991.     
The beginning of WWII brought the division of the territory of Gorski kotar 
between two notorious regimes of the Axis Powers. The western part of the 
region was annexed to the Kingdom of Italy under fascist rule, together with 
large part of the Croatian coast. The rest of the region of Gorski kotar got under 
the rule of the ISC. Based on its principles of racism and ethnic intolerance 
described in Chapter 4, the ISC regime disseminated terror and violence 
particularly against the population of Serbian ethnic belonging, triggering inter-
ethnic resentments. The monography Gorski kotar (1981) indicates that during 
the first months of ISC rule in the municipality of Srpske Moravice and the 
neighbouring Serbian villages the Ustashas had arrested, imprisoned, 
expelled or killed several hundreds of persons. At the same time, the fascist 
Italy was supporting the aims and the actions of the Chetnik movement, which 
tried to establish Greater Serbia by perpetrating ethnic cleansing of Croats 
from several areas (Goldstein, 2013).  
The National Liberation Movement (NLM) led by the Communist party, 
which was formed as an act of resistance to the Axis Powers, gained large 
support in Gorski kotar. The NLM and its members, the Partisans, were 
opposing ethnic divisions and promoting the idea of brotherhood and unity of 
Southern Slavs, as we have seen in Chapter 4. A number of armed clashes 
between Partisans and the Axis forces took place in the region of Gorski kotar, 
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resulting in high number of deaths and injuries, numerous displacements and 
massive destruction of the infrastructure. A large number of the inhabitants of 
Gorski kotar joined the NLM where, regardless of their ethnic origin, they 
struggled together for the same cause.  
The aftermath of the WWII saw the reconstruction of the infrastructure and 
the development of the region, particularly through the wood industry. Gorski 
kotar turned into a peaceful and modest region in Yugoslavia, where ethnic 
diversity was respected and celebrated. It was mostly during the census, 
undertaken every 10 years on average, and then during the 1990 elections, 
that people were reminded of their ethnicity and requested to choose «a box» 
defining their own ethnic identity. Changing and sometimes confusing 
categories, described in Chapter 5, and the previously analysed malleability of 
group identities, led to the results as described by one of my respondents:  
«There is a place named Tuk which is partially Orthodox. One side of 
Tuk, maybe some 20-30 per cent of the people, are Catholic, the rest are 
Orthodox. Some people declared as Serbs, others as Croats of Orthodox 
faith.» (Interviewee 1) 
According to the 1991 census, the majority of Serbs in Gorski kotar lived in 
the Municipality of Vrbovsko, making 2594 out of the total number of 7527 of 
its inhabitants. Serbs also lived in other areas of south-eastern Gorski kotar. 
Although during 1990 the nationalist party Croatian Democratic Union (CDU) 
won the majority both in the Parliament and in most localities in Croatia, in 
Delnice and most other towns of Gorski kotar it was the League of Communists 
of Croatia – Party of Democratic Reform (LCC-PDR) that was elected. As a 
successor of Yugoslav Communist party, this League continued to promote 
inter-ethnic cooperation.  
At the beginning of the war in Croatia the population of Gorski kotar was 
faced with two major and to some extent interlinked immediate threats. One 
was the threat of ethnic divisions and growing inter-ethnic tensions that were 
occurring in most places with heterogeneous population of Croats and Serbs. 
The other one was the threat to the lives of all inhabitants due to the presence 
of extremely large quantities of weaponry and explosives belonging to YNA. 
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With wisdom, good governance and constructive conflict management the 
authorities and other inhabitants of Gorski kotar managed to overcome those 
threats and preserved their major social capital – the peace. Their discourses 
and practices related to social identities played a very significant role in this 
success. They will be analysed in the forthcoming section.  
 
7.2. “We, the people of Gorski kotar”: social identity discourses and their 
link to the perception on parties in conflict 
7.2.1. On social identities in Gorski kotar 
Literally all persons that I interviewed in Gorski kotar referred to themselves 
at some point of the interviewee as «we, the people of Gorski kotar» (mi 
Gorani). They were unanimous in claiming that there are some specific traits 
of the Gorski kotar social identity, to which they referred in positive terms and 
with pride. Some interviewees were prompted to talk about their social identity, 
but most mentioned it spontaneously as an important aspect of their life. The 
analysed data shows that the belonging to the social group of «the people of 
Gorski kotar» has been a salient aspect of their group identity during wartime 
in Croatia, and remains such until today.  
«We are not homogeneous. We are neither for one side, nor for the other 
[laughter]. The region of Gorski kotar is not an aggressive region. We are 
relatively peace-loving». (Interviewee 1) 
«What made the difference here? Look, the people of Gorski kotar are so 
peaceful». (Interviewee 6) 
«Gorski kotar is special. It comes to my mind that this is because it is 
among the highest places in Croatia. It occurs to me that we are a bit 
closer to the sky and to the clouds which do not shoot at each other; the 
stars don’t shoot at each other either». (Franjo Starcevic, in Nansen 
dialogue center Osijek, 2009)  
With no intention of undertaking a comprehensive analysis of the Gorski 
kotar social identity, I will attempt to discern several of its characteristics 
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relevant for this study by applying the conceptual framework of Abdelal et al. 
(2009) presented in Chapter 3. In my analysis I found evidence that the content 
of social identity of Gorski kotar contributed to the preservation of peace in that 
region through the attachment of in-groups to specific norms, relational 
comparisons, worldviews and social purposes which were opposing to inter-
group violence, and which were in clear collision with the brusque changes in 
the content of ethnic identities. 
Referring to the social identity of Gorski kotar, Franjo Starcevic (2003) 
poetically talks about it as «the soul of Gorski kotar». Horvat (2003) links the 
traits of this «soul» to the specific geographic characteristics of Gorski kotar, 
particularly to the limited inhabitability of its space. He considers that the 
characteristics of the terrain did not allow for the physical separation of living 
space of the ethnic groups, which contributed to the cohabitation and 
developed into one of the main common characters of the population of Gorski 
kotar, which he calls «tolerance»: 
 «The stressful and decisive events that took place later make me believe 
that it was precisely that inherited component [tolerance] which had a 
decisive role in our approach to negotiations. At the beginning of 
negotiations, one needed to find enough strength to go and extend a 
hand. Little by little it became clear that human beings were sitting on 
both sides of the table». (Horvat, 2003, p. 18) 
Tolerance, as referred to by Horvat (2003), entails several very important 
aspects of the content of social identity of Gorski kotar, comprising 
inclusiveness, openness to dialogue and tendency to cooperate. Inclusiveness 
as a constitutive norm is remarkable in most discourses and practices in Gorski 
kotar, becoming a particularly important identity trait in the context of conflict. 
Many link the inclusiveness characterizing the population of Gorski kotar to the 
fact that people were coming to and leaving the region at different moments 
throughout the history, mostly in search of work. Furthermore, just as the 
region of Gorski kotar does not have clearly defined geographic limits and 
some territories can be considered as “in” or “out” of the region, the same 
seems to be characterizing the approach of its inhabitants to in-groups and 
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out-groups of Gorski kotar identity group. The analysis of the discourses 
indicates that the only condition for being included in the Gorski kotar 
community or social identity group – and sub-communities of its towns and 
villages - is to be living on its territory in peace with other inhabitants. Common 
traditions, religion, origin and other traits do not seem to matter for becoming 
an in-group, and the social identity of Gorski kotar is also inclusive in the sense 
that it easily coexists with additional group identities – ethnic, religious or other 
– of the same person.  
Interestingly, even the military personnel residing in the YNA barracks - 
officers and soldiers from other Yugoslav republics who in the dominant 
discourse were regularly referred to as «members of the enemy army» or 
simply «the enemy», here were called «our fellow citizens» or «inhabitants of 
our town»: 
«In Delnice military barracks, like in many others, live honest people, 
fellow citizens and planners or better future». (Radio Delnice, News, 16 
September 2016) 
«Yesterday, after contacts with the president of the Municipal Council, 
lieutenant colonel Ljubomir Buljin, new inhabitant of our town and our 
military barracks, received the representatives of the municipality of 
Delnice». (Radio Delnice, News, 17 September 1991) 
Even during the tensest moments in 1991 the language of local radio station 
and of local authorities remained highly inclusive. Unlike dominant discourses, 
Radio Delnice and the town authorities refrained from using ethnic identity 
terminology (such as “Serbian aggressor”) for defining the enemy. The 
analysis of their discourses indicates that this inclusive approach, a reflection 
of the highly inclusive social identity, also had several strategic purposes. 
Firstly, it was highlighting and instigating joint responsibility. If one feels part of 
the social group – has common past, positive experience, children who play 
together – then his or her responsibility towards this social group is much 
higher than if one feels as an out-group. Secondly, by promoting their feeling 
of belonging of YNA personnel to the social group of inhabitants of Gorski kotar 
or fellow citizens, the inclusive discourse was supporting their multiple 
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identities and cross-cutting group loyalties. YNA personnel was facing severe 
loyalty tensions at the beginning of the war. By insisting on their belonging to 
the community of Gorski kotar as fellow citizens, the authorities were reducing 
the salience of two other types of social identities of YNA military personnel 
that were becoming salient and violence-supporting: their ethnic identity (they 
were mostly Serbs) and their identity as members of YNA (they swore to 
protect the integrity of Yugoslavia).  
In terms of relational comparisons or defining the Gorski kotar inhabitants’ 
group identity by what they are not, as illustrated by the quotes at the beginning 
of this sub-chapter the inhabitants of Gorski kotar often identified themselves 
as “not homogeneous”, “not aggressive”, “not extremist”, characteristics that 
played an extremely important role during wartime. One of the constitutive 
norms that can be clearly derived from the analysis of their discourses and 
practices, is «behaving in a civilized manner». Horvat (2003), who was the 
head of Delnice Crisis Committee during wartime, uses the term «civilized» on 
several occasions while describing the actions of members of this Committee. 
When explaining their highly symbolic decision to write a letter of apology to 
the parents of the YNA soldier from Tuzla who was wounded by local 
nationalists, Horvat (2003, p. 307) states: 
«We also had in mind the impression that this would give in Tuzla about 
the level of civilization of our region in the moments of a general break-
down». 
When referring to the negotiations between Delnice Crisis Committee and 
the authorities of the YNA military barracks, Horvat (2003, p. 381) notes:  
«[…] during  this tumultuous time, burdened with numerous excesses, 
we have never crossed the threshold of the civilized dialogue, which 
helped us find the acceptable solutions».  
The inclusiveness in the sense of recognizing and embracing differences is 
another aspect contained in Horvat’s (2003) definition of «tolerance» as a 
characteristic of people of Gorski kotar. It further leads towards their strong 
sense of interdependence and the related high value attached to dialogue and 
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cooperation. This has been reflecting as a cognitive model of the inhabitants 
of Gorski kotar throughout my contacts with them as well as in their texts and 
actions. As observable from the generalized dominant discourses in Croatia 
focused on ethnic belonging, the cooperative attitude – «extending a hand» to 
the person of other ethnic group – was mostly perceived as a sign of cowardice 
and treason of own ethnic group even in areas with no armed violence. Such 
newly developed social norm was closing the communication channels and 
leading towards dehumanization of the ethnic outgroups, which then justified 
violence against them. Although they faced doubts and challenges related to 
their other social identity – the ethnic one - the leaders in Gorski kotar 
maintained the spirit of dialogue and cooperation which helped them overcome 
the threats of that moment.  
The strong sense of interdependence brings to the social identity of 
inhabitants of Gorski kotar a character of serenity, measure and rationality, 
which was strongly differing from the emotionally loaded visceral discourses 
and actions of people with high salience of ethnic identity. I found that this 
sense of measure was closely linked to the consideration of future 
consequences, which became transparent from a number of discourses and 
actions. Wolf et al. (2009) indicate that the recognition of the future 
consequences of each side’s actions supports cooperative behaviour, which 
usually results from long-range thinking.  
Interviewee 1 from Gorski kotar, who was recruited to the Croatian army in 
1991, recalls: 
 «We [the people of Gorski kotar] went to the frontline, but even there 
we showed no extremism […] There were all sorts of things. Once we 
almost clashed among us. I was keeping guard and my people were 
driving and proposing that we go and burn some house. I said why, who 
knows whose house that is, maybe it is full of explosive so it will blow 
me away. They said: “but it is a Serb’s house”. I found that way of 
thinking stupid».  
As we can see from his statement, instead of the irrational but highly 
common thinking which prevailed among many soldiers - «this is the house of 
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the enemy from the opposite ethnic group, let’s burn it» - my interviewee’s first 
reaction is: «what if this house is full of explosive? It could also harm me».  
The consideration of future consequences as a key worldview is also 
observable from the testimony of an inhabitant of Gomirje, a village of Gorski 
kotar inhabited mostly by Serbs, quoted by Tatalovic (1996, p. 328):  
«We knew that everything would be solved easily if no blood was shed. 
But when even a drop of blood is spilt, it is hard to get back to how it was 
before». 
The consideration of future consequences was also promoted by the local 
media of Gorski kotar, particularly Radio Delnice, which was the media outlet 
with most impact on the local population. Here are two examples of this local 
radio news, continuously inviting to the consideration of long-term effects 
during the highly tense moments of negotiations between the local authorities 
and the military base of YNA in Delnice: 
 «Gentlemen the officers and soldiers of the Delnice military barracks, 
until now you did not sow the seeds of hatred, until now we have been 
finding words and cooperation – let’s not sow the wind because we will 
be blown away together by the storm – in the name of your children and 
our safety – let’s throw away the hatred and let’s follow the voice of 
reason! It is your turn now, this calm place of Gorski Kotar and its future 
depend on your consciousness!» (Radio Delnice, News, 16 September 
1991) 
«Some facts are irrefutable: the wheel of change, however strong its 
goodness or evilness might be, continues turning.  We have to be aware 
of the consequences NOW. The history will judge us» (Radio Delnice, 
News, 17 September 1991) 
In addition to their common regional identity, the views, values and actions 
of the inhabitants of Gorski kotar were also influenced by other types of their 
social identities, such as their different ethnic belonging which gained major 
prominence in all Croatia prior to and during the war, or their professional 
group identities, including loyalty to the professional groups such as being 
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members of the army or police forces. Therefore, and in accordance with the 
findings of Citrin and Sears (2009) presented in Chapter 3, the social identities 
of the inhabitants of Gorski kotar need to be considered in their multiplicity, 
different levels of salience, as well as cross-cutting and sometimes mutually 
exclusive loyalty structures.  
The analysed discourse of the local and regional authorities and media in 
Gorski kotar indicates that during wartime in Croatia they used far less 
references to the ethnic belonging in comparison with the discourse of the 
authorities and media at national level. In clear contrast with the dominant 
discourses abundant with ethnic terminology, the most used terms referring to 
or addressing the population in Gorski kotar were the terms inhabitants (of 
specific town or village), people/folks (of Gorski kotar) and citizens.   
When referring to the inhabitants of Serb ethnic belonging, the authorities 
and the media in Gorski kotar often used the terms «our Serbs» or «the Serbs 
of Gorski kotar», implying a distinction between them and the Serbs from other 
parts of Croatia of from Serbia. In these cases, a value judgement was often 
implicit, whereby «our» Serbs were attributed positive connotations belonging 
to all inhabitants of Gorski kotar (cooperative, civilized, non-violent), in contrast 
to «just» Serbs who were usually perceived in a more negative light and 
ascribed negative characteristics typical for the Croatian ethnic group views of 
the Serbs (non-cooperative, uncivilized, violent).  
«Luckily, our Serbs here were thinking the same way [as us] when 
considering peace and war» (Franjo Starcevic in Manjine za manjine, p. 
116) 
When mentioning people of the other ethnic group, inhabitants of Gorski 
kotar often refer to them in religious terms, and instead of speaking of Croats 
and Serbs they refer to each other as Catholics and Orthodox: 
«I had one or two Orthodox people with me on the frontline» 
(Interviewee 1) 
Making reference to violent acts or threat of violence by the “opposite” ethnic 
group, inhabitants of Gorski kotar occasionally reached out for terminology 
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from the past, calling the opponents by names with strong negative load – 
Ustashas and Chetniks. Although primarily related to the period prior to and 
during WWII, this terminology containing high emotional load was used also 
for the 1990 events when referring to atrocities, barbarianism, or fear of those. 
As an illustration, in a highly tense moment of final negotiations, before the 
military barracks were abandoned by the YNA, Horvat (2003, p.378) describes 
his views on one of the military officers: 
«I really trust him and I don’t hide it. He is a soldier from head to toe, but 
a rational soldier. He disagrees with us in everything, but he is not a 
Chetnik». 
Instigating inter-ethnic fear by prompting negative collective memories was 
one of the key strategies of the nationalist elites, as seen in Chapter 5. To 
some extent the effects of this strategy reached Gorski kotar, too: 
«There is this man who was born here in a village in Gorski kotar, but 
studied and stayed in Belgrade. In 1991, just before it all started, he sent 
his children on vacation from Belgrade to [name of the village]… and then 
he called his parents and asked them to send his children back to him [to 
Belgrade] so Ustashas would not cut their throats. His parents told him: 
what Ustashas, what are you talking about, there are no Ustashas 
here…. » (Interviewee 9) 
Nevertheless, despite the turbulent moments lived in Gorski kotar during 
WWII, in the analyzed texts and interviews I found very few traces of negative 
feelings towards other ethnic groups linked to the collective memories. Only 
one of the interviewees had a negative experience, stating that his grandfather 
was killed by Chetniks. On the other hand, references to positive common past 
experiences were abundant and valued, and this is another trait of their 
regional social identity of which the inhabitants of Gorski kotar are proud:  
«Extreme Serbian or Croatian politics never made any success here! 
We have learned to live not next to each other, but together». (Zeljko 
Mirkovic, mayor of Vrbovsko, in Marinkovic, 2011)  
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During the early 1990s positive collective memories were intensively 
recalled by local and regional leadership to decrease tensions and avoid 
divisions along ethnic or other lines. Positive joint past with the YNA as an 
institution was also remembered and cherished as a connector to this group: 
«People of Gorski Kotar, all the folk of Delnice, lived until recently with 
the soldiers from entire Yugoslavia almost without differentiating them 
from our own sons. There was no holiday, no event or occasion that we 
didn’t share. During community works, the hardworking hands of soldiers 
and officers have been creating benefits for the town and the villages. 
We have spent many New Year’s Eves in the Army Hall, we have 
accumulated a lot of common experiences; here many have formed their 
families». (Radio Delnice, News, 17 September 1991) 
References to ethnic identities can be found in several toponyms in Gorski 
kotar. A small town in Vrbovsko municipality, which name since 1996 is 
«simply» Moravice, has been carrying seven different names in the past, 
including the names Srpske Moravice (Serbian Moravice) and Hrvatske 
Moravice (Croatian Moravice) during different political regimes. In Marinkovic 
(2011) a history teacher from Moravice Novica Vucinic claims that all these 
changes were promoted by «the will of the politics», and the mayor of Vrbovsko 
confirms this by stating that «different emissaries were coming here trying to 
damage our harmony, but we didn’t allow this to happen». Resistance to the 
ethnicization of discourses in Gorski kotar strongly influenced the perception 
on the parties in 1991-1995 conflict in that region, as will be discussed in the 
next section.  
 
7.2.2. On parties in conflict in Gorski kotar 
Positive collective memories of common past of Croats and Serbs, 
propensity to dialogue and cooperation, decent life in harmony with others as 
a common social purpose, these are some of the key characteristics of the 
social identity of people of Gorski kotar. In such context, the «logic» of ethnic 
conflict and the ethnic identity based definition of parties in conflict did not find 
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fertile ground in Gorski kotar, despite certain level of loyalty of the inhabitants 
to their respective ethnic groups.  
Reflecting on the high complexity of the relational processes linked to the 
armed conflict in Croatia, Horvat (2003, p. 35) writes:  
«In the environment of Gorski kotar, in the cohabitation of people and the 
nature, a sequence of vital events was taking place in the early nineties, 
characterized by the disintegration of one social system and the 
establishment of new human relationships, as well as by the realization 
of the idea of creation of national state. It was not the war against a 
classic aggressor, but a more comprehensive battle that was 
impregnating time and space, probing the moral relationships among 
people and changing the mental structures in their heads. Here the wars 
are not fought on some remote fronts, they enter into people’s homes 
searching for space deep in the souls of the members of the 
households».  
As observed by Horvat, one of the major threats of the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia and its social system was the threat to values, norms and human 
relationships, resulting in cultural violence – development of resentments, 
negative stereotypes, and similar. Aware of the risk of the three types of 
violence, and not only of the direct one, the authorities in Gorski kotar decided 
to take a specific approach to the problem. Radio Delnice made a clear 
distinction between the national context and their regional approach:  
«It is clear to all that we are in the position of defenders of our home, our 
place, our homeland Croatia, defending it from the Army [referring to 
YNA]. This is the general global context and a reality. However, in our 
place, in Delnice, on daily basis, including last night and today, a goodwill 
message is being sent in a mutual communication Military Base – 
Municipality Crisis Cell. In our Military Base -  we should say it loudly – 
live the people with whom until recently we have been sharing daily 
issues, meeting them at work, during walks, at cultural events, in school 
or kindergarten. We have our children». (Radio Delnice, News, 14 
September 1991) 
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Using the expression «we should say it loudly», Radio Delnice news team 
points at the fact that recognizing the humanity of military personnel of YNA 
was not welcome in the dominant discourse. Indeed, it was becoming a trigger 
for ostracism in the process of de-humanization of the enemy, and the Radio 
took on that risk in full consciousness.  
The discourses of the leadership and the media in Gorski kotar also indicate 
their awareness of the fact that the dynamics of the armed conflict were outside 
of their influence, the strings being pulled by the elites and, as they often said, 
by the extremists.  
«Do not allow that all we have achieved so far gets smashed because of 
the insane interests of individuals who ran amok, whose aim is not life! 
[...] Fight against those WHO PUSHED US ONTO barricades» (Radio 
Delnice, News, 14 September 1991) 
In this statement Radio Delnice clearly defined the parties in the conflict as 
perceived in Gorski kotar – the individuals with particular and insane interests 
versus the fellow-citizens desiring to live and believing in life. By calling to 
protest, resistance and fight against those who pushed people onto the 
barricades, the Radio is encouraging the listeners not to accept the 
argumentation of inter-ethnic war imposed by the dominant discourses. 
However, many inhabitants from Gorski kotar – mostly Croats but also 
Serbs – participated in the armed conflict in other parts of Croatia. Horvat 
(2003) confirms that 99 per cent of the men who received the mobilization 
request actually joined the army and went to the battlefield, mostly as members 
of the 138th Gorski kotar brigade. They were often praised by the media and 
authorities for participating in the Homeland war. This confirms the double logic 
on parties in conflict that prevailed in Gorski kotar, as well as the double 
loyalties to ethnic and regional identity groups.   
This double logic can be explained by the generalized perception that the 
armed resistance in many areas of Croatia was the only remaining choice. 
Several of the authorities of Gorski kotar indeed claimed that what was feasible 
in Gorski kotar was not any more feasible in other parts of Croatia, where the 
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armed conflict had already started. They were pointing at the need for timely 
prevention of violence, which was in the focus of their local actions. Aware that 
the elites at national levels were the ones deciding on the evolution of the 
conflict, they adopted the following strategy: 
«This is the time of quick decisions (…) In short, until the solution is found, 
and the solution is in hands of the power, let’s preserve our peace. This 
is the war of nerves, the time when many people serve the idea, and the 
idea has a suicidal context» (Radio Delnice, September 19, 1991)  
In Gorski kotar the strategy was to keep the war out of their region, by 
«actively remaining in peace», as expressed by professor Starcevic, the leader 
of the community of Mrkopalj and one of the key figures of resistance to 
violence in Gorski kotar. This expression is indicating that regional peace in 
the time of war was not given or natural, but that specific efforts were need to 
preserve it. 
In summary, the analysis of the discourses and actions in Gorski kotar 
shows that its authorities and most inhabitants did not accept the «logic» of 
ethnic conflict but rather worked proactively to prevent the spread of such 
«logic» in their region; that they perceived YNA as an opponent whose specific 
interests (preservation of Yugoslavia) were opposing to their own, but as such 
they worked with YNA at local level as a partner in transforming their joint 
conflict by identifying ways of avoiding violence and finding common life-saving 
solutions; that the major threat as perceived by the authorities of Gorski kotar 
were neither any of the ethnic groups nor the YNA, but the violence itself in all 
its forms (direct, structural and cultural). The two parties in that conflict were 
uncivilized extremists prone to death and civilized rational people prone to life, 
the violence itself being their enemy that they tried to prevent from spreading 
in their region.  
This discrepancy between regional understanding of the situation and 
dominant discourses did not remain unchallenged. Among other, many 
inhabitants of Gorski kotar were facing loyalty dilemmas explored below.  
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7.3. Is preserving peace turning us into traitors? Facing loyalty dualism 
and rejecting be(come)ing victims.  
Research shows that in times of social crisis, people search for safety and 
sense within their social groups. The discourse analysis of the collected texts 
indicates that many actors and decision makers in Gorski kotar were 
experiencing loyalty tensions related to the multiple groups belonging and 
groups’ sometimes conflicting norms and goals. In a war-torn country where 
the ethnic «logic» of armed conflict was successfully imposed and generalized 
through dominant discourse, the leaders and other inhabitants of Gorski Kotar 
were also feeling the need and a social pressure to support their own ethnic 
group. The challenge and the dilemma they experienced was related to the 
clash between several new norms and cognitive models developing in the 
framework of ethnic identity groups, and the norms and worldviews prevailing 
in their own social identity group of inhabitants of Gorski kotar, often matched 
by their personal beliefs and values. 
This loyalty dilemma is clearly reflected in an interview (Manjine za manjine, 
2010, pp. 116-117), in which professor Starcevic remembers:  
«I thought to myself: you want peace in Gorski kotar between Serbs and 
Croats, while your compatriots are going to Lika to fight against the 
rebelled Serbs – is it a treason if one makes peace with Serbs?» 
The quote reflects a dilemma related to different perceptions of parties in 
conflict and strategies for resolving the conflict. In the Croatian ethnic identity 
group worldview – and professor Starcevic was a Croat - the enemies were 
Serbs, and the conflict resolution strategy entailed defeating them using armed 
violence. However, in the Gorski kotar social identity worldview, and in 
accordance with Starcevic’s personal moral convictions, the «enemy» was the 
violence itself and Serbs and Croats were to be partners in the non-violent 
struggle against that enemy.  
Interestingly, Starcevic recognizes a very similar type of group loyalty 
dilemma among the Serbs in Gorski kotar: 
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«Luckily, our Serbs here were thinking the same way when considering 
peace and war: are they betraying the idea of defending Yugoslavia if 
they accept peace with Croats? In 1991 I drove to Jasenak [Serbian 
village] […] They [the Serbs from that village] had the same dilemma like 
us: here we are “arranging for peace”, while “our” people are being killed 
somewhere else» (Manjine za manjine, 2010, p. 116) 
The recognition of this common dilemma reaffirms the human 
connectedness between Croats and Serbs in Gorski kotar. It shows willingness 
to consider and understand the motivation of others, which is key to empathy 
and a tool of prevention of de-humanization of those others. Suddenly, the 
tension created by the feeling of treason becomes a common problem to be 
solved through continuous dialogue and cooperation. Starcevic continues: 
 «The next year we managed to have the Serbs [from Gorski kotar] 
liberated of that pressure of treason: how can they make peace 
arrangements while Serbs from Serbia are dying in combat. The same 
was happening to us in Mrkopalj. An extremely hard moment for me was 
when a 24 years old young man from Mrkopalj died on the battlefield in 
Dalmatian hinterland. I went to express my condolences to his parents. 
Can I speak of the idea of peace to the people whose son died for 
Croatia? But his parents, his father in particular, stressed the idea of 
peace above the idea of war: [he said] if we had managed to achieve 
peace, their son would not have died». (Manjine za manjine, 2010, pp. 
116-117) 
 
The moral dilemma was pursuing the inhabitants of Gorski kotar all 
throughout the war and even after it finished. However, the texts indicate that, 
when faced with such dilemma, the decision-makers in Gorski kotar were often 
guided by own individual values which helped them make decisions. In the 
moments of tension and possible chaos, Radio Delnice invited: 
«Let’s look deep into ourselves and around ourselves: we have many 
reasons to live and to die someday as human beings, not as victims» 
(Radio Delnice, News, 19 September 1991) 
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This refusal to become victims is yet another trait observable from the 
analysed texts of Gorski kotar inhabitants, and in clear contradiction with the 
generalized praising of victimhood among both ethnic groups in the rest of 
Croatia. While dominant discourses were abundant in lamentations about the 
historical and ongoing injustices, about own group past and present 
victimhood, inspiring the need for revenge, the messages conveyed in Gorski 
kotar discourse were not a lamentation but rather voices of determination and 
hope that its inhabitants would not become victims, that despite all the 
pressures and strings being pulled in the centres of power, they would remain 
the masters of their own destinies. This entailed a strong sense of 
responsibility requiring wise management of the situation, as well as 
governance inspiring trust among the population, which will be analysed in 
next section.   
 
7.4. Good governance and constructive conflict management: preserving 
order and mitigating fear to prevent violence 
A major paradigm shift in the governance methods and structures in Croatia 
occurred following the first democratic elections held in Croatia in 1990. After 
decades of one-party rule, the population of ex-Yugoslav republics had to 
«learn» democracy. In Croatia this process took place in the midst of war. This 
posed severe challenges both to the newly formed authorities, but also to the 
entire population, which was not used to democratic political debate or other 
processes and aspects of life under democratic rule.  
In most of Croatian municipalities and towns it was Tudjman’s CDU that won 
the elections. However, in most of Gorski kotar the majority of votes were given 
to the reformed communist party LCC-PDR. Tatalovic (1996) stresses that, 
although branches of political parties with strong national attributes – such as 
CDU and Serbian Democratic Party – were formed in Gorski kotar and 
recruited some of the municipal delegates elected within LCC-PDR group, 
many delegates remained loyal to LCC-PDR. Tatalovic further claims, and I 
agree with him, that this majority vote to the non-nationalist political option plaid 
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a significant role in the non-division along national (or ethnic) lines and the 
maintenance of trust in the region.   
In addition to regular regional and local administrative authorities, municipal 
Crisis cells were formed as of 1990 as per the instructions of the Croatian 
government and made accountable for all the tasks related to the risks of war. 
The Crisis cells were closely cooperating with institutions such as Police 
stations, Civil Protection and other relevant bodies. Due to the large size of the 
municipality of Delnice, in addition to the central Crisis cell in Delnice, 
communal Crisis cells coordinated by the municipal cell were formed in 1991.  
The role of the Crisis cell of the Municipality of Delnice proved particularly 
important due to the presence of Military Barracks of YNA with several hundred 
military officers and soldiers and three large military warehouses storing 
extremely large amounts of weaponry and ammunition. After declaration of 
independence of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the presence of 
YNA forces in those three countries entailed high risks and often led to clashes 
and victims. Part of the higher authorities of YNA, including many leaders of 
Military Barracks throughout the territory of former Yugoslavia, kept loyal to the 
social purpose of their professional social identity as defenders of integral 
Yugoslavia and firmly believed that they still could and should defend the unity 
of a dissolving country. Others among them were already siding with Milosevic 
and supporting his project of Greater Serbia. In addition to the Military 
Barracks, in Delnice there were huge arms and weaponry stores, and the 
possession of those arms and weaponry was of great interest of all parties 
involved in the war. If those warehouses were blown up, they would have razed 
to the ground not only the entire town of Delnice but also great part of the 
region. In their discourse, citizens of the region often compare this situation to 
the one of sitting on an atomic bomb. 
The analysis of the discourses of members of Crisis cell and a close look 
into their decisions and actions, particularly during the highly tense year 1991, 
reveals several characteristics of wise and constructive conflict transformation 
strategies. Unlike in most places in Croatia, where local authorities and YNA 
leadership got entrenched on the opposite sides which often led to armed 
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clashes, in Gorski kotar they saw each other as parties in conflict, but refused 
to solve that conflict by recurring to violence. They established human 
relationships and cooperation despite their apparently opposing and mutually 
excluding goals. Based on the positive history of relations and mutual respect, 
they initiated intensive communication looking for the common ground and a 
solution that would be acceptable to all. Soon they realized that the strings of 
the war were being pulled in the centres of power, where saving lives was not 
a top priority. Horvat (2003, p. 40) writes:  
«All of the sudden, the security of the warehouses becomes our common 
concern and a joint task of both parties in conflict. This was triggered by 
media reports on the increasing number of big military warehouses 
around Croatia being blown up, regardless of the consequences and 
victims from both sides, whereby each side accused the other […]». 
Taking into consideration the war context and the centralized nature of 
political and military powers, the level of autonomous critical thinking achieved 
by the Crisis cell and Delnice YNA leadership is striking. They recognised and 
accepted mutual interdependence and established a common goal – avoiding 
victims – which was not the key purpose in the dominant discourses. They also 
realized that the war was orchestrated elsewhere and that they needed to act 
together and in coordination in order not to become victims of the high level 
political and military decisions. They decided to take their own destinies and 
the destinies of the inhabitants of their region into own hands. In this process, 
they were challenged by a variety of actors, such as national media promoting 
the feelings of resentment and urgency, local extremists desiring to take over 
the power and impose a more nationalistic discourse, as well as their superiors 
in the political and military hierarchy.  
The records and the interviews with the actors of this process indicate that 
the strategy adopted by the Crisis cell and YNA leadership in Delnice to deal 
with the highly tensed situation was the one summarized by the Commander 
of the Military Barracks in Delnice, who proposed:  
«Well, you cheat a bit on your authorities and we will cheat a bit on ours… 
if we can preserve Gorski kotar and our lives from all that madness, let’s 
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do it. Dead people don’t need medals and awards» (quoted in Horvat, 
2003, p. 168).  
The common goal was established – avoiding a disaster and saving lives - 
and arrangements were made to reach that goal, often turning the blind eye to 
the instructions of the «central level» of both sides, which were proposing 
armed actions in order to take over or preserve the «treasure» stored in the 
warehouses - the weapons which were valued more than human lives.  
Taking initiative and acknowledging own accountability was another specific 
characteristic of the leadership style of the Municipal Crisis cell, differing in that 
aspect from similar entities in other parts of the country. One of the very 
illustrative moments of that leadership style was the management of the tense 
situation when, just after they reached an agreement with the military barracks’ 
leadership that they would not attack each other, a soldier serving his military 
service (native of Tuzla!) was shot at from outside of the barracks and injured. 
In most other places this event would either not be communicated publically or 
would be celebrated as a «damage incurred to the enemy». Delnice Crisis cell 
adopted a totally different approach – after the assessment of the incident, 
they wrote and read on air at the radio station a letter of apology to the parents 
of the wounded soldier, acknowledging own co-responsibility for the incident.   
The study of the texts and actions undertaken by the Crisis cell shows their 
continuous effort to reduce fear and inspire the feeling of safety among the 
local population, both Croats and Serbs, as well as among military personnel. 
In this very illustrative case of the injured soldier, which could have triggered 
an armed conflict in the region, they undertook a series of steps contributing 
to the prevention of violence. Firstly, they conducted a joint assessment with 
the leadership of the Military barracks, making sure they speak with the same 
voice and avoid divisions. Then they strongly condemned the incident, 
showing leadership and authority, and made sure the soldier received medical 
assistance and was supported to reach his home. Furthermore, they organized 
a meeting with all political parties who were encouraged to also condemn the 
incident, securing the necessary consensus of all parties at local level which 
represented people of the two ethnic groups. Finally, they showed the highest 
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level of empathy and at the same time their responsibility for the security and 
safety of all people inhabiting in their municipality, by reading publically a letter 
of apology to the parents of the wounded soldier. The letter was read on the 
radio by the president of the Assembly of the Municipality of Delnice, stating 
among other: «Your son is alive, he is getting better and we apologize for the 
incident».  
Horvat (2003, p. 306) describes the situation after the letter was read:  
«Of course, the letter was most criticized in our “civilized” environment, 
once again the resignation of the head of the Municipality was requested 
due to the apology to the enemy and to the parents of the enemy soldier».  
Indeed, this and other actions of the Crisis cell were often received with 
surprise and indignation by actors supporting nationalist policies and 
participating in the dominant discourses, as will be seen in section 6.9.   
Despite violence prevention efforts at local level, several decisions of the 
central level authorities – firstly of YNA and then of Croatian national 
authorities – brought the war at the very doorstep of Gorski kotar. On October 
3, 1991, there was an act of aggression by YNA from supra-regional level. Two 
transmitters were bombed in the area o Gorski kotar. Three persons were 
wounded, one died soon after the attack. This first armed attack increased the 
tensions in the area, including fear and impatience of the population, putting 
on trial the mutual trust gained between the local garrison and the municipal 
Crisis cell. However, Horvat (2003, p. 328) realized that this could have also 
strengthened in a way the links of the members of the Crisis cell with the local 
garrison personnel, which had not been involved in the decisions of the higher 
command of YNA:  
«We were not to destroy our relationship of trust with Garrison and 
Corpus (in Rijeka) built with so much effort, because it was obvious that 
we were guaranteeing them more personal safety then their higher 
command did […] With the attacks they [higher command] had placed 
local YNA in full dependence on us, as the fear that we would all be 
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sacrificed in the bombardment of military infrastructure was gaining 
space».  
Once more, the consciousness of mutual interdependence and clarity of the 
joint goal at the local level were decisive in managing the risk of an outbreak 
of violence. The culmination of that risk took place on November 5, 1991, after 
the order was given by the Supreme Command of the Republic of Croatia 
together with the Ministry of Interior of Croatia to undertake an armed attack 
on the YNA weaponry warehouses in Delnice. As per the description provided 
by Crnkovic (2014), the highest authorities of Croatia decided to organize the 
attack in order to take over the weaponry and ammunition of YNA, which were 
lacking on different frontlines in Croatia, and the expectation of the general 
offensive of YNA throughout the country. The information on the plan of attack 
was not shared with the members of the Crisis cell, which is an indication of 
distrust among people who were, at least theoretically, on the same «ethnic» 
side. However, when the action of the attack started and got into an impasse, 
the leadership of the Crisis cell was called in to help with the negotiations.  
Horvat (2003, p. 380) describes his disappointment with the way the 
Supreme Command decided to manage the situation: 
 «Are we really going to discard the capital created in the negotiations? 
[…] Are we really going to have the unprepared soldiers [of the forming 
Croatian army] without a single battle experience to attack the military 
barracks? Who are those soldiers? The citizens of Delnice and 
surroundings who got the uniforms a few days ago and attended only the 
basic training!».  
The difference between Horvat’s attitude and the attitude of national 
authorities in this matter – his strong concern for human lives versus their 
interest in getting the weaponry and ammunition regardless of the human cost 
in Gorski kotar area, presumably to protect citizens elsewhere in Croatia – 
stresses a clear difference in their values and goals. Even if they were 
excluded from the preparations, the leadership of the Crisis cells was asked to 
get involved when the strategy of the attack that was supposed to defeat YNA 
by inspiring fear did not give desired results. Once again, the key proved to be 
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in the pre-established trust and communication. On November 5, 1991, the 
agreement on the peaceful withdrawal of the YNA personnel from Delnice was 
reached and signed by Crisis cell and Military barracks representatives. On 
the same day the barracks and the warehouses of weaponry were abandoned 
by YNA and taken over by the Croatian authorities. The opponents from YNA 
were respected till the end - Horvat (2003, p. 388) confirms that «the Yugoslav 
flag was taken down and neatly folded». In most places it would have been 
burnt with triumphant fire.  
Upon their return to Belgrade, the commander of the military barracks 
lieutenant colonel Ljubomir Buljin and his assistant lieutenant colonel Djuro 
Vitanovic were sentenced by the Military court to 12 years of prison each14. 
Their sentences confirmed that the warehouses contained the amounts of 
ammunition and explosives that could have destroyed large parts of Gorski 
kotar region if the conflict was managed less cautiously.  
A few days after the departure of YNA personnel and soldiers, the area was 
attacked by YNA airplanes, in an attempt to destroy as much of the remaining 
weaponry and explosive as possible, but the attacks only caused minor 
material damage. Soon after a certain level of normality returned to the region; 
the schools reopened, numerous displaced persons and refugees found 
protection in the region while many of its long term inhabitants joined the 138th 
Brigade of the Croatian Army – Gorski kotar brigade – going to fight mostly in 
the neighbouring Lika region, which was not spared of armed conflict.   
Good governance, conflict management and proactive violence prevention 
made part of the discourses and practices also in other areas of Gorski kotar 
at threat of violence, such as Vrbovsko and Mrkopalj. While for Delnice the 
                                                          
14 The text of their sentence delivered at the Military court in Belgrade on April 13, 1992, quoted by 
Horvat (2013, p. 287), testifies of the violent intentions of the highest YNA authorities. The sentence 
clearly indicates that lieutenant colonel Buljin received the order to attack Delnice town from artillery 
and threaten with blowing up the weaponry warehouses should YNA get attacked. Lieutenant colonels 
Buljin and Vitanovic were declared guilty for disobeying the orders and for having established 
contacts with representatives of the Crisis cell. They were sentenced for «leaving the military barracks 
without exhausting all the possibilities of defence, practically without any resistance, which had very 
negative consequences for the armed forces of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, because it 
entailed handing over to the enemy military formation more then 5 500 tons of ammunition and 
explosives […]». 
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immediate threat was related to the presence of military barracks and 
weaponry warehouses, Vrbovsko and Mrkopalj as areas with mixed Serb and 
Croat population were at threat of worsening inter-ethnic relations influenced 
by dominant discourses of ethnic divisions. Many places in Croatia of similar 
ethnic heterogeneity had already witnessed an «overnight» relationship 
change: from good neighbours, mutual godfathers and close friends, 
influenced by generalized psychosis promoted by dominant discourses, 
people turned into enemies exclusively based on ethnic belonging. Those 
threats were imminent in Gorski kotar as well, particularly because both Serbs 
and Croats were being armed by «their» authorities in the growingly tense 
situation of mounting fear.  
Evidence shows that during the second half of 1991 YNA was supplying 
arms to the Serb population in several villages of Gorski kotar. Arms were 
brought in by helicopters and trucks from the existing army barracks in the 
broader region. Military trainings and guards were organized in the Serb-
inhabited villages. While there seems to be a consensus on the arming of the 
Serbs, there are – as in most other heterogeneous areas in Croatia - two 
different perceptions about the cause-effect processes in that regard. The Serb 
authorities and my interlocutors of Serb ethnic group explain that at a certain 
point they felt threatened by the Croatian ethnocentric discourse and actions, 
and therefore needed to be armed to be able to protect their villages in case 
of need. On the other hand, those adopting dominant discourse in Croatia 
consider that the «real» reason was to organize a rebellion against Croatian 
authorities in order to annex that area to the Greater Serbia. The two 
discourses are a result of different perceptions of reality, which also need to 
be understood in the context of manipulation with the fear as part of dominant 
discourses.  
In the context of generalized fear, the authorities of Delnice, Vrbovsko and 
Mrkopalj showed exemplary conflict transformation capacities. They 
decreased the threat of direct violence by paying particular attention to the 
prevention of structural and cultural violence. In terms of prevention of 
structural violence, they refrained from a new practice which was getting 
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generalized in the ethnically divided country - dismissing the members of 
ethnic minority from their jobs. This practice, which was rapidly becoming a 
«new normal» in the rest of Croatia – both in the areas controlled by Croats 
and those controlled by the Serbs – did not take place in Gorski kotar. Both 
the Serbs and the Croats that I interviewed confirm that no one in Gorski kotar 
was dismissed from his or her job based on the ethnic origin. One of the 
interviewees gives the example of Serbs in managerial positions being placed 
lower in the hierarchy. He stresses that these were decisions taken in Zagreb, 
not locally, therefore exempting the local authorities from accountability for 
them:  
«Some of those working in the state-owned companies were 
downgraded, I know of some two or three managers from the Railway 
Company who were placed on lower positions. But this came from 
Zagreb, it didn’t affect the relations here. Wherever the local authorities 
were deciding, nobody was removed». (Interviewee 2) 
Very importantly, the good practice of not dismissing employees on the 
basis of their ethnic origin was also applied in the Police forces. Records 
provided by Crnkovic (2014) prove that the staff of the Police station of Delnice 
remained ethnically mixed throughout the wartime in Croatia. This was not the 
case in most other places in Croatia, because of the increasing distrust and 
entrenching into the ethnic groups. In addition to providing job security and 
income to all the citizens, which certainly contributed to their feeling of safety, 
the practice of maintaining mixed work force contributed to the continuation of 
interethnic communication during the war, keeping the channels of dialogue 
open for common citizens as well as decision-makers and therefore also 
preventing the development of stereotypes and prejudice.  
Another violent practice that was getting «normalized» in the rest of the 
country, practiced both by Croats and by Serbs in the areas under their control, 
was occupying people’s properties or depriving them of equal opportunities to 
obtain housing, based on their ethnic identity. Local authorities and para-
authorities around Croatia were orchestrating such decisions. They used 
power to redistribute properties in their own interest or simply tolerated such 
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practices. Once again this practice did not take place in Gorski kotar, which 
gave a feeling of safety to all inhabitants who knew their housing was 
guaranteed regardless of their ethnic identity.  In general, the feeling of safety 
was promoted by respecting the rule of law and keeping the public order, which 
in many places in Croatia was replaced by a chaotic situation imputed to the 
war circumstances, while it was actually created to benefit the handful of the 
warlords. Although at some point the police as the key authority responsible 
for maintaining public order did turn the blind eye to some practices that were 
disturbing the public order (such as shooting by civilians towards the Military 
Barracks), in general my respondents confirmed that the forces of order had 
attempted to perform their duties without ethnic bias.  
The prevention of structural violence, in terms of maintaining the structure 
of relationships that allows all people to feel in control over their lives, benefited 
from genuine consultations and participation in decision-making of both Croats 
and Serbs. While in the rest of the country the minority was often “cornered 
and silenced”,  expected to be satisfied with the very fact that it was allowed to 
stay on the territory of the majority, in Gorski kotar a lot of attention was payed 
to ensure continuous dialogue and promote consensus of ethnic groups on 
key issues. Professor Franjo Starcevic was particularly active in those efforts, 
as will be elaborated in the subsequent sections. It was equally important to 
maintain the consultations and decision-making within the regular channels, to 
avoid para-decision making bodies. Evidence shows that opinion-making and 
decision-making was kept within clearly established administrative and political 
structures.  
Among many other aspects of constructive conflict management, the 
analysis of the practices of Gorski kotar leadership shows the capacity to take 
into consideration the feelings of different actors (YNA soldiers, Serbs and 
Croats, displaced persons), including the motives of the «opposite side» in the 
conflict and to deal with them in a constructive, proactive and empathic way. 
Recognizing the humanity of all actors was very important in the prevention of 
the spread of stereotypes and prejudice, which was rampant in other parts of 
Croatia. The cautious use of terminology, whereas the population of the area 
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was referred to most often as citizens, or Gorani (inhabitants of Gorski kotar), 
rarely in ethnic terms and never in insulting or aggressive terms, strongly 
contributed to the prevention of cultural violence. 
An example of a strategic and empathic approach that was used to prevent 
both direct and cultural violence was provided by one of my interviewees. He 
witnessed growing concerns of the leadership of Srpske Moravice, a small 
town with mostly Serb population, when in 1991 a decision was taken to open 
a Croatian police station in their place. Their concern was related to use of the 
(in)famous checkerboard that had many negative connotations for the Serbs 
because it was used by Ustashas in the past. The same checkerboard was 
now displayed on the premises and cloths of the policemen of Croatian police 
and there were concerns that this might awaken negative collective memories. 
A proposal was made for this insignia not be used in Srpske Moravice in order 
not to provoke commotion among the population, and in return the Serb local 
leadership would guarantee that no blockages would occur to the traffic in their 
area. The proposal was accepted and until the end of the war, my interviewee 
states, there was not a single day when the traffic in Srpske Moravice was 
blocked. Acknowledging people’s feelings and finding innovative solutions 
proved to be an effective way of preserving peace in Gorski kotar.   
In conclusion, with their wise governance and management of complex 
situations, the authorities in Gorski kotar were successful not only in preventing 
direct armed conflict, but in the prevention of all three mutually supportive types 
of violence: direct one (through negotiations with the YNA), structural one (no 
dismissals on basis of ethnic belonging, giving space to minority to express 
themselves on the most important issues) and cultural one (opening 
communication, showing empathy, preventing stereotypes). With such conflict 
management approach they laid the grounds for the lasting peace in Gorski 
kotar. To succeed on that path they had to overcome a number of emotional, 
mental and physical barriers, as we shall see in the next section.  
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7.5. Removing barriers on the roads and in minds and hearts: the power 
of empathy 
Human relations are at great test during conflict. Major changes occur in the 
pre-existing relationships, as could be observed from a number of cases in 
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina where former friends and neighbours turned 
into enemies. This relatively sudden change is a result of a number of 
processes supported by dominant discourses in the former Yugoslavia. The 
increasing salience of ethnic identities, reappearance of WWII extremist 
insignia and prompted remembering of past violence, growing distrust and 
feeling of threat, these were among the factors that supported the 
dehumanization or demonization of the out-groups – members of the «enemy 
group». 
 Dominant discourses orchestrating the war in Croatia supported the 
process of dehumanization of enemy because, as indicated by Fisher and 
Kelman (2010, p. 69), «the diabolical enemy image embodies a view of the 
opponent as an evil, monster-like entity that is simply outside of one’s moral 
universe», which justifies aggressive behaviour toward him. Under influence 
of dominant discourses, there was a great risk that similar processes, followed 
by similar atrocities, would happen in Gorski kotar, too.  
However, a precondition for completing a “successful” process of 
dehumanization of the opponent is the interruption of communication and ties 
with him. In other parts of Croatia this was achieved through the interruption of 
physical contact – often following the disruption of traffic by placement of 
physical barriers on the roads, but also through homogenization of the living 
place or workplace after expelling the out-groups from their homes or work. 
Lack of communication among members of different ethnic groups then 
facilitated the development of mental barriers, supported by stereotypes and 
prejudice. New ethnic groups’ norms developed, turning any dialogue with the 
members of the out-groups into a sign of treason and reason for ostracism. 
Aware of such threat, and with strong confidence in dialogue as one of the 
societal beliefs characterizing the people of Gorski kotar, the authorities in the 
region embarked on a demanding journey of removing physical and mental 
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barriers to prevent violence. As the tensions were mounting, in mid-September 
1991 the barriers of wood, metal and explosives were erected on a number of 
roads in Gorski kotar. Horvat (2003, 44-45) recalls the day when the Crisis cell 
received the information that YNA tanks might be heading towards Gorski 
kotar: 
«We decided that we needed to protect ourselves in the direction of 
Jasenak, a group of villages with mainly Serb population. We had 
contradictory information, triggered by a death of one Chetnik in the 
minefield while he was trying to perform a diversion at the transmitter of 
Mirkovica nearby. There were stories about the concentration of the 
enemy in the Sports and recreational center Bjelolasica, and of possible 
attack over the mountain. We decided to cut all the forest roads that were 
connecting us and increase control. Said and done. But our intelligence 
was letting us know that the opposite side was putting up their barricades 
close to ours». 
Here Horvat’s discourse gets more belligerent, testifying of the culmination 
of tension and his strong feeling of responsibility for human lives which seemed 
to be threatened. At this moments Serbs were defined as a threat, and even 
as enemy, however he differentiated the Serbs from “a Chetnik” who attempted 
the diversion and with such act passed the threshold of violence. Interestingly, 
both “sides”, at this moment clearly defined along ethnic lines, put up 
barricades – they were both afraid, seeking protection behind the blockades. 
My Serb interviewees confirmed that they were extremely anxious in those 
moments, feeling that they could get cut off the world, surrounded by Croats.  
A turning point in this situation, which was clearly leading towards physical 
and mental separation of Croats and Serbs, occurred when Franjo Starcevic, 
a Croat and the head of the community of Mrkopalj, decided to cross the 
barricades to go talk to the leaders in the villages on the other side. Horvat 
(2003, p. 45) recalls own anxiety following such decision: 
«Crossing the barricades from any side is putting your head at risk (…) 
But the professor [Starcevic] trusts the neighbours. It is impossible that 
the whirlwind of war in such short time turned peaceful people into 
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monsters of war. We warn him that the trip is risky, long and difficult, you 
have to cross the mountain on foot. “I am seventy years old and it will not 
be much harm, and at least you will know where you stand!” He is calm 
and smiley. It seems he enjoys our confusion». 
This was only the first of many visits that professor Starcevic will pay to the 
Serb, and later on also to the Croat villages in the area. Acting as a convener, 
he initiated a series of exchanges that will allow for continuous constructive 
communication between Serb and Croat leaderships, who became partners in 
preserving the peace in Gorski kotar. This highly symbolic act of peace – 
extraordinary human effort that professor Starcevic made in order to go «listen 
to the other side» and «offer a hand» -  had a strong positive impact on the 
Serb population on the other side of the mountain and inspired trust. In the 
video by Nansen dialogue center Osijek (2009) Djuro Trbovic, the leader of the 
community of Dreznica, recalls: 
«The man sacrificed himself, he put his life at danger, he walked 27 
kilometers from here to Jasenak» 
In the same video, an inhabitant of Jasenak village emphasises: 
«He came through the snow, there was one meter of snow, he came 
across the street, across the forest, he was coming to prove wrong all 
those who had bad intentions». 
Progressively, Franjo Starcevic managed to influence police authorities, too. 
Crnkovic (2014, p.16) names Starcevic among the people who «contributed to 
maintenance of safety in the region» and remembers having accepted his 
suggestion to remove the barriers on the road Jasenak-Mrkopalj. 
When considering the effects of these actions, it is important to keep in mind 
that in many places in Croatia which suffered tremendous human and other 
losses, the violence started with the barricades. Sense of threat, growing 
distrust, people entrenching on the two sides, a few bullets, first victim, 
increase of hostilities, additional military forces brought by both sides to 
support their group – this was a common scenario in such places. In Gorski 
kotar, the barricades were slowly dismantled, wood was taken from Jasenak 
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to Rijeka and sold, people from both ethnic groups kept going to their jobs and 
leadership started dismantling the idea of ethnic conflict and convening on the 
same side – on the side of life. One of my respondents emphasised the 
importance of sports and cultural events in the municipality of Vrbovsko, which 
resumed very quickly. The daily interaction of members of both groups 
prevented the evolution of stereotypes and prejudice, therefore not allowing 
for de-humanization of the ethnic out-groups to happen.  
In opposition to dominant discourses which victimise in-groups but do not 
empathise with them, the discourses and practices in the region of Gorski kotar 
transmitted high levels of empathy with individual human beings in different 
circumstances. The human, individual empathy in Gorski kotar was not 
replaced by the ideological extremism which sees Homeland, but does not 
necessarily see or value human lives on its territory. This was confirmed in a 
number of situations, such as the empathy with the parents of the wounded 
YNA soldier, the empathy with displaced persons who sought refuge in Gorski 
kotar, as well as the recognition of and understanding for the fears and doubts 
of the ethnic out-groups. The empathy would not have been possible without 
continuous and open communication, which role is analysed in the next 
section.  
 
7.6 The power of communication: preserving trust and cooperation by 
nurturing continuous and open communication of all actors 
The closure of communication channels between groups that perceive each 
other as a threat is one of the most common pathways to violence. Lack of 
communication disables us from understanding the motivation of our 
opponents, eliminates trust, introduces fear and discourages us from looking 
for common ground and win-win solutions. It promotes the process of 
transformation of the opponent into a demonized enemy, in which violence 
becomes a «legitimate» tool of his annihilation. There is ample evidence that 
this process of closure of communication channels is one of the key causes of 
the sudden transformation of so many people who until 1990 were close 
friends into enemies ready to kill each other.  
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 With the political and social developments in the former Yugoslavia and a 
strong push by dominant discourses towards setting firm boundaries of the 
ethnic groups, there was a high risk that this process would take place also in 
Gorski kotar, which would be opening the door to violence. Two major potential 
division lines, based on social identity traits of the groups which were perceived 
by dominant discourse as mutually excluding, could be identified on the 
territory of Gorski kotar. Firstly, as the ethnic identity had become extremely 
salient, there was a risk of closure of people into their ethnic identity «shells», 
entailing the perception of Croats and Serbs as opponents and enemies, 
particularly if they embraced the dominant discourses of Croatian and Serbian 
leadership. Secondly, the military-civilian divide was likely to happen due to 
the fact that there was a strong presence of military personnel of YNA in 
Delnice. The majority of military leadership everywhere, including in Delnice, 
belonging to the Serb ethnic group, and the presence of large amounts of 
weaponry stored in the region that YNA was strongly interested in keeping and 
Croatian authorities equally interested in getting, increased the risks of 
potential deadly conflict between YNA and Croatian authorities at the local 
level. The key social purpose of members of YNA identity group being the 
preservation of Yugoslavia, the Croatian declaration of independence in 
October 1991 further made the goals of these two identity groups seem 
incompatible.  
Keeping open the channels of communication with the alleged out-groups 
was often perceived negatively by the in-groups and followed by sanctions, 
such as ostracism. However, at least three important channels of continuous 
communication were kept open and nurtured in Gorski kotar, which proved 
crucial for the prevention of violence. They include the channel fostering 
communication between local leadership of the two major ethnic groups, Serbs 
and Croats; the channel of communication between Crisis cell of Delnice and 
the leadership of YNA military barrack in Delnice; and the channel of intense 
communication of Radio Delnice with the population of the region.  
Firstly, as described in the previous sub-chapter, the channel fostering 
communication among leadership of the two ethnic groups was established by 
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Franjo Starcevic after crossing the physical and mental barriers that had 
started to develop. The series of encounters that Starcevic initiated in 
September 1991 culminated in a very special, for those times almost 
unimaginable meeting, a year later. 
On September 16, 1992, while the war was ravaging in many places in 
Croatia spreading inter-ethnic divisions and increasing resentment between 
Serbs and Croats in the country, in the village of Vojni Tuk a highly important 
meeting of representatives of local communities, police authorities and other 
authorities of Gorski kotar took place. It was organized by the Crisis cell branch 
of the Community of Mrkopalj and hosted by professor Starcevic. Describing 
that meeting, Horvat (2003, p. 28) states:  
«a truly exceptional meeting for the war circumstances was held, which 
inscribed perfectly into the general efforts to achieve the final goal with 
peace, in other words to maintain mutual trust between the communities 
with Croat and Serb population through joint meetings».  
As the minutes of this meeting bring important insights into the Gorski kotar 
counter-discourse to the discourse of violence, their integral text is available in 
Appendix 2. The analysis of this document provides a view into the evolution 
of the inter-ethnic relations in the region and in Croatia in general. One year 
after the initial visit of professor Starcevic to Serb villages, the year 
characterized by tremendous loss of human lives, infrastructure and social 
capital in many parts of Croatia, the leaders of Gorski kotar concluded with 
grief that «it would have been psychologically easier for them to have made 
war then peace». This is a testimony of the rapidly worsening inter-ethnic 
relations in the rest of the country, where most people were already 
«entrenched» behind the walls of their ethnic identity groups.  This is also a 
testament of the criticism and ostracism to which they were exposed as leaders 
from two «enemy» ethnic groups who were communicating among 
themselves. However, by September 1992, after a series of talks and despite 
ostracism they faced within their own ethnic groups, the leaders of the 
communities of Gorski kotar were resolute in their decision to find their own 
solution to the problem, and to do it by cooperating with each other.  
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As emphasised by Jabri (1996), and contrary to the common belief, in some 
circumstances it is easier to mobilize people for war then for peace, just like 
pointed out in the minutes of the Vojni Tuk meeting. This implicates that, in 
times of crisis such as the one during break-up of Yugoslavia, peace does not 
persist naturally but systemic efforts need to be made to preserve it. 
Continuous communication among leaders of Gorski kotar community made 
part of those efforts. Not only did they strategically decide to maintain 
communication channels open, but they also initiated planning development 
actions in order to improve lives of the population in that area by the 
rehabilitation of roads, opening of a ski centre, etc. This confirms once more 
that the social purpose of the Gorski kotar identity group was life, a good quality 
of life beyond any ideological reasoning, and that they perceived the 1991-
1995 conflict as a struggle between life (communication, civilization, 
constructive efforts) and death (entrenching, violence, barbarianism, 
destructive efforts). 
The second important channel of communication was the one between the 
Crisis cell of Delnice and the command of the Military barracks in the same 
town. As a member of Crisis cell, Horvat (2003, p. 40) describes the experience 
of their incessant communication: 
«The absurdity of the war is probably soonest and most felt in the 
negotiations. The generally accepted purpose of the war is the victory of 
one of the parties in conflict. Negotiations bring both parties to the same 
table and as soon as you sit at that table, whether you want it or not, you 
accept the possibility of compromise […] During long, day-and-night long 
meetings the war loses black and white tones and you start hearing more 
and more the voices shaded with specific, human colours. In parallel with 
the fear, felt by all of us, just better hidden by some than by others, we 
start to discover many points in common that define the human kind as a 
sociable being ready for all sorts of contacts, both in joy and in different 
forms of conflict».  
Horvat and his colleagues strongly believed in the power of communication, 
which made them discover the human side of each participant in conflict and 
 192   
 
define the common goal. At some point, their trust in communication was 
conflicting with the increasing demands from the capital for using the violent 
approach – an armed attack on the garrison – as a solution. The events of 5 
November 1991, and the detailed description of the final negotiations by 
Horvat (2003), confirm that the level of trust reached during the mentioned day-
and-night communications was a determinant factor for the decision of the 
YNA military commanders not to attack the town. They took such decision 
despite the pre-existing attack order received from central YNA authorities and 
despite the awareness of personal consequences that they would face for 
disobeying that order, translated later into 12 years prison sentence. Crnkovic 
(2014) confirms that the final negotiations with the command of Military 
barracks were entrusted to Horvat and his colleagues after the central level 
plans for the military attack of Croatian army on the garrison got embroiled. 
The power of communication played a crucial role in saving Delnice from 
massive destruction.  
Radio Delnice with its informative, empathic and tireless communication 
with the citizens was the third crucial channel of communication that 
contributed to the preservation of peace in Gorski kotar. During wartime in 
Croatia Radio Delnice had several important roles, one of them was the role 
of facilitator of communication between authorities and the population, as well 
as among the citizens, the role that Horvat (2003) would characterize as 
psychotherapeutic. Open to all queries and empathic with each inhabitant, in 
clear contrast with the dominant media discourse, the discourse of Radio 
Delnice was unmistakably in the service of peace in Gorski kotar, as we shall 
see in the next section   
 
7.7. Local media in the service of peace: the power of media discourse 
In times of crisis and uncertainty information is key and has an enormous 
influence on the behaviour of groups and individuals. As observed in Chapter 
5, most of the mainstream media both in Croatia and in Serbia promoted the 
discourse of ethnic conflict, including self-victimization of own ethnic group and 
de-humanization of out-groups. This contributed to the high levels of 
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acceptance of violence perceived as the only choice and to the legitimation of 
violence perceived as defence of own group interests and members. This 
approach strongly challenged the voices promoting non-violence anywhere in 
Croatia, including in Gorski kotar. Horvat (2003, p. 42) writes: 
«Media news are “bombarding” us with the images of destruction, blood 
and suffering, the citizens are losing patience for the peace illusions. 
They require action».  
The generalized psychosis triggered by the war imagery was fomenting the 
belief among Croats that the desirable solution – separation of the Homeland 
from Yugoslavia – required sacrifice of human lives, that it was the «price» of 
sovereignty and independence. Slowly, preserving lives started being 
perceived as a sign of cowardice and treason, and sacrificing lives as a symbol 
of heroism.  
Horvat’s reference to the media refers primarily to the national television, 
which was the predominant source of information for most people in Croatia. 
In this regard, several interviewees indicated that ethnicity plaid an important 
role in the individual’s choice of TV channels. While most Croats were following 
Croatian national TV programme, many Serbs were also gathering information 
from Serbian TV. Interviewee 1 observed that «at the beginning of the war 
people in Tuk [the village in Gorski kotar with predominantly Serb population] 
massively started buying satellite dishes». This is a clear indicator of growing 
distrust in the sources of information, certainly fomented by dominant political 
discourses but also linked to the biased discourse of the national mainstream 
media, often hostile towards the ethnic minority groups.  
In addition to the national TV, the inhabitants of Gorski kotar were using 
other media outlets, mainly daily newspapers and radio. Regionally, the most 
commonly read newspaper was Novi list published in Rijeka, which remained 
moderate in comparison with other major daily papers of national coverage.  
The key source of real-time regional and local information for the inhabitants 
of Gorski kotar was Radio Delnice, the radio station with coverage in all Gorski 
kotar and in the neighbouring regions. Close cooperation of the municipal 
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Crisis cell and Radio Delnice was established soon after the Crisis cell was 
formed. Authentic transcripts of several pieces of daily news and other 
information transmitted by Radio Delnice were made available to me for this 
study. This allowed me to get a direct and deep insight into the discourse of 
their wartime radio programme. The analysis of this discourse shows 
extraordinary levels of responsibility for the transmitted messages, in terms of 
linguistic care, meticulous use of non-violent terminology, timely and accurate 
informing coupled with the highest level of attention paid to the appropriate 
tone and content. The analysis points towards numerous contributions of radio 
Delnice to the social practices of non-violence in Gorski kotar region, some of 
which are described below.   
The station was keeping the citizens informed at all times and trying to 
decrease the levels of their uncertainty. The content was delivered in an 
honest, open and emphatic way. Unlike in most national media where it was 
exacerbating fear, anger and resent, on Radio Delnice the messaging was 
encouraging the citizens to remain calm and rational. This was supported by 
detailed informing on the reasoning of local authorities and their actions aiming 
to protect the local population. This type of language was conveying the 
message that local authorities were in control of the situation, fomenting the 
feeling of order and safety: 
«The Crisis cell of the municipality as well as the local crisis cells have 
prepared the maximum of human force to make the situation bearable.  
In a given moment each one of us knows their duty and their place». 
(Radio Delnice, News, 14 September 1991) 
The content of Radio Delnice news stood out for its highly reflective nature. 
Unlike most national and local radio stations which were informing in a dry, 
technocratic way – with news mostly reduced to numbers of deaths and 
injuries, details on places and nature of destruction complemented by blame 
against the enemy – Radio Delnice was fomenting reflection and empathy with 
all inhabitants of Gorski kotar.  It was informing without blaming, not allowing 
for simplistic side-taking, promoting critical thinking while expressing the view 
that the war which was underway in many areas of Croatia does not need to 
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become the war of the people in Gorski kotar, because it was ideated and 
orchestrated elsewhere. 
Although it was made clear that the YNA barracks and their massive stores 
of weapons and ammunition were representing a huge threat for the lives of 
all inhabitants, human face of soldiers and military personnel and empathy with 
them were also promoted: 
«These are really the most difficult moments for them, the soldiers, who 
are soldiers out of conviction and until recently were defending the 
people, and the soldiers here and probably in many other areas also 
became insecure because the idea of the Army, its ideology and its 
function, has been spoiled by many of their superiors with blood of 
innocent victims». (Radio Delnice, News, 14 September 1991). 
Without contradicting it openly, the discourse of radio Delnice was often 
challenging the dominant discourse by promoting critical thinking and 
proposing ideas out of the box. In that effort, Radio Delnice and the Crisis cell 
established close cooperation.  Here is an example of out of the box thinking 
of the local leadership, and clear counter-discourse to the dominant discourse 
of violence: 
«Today is the third day of the application of the order of the Ministry of 
National Defence and the Government of Croatia, which literally states 
that in all areas with military barracks actions of blocking the movement 
and withdrawal of communal services to members of YNA should be 
applied. Such act, allegedly, would represent a synchronized and 
coordinated action of the inhabitants towards the army which in many 
parts of the homeland is undertaking unwanted actions. Delnice and the 
inhabitants of Delnice have always acted peacefully and in friendship, 
in cooperation with the army, at all levels. Motivated by such practice, 
the Crisis cell of the municipality of Delnice decided to implement the 
order of the Ministry and the Government in a cooperative, peaceful 
way, together with the officers of Delnice military barracks, because until 
now no reason was given to act differently» (Radio Delnice, News, 16 
September 1991) 
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In this paragraph one can observe a clear clash between dry, bureaucratic 
and exclusive language of the national authorities, and the more cooperative 
discourse and approach of the local authorities. The expression «literally 
states» underlines this difference, while the term «allegedly» implies some 
doubt in the argument stated by national authorities. 
Indeed, in all Croatia the national authorities issued an order to local 
governments to block the military barracks, due to the great threat that they 
were presenting for the population. The military offensives of YNA started 
taking place in almost all Croatia. According to Goldstein (2013, p. 443) «it was 
expected that the Croatian resistance could last only between 10 and 20 days, 
and this was confirmed by the analysis produced by NATO experts. The aim 
[of the YNA] was to cut Croatia into five parts […] Yugoslav navy blocked all 
the ports of Croatia, and the air forces and artillery heavily attacked the towns 
of Croatia». 
In this context of massive violence perpetuated by YNA in other parts of 
Croatia, the local authorities in Delnice opted for a different approach, which is 
a testimony of their supreme trust in human communication and strong belief 
that every problem can be solved through dialogue. They decided to agree 
with the army officials on limiting their movements and withdrawing services to 
the army barracks! Once again, this proves that the local leadership perceived 
the problem as a common problem of the people in the local military barracks 
and the local population, imposed from outside. By stating that they would deal 
with this problem in a peaceful way «because until now no reason was given 
to act differently», the local leadership sent a signal that they might consider 
other means in case the army officials would resort to violence.  
The empathy was fomented by Radio Delnice not only with local population 
and the military personnel, but also with the displaced persons who were 
arriving to Gorski kotar from war affected areas: 
«Vicinity of war, which resounds through the arrival of displaced 
persons whom we meet with bundles of donated cloths, at school, on 
the street. In their eyes we read fear, disbelief, and suffering. They lost 
the words home, safety, house doorstep, Sunday going to the church. 
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And we make sure that they are not lonely or concerned. That they get 
basic shoes and cloths. To compensate for the stolen warmth of their 
villages which are in war». (Radio Delnice, News, 14 September 1991) 
Transparency and empathy were also shown in the moments of highest 
tension, which could have easily ignited a larger violent conflict. The same 
evening after the agreement on mutual non-violence between local authorities 
and the leadership of military barracks was reached, a soldier of YNA was 
wounded by local extremists while on guard. This is how the event was 
described by Radio Delnice:  
The soldier Safet Zukic was wounded last night around 20:25 at the 
guard position at the military building VE-2.(…) 
It happened moments after the members of the Crisis cells of the local 
communities of municipality of Delnice finished the joint meeting: as 
human beings, they were happy about the declared, although not yet 
fully defined and clear reconciliation. They parted with a joint conclusion 
that the peace, as the one Delnice had, should be preserved and 
cherished with continuous joint contributions (…) 
The president of the Crisis cell engineer Josip Horvat, the head of the 
Police station Anton Crnkovic and his assistant Ivica Briski, went to the 
command of Delnice garrison for a meeting and an investigation on the 
last night events. The report that they produced together was 
transmitted by the representative of Delnice garrison (…) 
The last night event was also a matter of discussion during the joint 
meeting of the president of the Crisis cell of municipality of Delnice, 
engineer Josip Horvat, with representatives of political parties. They all 
dissociated themselves from this attack on the man, whichever side he 
belongs to. In this case the victim of abuse was a soldier who, without 
any guilt, suffers the consequences of a bewildered time.  (Radio 
Delnice, News, 23 September 1991) 
Empathy shown with the wounded soldier, who was defined as an innocent 
victim of a bewildered time, once again confirmed that in the discourse of the 
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local news the violent conflict was not between Croats and Serbs, neither 
between YNA personal and local inhabitants, but between people who made 
the time «bewildered» and those who wanted to live in a civilized time. The 
reference to the «reconciliation agreement» between local crisis cell and 
military barracks command indicates that there was uncertainty about its 
formal contents, but that both parties had full clarity on the common goal: to 
continue enjoying peace, «as the one Delnice had», which showed that they 
were aware of Denice being a «special case» and as such having to search 
for own and often innovative solutions. 
The fact that after the incident the local authorities and the army officials 
came out with a joint report confirms their decision to speak with the same 
voice as a strategy for preserving calm, preventing divisions and avoiding 
mutual accusations that could have easily led to violence. Another very 
eloquent step undertaken by the local authorities was the meeting with the 
local political parties - which were having clear ethnic identity prefix, therefore 
could have instigated ethnic division on the basis of this incident - in order to 
reach a consensus, get everyone on board and secure support in calming 
down the population. As hoped, the political parties reconfirmed the legitimacy 
and the leadership of the crisis cell by calling their membership to follow their 
decisions. Inclusiveness, shared responsibility and consensus seeking proved 
to be demanding, but highly effective strategies in Gorski kotar. 
Another important trait that can be observed in the local radio 
communication is the call to humanity, to our individual values as human 
beings. Promoting empathy and responsibility of each member of community 
based on the values of human life was contributing to the process of fomenting 
common group identity of all people living on the territory of Gorski kotar, 
sharing the same problem - threat of violence, and having a common social 
purpose – preservation of life. In the local radio discourse references to ethnic 
identities of the local population were very rare and the terms used when 
referring to the population were mostly: inhabitants, citizens and people (of 
Delnice, of the municipality of Delnice, of Gorski kotar, etc.). Mostly geographic 
and not ethnic terms were used to delimitate the group identity. In six pieces 
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of Radio Delnice news analysed in detail not a single time were the terms 
Croats or Serbs used to describe the population of the area.  This, in my view, 
was one of the crucial contributions of the local radio to the non-violence in 
Gorski kotar: through its inclusive discourse and focus on common interests it 
was preventing the division along ethnic lines strongly stimulated by dominant 
discourses in Croatia and Serbia15.  
The tolerant and empathic Radio Delnice was often perceived as 
insufficiently patriotic and as such it was subjected to continuous external 
pressure, mostly from the local opponents. Already in late 1990s the local CDU 
started insisting on the change of the name of the radio into – Croatian Radio 
Delnice. The request was addressed all the way up to President Tudjman, 
however the station kept its original name. Financial pressures through the 
reduction of financial allocations followed, but till the end of the war this station 
managed to continue crafting its programme in its unique, non-violent style.  
The respectful communication from Radio Delnice helped in maintaining the 
sense of dignity of the YNA military personnel in town, strongly contributing to 
violence prevention. This was noticed by the military commander, who told to 
the director of the Radio (in Horvat, 2003, p.168): 
 «Every day at 4 pm I turn on the News. So far I haven’t heard you using 
the hate speech, at no point have you spat on us. I like that. You know, 
the media will create the war, that damn propaganda…» 
Even during and after the departure of the YNA officers and soldiers on 
November 5, 1991, the tone of the radio remained prudent, communicating 
without resent or hatred, just with great relief as the danger was over. The 
members of YNA were not humiliated or called in ethnic, hostile or 
                                                          
15 Reflecting on the wartime media challenges, Nada Glad, the wartime director of Radio Delnice, 
remembers (in Horvat, 2003, pp. 150-151): «State television and radio, as well as most of the press in 
Croatia, already then spoke the language of the street where many rabble-rousers were strongly 
condemning the events without choosing their words. The speech is full of intolerant tones. In this 
clatter of new and old, it is not good to send on air the new words with the touch of absurdity. They 
should be replaced with other, softer words, with those words that bring back faith into life after all 
this [...] The media should not harness trendy patriotic nagging. The radio should not become the 
machine for inducing the feeling of ethnic or any other intolerance [...] It was not easy to resist the 
style of expression that was getting imposed by stronger media, and also used at the nearby 
gatherings». 
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disrespectful terms even after their departure. The news referred to them in a 
more neutral tone, not any more as «fellow co-citizens» but simply as «they»: 
«Dear listeners, today is November 5, 1991. Today is our great, the 
most important day […] Today you have been asked to move to your 
shelters for the first time, today in Delnice there was a decisive moment 
in which it was necessary to end the agony of mutual promises that we 
would remain unharmed, undestroyed, alive – despite the fact that 
around us people are in war, people die, people disappear… Today, a 
few moments ago, they left. They left forever. Our Delnice, our land is 
now only ours. It was preserved from destruction. This is why today, 
dear, dearest listeners, is the day that should be remembered» (Radio 
Delnice, News, 5 November 1991) 
 
7.8. Peace discourse as a social practice: in the midst of war in Croatia, 
the inhabitants of Gorski kotar start a Peace School 
In 1994, three years after the first life was lost in Croatia in the war that 
different people would call by different names, the dominant discourses of 
violence seemed to have instigated all three types of violence – direct, 
structural and cultural one. The major part of the society in Croatia was by then 
divided along ethnic lines, and the process of mutual de-humanization of ethnic 
groups and development of stereotypes was ongoing.  
The territory of Croatia was also largely divided along ethnic lines: almost 
one fourth of it was occupied by Serbs (Croat terminology) / liberated (Serb 
terminology) and making part of Republika Srpska Krajina, the self-proclaimed 
and never internationally recognized entity aspiring to be annexed to Serbia. 
Almost all citizens of Croatian ethnic group were expelled from that territory 
after having suffered tremendous hardship, destruction and killing. The 
borders between Croat-controlled and Serb-controlled territories were being 
secured by the United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR), which were 
ensuring the implementation of the ceasefire. The highly tense situation and 
ethnic divisions were further exacerbated by the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
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where the group identities’ situation was even more complex and direct 
violence even more widespread.  
In such context, when the population in Croatia was strongly polarized along 
ethnic lines, while the authorities and the inhabitants of Gorski kotar managed 
to maintain a fragile peace continuously challenged by the exclusionary and 
violent discourse of higher authorities and the media, in 1994 professor Franjo 
Starcevic and his colleague Josip Butkovic came up with an unusual initiative. 
They gathered a group of children from the surrounding villages and several 
towns in Croatia, secured space in the primary school in Mrkopalj, connected 
with workshops’ facilitators in a number of areas, mobilized local families to 
host the children and – opened a Peace School.  
The purpose of this School, as noted in the 1994 Bulletin of the Primary 
School in Mrkopalj, was «to assist children – boys and girls – to start and 
persevere living in mutual cooperation, respect and understanding; to create a 
world without hatred and war and to transform the existing borders of national 
and misunderstood religious belonging into the points of encounter of general 
human togetherness» (Bulletin Board Club, 1994, p. 3) 
The first week-long session of the Peace School was organized in August 
1994 and gathered 46 participants from Gorski kotar, Rijeka and Zagreb, of 
Croat, Serb and Muslim ethnic origin, including children displaced from other 
parts of Croatia due to the war. Involving participants from different parts of 
Croatia, the School’s peace discourse started spreading its influence beyond 
the region of Gorski kotar.  
The organization of the Peace School was preceded by Starcevic’s walks 
and visits to several villages inhabited by Serbs. In the video produced by 
Nansen dialogue center Osijek (2009), Milan Kosanovic, a Serb from Jasenak, 
recalls that his decision to send his daughter to attend Peace School in August 
1994 was closely linked to the pre-established relation with professor 
Starcevic:  
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«Here is the logic. If I trust you, then my child… there is nothing more 
one could invest in some goodness or in some honour and fairness then 
to entrust you their own child». 
The relations of mutual trust among adults and children of both ethnic 
groups were strengthened and intensified through this experience – the 
organization and implementation of the activities of Peace School required 
their cooperation, joint decision-making and confidence. As children have been 
also systematically exposed to dominant discourses of divisions, many adults 
among the organizers were concerned about the way their children would feel 
and behave in an ethnically mixed environment. An interviewee who assisted 
in organizing the participation of children from war affected areas shared with 
me her concerns, particularly because she knew how often the discourse of 
their parents was loaded with rage and ethnic stereotypes. However, she said 
that during her participation in the Peace School sessions, they didn’t 
experience a single challenge related to interethnic communication. Josip 
Butkovic, the co-organizer of the Peace School, confirms this in the video of 
Nansen dialogue center Osijek (2009): 
«From what I recall from my experience, children did not have this kind 
of problem [ethnic issues]. Children had love problems [laughter], you 
know, children started loving each other. That is normal when you are 
in the eighth grade». 
However, in the same video Sanja Kosanovic, who was a child participant of 
the Peace School, does recall concerns other than the love-related ones: 
«The very idea of the arms and somebody doing harm to others by using 
arms is a horrible thing when you are a child, but there is also a guilt 
feeling that you have as a child for belonging to a different national 
group. You are carrying a heavy burden of something that you don’t 
understand, you don’t see why it would be your fault». 
In the context of the ongoing war in Croatia and neighbouring Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the idea of the Peace School was truly revolutionary and as such 
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not without opposition. Recalling the initiative of the Peace School, one of my 
respondents from Mrkopalj area shared with me:  
«I was very sceptical about this idea at the beginning. Why did he 
[Franjo Starcevic] have to bring all these children? You see, in all 
villages there are some hooligans who will get drunk and do something. 
The other one will fight back, you know, one will mention his Croat, or 
his Serb mother, the other one will hit him, and then someone will make 
a big incident out of it. We were simply scared that something could 
happen and that someone could use it against us» (Interviewee 1) 
The organizers of the School were aware of the risks, but also of the multiple 
benefits of the Peace School, which directly challenged the dominant 
discourse of ethnic divisions. The programme initiated in 1994 continued 
extending the scope of its activities – including arts and crafts, sports, ecology, 
non-violent conflict resolution conferences and seminars, handicraft 
workshops and many other activities. As the organizers confirm, at the very 
start they were not teaching students about peace in theory, they were simply 
letting the youth do things together. In this process many barriers were 
removed and a number of different actors were involved in contributing to 
peace. Interestingly, one of those actors was - the Croatian army. Professor 
Starcevic (Manjine za manjine, 2010, p. 117) explains:  
«Croatian ministries were not supportive in terms of peacebuilding. 
During the initial stages of Peace school we didn’t yet have the support 
of Europe or Soros, at that first time we didn’t have a single penny so I 
followed the advice of someone who told me to ask for help of the 
Croatian army. So I wrote to them asking if they could feed the 
participants of the Peace School, and they referred me to Delnice. 
There, in half hour they told me just let us know when you start and for 
how many children. Regardless of the number of children they would 
bring us food from the Croatian army barracks and they would come to 
pick up the dishes. So in the ministries they saw us as Serbophiles, and 
at the same time the Croatian army was feeding us». 
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 Over time the School expanded its geographic presence and influence: 
initiated in Mrkopalj, the activities of the School spread to Montenegro, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Serbia, Slovenia, and also involved initiatives and persons from 
Switzerland and Austria. Initially relying on funds raised from individuals, the 
Peace School gradually got funding also from Council of Europe, Open Society 
Institute and other organizations.  
For many years this School remained the place of encounter and positive 
joint experiences of children from different ethnic groups, ranging from local 
villages to neighbouring countries. As an innovative social practice, the Peace 
School was one of the key sources of the Gorski Kotar counter-discourse 
opposing the dominant discourses of violence. 
 
7.9. Counter-discourse to counter-discourse equals - dominant 
discourse? Comparative analysis of several aspects of Gorski kotar 
discourse of non-violence and its counter-discourse at a local level 
The discourses and practices of non-violence that developed in Gorski kotar 
in the 1990s faced resistance and criticism from the people who believed that 
the «issue» should have been dealt with differently. The local authorities, who 
made the discourses and practices of non-violence prevail at the local level, 
were criticised for lack of firm hand, lack of patriotism, for being «red» – 
meaning communists and pro-Yugoslav. As readiness to kill or die for the 
Homeland became the main social expectation and the enemy was defined in 
ethnic terms, communicating with the Serbs, negotiating with the YNA and 
proposing non-violent solutions was considered anti-patriotic. This means that, 
while the counter-discourse to the dominant discourse of violence became the 
main discourse in the region of Gorski kotar, it was also faced with specific 
counter-discourses.  
Taking into account the war circumstances, the widespread violence 
suffered by the population in Croatia and the influence of dominant discourses 
of violence, the criticism of non-violent discourses and practices at that 
moment was expected and to a certain extent understandable.  However, it is 
interesting to note that the wartime discussions related to different perceptions 
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of wartime events continue up to date, more than 20 years after the armed 
conflict in Croatia finished.  
The concept of the «peace in Gorski kotar during the war in Croatia» has 
been challenged from the very moment the term «oasis of peace» was first 
used by the President of the Assembly of the Municipality of Delnice in 1991. 
The concept got particularly problematized in the local and regional public 
space since the publication of Horvat’s book «Oasis of peace» in 2003. In an 
attempt to demonstrate that there was actually war, and not peace, in Gorski 
kotar in the 1990s, the head of the police station in Delnice of that time Anton 
Crnkovic published in 2014 a book of an apparently oxymoronic title: War in 
the oasis of peace. Through a detailed account of police activities in 1991, in 
his book Crnkovic tried to provide evidence that the Municipality of Delnice was 
in war and that it was successfully liberated, opposing the discourse of Horvat 
who claims that the local authorities had managed to preserve peace. The 
comparative analysis of the discourses used by Crnkovic and by Horvat 
provides an excellent insight into the differences between the discourse of 
violence and its counter-discourse of non-violence at local level. 
In many aspects Crnkovic’s text reveals author’s in-group favouritism for 
ethnic Croats, replicating a number of characteristics of the national dominant 
discourse in 1990s. A phenomenon off mirror images (Fisher and Kelman, 
2011), whereby the parties in conflict tend to develop parallel images of self 
and other, except with the sign reversed, can be observed, with the same 
actions judged as bad if committed by members of Serb ethnic group, and 
judged as good or acceptable if committed by ethnic Croats. For instance, 
when inhabitants of Serb villages cut the trees and block the roads, Crnkovic 
refers to this as «trunk revolution», using a pejorative term that ethnic Croats 
invented for this kind of action when performed by Serbs, reflecting an act of 
barbarianism. A few days later a decision was taken by the Croatian authorities 
«to block all roads that were leading towards the territory where Serb 
population supporting YNA and Greater Serbia aiming aggression on the 
Republic of Croatia» (Crnkovic, 2014, p. 53). Although consisting of the same 
acts – cutting the trees and placing them on the road to prevent circulation – 
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this is now considered as a legitimate action of protection from potential harm, 
and not as a «trunk revolution».  
As Head of Police Station, the author also shows bias in the description of 
the illegal acts, depending on the ethnic belonging of the actors. For instance, 
he describes with a lot of permissiveness and a certain level of complicity the 
incidents involving the inhabitants who were damaging WWII monuments, 
which were related to the creation of Yugoslavia and the brotherhood and unity 
discourse that was strongly challenged by the Croatian nationalist discourse. 
Crnkovic tries to justify the actors with the emotions of newly acquired freedom 
in democracy:  
«In fact, since the multiparty elections, there was some anxiety among 
the inhabitants. They started breathing with full lungs so some of them 
permitted themselves things which were not habitual and, we could say, 
were not allowed. At the very beginning it was destroying or damaging 
the monuments related to the Second World War» (Crnkovic, 2014, p.15)  
Experiencing tension of loyalties to the social norms of two of his social 
identity groups - Croats as his ethnic group and police as his professional 
identity group - Crnkovic testifies of the relatively professional behaviour of the 
police, which was confirmed by a number of my interviewees, both Croats and 
Serbs. The police, states Crnkovic (2014, p. 15) had to react: «In accordance 
with our regular authorities and duties, the police had to investigate, find and 
process those who were putting the explosive under the monuments. And it 
did so, even if it was not always simple and easy». This was not the case in 
many places in Croatia, where the police started «tolerating» all sorts of crimes 
committed by own ethnic group, or where parallel structures of control were 
formed, the formal police losing any influence. The mostly professional work 
of the police in Gorski kotar actually contributed to the feeling of order and 
safety, and consequently to the prevention of violence in Gorski kotar.  
However, as the tensions were mounting in the region, many discourses 
and practices were becoming biased and exclusive. The definition of the 
threat, related to the social purposes and perceptions of the in-group out-group 
relations, is what makes the clearest difference between the discourses of 
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Crnkovic and Horvat. In Horvat’s perception, all inhabitants of Gorski kotar 
made part of the same social group, whose social purpose or final aim in the 
1990s context was saving human lives and relationships. The realization of 
this goal was threatened by the violence, which was considered as the enemy. 
On the other hand, Crnkovic adopted the dominant discourse whereby the 
social group was defined as ethnic Croats, whose final aim was to establish 
own state at any price, and the threat to that goal were the Serbs, including 
the YNA run by the Serbs. Such worldviews are translated in a number of 
aspects of Crnkovic’s discourse. 
 When the civilian shooting towards the Croatian police patrol occurs, the 
actors are tagged by Crnkovic as terrorists. However, when the shooting by 
civilians towards the military barracks of YNA occurs, the actors are portrayed 
in positive terms. In clear conflict with his role of Head of Police, Crnkovic 
expresses approval and praises the actors of such (illegal) action – shooting 
toward military barracks - for their role in increasing the fear of the already 
tense military forces. This double standard can be explained by Crnkovic’s 
Croat ethnic identity and the role of ethnic identification in justifying aggression. 
As explained by Brewer (2011) high identifiers perceive in-group aggression 
against an out-group as more justified and are more likely to feel satisfaction 
rather than guilt in response to such aggression. Justification of such actions 
includes attributions to external circumstances or blaming the out-group for 
bringing it on themselves, downplaying the severity of the harm and 
dehumanization of the out-group.  
The de-humanization of the out-groups in the dominant discourse, including 
in the discourse used by Crnkovic, is often reflected in the terminology used to 
describe the enemy. The term «terrorists» was very commonly used for that 
purpose, and it was often extended to incorporate all Serbs, without 
distinguishing between the local Serb population, the members of YNA of Serb 
origin and the Serbs from Serbia who came to fight for Milosevic’s plan of 
Greater Serbia. Perceived as terrorists, the enemy is dehumanized and at no 
point there seems to be any genuine effort to understand the motivation of his 
behaviour and even less to search for win-win solutions. This is one of the key 
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differences from the discourse of non-violence promoted by Horvat, whereby 
the opponent was perceived as a respected partner in the search for common 
ground and solutions acceptable to all.  
After receiving the order to co-organize the attack on the YNA premises and 
stores of weapons in Delnice, Crnkovic (2014, p.78) had mixed feelings: the 
feeling of fear due to awareness of the scope of destructive power of the stored 
weaponry is superseded by satisfaction «because due to my predispositions, 
I belonged to the group in the Municipal Crisis cell that has been proposing 
even earlier to proceed with an attack and take-over of the military 
infrastructure».  After the shooting and handover of one of the stores of the 
weapons from YNA to the Croatian authorities, Crnkovic (2014, p. 101) 
describes the scene in the following terms:  
«I was looking at the spot of the clash. The faces of my Special Forces 
policemen don’t say anything. They are serious and joyful, they seem 
proud and sad at the same time. No, I think it is the pride that reflects 
most. Of course it does. For the first time in their young lives they 
participated in war, for the first time bullets buzzed around them, the guns 
went off, for the first time they had the opportunity to offer their young 
lives to their beloved homeland».  
This statement illustrates well the key difference between the discourse of 
Horvat and the one of Crnkovic. Horvat and his team did everything to prevent 
any outbreak of violence and were horrified by war, while the dominant 
discourse in Croatia represented here by Crnkovic glorified and romanticized 
the war as an opportunity to die for the Homeland, making the war not only 
legitimate, but a desirable way of solving the problem. This difference is still at 
the origin of a 20 years long debate about the merits and the patriotism during 
1990s in Gorski kotar, opposing discourses of war and discourses promoting 
non-violence at local level, which key characteristics will be summarized in the 
concluding part of this chapter.  
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7.10 Oasis of peace in Gorski kotar: conclusions 
In this chapter I explored the wartime discourses and practices of the 
community of Gorski kotar in the context of its resistance to inter-ethnic 
fracturing during 1991-1995 violent conflict in Croatia. The analysis of the 
gathered data confirms the existence of a structured and well-defined counter-
discourse to the discourse of violence in this region. The analysis of this 
counter-discourse in relation to the three key themes of this study - namely 
group identification processes, inter-group relations and governance – 
revealed the key aspects of that counter-discourse which are summarized 
here.  
With reference to group identification processes, the analysis indicates that 
during 1990s the population of Gorski kotar maintained multiple social 
identities, in which their regional identity continued playing a significant role 
and enjoying salience. Like in all other places of Croatia, ethnic identities of 
Croat and Serb inhabitants also gained prominence in Gorski kotar, but did not 
achieve exclusivity or supersede other social identities. The study of the 
content of the Gorski kotar social identity points at specific traits that were key 
for the resistance to violent discourses and preservation of peace in the region. 
These comprise cherishing diversity, inclusiveness and openness to dialogue, 
tendency to cooperate, awareness of human interdependence, deep respect 
for human life, consideration of future consequences and moderation, among 
others. These aspects of Gorski kotar social identity were in clear contrast with 
the new traits of ethnic identities which developed in the pre-war and war 
context. This is why on a number of occasions, authorities and common people 
of Gorski kotar faced loyalty tensions related to the conflicting norms, relational 
comparisons, goals and worldviews of their multiple identities. 
 However, with reference to inter-group relations, maintaining multiple social 
identities incited them to develop their own definition of the problem and of the 
parties in conflict in Gorski kotar, different to the ones developed within 
dominant ethnic-identity focused discourses. The generalized definition of 
parties in conflict in ethnic terms was not adopted in Gorski kotar. On the 
contrary, the authorities, local media and other key actors were proactively 
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promoting positive collective memories and constructive inter-ethnic relations 
to prevent any of the three types of identity-based violence which were rapidly 
spreading in the rest of Croatia. The leadership of the two ethnic groups in the 
region, as well as the leadership of YNA and local authorities, adopted and 
fostered cooperative inter-group relations and jointly sought for solutions to the 
common problem clearly defined as threat of violence in the region, with the 
common goal consequently defined as saving lives of all inhabitants of Gorski 
kotar.  
The alternative definition of threat, parties in conflict and desired goal 
resulted in the selection of different conflict management strategies and tools 
by the regional and local authorities and other actors promoting peace in 
Gorski kotar. The existence of a group of inter-linked actors who developed 
high levels of mutual trust also proved key. In Gorski kotar these included local 
authorities at different levels, members of crisis cells, regional Radio Delnice 
and YNA leadership in Delnice, among other.  
Numerous characteristics of good governance were identified in the analysis 
as crucial for preserving positive inter-ethic and other inter-group relationships 
and maintaining peace. These include the local authorities taking full 
accountability for the situation in the region, making continuous efforts to 
reduce fears of all groups and individuals, fostering communication at all levels 
and ensuring genuine consultations with all key actors while recognizing them 
as human beings with needs and feelings, preventing breaches in the rule of 
law and adopting innovative approaches in dealing with the problems, among 
other.  
Although the resistance to ethnic fracturing and violence proved successful 
in Gorski kotar, discourse analysis reveals that the key actors in this region did 
not believe that their approach could influence the overall political elites and 
systems in Croatia towards wiser, peaceful solutions of the broader 1991-1995 
conflict. While their focus was on saving their own region from the politics of 
war, to some extent they also adopted the view that armed resistance in other 
places in Croatia was inevitable, particularly in those places which were 
already affected by violence.  
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Even if its influence on wartime event in the rest of Croatia remained limited, 
the counter-discourse which developed in Gorski kotar strongly challenged 
dominant discourses of war in the country. This can be perceived from the 
criticism and opposition that it faced from nationalist actors and the fierce 
debate about wartime events, processes and merits in Gorski kotar which 
continues until now.   
Challenging dominant discourses of war and preserving communal peace 
and inter-ethnic cooperation in Gorski kotar was a highly demanding task. 
Horvat (2003, p. 36) writes:  
«Leading war by peaceful means was not easy at all. We had to find the 
way to the most noble spiritual and general human values and wishes 
of common people. Inhabitants of Gorski kotar were chasing away the 
ghost of war far from their region» 
This confirms Bar-Tal’s claim (2011, pp. 15-16) that it is much easier to 
mobilize society members for violent conflicts than for peace. Bar-Tal explains 
that this is because the instinct for survival in times of threat is strong and very 
basic, and the negative information about potential harms has more weight 
than positive information about peace opportunities. Also, hope is needed to 
override fear, and while fear is activated automatically, hope relies on thinking 
and requires various intellectual skills. As could be observed in this chapter, 
leadership and inhabitants of the region of Gorski kotar made extraordinary 
efforts to identify and seize peace opportunities and maintain hope in the 
common, interdependent and non-violent future of Croats and Serbs in Gorski 
kotar. The exemplary results of those efforts, which turned Gorski kotar into an 
oasis of peace, are best summarized by Nada Glad in the opening quote of 
this chapter.  
The mapping of inter-ethnic wartime experiences in the neighbouring 
Bosnia-Herzegovina revealed the existence of another oasis of peace in the 
city of Tuzla, which is explored in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 8: Ethnically mixed communities as a counter-discourse (II): 
case study from the city of Tuzla in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
 
After the Orthodox church in Tuzla was hit in the bombing by 
Serbian armed forces, Tuzlan authorities embarked immediately 
on its reparation. One of the city officials explains the 
astonishment of a German Parliamentarian on his visit to Tuzla 
after seeing the reparation of the Orthodox church during 
wartime:  
«”Who is restoring this?!”, he asked me. “The municipality”, I 
said, “this is not their church, it’s the church of our citizens”. Then 
he was curious to find out who were the workers up on the 
church. “Let’s ask them!” I said. And there they were… up there… 
a Serb, and a Croat, and a Muslim… “I can’t understand this”, he 
commented» (Interviewee 11) 
 
In this chapter I will analyse the discourses and practices that prevailed in 
the city of Tuzla during wartime, focusing on the same three key themes and 
four types of discourses as in the previous chapters. My analysis is based on 
the gathered pre-existing texts and on the interviews with eleven citizens of 
the city conducted between 2014 and 2016. The period in the focus of the 
analysis includes the initial months of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in spring 
1992 when the tone was set, and the time of critical events occurred during 
the war, which in the case of Tuzla include the departure of numerous citizens 
of Serb ethnic group and the clash between Yugoslav National Army and local 
military forces in May 1992, and the massacre of youth in the city centre in 
May 1992. 
After providing a brief overview of the most important historical discourses 
and aspect of life in Tuzla relevant for the evolution of its discourses and 
practices of peace, I will closely look into the social identity discourses in the 
city, the inter-group relations among its citizens of Bosniak/Muslim, Croat and 
Serb ethnic group and the governance structures that contributed to 
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maintaining communal peace in the city. I will also elaborate on two critical 
moments mentioned above, which exposed Tuzlan inter-ethnic harmony to 
high risk. I will analyse the role of the media in wartime Tuzla, as well as the 
role of selected civil society organizations and religious leaders who 
contributed to constructive inter-group relations in the city during wartime. At 
the end of this chapter, I will analyse the key challenges that Tuzlan discourse 
of peace was exposed to and summarize the key elements that made Tuzla 
an oasis of peace during the 1991-1995 war.  
The city of Tuzla counts with a unique experience of preserved inter-ethnic 
peace and cooperation throughout the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
As observed by Armakolas (2011, p. 231) «the vast academic literature on 
Yugoslav collapse and the Bosnian war pays very little attention to wartime 
Tuzla. Tuzla politics is usually portrayed as “exceptional”, a “paradox” that is 
simply discounted because it is assigned to the presumed unique 
characteristics of the city. As a result no elaborate investigation of Tuzla has 
been attempted and no lessons from its politics have been drawn». 
 Building on this observation, and taking into account a definition of paradox 
as a principle that appears logically unacceptable or seemingly contradictory 
to common sense, it is important to note that Tuzla was perceived as 
«paradox» because it did not follow the «logic» of ethnic radicalization and 
fracturing, the «new logic» that spread fast in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Several 
other cities and towns, including the capital Sarajevo, tried to resist this «ethnic 
logic of violence», but nationalist forces were successful in breaking down their 
resistance. It is only Tuzla’s multi-ethnicity that survived the entire period of 
wartime, and this is what makes its experience exceptional. Analysing its 
discourses and practices, in this chapter I will attempt to discern the key factors 
that contributed to the success of Tuzla’s resistance to ethnic fracturing and 
violence, which turned this city into an oasis of (communal) peace. Firstly, I will 
elaborate on several aspects of the history and society of Tuzla which are key 
for understanding the evolution of its discourse of peace.  
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Map of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2010)                 
with highlighted position of the city of Tuzla 
 
 
 
8.1. Tuzla in context: the city of salt and diversity 
To grasp the evolution of Tuzlan community and its peculiar approach to the 
conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is crucial to understand several aspects of its 
past which contributed to the positive inter-group relations and the evolution of 
Tuzlan counter-discourse to the discourse of war during 1991-1995. 
In the former Yugoslavia Tuzla had been widely known as an industrial and 
mining city in the north-eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina, with long anti-fascist 
tradition and large working class. Tuzla’s salt bags were sold in the markets 
throughout Yugoslavia, making the city recognizable for its salt mines. Salt has 
marked the history of Tuzla16. The industrial production of salt was started in 
                                                          
16 «Throughout its existence and in the languages of all travellers, cartographers, historiographers 
and conquerors, the name of the city has been related to the salt. The river Jala, running through Tuzla, 
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the 19th century, attracting people from different parts of the region into Tuzla, 
consequently fomenting another one of the city’s key traits – its diversity.  
At the beginning of the 20th century more than ten languages were spoken 
in Tuzla, including Serbo-Croatian, German, Czech, Hungarian, Polish, 
Slovak, Italian, Spanish, Slovenian, Rusyn and other languages (Bajric, 2000). 
As a result of migrations, the city benefited from an extraordinary variety and 
inter-group tolerance of its inhabitants. Recalling her life in Tuzla between the 
two world wars, Mujbegovic (2016, p. 301) writes:  
«Languages, religions nations, minorities, foreigners – settlers with their 
surnames, forenames and languages, all this was happily mixed on our 
salty land, as a national and social mix (…) People were living in different 
ways, but they were mainly understanding each other» 
The inter-group tolerance characterizing Tuzla was challenged in several 
historical moments. It was severely threatened for the first time during WWII. 
In 1941 the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina, including Tuzla, got under governance 
of the quisling regime of the Independent State of Croatia (ISC).  While it was 
openly persecuting Serbs and Jews, the pro-Nazi leadership of ISC had a 
different approach towards the Muslims. In an effort to win their support and 
collaboration, the Ustasha regime was describing Muslims as «Croats of 
Islamic faith», therefore including some 700.000 Muslims in Bosnia-
Herzegovina into the corpus of the Croatian nation. Moreover, in the Ustasha 
propaganda discourse Muslims were portrayed as the «flower of Croatian 
nation» and Bosnia as «the heart of Croatia». Although several eminent 
                                                          
carries the name which originates in the Greek word Jalos, meaning salt.  Throughout its history the city 
was named: Castron de Salenes, the city of salt pans (Greek), Salenes (Greek), Ad Salinas (Latin), Soli 
(south Slavic), Memlehatejn (Arabic), Memleha-i-Zir (Persian), Tuz (Turkish)… until it got its the 
current name Tuzla, meaning salt pan in Turkish» (Grad Tuzla, 2016). The salt mines are remnants of 
the Pannonia Sea, which was spreading in this area more than ten million years ago. The organized 
production of salt in Tuzla was initiated during the Ottoman era and became the main source of income 
in the city. In the 15th century on the main square of Tuzla – today called Soni trg, meaning, predictably, 
the Square of Salt – there were 80 large pans where the salty water extracted from the well was cooked. 
 
 216   
 
Muslim leaders joined the Ustasha regime and despite the fact that many 
Muslims considered ISC as a better option when compared to the Serbian 
regime, most Muslims were reserved and soon horrified by the Ustasha terror 
over the Serbs (Goldstein, 2013). Furthermore, Muslims were often victims of 
reprisals of the Serbs who were forming militias to defend themselves against 
the terror of ISC.  
As described in Chapter 4, Muslim leaders’ disapproval of the atrocities 
committed by the Ustasha regime against the Serbs was publically expressed 
in a series of resolutions addressed to the Ustasha leadership. One of those 
resolutions was sent from Tuzla on December 11, 1941, signed by 22 eminent 
citizens of Tuzla of Muslim faith. In their letter to the supreme leader of ISC 
they complained about major security problems and violence17. With this 
resolution, Muslim leaders were calling upon an extremist government to install 
order and punish those who were terrorizing Serbs, which was a behaviour not 
only accepted, but also strongly promoted by the ISC. By this resolution Muslim 
leaders warned that as long as part of the population was terrorized nobody 
was safe, as violence against Serbs was resulting in their counter-violence 
against all non-Serbs. They invoked the concepts of legality and accountability 
and proved strong awareness of inter-dependence, deep understanding that 
peace is only possible if the needs and rights of all people, regardless of their 
ethnicity or other group identities, are safeguarded. These concepts would 
guide the behaviour of Tuzla’s leadership also half a century later, during the 
1991-1995 war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as we shall see in the rest of this 
chapter.  
An even more tangible evidence of inter-group solidarity and support during 
ISC was recorded on the Orthodox Christmas Eve on January 6, 1942. Having 
found out that Ustasha forces had planned to undertake a massive killing of 
                                                          
17 Here is an excerpt of the Tuzlan resolution: «It appears that all the violence was provoked by the 
incidents against Serbs committed by irresponsible elements, but unfortunately those incidents against 
them keep happening also now, which causes revenge. Our Muslim population inspired by the spirit 
of Islamic culture and ethics, condemns all violence [..] If the disorder can’t be controlled in a purely 
military way, why not undertake also in parallel some political measures for calming down the chaos 
by punishing the persons guilty for illegal acts, which preceded the disorder, and calling them to 
accountability and public punishment» (Hamzic, 2012, p. 117). 
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Serbs in Tuzla during that night, Muslim mufti effendi Kurt requested an urgent 
meeting with the German commander of the city and insisted on this plan to 
be revoked.  In follow up to this, a delegation of Muslims led by effendi Kurt 
travelled to the headquarters of ISC in Zagreb, where they requested from the 
Minister of interior and the author of «racial laws» Andrija Artukovic to stop 
harassing innocent Serbs. No massive slaughters of Serbs in Tuzla area were 
documented after that. When Effendi Kurt died many years later, in sign of 
deep respect for him an Orthodox priest held a speech at his funeral attended 
by 10.000 people. Priest Jovanovic also asked for an unusual honour to 
descend into the grave before the body of effendi Kurt and receive it there. 
This was another example of mutual support and respect of the religious 
communities in Tuzla, which helped build the inter-group trust and respect that 
would be of great importance for the behaviours of individuals and groups in 
Tuzla during 1991-1995 war.  
As of 1942 many citizens of Tuzla joined the League of Communist Youth 
of Yugoslavia or Communist Party of Yugoslavia, the nascent force which 
embraced the idea of brotherhood and unity of all ethnic groups. The partisan 
struggle against fascism would result in Tuzla becoming one of the largest so 
called liberated territories firstly in 1943, and then in 1944. Under control of 
Tito’s communist party, «the final liberation of Tuzla was of great importance 
for the continuation of struggle against occupation. Tuzla became a centre of 
a large free territory. The liberation of Tuzla positively affected the massive 
growth of the Movement of National Liberation» (Sakic, 2003, p. 60). Tuzla’s 
antifascist tradition, strongly based on anti-nationalism, remained as one of the 
key traits in the social identity of most citizens of the town, and its continuity 
would be seen during the break-up of Yugoslavia. 
When the war broke out in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tuzla counted with some 
131.000 inhabitants. As per the 1991 census more than 50 per cent of them 
were Muslims, some 17 per cent were Serbs and another 17 per cent Croats. 
Some 11 per cent of citizens of Tuzla declared as Yugoslavs, and more than 
4 per cent belonged to other groups listed in the census. It is also important to 
note that prior to the war there was a large number of officials and soldiers of 
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Yugoslav National Army (YNA) residing in Tuzla, as well as a massive military 
infrastructure including one of the major military airports, four military barracks 
and seven warehouses of ammunitions, all inside or in the vicinity of the city.  
During the elections held in Bosnia-Herzegovina on November 18, 1990, 
the first multiparty elections after the WWII, the citizens of Tuzla gave a 
majority vote to the alliance of former communist party and other non-
nationalist parties. During the pre-war political crisis, lasting from the 
November 1990 elections until the outbreak of armed hostilities in Bosnia-
Herzegovina in April 1992, as well as throughout the wartime period lasting 
from 1992 until 1995, during which Tuzla was exposed to severe hardship 
including shelling, hunger and massive influx of displaced persons, the local 
government and the great majority of the citizens did not succumb to intensive 
and continuous nationalist pressures promoting inter-ethnic violence. Instead, 
they remained a bastion of inter-ethnic tolerance and cooperation, challenging 
the discourse of the so called ethnic war in the country. As the community of 
Tuzla inverted the «problem» of ethnic heterogeneity in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
into a solution at the local level, paraphrasing Campbell (1998) we could say 
that they counter-problematized the problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In that 
effort, they strongly relied on their citizens’ social identity, which will be 
analysed in the next section.  
 
8.2. Tuzla and its citizens: the citizens’ option as a social identity 
discourse and a counter-problematization of the conflict in Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
The analysis of dominant discourses, as well as of the key political 
developments in the early 1990s, shows that with the breakdown of Yugoslavia 
many inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina, even more than those in other 
republics, were faced with a challenge of social identification and 
representation. Substituting the discourse of brotherhood and unity, in the 
process of a disintegrating state and under the influence of the nationalist 
elites, ethnic identity and nationalism became the main sources of legitimation, 
representation and social identification of the majority of the population. As a 
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consequence, those inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina whose social identities 
were not characterized by high salience of ethnic or national feeling found 
themselves in a limbo, without representatives to champion their own priorities 
and values. The field of representation was appropriated by nationalists. 
Although there is a widespread belief that nationalist political parties were 
in mutual confrontation prior to and during the dissolution of Yugoslavia, there 
is sufficient evidence contradicting such a conviction. As described by 
Kurspahic (2003, p. 95), in Bosnia-Herzegovina «the three nationalist parties 
– united in their determination to win at any cost and worried that Bosnians 
might vote for Markovic’s Alliance of Reformist Forces or the Social-
Democratic Party of reformed communists – went so far as to encourage 
voters to vote for any one of the ethnic parties in order to generate a winning 
coalition against their major opponents». In other words, salience of ethnic 
identity and division along ethnic lines was a common interest of all nationalist 
parties, while the ethnic coexistence was a threat to their goals.  
This phenomenon was particularly prominent among Serb and Croat 
nationalists in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but gradually also became the strategy of 
the Muslim leadership. Campbell (1998) confirms that, although the official 
Bosnian position (referring to the Bosnian Muslim elites) has been the one of 
defending non-nationalist and multi-ethnic position, there have been strong 
political undercurrents dissenting from that position. «By and large, those 
undercurrents have come not from a constituency that wished to pursue a 
Muslim nationalism prior to the war but, rather, from those who have argued 
since the outbreak of war that the success of chauvinism made a defence of 
multiculturalism untenable» (Campbell, 1998, p. 111). This is clearly 
observable in the evolution of the discourse of the supreme leader of Bosnian 
Muslims Alija Izetbegovic, as elaborated in Chapter 5.  
By instigating fear of other ethnic groups and promoting salience of ethnic 
identity, in the 1990 elections the nationalist parties succeeded in gaining trust 
of the large majority of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina and won in 107 
out of 109 municipalities of the country, initiating an intensive and hardly 
reversible process of ethnic fracturing. Tuzla was the only city where non-
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nationalists succeeded in winning the elections and formed the local 
government. The Alliance of Reformist Forces entered into coalition with the 
Communist Party and a small Democratic party. Together they formed a solid 
majority of 67 in the 100-member Assembly. The representative of the 
Reformists Selim Beslagic was elected mayor of the city, formally titled 
President of the Municipal Assembly. Together with his colleagues in the 
Municipality of Tuzla, throughout his mandate in pre-war, war and post-war 
times, mayor Beslagic was promoting the citizens’ option as a counter-
discourse to the discourse of ethnic rivalry and conflict. In the next section I 
will analyse the characteristics of citizens’ option social identity discourse and 
contrast them with the key aspects of the renewed ethnic identity discourse.   
 
8.2.1. Citizens’ identity versus ethnic group identity: the growing incompatibility    
As demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 5, collective identities can take many 
forms – they can include or exclude different traits, such as religion, language 
or class, but also differ in their content, i.e. in constitutive norms, social 
purposes, relational comparisons and worldviews. Political leaders and other 
authorities are in a position to influence the shaping of those identities, which 
are often being «re-defined» in times of crisis. As elaborated in Chapter 5, 
nationalist leaders and other nationalist influencers in the former Yugoslavia 
promoted group identities based on ethnic exclusivity, with strong focus on 
religion, portraying own ethnic group as a victim of others by stressing negative 
past experiences, praising readiness to kill or die for ensuring control of own 
group over specific territory, among other aspects. With the salience of these 
characteristics, ethnic identities significantly changed in their content. 
The group identities promoted by the advocates of citizens’ option relied on 
the constitutive norms, social purposes, relational comparisons and 
worldviews significantly deferring from and often incompatible with the ones 
newly promoted by the ethnic identity enthusiasts. In addition to Mayor 
Beslagic and his team at the Municipality of Tuzla, the key actors in the 
promotion of this alternative to nationalist identities and politics in Tuzla 
included the daily paper Front Slobode, Radio and Television of Tuzla, several 
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religious leaders and civil society organizations such as the Forum of Citizens 
of Tuzla, among others 
In his public announcement made on 19th April 1992 mayor Beslagic offered 
the following description of citizens’ option: 
«The outcome of the first multiparty parliamentary elections confirmed 
the “citizens’ option” (the political view that government in Bosnia should 
serve the interests of all citizens regardless of their ethnic or religious 
background)» (Beslagic, 1998, p. 18).  
He further expanded on this definition of citizens’ option by underlining some 
of its key attributes, in a public announcement of 12th May 1992: 
«Our political goal is the citizens’ option. This means political, legal and 
social equality of all citizens regardless of their religious, ethnic and 
political affiliations. We divide and evaluate people according to their 
abilities and the contribution they make by their work, and not according 
to their religion, ethnicity and the like» (Beslagic, 1998, p. 23). 
In terms of constitutive norms of the social identity promoted by citizens’ 
option, the above quote of Mayor Beslagic points at: inclusiveness of members 
of all religious, ethnic and political options, common territory and government, 
promotion of equality and of the contribution of citizens to the common well-
being. The analysis of public announcements of Mayor Beslagic issued 
throughout the war indicates that he was carefully crafting his discourse to 
support the practices of citizens’ option. For instance, he was regularly opening 
his addresses using the terms «Citizens of Tuzla!», sometimes preceded by 
the adjectives Respected, Dear, or similar. This type of address was in direct 
opposition to the ethnicity-focused language of nationalist leaders. For 
instance, Croatian president Tudjman used to open his addresses with the 
term «Dear Croats», sometimes followed by «dear citizens of Croatia», 
showing that the state belonged more to the former than to the later.  
Furthermore, in his discourse Mayor Beslagic and the supporters of citizens’ 
option mostly refrained from the use of religious terminology, unlike the 
nationalist leaders such as Tudjman or Izetbegovic. Alija Izetbegovic, whose 
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use of religious terms got more explicit in the later stages of his wartime 
discourse, often used the terminology pertaining to Islam. For instance, in his 
address at the session of the city council of Party of Democratic Action, he 
greeted the participants in the following terms: «Dear brothers and sisters, 
dear friends, Essalamualejkum, Bismilahir-rahmanir-rahim» (Izetbegovic, 
1995, p. 31).  
Nationalist social identities in Bosnia-Herzegovina were strongly 
characterized by the superposition of ones’ own group goals over the goals of 
other ethnic groups. Not only were the goals of other groups considered 
secondary or illegitimate, but often there was a belief that those other groups 
had to be annihilated in order for the goals of own group to be achieved. In 
such context, inter-ethnic coexistence was perceived as a threat and 
bottleneck in the realization of own group goal, and lives of the out-groups, and 
even of the in-groups, had to be sacrificed for the ultimate goal – own ethnic 
state or territory. However, advocates of citizens’ option did not consider the 
multi-ethnicity as a threat, but rather as the greatest value and the main aspect 
of their social identity which was under attack and had to be defended. Where 
most leaders, including the international community, saw a problem, Tuzla’s 
leadership and most citizens saw a source of strength and a social identity trait 
which was not negotiable. Equality and inter-ethnic cooperation were 
considered as key values among citizens of Tuzla who, unlike many others, 
were highly aware of their interdependence. 
 «We are deeply aware of the fact that our society cannot be good for 
Muslims if it isn’t good for Serbs, Croats and others who live here. 
Conversely, it cannot be good for Serbs and Croats if it isn’t good for 
Muslims» (Beslagic, 1998, p. 24) 
The above mindfulness of mutual interdependence is strongly diverging 
from the dominant discourses of nationalist identities, which propose that the 
precondition of the well-being of own ethnic group is the expulsion or 
subjugation of other, usually minority group.   
Most citizens of Tuzla strongly cherished their common social identity based 
on shared space and the constitutive norms and relational comparisons in 
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which ethnicity did not enjoy salience. In fact, the analysis of the conducted 
interviews shows that my respondents were referring to the religious belonging 
rather than the ethnic belonging as one of the distinguishing identity aspects 
among the co-citizens of Tuzla. An interviewee who worked in the media stated 
that they paid a lot of attention to avoid the terms Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks, 
replacing them with the terms Orthodox, Catholics and Muslims, when 
referring to the citizens of Tuzla. By «reducing» their differences from ethnicity 
to religion only, the promoters of citizens’ identity established a different 
balance between commonalities and differences among inhabitants of Tuzla. 
Vera Mujbegovic (2016, p. 285) testifies that this was also the common 
discourse in the first decades of the 20th century, which reconfirms that ethnic 
or national identities were not coming from the grassroots level.  
In terms of the prevailing worldviews as an aspect of social identity, while 
nationalist leaders and ethnicity-based groups often insisted on the negative 
aspects of past inter-group relationships, in Tuzla references to the positive 
common past were frequently highlighted to challenge nationalist discourses 
and practices, to strengthen inter-group relationships and to inspire hope. 
Such positive references were commonly present in the reflections of my 
respondents:  
«Somehow we managed to avoid all the wars. There is a legend that 
blood and salt do not go together. This was the case during WWII, and 
also now (…) Tuzla was saved, maybe indeed because we were 
“operated” from nationalism, because we were like that, we were multi-
ethnic» (Interviewee 12) 
Similar positive references to the past were often emphasised in the political 
and media discourse in Tuzla to support the prevention of ethnicity-based 
violence which was ravaging in the rest of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Front Slobode 
transmits the appeal of Rada Gavrić Nujić, citizen of Tuzla of Serb (Orthodox) 
origin, employee of Radio Sarajevo. In the article titled «We are indebted to 
the Muslims», recalling the well-known episode of the past when a Muslim 
religious leader prevented the massacre of Serbs in Tuzla, she states: 
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«I am appealing to all Serbs not to use violence against the Muslims, not 
to hurt their religious, national and other feelings and dignity. I say this as 
a citizen of Tuzla of Serb nationality, aware that we are highly indebted 
to the Muslims for what they did for us during WWII» (Front Slobode, 
1992b) 
In a public announcement of June 9, 1992, following a break into the 
Orthodox bishop’s palace, the mayor of the city reminds of that same positive 
experience from the past by stating: 
«May I remind you that our city kept itself free of nationalism during the 
WWII. The Mayor then was Hadzi Hasanaga Pasic, and the Mufti a man 
by the name of Kurt. Together with the citizens of Tuzla they refused to 
permit genocide against the Serbs and did not allow the Orthodox church 
and the bishop’s palace to be burned down[…] This is Tuzla, and in Tuzla 
we will not allow any vandalism or barbaric behaviour» (Beslagic, 1998, 
pp. 39-40) 
Building on the positive past, the Mayor sends a clear message that himself 
and his administration were following the same path as their predecessors, 
and that they would not allow anything to happen now that would later be a 
cause for shame. Shame as a sense of accountability to the community and 
awareness of possible long-term consequences are two important 
characteristics of the civic social identity of Tuzla, pointing at strong recognition 
of inter-dependence and traditional values. Relational comparisons are clearly 
translated in the above claims of non-vandalism and non-barbarianism, 
pointing at the values of civilization, decency and order.  
While the nationalist identities were characterized by strong irrational 
orientation of passion and readiness to die or kill for own group, Tuzla’s civic 
social identity was inclined towards rational behaviour which cherishes human 
life.  In this context, an important aspect of Tuzla social identity was empathy 
with the civilian victims of the conflict, regardless of their ethnic or religious 
background. This empathy is documented in frequent public announcements 
expressing solidarity with citizens of different attacked areas (Mostar, Zvornik) 
and through the care for numerous internally displaces persons (IDPs). 
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Throughout the wartime Tuzla has been receiving a large number of IDPs from 
the surrounding areas, reaching some 70.000 persons by the end of 1993 
(Armakolas, 2017). Their arrival significantly changed the structure of the 
population of Tuzla, as they were mostly rural population, with higher influence 
of religion and lower educational levels. As victims of violence committed 
mostly by ethnic Serbs, they were more inclined towards SDA-promoted 
Muslim nationalist discourse. Nevertheless, the solidarity with victims of armed 
violence was never contested and there is vast evidence of Tuzla’s families 
offering a roof and a helping hand to displaced families. 
The civic social identity discourse was strongly Tuzla-centric, and relying on 
the positive self-image, as it was building on the values and traditions rooted 
in Tuzla of which most citizens were proud. At the same time, this discourse 
was reflecting high levels of Bosnian patriotism in its deepest sense. Contrary 
to those elites and international community who believed that Bosnia-
Herzegovina could exist fragmented by ethnic majority and minority principle, 
the authorities and citizens of Tuzla defended the view that this would lead to 
ghettoization and that such Bosnia-Herzegovina would lose its essence. In 
fact, as it was this very essence that was under attack, it had to be saved for 
Bosnia-Herzegovina to be saved: 
«It was not a civil war, it was an aggression, a desire to divide Bosnia […] 
After all, Bosnia has been existing for thousands of years, and it is us, 
the humans, who die» (Interviewee 11) 
This kind of rational offered an alternative approach to the violent conflict in 
the country, based on an alternative view of the problem or, using Campbell’s 
(1998, p. xi) terminology, «the problematization of the problematizations that 
reduced Bosnia to a problem». This alternative approach will be analysed in 
the next section.  
 
8.2.2. Citizens’ option as a counter-problematization of armed conflict in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 
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From the start of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina divisions along ethnic lines 
were considered as necessary and desirable not only by nationalist leaders, 
but also by most of the international community. As «the problem of Bosnia-
Herzegovina» was generally perceived (or successfully presented) as an inter-
ethnic conflict, and the violence understood mostly as a matter of ancient 
hatreds among different ethnic groups, the only «logical» solution was seen in 
separating those ethnic groups by fracturing the territory and sacrificing the 
multi-ethnicity of the society for the bare survival of the people. The community 
of Tuzla opposed such approach from the very beginning of the war. Among 
most citizens of Tuzla there was strong awareness that nationalism and 
national divisions were contributors to violence, and unity was perceived as a 
source of strength and a solution, and not vice-versa as promoted by dominant 
discourses.  
This is why the citizens and the authorities got alarmed already in early 1992 
when the ethnic divides started taking place within the Police forces of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Conscious that ethnic divisions would not bring the desired 
peace, but would rather exacerbate the problem and cause an irreversible 
process of entrenching in ethnic groups, members of the Tuzla police decided 
to oppose such change, and received support from city authorities, citizens 
and the local media alike. The Front Slobode article titled «The police forces 
for an indivisible service», reporting on the public protest of the members of 
Tuzla police forces against ethnic divisions, stated: 
«Citizens of Tuzla showed solidarity with all the colleagues [members of 
Tuzla police forces] who want to remain united and professional, and who 
had taken a decision that they would detach from the Ministry of Interior 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina and act in accordance with the needs and 
capacities of the Municipality of Tuzla and other interested municipalities 
should there be (and there already are) nationalist divisions in the police 
forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Front Slobode, 1992a). 
The awareness that splitting the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina along 
ethnic lines would result in more violence was so high, and the determination 
of the authorities and citizens not to allow such scenario in their own city so 
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strong, that members of police forces of Tuzla were even ready to detach from 
their central level command in Sarajevo. In the same vein, on 30 March 1992, 
in light of the international negotiations which were discussing the ethnic 
divisions of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the authorities of Tuzla 
adopted a «Declaration on the status of the municipality of Tuzla». Strongly 
contested by the nationalist elites, the Declaration previewed the possibility of 
Tuzla’s leadership declaring an extraterritorial status of the city in case the 
country would get fractured along ethnic lines. This, just as the warning of 
Tuzla’s police forces that they might disobey the instructions from the central 
level, was perceived by the nationalist elites as a sign of «autonomist spirit» 
against the integrity of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Although accused 
of separatist intentions, Tuzla’s authorities proved to be among the very few 
defenders of the true sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina, with authentic and 
not only declaratory care for its multi-ethnic nature.   
Clearly in Tuzla parties in conflict were not defined in ethnic terms, but the 
conflict was rather perceived as the struggle between those trying to divide the 
population and promote ethnic and other inequalities versus those trying to live 
in peace and remain united and equal. In such context, among the majority of 
inhabitants the local group identity (people defining themselves as “citizen of 
Tuzla”) gained more salience than the ethnic group identity. As an important 
symbol of such identification, in 1992 the public safety forces in Tuzla rejected 
to wear the emblem of lily, which was introduced from the central state level 
but was perceived by many as the emblem representing only the Muslims. The 
authorities of Tuzla decided that, instead of the emblem of lily, the public safety 
forces in town would wear the emblem of the city of Tuzla, stressing their 
accountability to and inclusiveness of all ethnic groups. Armakolas (2017, p. 
106) claims that «even at risk of losing some of the Muslim patriots, this 
measure helped the Tuzla police and territorial forces not to divide along ethnic 
lines».  
Challenging the existing dominant discourses of ethnic conflict, in Tuzla 
different actors offered a number of alternative descriptions of parties in 
conflict. In FF of April 28, 1992, speaking of the parties in conflict the editor of 
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the newspaper proposed a dichotomy human against inhuman. In its 
announcement to the citizens of Tuzla of May 22, 1993, the Crisis cell of the 
Municipality of Tuzla describes the violence and the parties in conflict in the 
following terms:  
«Our city has been aggressed. Grenades that were fired from the enemy 
positions in Pozarnica attacked all the citizens of Tuzla, their homes and 
their values. Our persistent effort to keep the peace was attacked! A 
horrific gunshot was fired into the liberty aspirations, our citizens’ 
orientation, our harmonious life together (…) Our joint strength and the 
determination of all of us are a powerful arm that aggressor does not 
have. Our unity and readiness to fully fledged resistance to aggressor are 
the power against which the enemy has no response» (Front Slobode 
1992d).  
As elaborated above, in the worldviews of the civic social identity the very 
idea of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a multi-ethnic state was under attack. In the 
article titled «The killing of Bosnia» (Front Slobode 1992c), the author 
distinguished two sources of aggression against the country - the internal and 
the external one. Nationalism was identified as a source of internal aggression, 
the «opponent» which had to be contested. The author of this text confirms 
another worldview characteristic for the civic social identity – «there will be no 
winner in the ongoing war, we have all lost too much». Unlike in the nationalist 
and ethnic identity discourses where war is considered as “sacred”, “just” or at 
least acceptable in order to achieve own group’s goals, in civic social identity 
discourse war was considered solely as a human disaster. Fatmir Alispahic, 
one of the founders of the Forum of Tuzla Citizens (FTC), explains:  
«War, even the defensive one, is the time of evil. It is only our roots that 
can lead us towards the good. This is why, in the context of the general 
B-H picture, we need to revitalize the values that make Tuzla European 
city, in order to be useful to ourselves and others as a firm and moral 
mobilization force. Because only if we remain what we had always been 
we will have the strength to mentally and physically overcome the 
nothingness of the aggressor» (Front Slobode, 1993) 
 229   
 
The different understanding of the parties in conflict also influenced the 
discourse used by the authorities and most inhabitants of Tuzla related to the 
enemy. Discourse analysis shows that, when referring to the enemy, the 
authorities, my respondents as well as many other citizens of Tuzla were 
cautious not to draw on ethnic or religious terms in order not to contribute to 
the «ethnicizing» of the conflict. 
«I have never equated the one who was targeting me from the mountain 
with an Orthodox person living in Tuzla. I had colleagues at my 
[workplace] who were Orthodox. So I couldn’t say that they were all the 
same, or that they were all Chetniks. How could I say that when [name 
and surname]18 sits so many years with me at the same desk?! When he 
lives through the same shelling as I do?!» (Interviewee 12) 
The daily experience of multi-ethnicity was reaffirming the belief of citizens 
of Tuzla that the Bosnian conflict was not an inter-ethnic one. Just like in the 
above example, the authorities and my respondents often referred to the 
enemy as Chetniks.  Campbell (1998, p.1) observed the same phenomenon 
while speaking to another citizen of Tuzla and concluded that «she did so 
rather self-consciously[...] It was, she said, so that a distinction could be made 
between Serbs as a whole and those who waged war against Tuzla. “It is just 
like the distinction you draw between Germans and Nazis”, Amira observed».  
The content of the term Chetniks which was used to define the enemy also 
clearly points at the relational comparisons of the group identified as “citizens 
of Tuzla”, integrating all what citizens of Tuzla considered themselves not to 
be: barbarian, violent and nationalist. In extension to this, the mayor of Tuzla 
often used the terms “fascists” and “fascism” as the enemy, which clearly 
points at the political and ideological nature of the conflict, rather than the 
ethnic one.  
The counter-problematization of the «problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina» also 
entailed a different conceptualization of the solutions proposed by advocates 
of citizens’ option. What international community saw as a solution, Tuzla’s 
                                                          
18 Some elements of the quote were omitted to protect the identity of the interviewee. 
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citizens saw as the road to an even bigger problem. This is why, in his letter 
addressed to Bill Clinton, the then President of USA, in January 1993 mayor 
Beslagic pleaded: 
«Please do not allow the completely mistaken European concept of the 
division of Bosnia-Herzegovina along ethnic lines to be implemented. 
This would lead to […] lasting, still bloodier conflict» (Beslagic, 1998, 
p.81). 
While in the dominant discourse, including in the international community 
and academia, the «problem» of Bosnia-Herzegovina was observed as 
violence among ethnic groups caused by ancient inter-ethnic hatreds, and 
consequently the «solution» imagined in terms of division of ethnic groups into 
«ethnically consistent» territories, the citizens of Tuzla in their discourses and 
practices challenged such generalized understanding and identified 
nationalism or prioritization of own ethnic group interests as a source of 
violence, that could only be overcome by maintaining the traditional values of 
Tuzlan society such as unity and inter-ethnic cooperation. In other words, what 
was considered as a source of the problem in the dominant discourse was 
defended as the main value and the solution to the problem as defined in the 
counter-discourse of Tuzla, and proved in its wartime experience.  
Fracturing along ethnic lines would mean the victory of nationalism, which 
indeed happened in most of the B-H.  Aware of the power and influence of the 
dominant discourses that were instigating mistrust and division among 
members of society from different ethnic groups, the city authorities kept 
reminding the citizens that «constructive inter-ethnic and inter-personal 
relations in our city are the best possible guarantee of peace and prosperity in 
the future» (Beslagic, 1998, p. 24). Through their consistent efforts to provide 
good governance at local level and secure the rule of law in extremely 
challenging circumstances, as will be presented in the next section, the town 
authorities gave a critical contribution to the communal peace in Tuzla. 
 
 231   
 
8.3. Good governance: inspiring trust, preserving the rule of law and 
prioritizing the safety of all citizens  
8.3.1. Continuous and authentic communication with citizens and other actors 
as a source of confidence in the local leadership  
The review of a set of records documenting the communication of local 
authorities with the community in Tuzla, through written and spoken public 
announcements and interviews with the city leadership in the local media, 
complemented by the information gathered from my respondents, points at 
several characteristics of this communication which contributed to the 
communal peace and the prevention of ethnic divisions. The regularity and 
authenticity of that communication and high levels of empathy with the citizens 
are amongst the most notable of those characteristics. 
The analysis indicates that the city authorities were informing the local 
population often and in detail about all relevant developments.  
«We took a strategic decision that Radio Tuzla would be operating 24/7. 
They were the eyes and the ears of the citizens and political structures. 
We kept issuing public announcements all the time» (Interviewee 11).  
The exhaustive regular communication with citizens was preventing or 
mitigating rumours and panic, which could have led to inter-ethnic suspicion 
and accusations. In their tone, public announcements of local authorities were 
empathetic with the citizens who were exposed to the wartime hardship. 
Nevertheless, they were also very firm in clarifying that no violations of the rule 
of law would be tolerated in the city despite the extraordinary circumstances. 
In several public announcements the mayor openly asked the citizens to have 
confidence in the Municipal Presidency. At the same time, he was very 
candidly explaining to the citizens the limitations that local authorities had in 
wartime circumstances, being very cautious not to give any false promises 
which would jeopardize the trust of citizens into city authorities. The full 
commitment and dedication of the city authorities to ensure the maximum 
possible level of safety of all citizens transpires from all communications, with 
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guarantees that «our citizens will not be abandoned to chance or disorganized 
self-defence» (Beslagic, 1998, p. 15).  
Open communication with the citizens entailed the readiness of the 
municipal authorities to hear about and address the daily problems of the 
citizens. Twice a week the mayor himself was receiving citizens in his office, 
and there were radio and TV programmes channelling direct communication 
between local authorities and the population. In addition to fostering 
cooperation and trust, through this approach the local authorities were 
addressing rumours, false information and attempts of manipulation by several 
media outlets at local, national and international level.  The authorities made 
systematic efforts of officially denouncing and rectifying the untrue information 
because they were aware of the damage that it could create, including panic 
and inter-ethnic mistrust. For instance, a public announcement of 17 April 1992 
stated:  
«In the unusually fierce propaganda war being waged in the Tuzla area 
in recent days a particularly vicious and politically damaging rumour has 
been circulated. According to this dangerous rumour the Tuzla Police 
Forces are about to be divided with serious consequences to follow (…) 
All the members of our police force are committed and resolved, if need 
be at the cost of their lives, to defend, alongside our other citizens, their 
city, their homes and the community values of all Tuzla’s inhabitants, 
Muslims, Serbs, Croats and members of other ethnic groups that live 
here» (Beslagic, 1998, p. 16).  
In protecting the city and its inhabitants, the city authorities, particularly the 
Municipal Crisis Committee, was regularly issuing instructions and orders to 
the citizens, such as prohibiting entry and departure from the city without 
permission, issuing the obligation to go to work, prohibiting selling or 
exchanging properties, etc. The language of these instructions was firm and 
clear, the decisions were well articulated and explained in detail, giving the 
impression that limitations to the rights and freedoms are enforced for well-
founded reasons and for the benefit of all.  
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With great efforts the local authorities managed to keep the communal 
peace in the city. However, they could not prevent the continuous attacks on 
the city launched by the aggressor from the mountains surrounding Tuzla. In 
their attempts to save the city from aggression, and in line with their firm trust 
in the rule of law, the city authorities frequently appealed to the relevant 
international actors with mandate to intervene, such as UN Security Council, 
Secretary General of NATO and others, imploring for help. The mayor and his 
team managed to put Tuzla on the map of international actors and got 
recognition from European Parliament, Council of Europe and other actors. 
They also frequently communicated with the international press agencies 
about the situation in the city. The analysis of the communication with UN 
gathered from Beslagic (1998) shows the evolution of the tone of the town 
authorities in their messages throughout the war: from respectful and imploring 
at the beginning («in the name of all peace loving people in the name of all the 
children, in the name of future generations, we implore you to help us»), 
towards distressed («time is running out») and desperately appealing to their 
sense of responsibility («you have a historic responsibility on your shoulders»), 
until it finally became overtly rough, blaming and cynical, after so many failed 
attempts to convince the international authorities to stop the aggression 
against Tuzla citizens («we want to alert both you [UN Secretary General] and 
the international public to the fact that your activities to date in B-H have met 
with total failure!», «UNPROFOR officer, it seems, cannot see or hear. We 
appeal to you to remove these blind, deaf and dumb monitors of Bosnian war 
crimes»; «you too will be guilty for the suffering and death of these old people, 
women and children»). 
Regular, genuine but wisely crafted communication with the citizens was 
one of the key strategies of the local authorities which allowed them to maintain 
communal peace and order in the city and nurture the hope of its citizens in a 
better future, as shall be elaborated below.   
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8.3.2. Firm belief in the rule of law and equality of all citizens. Distinguishing 
between aggressor and civilians, prioritizing safety and maintaining hope that 
justice will prevail 
 In Bosnia-Herzegovina generalized violence left almost no area without 
population transfers. Over 80 per cent of non-Serb population was expelled 
from areas under Serb military control. The creation of parallel structures of 
governance and para-military forces, almost always based on ethnic identity, 
was a common trigger of disorder which led to inter-ethnic mistrust and 
violence. Aware of this risk, the authorities in Tuzla made efforts at the very 
beginning of the war to prevent divisions along ethnic lines in the forces of 
order such as police and army, and to streamline the appearance of 
paramilitary forces.  
 This was only possible due to the very close cooperation between civilian, 
police and military authorities in the city. It also required highly strategic and 
balanced approach to the opponents such as YNA or promoters of nationalism. 
Although there is evidence that in some instances the authorities were 
informally bypassing or isolating some of their members who were tempted by 
nationalist politics, the perception of joint decision-making was preserved and 
insisted upon. In general, all local authorities in Tuzla were balanced and 
moderate, avoiding radicalism in their approaches, not confronting directly with 
YNA or nationalists as their main opponents but wisely negotiating with them. 
One of the key characteristics of their behaviour was strict adherence to the 
rule of law. As observed by Armakolas (2017), respecting the law in wartime 
circumstances was particularly challenging and often more difficult than 
breaking the law; however, it was also dismantling in advance any arguments 
from Serbian (or any other) nationalist groups that would justify their rebellion. 
In addition to that, the observance of the rule of law fomented trust of the 
citizens, and vice-versa.  
Despite chaotic times in Bosnia-Herzegovina, evidence shows that Tuzla 
authorities had a clear idea on how to prevent violence in the city. In a public 
announcement of April 19, 1992, the city authorities listed the following as 
«factors constituting the basis for maintaining peace and security of our 
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citizens: traditional inter-ethnic harmony; good relationships between 
neighbours; mutual trust and togetherness; unity amongst members of the 
Municipal Parliament and Presidency; and unity of the police and security 
forces» (Beslagic, 1998, p. 17-18).  
The above unity was sometimes challenged by differences in the views on 
how to solve the wartime problems, such as the accommodation of large 
numbers of IDPs in the city. In most parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia 
many IDPs would be placed into the houses or apartments temporarily vacated 
by members of the “enemy” ethnic group. There is also broad evidence that in 
both countries numerous civilians, usually from minority ethnic groups, were 
forcibly evicted from their homes, which were then occupied by members of 
the majority ethnic group, mostly those related to political structures or armed 
forces. This was a common practice even in the areas which were not directly 
affected by war, such as Zagreb or Split. But in this important aspect, too, Tuzla 
was an exception. Despite all the wartime challenges and a large number of 
IDPs, rule of law in Tuzla included guaranteeing the right to private property 
equally to all citizens. My respondents confirmed that no one was forced to 
leave their property and the apartments which were vacated for longer period 
were properly sealed by local authorities.  
In wartime Tuzla, unlike in most other places in Bosnia-Herzegovina, rule of 
law was promoted in discourse and ensured in practice. This is why «in Tuzla 
there was no organized crime, paramilitary or outlawed police forces which 
would terrorize the population by using the war circumstances as an excuse» 
(Armakolas, 2017, p. 56). In my view this was a key pillar for preserving inter-
ethnic trust and cooperation. However, applying the law and treating all 
citizens equally in wartime circumstances was often challenged and perceived 
or portrayed as betrayal of own ethnic group.  
One of the locally most well-known examples of equality in the protection 
of property is related to the break-in into the Orthodox bishop’s palace in 1992. 
The public announcement issued on this even on June 9, 1992, stated:  
«Unfortunately, although we have excellent control over the city, a 
shameful act took place during the night. Persons unknown broke into 
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the palace of the Orthodox bishop (…) I promise to the citizens of Tuzla 
that we will do our utmost to bring these burglars and vandals to justice. 
This is Tuzla and in Tuzla we will not allow any vandalism or barbaric 
behaviour. We will punish anyone who tries to disgrace the city by his 
actions» (Beslagic, 1998, pp. 39-40). 
With such discourse the leadership of the city sent several important 
messages. Firstly, the message that nobody would be allowed to break the 
law, even against ethnic Serbs or Serb property, despite the fact that Serbian 
armed forces were attacking the city; than that vandalism was unacceptable 
and it would be punished; and finally that citizens were equal in their right to 
private property and city authorities could be held accountability for ensuring 
that right. This attitude was strongly differing from the approach adopted in 
most other places, where the “exceptional circumstances” of war were being 
used for as an excuse for tolerating vandalism and often exploited for elites’ 
own financial and political interests.   
As can be discerned from the example above, in their discourses and 
practices the authorities were making sure that no equivalence was made 
between Serbian armed forces which were attacking the city and the ethnic 
Serb civilian population in the city, in order to prevent the generalization of 
ethnicity-based “Serbian guilt”. Another example of such clear distinction is the 
action of the city authorities presented in the opening quote of this chapter. 
Despite critical circumstances, the analysis of the discourse of local 
authorities reveals hope in the better future, which would bring peace and also 
justice for all perpetrators of war crimes. Hope, the feeling that helps overcome 
fear, was supported by historical memory. Expressions including «the history 
and the people will punish them», «the time of the inhuman is still here, but the 
dawn of the human will come again» or «war crimes don’t grow old», gathered 
from the media and public statements, illustrate the hope that, once again, 
Tuzla would survive hard times with dignity and pride.  
Overall, with wise and strategic management of the city, in very difficult 
circumstances the local authorities managed to preserve positive inter-ethnic 
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relations and keep the life going on despite all odds, as described in the next 
section.   
 
8.3.3. «Life must go on» – combatting aggression by living a «normal» life 
In the period 1992-1995 the inhabitants of Tuzla were exposed to extreme 
hardship. Random shelling was their daily reality and a strategy used by the 
aggressor to disseminate fear. Hospital, residential areas, industrial 
installations and many other facilities were hit by bombs and many citizens 
were wounded or killed. Thousands of IDPs were pouring into the city after 
having their villages and towns occupied. In 1993, Tuzla was cut-off from the 
world and faced severe shortage of food. My respondents recall days without 
eating, but also a strong solidarity among people sharing whatever was 
available.  Despite all this hardship, great efforts were made to preserve the 
«normal» functioning of the city, including not only survival but also 
educational, cultural and other activities.  As the «old Tuzlan way» of life was 
under attack, the only way of defending it was by living this type of life. 
Interviewee 12 quotes mayor Beslagic who used to say: «Life must go on. 
They didn’t stop it. If we stop it, then all is lost». 
 Respondents recall that schools were reopened whenever possible or else 
teaching over the radio was organized. Factories, restaurants and cafes were 
open despite all risks, which also helped sustain the economy and supply 
products and services. In 1994 the city authorities went so far as to organize 
the so called wartime Olympics: 
«We had Olympic Games in 1994, imagine! It was requested, my late 
husband requested to call the commandant from Srpska Republic…. To 
call the other side to stop shooting so people from Srpska Republic 
could also participate in the Olympics! » (Interviewee 13) 
The “normal” life relied on the daily interaction of citizens of Tuzla of different 
ethnic groups, who were resisting ethnic divisions taking place in the rest of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the wartime circumstances their mutual trust was often 
challenged by the events taking place outside of Tuzla, but sometimes also by 
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the developments in the city, particularly those which took place during May 
1992 and which will be analysed below. 
 
8.4. Inter-ethnic trust on trial: the departure of Serbs and the clash of 
Brcanska Malta 
Maintaining and nurturing inter-ethnic trust and cooperation in the wartime 
Bosnia-Herzegovina was an extremely demanding task. While the authorities 
in Tuzla were promoting non-nationalist politics and solutions and trying to 
preserve the multi-ethnic character of the city, two events which occurred at 
the very beginning of the war, in May 1992, strongly challenged the inter-ethnic 
trust in Tuzla, leaving deep scars on the tissue of its society. These include the 
unexpected and silent departure of a significant number of ethnic Serbs from 
Tuzla, followed by the violent clash between YNA and Tuzla’s armed forces 
during the withdrawal of YNA from the city.  
According to the 1990 census, some 22.000 citizens of Serb (or Orthodox) 
origin lived in Tuzla before the war, constituting some 17 per cent of the total 
population of the city. During the first half of May 1992, large part of that 
population silently left the city, most often without informing colleagues and 
friends, and in some cases also without letting know their own family members. 
This caused perplexity of the rest of the population and severely challenged 
the previous positive inter-ethnic relations: 
«It was so disappointing to see how many people left by May 15 towards 
Bijeljina, Belgrade, in that direction… I understand fear, I really do 
understand fear… Who am I to judge someone who left out of fear?! […] 
But I cannot forgive. I have two friends with whom I had been growing up, 
I cannot forgive them. I told them this, of course. [I told them:] Why didn’t 
you tell me on 14 May that we had to seek refuge? I would have sought 
refuge, too, maybe. I also have a family, and I could have gone out of 
Bosnia. This is something that remained… very ugly among us… it left a 
very ugly taste in our mouths» (Interviewee 12, of Muslim origin) 
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Similar views and emotions were shared by other citizens who stayed in 
Tuzla, who considered this mass departure as a betrayal. One interviewee 
shared the experience of a colleague who simply disappeared from his 
workplace in the middle of the day, and another one reported on the case of a 
Serb women who departed with two daughters without letting know her 
husband, a Muslim, who was at work when they left. 
Faced with this situation and attempting to address it, in a public 
announcement of May 12, 1992, the mayor stated: 
«In the last few days we have observed in Tuzla considerable unrest 
amongst the citizens with a Serbian ethnic background. We wish to 
emphasize that there is no particular reason why the Serbs should be 
more worried than any other ethnic group. We are all, unfortunately, 
endangered, Muslims, Serbs and Croats. We are under threat as people, 
as citizens regardless of our ethnic background» (Beslagic, 1998, p. 23) 
In this statement the mayor underlines once again the equity of all citizens 
in all matters, including in the existing threat. In line with the policy of the city 
authorities not to promise anything that they could not fulfil, his message is not 
optimistic with regard to the overall security situation, but it is reassuring the 
Serbs that they would not be discriminated or targeted as ethnic group.  
Armakolas (2017) reports that according to the available data some 65 per 
cent of Tuzla’s Serbs left the city in May 1992. Reflecting on the dynamics of 
this departure, he further notes that «this meant that Serbian Democratic Party 
(SDP) managed to spread its influence onto many citizens who did not vote for 
SDP during 1990 election» (Armakolas, 2017, pp. 94-95). I agree with 
Armakolas that the key reasons for the mass departure of Serbs should be 
sought in the nationalist campaigns aiming to spread inter-ethnic fear. In 
addition to the one of SPS, I believe that the influence of radical pro-Muslim 
voices, which would later find their stronghold in the newspaper Dragon of 
Bosnia, discussed in more detail in the following sub-chapter, must be taken 
into account.  Despite egalitarian discourse of the city authorities, at a specific 
point in time citizens of Serb ethnic group were perceived or suspected as 
potential allies of the Serb forces attacking other areas of the country. In such 
 240   
 
context they felt more threatened than others and were tempted to seek refuge 
in their ethnic identity group, just like the majority of the population of B-H in 
the rest of the country. The discourse analysis shows that the experience of 
their mass departure from Tuzla – about which many citizens from all ethnic 
groups still feel very uncomfortable to discuss – was, and still is, characterized 
by resentment and shame. However, it did not lead to an overall ethic fracturing 
in the city and the positive inter-ethnic relationships as a trait of citizens’ social 
identity prevailed among the majority of the population of Tuzla. 
Soon after the mass departure of Serbs another incident put the inter-ethnic 
peace in Tuzla at high risk. The withdrawal of YNA from Tuzla had been 
negotiated between YNA leadership and the city authorities for several weeks. 
Like in most other places in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia with presence of 
YNA troops, those negotiations were characterized by high levels of tension. 
A telephone conversation between Mayor Beslagic and the leader of YNA in 
Tuzla Tomislav Pracer clearly illustrates this tension. In this conversation 
Pracer suggested to Belsagic to «declare some kind of autonomy and state 
that they [Tuzla authorities] wished to live in Yugoslavia». Strongly agitated, 
Beslagic responds that this was out of question and pronounces the sentence 
that would became well known locally: «I have no other country apart from 
Bosnia and Herzegovina». Aware of their disagreement, the interlocutors 
come to an ominous conclusion: «than it’s war» (Beslagic, 1998, p.25).  
Indeed, armed violence broke out in Tuzla on May 15, 1992. During the 
agreed withdrawal of YNA forces from the city, a sudden exchange of fire 
between YNA and local armed forces occurred in the neighbourhood named 
Brcanska Malta, lasting for several hours and resulting in dozens of deaths, 
mostly of young YNA conscripts enrolled in their military service in Tuzla. The 
entire clash was video-documented by the TV station FS3, which headquarter 
was in the vicinity of the place of incident, and the video is still available online.  
Several different and in many aspects mutually opposing narratives 
developed and persist around the incident on Brckanska Malta, which is still 
largely debated in the city. The difference in the narratives is reflected, among 
other, in the terminology that different groups use to refer to the incident. In 
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Tuzla it is most often referred to as a battle on Brcanska Malta, while in Srpska 
Republic (SR) and in Serbia it is called an attack on the YNA (Armakolas, 
2017). Analysing the available data, I could identify a narrative line used in SR 
and in Serbia, where this incident is seen as a crime committed against Serbs, 
which was planned in advance by Tuzla authorities. Although the victims 
belonged to a number of different Yugoslav nationalities, in Serbia and RS this 
incident was primarily perceived as an attack against the Serbs. The discourse 
of Tuzlan authorities on this incident is more complex and has at least two 
narrative lines, which are often combined by the same interlocutor. One line is 
claiming that Tuzlan authorities never planned such development and were 
only interested in the peaceful departure of YNA, which was interrupted when 
YNA opened a fire. Another narrative is praising this event as the first and great 
victory of the defenders of Tuzla, during which they seized critically needed 
arms. 
  Armakolas (2017, pp. 95-96) concludes that «while the number of deaths 
is debated until today, the number of killed on both sides clearly indicates that 
the YNA forces were either unarmed or unprepared for the exchange of fire, 
or both». Just like the massive departure of Serbs, this event also threatened 
to jeopardize the inter-ethnic relationships in the city. It caused strong 
emotions from all sides and was perceived differently by different ethnic and 
political groups, which was exacerbated by the still existing lack of clarity 
around some of the dynamics of the incident. Although this traumatic event left 
a deep mark on the society in Tuzla, it did not lead to inter-ethnic hostility in 
the city. Tuzlan multi-ethnic society survived also this trial, due to intensive 
efforts of several actors, including a great part of the local media.  
 
8.5. Wartime media in Tuzla: non-nationalist and nationalist discourses 
in a public debate 
The analysis of dominant discourses in the post-Yugoslav countries 
presented in Chapter 5 points at the highly important role that national and 
local media played in supporting and strengthening nationalist discourses and 
actions, strongly contributing to inter-ethnic fears and resentments while 
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supporting divisions along ethnic lines. There is also ample evidence that 
media outlets which were proposing alternatives to ethnic divisions and 
objecting to widespread violence were marginalized or silenced.  
In Tuzla the media setting was significantly different. Citizens’ option 
defending the multi-ethnic character of the city, promoting inter-ethnic 
cooperation and non-nationalist solutions, was strongly supported by and 
working closely with a number of local media outlets, including TV Tuzla, Radio 
Tuzla and the daily paper Front Slobode (Front of Freedom, FF). While Radio 
and TV Tuzla were directly supervised by the city authorities, FF was more 
independent and on several occasions contested the interference of the 
authorities into its media liberties and staffing policies. However, FF and local 
authorities shared most of their worldviews, particularly in advocating for multi-
ethnic Tuzla, and were complimentary in the amplification of civic voices in the 
city.  
On the other hand, discourses of ethnic divisions which were dominating 
among nationalist elites also had influential voices locally in Tuzla, particularly 
in the paper Zmaj od Bosne (Dragon of Bosnia, DoB). Furthermore, other 
national or international outlets consumed by the citizens of Tuzla influenced 
their views on identity, safety and other key themes. For the purpose of this 
research, I reviewed and analysed selected texts from FF and DoB published 
during the initial stages of the war (1992 – beginning 1993), as well as those 
published during some of the critical moments in the wartime life of Tuzla 
society. I also listened to a set of wartime recordings of Radio Tuzla and sought 
views of my interviewees on the role of media in Tuzla during the war.  
A respondent who was a media worker during war shared with me an 
observation that was expressed also by several other respondents with high 
salience of civic social identity. They referred to the high levels of awareness 
of media workers in Tuzla about own responsibility for inter-ethnic relationships 
in the city in the given circumstances: 
«We had this huge responsibility for the spoken word, because we knew 
[that] if we panic and transmit any news in panic, than the entire city will 
start panicking. We had fantastic cooperation with Selim [Beslagic], who 
 243   
 
was at our service 24/7(…) All the time we were encouraging people to 
stay here, saying that we need each other and that we should not split. 
We even did something that in war seemed ridiculous, some type of 
educational programmes called “Togetherness”» (Interviewee 12) 
Closely linked to the city authorities, Radio and TV Tuzla supported the 
regular contact of Tuzla’s leadership with the citizens and contributed in such 
way to their mutual trust. Diffusing frequent public announcement, transmitting 
daily interviews with key persons from local authorities and keeping the 
citizens informed of the developments in the city, they helped reassure the 
population in extremely stressful times. Furthermore, local authorities often 
used their media partners to denounce the false information transmitted by the 
media supporting dominant discourses in the country and abroad, which was 
clearly aiming at spreading inter-ethnic fear and hatred. For instance, in their 
public announcement of 3rd June 1992, the city authorities denounced a series 
of lies from Serbian media:  
«Another atrocious lie heard in Belgrade offered the information that the 
bodies of murdered Serbs were floating down the Jala river. In fact the water 
of the Jala is so shallow that not even a body of a kitten could float down it 
(…) TV Belgrade has broadcasted and twice repeated a monstrous lie that 
exploded like a bomb here in Tuzla. According to the allegation published 
by Milosevic’s TV station, five thousand Serb were being held in a 
concentration camp at the football stadium “Tusanj” (...) Anybody who 
wishes to do so can go to the stadium and confirm that there is nothing there 
apart from the stands and the grass!» (Beslagic, 1998, pp. 37-38).  
In addition to Radio and TV Tuzla, the daily paper Front of Freedom was 
consistent in promoting the values of inter-ethnic harmony, equality and 
coexistence. Formed in 1943, in the midst of WWII, this paper was one of the 
media outlets with the longest tradition in B-H and a symbol of antifascism. In 
the wartime period its circulation was varying significantly, often depending on 
the availability of paper and financial resources. FF’s journalists remember 
that, due to lack of printing paper, several issues were printed on the paper 
normally used for paper bags. Promoting non-violent solutions to the B-H 
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problem, FF considered that «Nationalism is like a cancer» and that in B-H 
«there were only two nations, only two sides – the human and the inhuman» 
(Front Slobode 1992e). Other key contributions of FF include listening to and 
replicating the voices and concerns of the citizens and regularly transmitting 
the public announcements of the city authorities. Furthermore, FF was warning 
about the dangers of propaganda war and denouncing misinformation and 
media outlets promoting nationalist radicalism, particularly the local paper 
Dragon of Bosnia (DoB). 
DoB was formed in Tuzla in September 1992, with strong support from 
Izetbegovic’s Party of Democratic Action (PDA) headquarters in Sarajevo. At 
its peak, it reached the circulation of 10.000 samples. Unlike FF which was 
promoting equality of all ethnic groups, DoB was openly prioritizing Muslims 
as the majority population over all the others. It was particularly hostile towards 
the Serbs in Tuzla. In line with the dominant pro-Muslim discourse, the authors 
of DoB considered that the citizens’ option promotion of inter-ethnic harmony 
and cooperation was an anachronism of those who were not able to overcome 
the death of Yugoslavia and who were trying to «disregard the national issue 
and believed in some sort of “Bosnia without nations”» (Jahic, 1992b). 
Replicating the dominant discourse, DoB suggested that the “anachronistic” 
equity approach should be replaced by the majority/minority power relations 
because the domination of the majority was the natural order of things.  
In light of the growing Serb and Croat nationalism, DoB considered that the 
only «logical» or «reasonable» solution was promoting Muslim nationalism as 
a counter-balance. One of the key tasks that DoB embraced in that context 
was instigating the salience of ethnic identity among young Muslims in Tuzla, 
as a precondition for the domination of Muslim majority in the city. The paper 
made numerous attempts to activate the rage of the Muslims by transmitting a 
message that they were the only ones who believed in Yugoslavia, at the 
expense of their own ethnic group interests, while the «communist pseudo-
egalitarianism» was a simple cover for Serbian hegemony. The paper 
suggested to the Muslims to embrace their ethnic identity as a naturally salient 
group identity of every person, and insisted on the importance of religion. In 
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the Article «Doslo doba da se zmaj proba» (Time has come to try the Dragon), 
Adnan Jahic, one of the founders of this paper, defines the key aim of DoB in 
the following terms:  
«In the educational sense the primary aim of Dragon of Bosnia is to 
awaken the nationally apathetic and by the Partisan spirit still blinded 
majority of Muslims in Tuzla, and to direct them towards the historical and 
political reality and the urgent demands of the actual times burdened by 
the war» (Jahic, 1992a) 
Promoting radical Muslim nationalist agenda, DoB journalists were heavily 
criticizing all those who were not on their ideological side: the city authorities, 
particularly mayor Beslagic, a Muslim who refused to join PDA, but also the 
members of UN forces, who were offensively called “rats”. Croatian pro-
Ustasha leaders were, however, praised as friends of Muslims and allies 
against the Serbs.  
The analysis of DoB articles reveals numerous examples of hate speech 
against citizens of Serb ethnic group and open instigation to violence against 
them. Unlike citizens’ option which was clearly distinguishing civilians from 
those undertaking a military aggression, DoB blamed all Serbs for the 
widespread violence in B-H, stating that «they all actively or passively 
participate in the aggression» and even claiming that «they have barbaric 
genes» and that «they are a nation in which most people are scam». The 
extremism of this paper culminated in two articles which sparkled heavy 
debates in the city. On February 4, 1993, in the article «Farewell to lullabies» 
its author Vedad Spahic strongly offended numerous citizens who were 
children from mixed marriages (couples originating from different ethnic 
groups), calling them “mješanci” (bastards, term usually used for dogs) who 
were privileged mediocrities in Yugoslavia. Another article, dating from April 1, 
1993, directly invited to inter-ethnic violence, as it encouraged «each Muslim 
to have his own Serb whom to kill». Although there is no quantitative data on 
the influence of DoB in Tuzla, it is evident that its openly racist hate speech 
contributed to the feeling of unsafety and departure of many citizens of Serb 
ethnic group from the city.  
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The local authorities reacted to DoB for the first time, and very tepidly, after 
the article «Farewell to lullabies» was published. They reprimanded both DoB 
and FF for their «public quarrelling» which was a threat to the «political 
security» of the city. The permissiveness of local authorities towards the hate 
speech of DoB, that was severely jeopardizing the highly sensitive inter-ethnic 
relationships, keeps puzzling most of my respondents. Still, this approach of 
the city authorities can be explained by their attempts to avoid direct 
confrontation with the paper that enjoyed strong support from national level 
PDA, which could open the space for further radicalization.  
In conclusion, despite the presence of Muslim nationalist media embodied 
in the paper Dragon of Bosnia, in Tuzla there was a prevalence of non-
nationalist media supporting inter-ethnic harmony and cooperation. Unlike in 
many other localities of Bosnia-Herzegovina (and even more so in Croatia and 
Serbia), in Tuzla non-nationalist media outlets promoting a counter-discourse 
to the dominant discourses of violence were not silenced or marginalized, but 
were working hand in hand with the local authorities and significantly 
contributed to the promotion and strengthening of the constitutive norms, 
social purposes, relational comparisons and worldviews characteristic for the 
civic social identity. In that endeavour, local authorities and the media were 
joined by a number of important groups or individuals from the civil society of 
Tuzla, whose roles are examined in the next section.  
 
8.6. Community in the service of peace: civil society, religious leaders 
and other members of Tuzlan society supporting inter-ethnic 
cooperation 
8.6.1. Key actors in the civil society and religious communities contributing to 
positive inter-ethnic relationships 
The lack of civic activism in the former Yugoslavia coupled with the 
prevalence of non-critical voices in the media are often identified by among the 
key factors that enabled the rapid shift from socialist to nationalist ideologies 
in several of the former Yugoslav republics. Like elsewhere in the country, in 
Tuzla before the war there was little civic activism. However, several initiatives 
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developed in the new 1990s circumstances, and two among them had a 
particularly important role in the defence of the multi-ethnic society and the 
pervasiveness of non-nationalist worldviews among the population.  
As an association of prominent citizens supporting non-nationalist solutions, 
named Forum Gradjana Tuzle (Forum of Tuzla Citizens, FTC) was formed on 
February 28, 1993. The Declaration adopted at its initial session stresses out:  
«The citizens of Tuzla gathered at this founding sessions of the Forum of 
Tuzla Citizens have a message for all those who are deciding about the 
destiny of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to stop speculating about some ethnic 
division of our homeland. Today, just like in the time of peace, the citizens 
of Tuzla demonstrate by own example that a free life worthy of human being 
is possible only in an undivided territory, with full respect for dignity of every 
citizen, regardless of his national or religious belonging» (Forum Gradjana 
Tuzle, 2017)  
As can be observed from the above excerpt of its Declaration, FTC was 
promoting non-nationalist solutions to the problem in B-H. In Tuzla it gained 
wide support and status, as a large number of prominent intellectuals and 
professionals from different areas, as well as influential managers of Tuzlan 
companies, joined the Forum. As such, FTC was inspiring a large number of 
young citizens of Tuzla: 
«I remember the meetings of the Forum… those who spoke, these were 
the people I have always admired. There was a great atmosphere and… 
somehow… I realized there that my thinking was correct, my ideas were 
reaffirmed there» (Interviewee 14) 
As an organization gathering over 15.000 members, more than 10 per cent 
of the population of the city, FTC provided a very strong communitarian support 
to the politics of equity and non-nationalism in the city. Armakolas (2011) 
considers that the moment when the non-nationalist activists decided to 
formally unite under the umbrella of FTC was a turning point in the opposition 
to radical nationalist forces in Tuzla.  
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Another highly important moment in that regard was the establishment of the 
Tuzlan office of Serb Civic Council (SCC). The formal establishment of this 
organization of Bosnian Serbs in Tuzla took place in March 1994, with the aim 
of ensuring equity and unity with other nations in a sovereign and integral 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Through this platform the Serbs in Tuzla had the 
opportunity to clearly distance themselves from the nationalist politics and take 
away the arguments of many non-Serbs that all the Serbs are actually, actively 
or passively, supporting the violent politics of Milosevic. Although its 
membership was based on ethnic belonging, in the wartime circumstances 
SCC played an important role in contributing to the preservation of the multi-
ethnic fabric of Tuzlan society. As explained by Armakolas (2017, p. 143) «it 
was an honest attempt to make a clear difference between the citizens loyal to 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and the extreme nationalists within their own nation». The 
large support that SCC enjoyed among citizens of Serb ethnic belonging in 
Tuzla certainly helped prevent the development of inter-ethnic mistrust and 
fear.  
The inter-ethnic trust and cooperation were further reinforced by discourses 
and actions of specific religious leaders. In the 1990s the religious belonging 
was gaining salience as one of the very few distinguishing traits among 
Bosnian nations. Elsewhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina, just like in Croatia, there 
are numerous examples of religious leaders who were contributing to 
radicalism and dominant nationalist discourses, and fewer examples of the 
opposite practices. However, in Tuzla religious radicalism did not become 
widespread. On the contrary, several texts and interviews indicate that Muslim 
religious leaders in Tuzla were mostly moderate (with the exception of two 
persons), and the leader of the Catholic community, Franciscan Petar 
Matanovic, is particularly remembered for good by numerous inhabitants. 
During times of food scarcity and hunger he was generously distributing food 
– humanitarian aid provided by the Catholic relief agency Caritas - to needy 
inhabitants of Tuzla regardless of their religious belonging.  
«He was like a father to me. He would give us a bit of all that he had, and 
Caritas had the store of the convent pretty full. He was a man to whom 
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you could always turn, a very broad-minded man» (Interviewee 12, of 
Muslim origin) 
In addition to giving the example of inter-ethnic solidarity by distributing food 
to all citizens in need, this remarkable friar played a crucial mediation role in 
March 1993, following an incident which could have severely damaged the 
inter-ethnic relations in the city. During their return from an official trip to 
Zagreb, a ten member delegation from Tuzla including the mufti of Tuzla 
Husein Kavazovic and the head of PDA for Tuzla region Salih Kulenovic was 
arrested and imprisoned by members of Croatian Defence Council (CDC), the 
military force of Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina which at that point was in 
conflict with the Army of B-H. The plan of the CDC leadership was to exchange 
these high authorities for all or many of the approximately 450 Croatian 
soldiers who were imprisoned by B-H Army close to the town of Konjic. The 
news that the head of their Muslim community was arrested and imprisoned 
spread fast in Tuzla and was received with indignation and rage, putting the 
fragile inter-ethnic peace at risk.  
«They believed that by having the mufti they had a huge capital, because 
back than people were not perceived as individuals, but as means to 
achieve a specific goal […] One day mayor Beslagic came and told me 
that they had to provide me with police escort because there was a 
problem – some extremist groups were planning to abduct me and 
exchange me for the mufti. If that happened, it would have been a huge 
problem in Tuzla region» (Petar Matanovic, in Obrenovic, 2015) 
Friar Matanovic started advocating for the release of the mufti and other 
members of the abducted Tuzla delegation, contacting people on both sides 
and serving as a mediator. Despite all risks, he was transported by helicopter 
to Konjic, where he visited mufti Kavazovic and spent eight days negotiating 
his release. 
In the society of B-H that was being ripped along ethnic lines, Matanovic’s 
care for his peer in the Muslim community prompted some negative reactions, 
some nicknamed him «Alija’s spy» or «Alija’s friar». However, the large 
majority of citizens felt inspired by friar Matanovic, who remains remembered 
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in the community as an example of high moral values which cut across all 
religions. Despite all hardship and the opportunities that he had to take refuge 
in a safer place, he did not leave Tuzla but remained in the city sharing the 
destiny of its population, which is an act that Tuzlan population highly respects.  
 
8.6.2. «Staying for Tuzla»: remaining in the attacked city as an ultimate sign of 
loyalty to its community 
Despite radical differences in their norms, social purposes, relational 
comparisons and worldviews, both nationalists and non-nationalists in Tuzla 
concurred in their negative attitude towards those inhabitants who left the city 
during the war. However, the nature of this negative attitude differed between 
the two groups. While the nationalists were criticizing those who left on the 
basis of their ethnic identity (as they were mainly Serbs), the supporters of the 
civic social identity discourse considered that staying was a pre-condition for 
saving the multi-ethnic character of the city. 
While the nationalist social identity was characterized by the readiness to 
kill for the homeland, and the nationalist media categorized by their readiness 
to lie for the homeland, the way that citizens supporting non-nationalist options 
if Tuzla showed and perceived their outmost loyalty to the city and its 
community is by – staying in the city despite all risks and extreme hardship. 
The constitutive norm of the civic social identity required remaining in Tuzla 
against all odds, although most citizens had safer places where they could 
have been temporarily accommodated. 
«I was in Split [Croatia] in 1993, trying to find transport to take me back 
to Tuzla. I was panicking, I felt this urgency of going back, people at 
home were starving […] I can’t explain that, I simply had to go back as 
quickly as possible» (Interviewee 14) 
The analysis of discourses and practices of civic social identity indicates that 
it is by their physical presence in the city that those citizens were defending 
the value of multi-ethnicity and the tradition of joint life. This is also the reason 
why many of them were so strongly traumatized by the departure of numerous 
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Serbs in May 1992. In a public announcement related to the departure of 
Serbs, Beslagic (1998, p. 23) stated that «every temporary or permanent 
exodus of our citizens further undermines this inter-ethnic trust». Therefore, 
remaining in the city, even while it was faced with bombing, scarcity and 
hunger, was crucial for preserving its very essence – the multi-ethnic fabric. 
This can also explain why those citizens who left the city of sent their families 
to safer areas were often exposed to criticism.  
Despite its non-violent approach to the solution of the problem in B-H, in the 
worldview of many citizens with high salience of civic social identity the 
defence of the multi-ethnic space seems to have become more important than 
own life. This worldview was guided by the awareness that, if multi-ethnic 
space was not saved, if could never be restored in the future. One of my 
respondents who was a media worker during war recalls the occasion in 1993 
when she was invited for a meeting to Zagreb by a prominent international 
correspondent:  
«According to me, that meeting was invented so she [prominent 
international correspondent]19 would get us out for five days to take a 
breath… and to make space for those who wanted to leave to actually do 
so. We were sitting on Ban Jelacic square [in Zagreb] and drinking coffee 
when I told her I was going back [to Tuzla]. She said: “[name of 
respondent], this is a great chance for you to get out. You got out, now 
you should move on”. And I said: “Oh no, no, for me THIS is patriotism”. 
She said it was for primitive people. “Maybe it is”, I answered» 
(Interviewee 12) 
By staying in the attacked city and preserving its tradition of equal valuing 
of all citizens regardless of their ethnic belonging, the inhabitants of Tuzla 
disarmed the nationalist claims about the inevitable need for ethnic divisions 
within Bosnia-Herzegovina. The efforts of the citizens to preserve the tradition 
of inter-ethnic (co)existence and trust were put on trial in many critical instants, 
                                                          
19 Name omitted to protect the identity of the interviewee. 
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the most tragic one being the massacre of young civilians in the centre of the 
city on 25th May 1995. 
 
8.7. Outcry of defiance to radicalism and nationalism: the joint burial of 
the victims of the Kapija massacre in 1995 
For three full years, from May 1992 to May 1995, the citizens of Tuzla had 
been exposed to extreme hardship and life-threatening conditions, including 
countless bombings of the city from the surrounding hills, shortage of food, 
water, electricity and other basic services, coupled with the arrival and care for 
tens of thousands of IDPs. They have also been witnessing mounting inter-
ethnic violence in the rest of the country and the ethnic fracturing of the territory 
of B-H supported by the international community. Nevertheless, most 
inhabitants of Tuzla remained firm in maintaining their norms and values 
related to civic social identity, which included equality and cooperation of 
citizens regardless of their ethnic origin.  
On 25 May 1995, after more than three years of war, Tuzla lived the most 
tragic moment in its history. An artillery shell launched from the position of Serb 
forces in the neighbouring mountains hit the central pedestrian area of the city, 
killing 71 and wounding 124 civilians, mostly young people of different ethnic 
origin. A wave of consternation and despair unfolded in the Tuzlan community. 
Outraged by their persistent inaction against the continuous attacks of Serb 
forces on the civilian population, the Mayor of Tuzla wrote to the UN Security 
Council: 
«Please don’t expect me to use polite, diplomatic, insincere language in 
this moment of tragedy, the greatest tragedy in our 1043 year history. 
Tonight parents are gathering up the pieces of their children from the 
pavements of Tuzla. They thought these children had a future» 
«The people of Tuzla have nothing more to say to you […] The fact that 
you watched passively the murder of innocent people, although you have 
both the legal authority and the military resources to stop these crimes, 
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is nothing but barbaric diplomacy and makes you accomplices of this 
crime against humanity» (Beslagic, 1998, pp. 156-158) 
In the worst moments of despair, when many were expecting that the multi-
ethnic fabric of Tuzla’s society would finally tear apart under ethnicity-based 
accusations for the mass murder, the parents and the local authorities decided 
to undertake an unexpected and extraordinary act of togetherness, an outcry 
of defiance to nationalists and radicals of all sides – they decided to bury the 
victims in a common burial site, regardless of their different religious belonging. 
Armakolas (2012, p. 3) writes that «in this they defied the official Islamic 
institutions and Mustafa Ceric, the highest authority of the Islamic Community 
in Bosnia who spoke against the “sinful” joint burying of victims of different 
religions. They also opposed radical nationalist politicians and intellectuals 
who objected to this “unification” of the killed youth and who with aggressive 
verbal attacks, condemned the local authorities and the parents who accepted 
the joint burial site».  
Disobeying the order of his higher Islamic authorities, Imam Muhamed 
Lugavic, a highly respected Islamic leader in Tuzla, decided to co-lead the 
ceremony of the joint burial of youth. In order to avoid the high risk of new 
attacks, it was agreed that the joint funeral would not be publically announced 
but would be held discretely, in full silence and at dawn. Nevertheless, around 
4 a.m. on the day of the burial the inhabitants of Tuzla started pouring towards 
Slana Banja memorial. More than three thousand citizens came to pay their 
last respects to their murdered youth, together, joined by the representatives 
of all three religious authorities.  
«Once again, Tuzla raised above everything else... it reunified those 
children, they are together again» (Interviewee 12) 
The communal response to the massacre demonstrates the unbreakable 
determination of the inhabitants of Tuzla to preserve and cherish the inter-
ethnic peace at all cost. The memorial complex of Slana Banja, as well as the 
monument at Kapija, the spot where Tuzlan youth were killed, remain as the 
enduring symbols of that determination. In his speech given at the 
commemoration of the massacre, the mayor implored: «Living must go on 
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even when it costs lives. In the thousand-year chain of Tuzlan history we are 
the link that has been hardest hit and we are the link that must not break. Life 
must go on at any cost» (Beslagic, 1998, p. 162).  
Reminding the passers-by of that determination to live, and to live together, 
the verse of Bosnian poet Mak Dizdar resounds from the Kapija monument: 
Here we don’t live just to live 
Here we don’t live just to die 
Here we die 
So that we can live 
 
8.8. «Now tell me… whose side are you really on?» – challenging Tuzlan 
non-nationalist discourses and practices 
In its approach to the «problem» of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the community of 
Tuzla was unique in the country. Its discourses and, even more importantly, its 
practices of inter-ethnic egalitarianism and cooperation strongly challenged 
dominant discourses which were promoting ethnic divisions and inequity in 
practice if not in theory as a solution to the violent conflict in B-H. As it was 
putting at risk the interests of the nationalist elites, Tuzlan non-nationalist 
discourse was denigrated by a number of local and external actors. They often 
concurred in the narratives which were used to question the multi-ethnic 
experience of Tuzla and portray it in negative light.  
Firstly, Tuzla was often labelled by its opponents as «communist» or «red». 
This had negative implications in the context of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, 
which was often presented in the dominant discourses as a defeat of 
communism, while nationalism was promoted and supported as a counter-
balance to Tito’s legacy of communism. Although most of the new nationalist 
elites had been highly positioned functionaries of communist party during 
Yugoslavia, in Bosnia-Herzegovina and even more so in Croatia they 
managed to shift the discourse and portray communist times in Yugoslavia as 
dark times of oppression. In such context, being labelled as red or communist 
had negative connotations.  Tuzla’s imam Lugavic, who agreed to participate 
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in the joint funeral of the youth from different ethnic groups killed in 1995, was 
often labelled «red imam», and similar reproaches were made against the 
catholic leader in the city, friar Matanic, as well as against the members of 
Tuzlan leftist leadership. 
One could argue that Tuzla’s citizens indeed shared a number of values and 
norms – such as equality and cooperation of different ethnic groups – with the 
former communists’ discourse. However, in the context of dissolution of 
Yugoslavia and birth of nation-states, these values and norms brought against 
them the accusations of anachronism, of inability to accept that the geopolitical 
situation has changed, often labelled by the pejorative term Yugonostalgia. In 
these new circumstances, when division of territory was pursued by 
nationalists from all sides, the inter-ethnic tolerance became undesirable.  DoB 
speaks of the «pathologic insisting on own tolerance and citizenship, which 
made Tuzla an exception from all other areas of B-H». Denouncing such 
attitude as «communist pseudo-egalitarianism», DoB expressed its hope that 
«Tuzla is not destined to be crucified on the crucifix of brotherhood and unity» 
and advocated for «restitution of pre-communist relationships, when it was 
known what belongs to whom and how much belongs to whom» (Jahic, 1993). 
 The accusations of Yugonostalgia implied the lack of salience of ethnic or 
national identity. My respondents coincide in the view that other people from 
B-H, elites and common folk alike, found the behaviour of citizens of Tuzla 
bizarre and suspicious and that they were often perceived as traitors of own 
ethnic groups. Unable to imagine non-nationalist representation and positive 
inter-ethnic relationships in the war-torn B-H, other inhabitants of the country 
were indirectly or directly questioning the citizens of Tuzla about the side they 
were really on. DoB reproached to the leadership of Tuzla the «quasi-
intellectualistic neglect of the national feeling and believing in some “Bosnia 
without nations”» (Jahic, 1992b), while Beslagic as a Muslim was reproached 
for not joining PDA, which was considered «the only legitimate representative 
of the Muslim nation» (Jahic, 1993).  
Indeed, despite all efforts and increasing influence in all areas inhabited by 
Muslims, PDA never managed to gain significant support in Tuzla, which was 
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particularly annoying for its leader, president Izetbegovic. In their criticism of 
civic group identity in Tuzla, DoB and PDA were joined by part of the Islamic 
authorities in the city. By taking away the «exclusive» right of the nationalists 
to represent the people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, non-nationalist leadership of 
Tuzla was also disturbing their territorial aspirations.  
«We faced resistance from the top political structures of our country, much 
more than resistance in Tuzla… Because, let’s not fool ourselves, there 
were not only ideas about Greater Serbia or Greater Croatia, there was 
also the idea of Bosnia-Herzegovina, not as Greater but as a Muslim state 
in which, believe me, I would not live even for a second» (Interviewee 12, 
of Muslim origin) 
In their efforts to preserve multi-ethnic community of Tula, throughout the 
wartime the authorities of the city were faced with different types of 
accusations. From the beginning of the war they were being accused of 
“autonomist tendencies”, which Mayor Beslagic publically denied on a number 
of occasions, including in his reactions to the international media reporting. 
Those accusations, grounded in the rejection of the Tuzlan authorities to 
accept the divisions along ethnic lines, were aiming at discrediting local 
authorities, imputing to them lack of Bosnian patriotism and lack of loyalty to 
the central government. 
Disagreements and power struggles on the line Tuzla – Sarajevo can be 
tracked in the correspondence between Mayor Beslagic and the Presidency, 
particularly President Izetbegovic himself. Their continuous frictions escalated 
in February 1995, following an attempt of a group of members of the Army of 
B-H to forcibly evict several Serb and Croat families from their apartments in 
Tuzla in order to accommodate several families of refugees and Bosniak 
soldiers coming from other areas. Due to their systematic enforcement of the 
inviolability of private property and firm attachment to the equality of all citizens 
before the law, the authorities of Tuzla managed to prevent similar incidents 
throughout the wartime, which strongly contributed to their legitimacy among 
all ethnic groups as well as to the citizens’ feeling of safety. In this specific case 
the soldiers claimed that they had Izetbegovic’s permission to evict the 
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mentioned families. To clarify this Mayor Beslagic wrote an internal letter to 
Izetbegovic. To Beslagic’s surprise, Izetbegovic responded in an open letter 
publically read on TV, seizing the opportunity to openly challenge the mayor of 
Tuzla and accuse him of being insufficiently sensitive to the needs of (Bosniak) 
soldiers and their families. This allowed Izetbegovic to publically show his own 
prioritization of Bosniak soldiers and their families over the citizens of Tuzla of 
other ethnic groups. In his address to mayor Beslagic, Izetbegovic requested 
him to find solutions for the families of soldiers that had nowhere to live and 
finished his letter with the following terrifying words: 
 «I don’t need to remind you that people will make their own justice if they 
don’t get it from the authorities(…) Other solutions may conform to the 
letter of the law, but they will not dispense justice» (Izetbegovic in 
Beslagic, 1998, p. 155).  
Setting the dividing line between law and justice, Izetbegovic sent a public 
message that, as president of B-H, he did not consider that the laws of the 
country needed to be strictly respected. We such message he sent a positive 
sign of approval to those who wanted to take justice into their own hands. 
Nevertheless, such anarchy or parallel structures of authority never developed 
in Tuzla, unlike in most other places in the country. The legitimacy of local 
authorities was challenged by some groups in the local community (bottom up) 
and by the central level (top down), and nationalist voices were present at both 
levels. However, the main source of their legitimacy was in the strong and 
massive support of the local community, with whom they have been 
maintaining very close relationship, based on local civic identity and common 
values.  
Although the “Tuzlan way” of governance and behaviour, reflecting Burton’s 
(1990) concept of provention of conflict by addressing its root causes, got well 
known in Bosnia-Herzegovina and received some international recognition, it 
did not get transferred to other local communities nor it influenced the overall 
perception of what Critical Discourse Analysis names «possible and 
appropriate course of action» in B-H. The influence of Tuzla’s counter-
discourse on the discourses and practices beyond Tuzla remained limited, and 
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the likely key reason for such development is summarized by one of my 
respondents: 
«We wanted to be a model, but they didn’t let us (…) Because we were, 
actually, a counter-model to their model!» (Interviewee 13) 
Nevertheless, as summarized in the final section of this chapter, with its 
successful experience Tuzla served and still serves as a powerful counter-
discourse to the discourses of violence in the three key thematic areas of this 
study.  
 
8.9. Oasis of peace the Tuzlan way: conclusions 
As the only city in Bosnia-Herzegovina in which inter-ethnic peace and 
cooperation were preserved till the end of the war, and still persist, Tuzla is 
truly unique. The analysis of its discourses and practices related to group 
identification as one of the three key themes of this study indicates that the 
strongly salient civic group identity and the sense of belonging and 
accountability to the community of citizens of Tuzla prevented the exclusive 
prominence of ethnic identity of most citizens, who persisted in defending the 
multi-ethnic character of the city and promoting norms and worldviews not 
characteristic for the «new» ethnic group identities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
 This supported the perseverance of constructive inter-group relationships. 
Although they were challenged on many occasions, they remained positive 
due to the strong sense of interdependence and firm belief that without its 
multi-ethnic character Tuzla would lose its very essence. Many of my 
respondents told me that they saw preserving inter-ethnic trust and 
cooperation as «something normal». A respondent who was among the key 
leaders of the city during wartime told me with a big smile: 
«When so many people ask me how we managed to keep people 
together,    why we didn’t kill each other, I am tempted to tell them: don’t 
ask me, go and ask all the others why they did kill each other. We did 
what the people [narod] asked for, the others didn’t» (Interviewee 11) 
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Unfortunately, in the 1990s the interethnic violence became «the new 
normal», making Tuzla an exception. Although occasional ethnicity-based 
incidents in Tuzla did happen, they never became systemic. This was largely 
due to the good governance provided by the local authorities. Their strong 
nexus with and sense of accountability to the citizens whose safety and well-
being were clearly made a priority, close cooperation with all key actors, loyalty 
to the city and determination not to let it get «disgraced» by inter-ethnic 
violence, promotion of positive inter-ethnic past experiences and enforcement 
of the rule of law, among other, were of critical importance for the success of 
Tuzlan resistance to violence. A strong alignment between non-nationalist 
inclusive discourses of the local authorities and their actions can be easily 
tracked from the analysis presented in this chapter. The commitment of non-
nationalist local media, civil society and some religious leaders, are among 
other key factors that contributed to the preservation of the inter-ethnic trust in 
Tuzla. 
If the experience of Tuzla is still perceived as a «paradox» (Armakolas, 
2011), as a «suspicious exception» to the realities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, this 
is because its experience disrupts, challenges and delegitimizes the dominant 
discourses on the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina as an inter-ethnic conflict. 
Moreover, Tuzlan community dared to switch sides of the alleged problem and 
solution, by promoting inter-ethnic trust and not fear during the war and by 
opposing to the «solution» of ethnic fracturing and warning that it would bring 
additional, even bigger problems. Despite the generalized idea about the 
existence of ancient inter-ethnic resentments and hatreds in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, different knowledge and truth were shaped by Tuzla’s 
experience. Constructive social interactions among members of different 
ethnic groups were promoted as the powerful tool against inequality and 
violence. The tone for this type of norms and behaviours was set already prior 
to the war and remained firm and decisive even in the moments of greatest 
wartime challenges. 
As different discourses each point to different courses of action as possible 
and appropriate, Tuzlan discourse was a clear threat to dominant discourses 
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of ethnic divisions. Namely, inter-ethnic cooperation strongly interfered with the 
course of action desired by the nationalist elites and undermined their role of 
«saviours» of own ethnic groups. This is why Tuzlan experience had been and 
continues to be challenged and marginalized. «Tuzlan way» was undermined 
by dominant discourses at different levels, which prevented it from gaining 
more power and establishing as a «solid and stable representation of the 
world» (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002) or an alternative social world beyond 
the city community.  The power of nationalist discourses, which had «indirect 
mind control» (van Dijk, 2008) or almost exclusive influence over the 
knowledge, opinions and attitudes of the population in the country, was too 
high and supported by the way the solution to B-H problem was imagined by 
the international community.  
Problematizing such discourses, which are prevailing among national and 
international political elites but also in most of the academia, Tuzlan 
experience is blurring the typical boundaries of inclusion and exclusion and 
showcasing a type of group identification and solidarity different to the ethnic 
one. As such, it might have been condemned to «directed forgetting», just like 
many other experiences and narratives disconcerting the dominant 
discourses, was if not for the continuity of its discourse and practices of inter-
ethnic cooperation also after the war, coupled with the efforts of a handful of 
people to document, analyse and disseminate its experience. This study is an 
attempt to contribute to those efforts with narratives from two oases of peace, 
which are synthetized and compared in the closing chapter of this study.  
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Chapter 9: Comparative analysis, conclusions and research implications  
 
«All the conditions for the beginning of armed conflict [in Gorski 
kotar] were there – except the will of the majority of its citizens, 
Croats and Serbs» (Tatalovic, 1996, p. 327) 
 
This study is an enquiry about community resistance to war in general, and 
to ethnic fracturing in particular, during the 1991-1995 violent conflict of 
dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. Rooting this thesis in the conceptual 
framework integrating social constructionism, social psychology and peace 
and conflict studies, and using discourse analysis as a method of choice, in 
the core body of this work I explored the evolution of several discourses and 
practices from the past (Chapter 4) which influenced the evolution of 
discourses relevant for this study. Some supported the evolution of dominant 
discourses of violence, which contributed to the preparation, eruption and 
mobilization for violence, including ethnic fracturing in Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The characteristics and dynamics of those dominant discourses 
of violence were explored in Chapter 5. Building on the others, which 
supported the evolution of discourses of peace, Chapter 6 elaborated on some 
of the key alternative discourses in the former Yugoslavia, which challenged 
dominant discourses and promoted non-violent solutions. As a specific type of 
counter-discourse to war, the case studies of two communities that resisted 
ethnic divisions and violence and preserved ethnic coexistence during the war 
were presented in Chapters 7 and 8, answering the secondary question of the 
research: how did the resistance in those communities evolve, prevail and 
persist during the entire wartime period.  
In this final Chapter 9 I will undertake a comparative analysis of the two case 
studies, assessing their commonalities and differences, and contrasting them 
with dominant discourses of violence. This will enable me to address the 
primary research question of the research: in what ways did these two 
ethnically mixed communities in the former Yugoslavia present a challenge to 
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dominant discourses of war during the 1991-1995 violent conflict? I will 
elaborate on the parallels that I identified in their discourses and practices 
around the three key themes that guided me throughout the core body of this 
research, namely group identification processes, inter-group relations and 
governance. 
I will then recapitulate those findings to summarize why the communities of 
Gorski kotar and Tuzla were genuine oases of peace during 1991-1995 conflict 
and briefly look into the post-war realities of those communities. Finally, I will 
identify possible directions for future research which emerge from this study.  
 
9.1. Challenging dominant discourses of violence: a comparative 
overview of the two case studies 
When they wrote a letter of apology to the parents of a wounded soldier from 
Tuzla, Josip Horvat and his colleagues from Gorski kotar could not yet know 
that Tuzla would become their «sister oasis of peace», one of the very few 
places in Bosnia-Herzegovina that would remain ethnically mixed and resist 
the narrative of inter-ethnic war, just like Gorski kotar in Croatia. However, 
these two communities were to develop an astonishing set of commonalities 
in «chasing away the ghost of war» (Horvat, 2003, p. 36) from their areas. Ten 
key commonalities in dealing with the threat of violence are presented in the 
section below. They are grouped around the three key themes of the study and 
contrasted with the dominant discourses of violence which prevailed in other 
areas of the two countries.  
 
9.1.1. Group identification processes: challenging the dominant discourse on 
ethnic identity as the only relevant group identity, and its increasingly exclusive 
and hostile content 
In drawing conclusions on the group identification processes related to the 
pre-war and war periods in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is important to 
recall the motivational theories of social identification and the function of group 
membership in reducing uncertainty and achieving meaning and clarity in 
social context. The evidence summarized by Brewer (2011) showed that in the 
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contexts of high cognitive uncertainty the function of group membership and 
identities is to provide self-definition and guidance for behaviour in otherwise 
ambiguous social situations.  
Pre-war and war times in the former Yugoslavia were clearly the times of 
highest uncertainty for the country’s inhabitants: social, political and economic 
systems were falling apart in the midst of rising violence, and the future was 
unclear. Although the Yugoslav society was characterized by high 
heterogeneity and the malleability of its group identities, the pre-war context 
was used by the political elites to promote salience and exclusivity of ethnic or 
national identity. Moreover, in the new circumstances ethnic identities became 
more closed, more focused on religion as a distinguishing factor, and started 
praising killing or dying for one’s own group interests as one of the main values.  
 As observed by Campbell (1998) violence had a constitutive role in identity 
politics during breakdown of Yugoslavia. It was used for the constitution of 
political communities and homogeneous political realities desired by the elites. 
Aiming at ensuring the association between people and territory along ethnic / 
national lines, the elites imposed the dominant discourses of ethnic / national 
belonging as the only group identity (that matters), artificially and forcibly 
reducing the complexity of social identities on the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia to one dimension. They combined this discourse with portraying 
ethnic heterogeneity as a threat to one’s own ethnic group survival and 
interests, as inter-group differences got institutionalized and ideologically 
legitimated (Jabri, 1996). These simplistic and exclusive discourses on ethnic 
/ national identities by the political leaders positioning themselves as saviours 
in an increasingly threatening context explain why most citizens sought 
protection, self-definition and guidance within own ethnic groups and adopted 
violence towards ethnic out-groups as a new norm. 
This process was successfully prevented in both oases of peace by several 
means, observed in the two case studies and summarized below. 
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Heterogeneous and multiple group identities were promoted as a value and 
as a strategy against violence 
With a demographic structure characterized by mostly work related 
migrations, in both oases of peace the heterogeneity of group identities was 
protected and preserved prior to and during wartime, and highly valued. As 
stressed with pride by interviewee 11 «we have always been very diverse […] 
After WWII there were 74 national groups living in Tuzla!».  
While in the rest of the two countries multiple group identities were sacrificed 
at the altar of ethnic identities, in the two oases of peace they were promoted 
not only as a value, but also as a strategy of protection against the mounting 
violence. This is, among other, why Radio Delnice was regularly pointing out 
that the military personnel of Yugoslav National Army in their town were also 
«fellow citizens», while their commander was also «the new inhabitant of our 
town» (Radio Delnice, News, 16 and 17 September). This is equally one of the 
key reasons why the identification of individuals as citizens was strongly 
promoted in Tuzla, supplementing the ethnic group identity. This approach is 
clearly reflected in the April 19, 1992, public announcement by the local 
government of Tuzla, which listed «traditional inter-ethnic harmony, good 
relationships between neighbours and mutual trust and togetherness» as three 
of the most important «factors constituting the basis for maintaining peace and 
security of our citizens» (Beslagic, 1998, pp. 17-18). 
 Rather than looking for minor differences, members of the communities of 
Gorski kotar and Tuzla were highlighting those identity aspects and values that 
they shared. In both communities I observed that references to ethnic 
differences were often reduced to differences of religion, as my interlocutors 
would refer to their Catholic or Orthodox neighbour, friend or colleague much 
more often than using the terms Croat or Serb.  
 
Strong identification of inhabitants with local community and with the 
concept of citizenship 
Although, under the influence of the broader context, ethnic identification did 
gain some salience in the two oases of peace, it did not supersede other types 
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of group identities, as was the case in other areas of the two countries. My 
research identified two of those other types which might have played a critical 
role in the prevention of ethnic fracturing and violence.  
Firstly, I noticed a strong sense of belonging to and identification with the 
local, territorially-defined community, the community of the region of Gorski 
kotar and of the city of Tuzla, with a related set of constitutive norms, social 
purposes, relational comparisons and worldviews characterizing those 
communities. The analysis of the content of social identities of the inhabitants 
of Gorski kotar and Tuzla points at several common characteristics of that 
content in both communities, such as inclusiveness, embracing and cherishing 
diversity, strong awareness of human inter-dependence and valuing common 
past, among others. In my interviews in both oases of peace the respondents 
regularly showed strong attachment to and high level of pride for being 
members of those two specific non-violent local communities, as reflected in 
numerous quotes, such as «we [the citizens of Tuzla] are “operated” from 
nationalism» (Interviewee 11) or «[we], the people of Gorski kotar, are so 
peaceful» (Interviewee 6). 
Secondly, strong attachment to the concept and practices of citizenship was 
observed in both oases of peace, entailing equality of all individual citizens in 
rights and responsibilities, as well as values such as rationality and serenity, 
as opposed to irrational tribalism promoted by nationalist leaders. While these 
concepts were entailed in the comprehensive political programme of citizens’ 
option in the case of Tuzla, in Gorski kotar they were reflected in the common 
references to fellow citizens (Radio Delnice, 1991) as well as in the calls for 
behaving in the civilized manner, not crossing the threshold of civilized 
dialogue, keeping the level of civilization of our region (Horvat, 2003), etc. 
The outcomes of the two cases studies indicate that multiple and non-violent 
group identification processes in the communities of Gorski kotar and Tuzla, 
in combination with their trust in the local governments, reduced uncertainty 
and supported the satisfaction of needs for self-esteem, belonging and safety 
of their citizens, without them having to resort to the protection of exclusive 
national groups and their nationalist leaders.  
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9.1.2. Inter-group relations: challenging dominant discourses on the ethnic 
nature of conflict, on the inevitability of inter-ethnic violence and the ethnic 
fracturing as a solution; redefining parties in conflict and offering alternative 
solutions to the conflict 
The increase in the salience of ethnic identities prior to and during the violent 
conflict in the former Yugoslavia was coupled with the characterization of that 
war as an ethnic conflict. This characterization, promoted by dominant 
discourses and generalized internationally, was based on the assumption that 
the territory of the Balkans was inhabited by fixed and homogeneous ethic 
groups who have been hostile towards each other for many centuries, growing 
inter-ethnic resentments and hatred which, sooner or later, had to result in war. 
This is how the notion of inevitability of violence was promoted, and ethnic 
fracturing followed by the creation of nation states or nation state-like territories 
presented as the only viable solution.  
As clearly demonstrated in Chapter 4, this rationale promoted by dominant 
discourses was largely inadequate, as it was based on several false premises. 
Firstly, the ethnic groups on the territory of the Balkans were not 
homogeneous, and secondly, despite several episodes of identity-based 
violence, they enjoyed a long history of multi-ethnic cooperation without 
evidence of ancient inter-ethnic hatreds. Nevertheless, dominant discourses 
succeeded in promoting the idea that ethnic groups, namely Croats, Bosniaks 
and Serbs, were parties in conflict or enemies in the 1991-1995 war. This 
understanding was not shared in the two oases of peace. 
In my analysis I demonstrated that the above way of posing the problem of 
the conflict in the former Yugoslavia was highly problematic, and that it 
conditioned even more problematic solutions, including ethnic fracturing as 
part of the desired solution. Luckily, the communities of the two oases of peace 
problematized the way the problem had been posed and rejected the claims 
being made by the political elites about ethnic conflict.  
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The two communities ideated and promoted alternative definition of parties 
in conflict 
In their discourses and practices, the communities of Gorski kotar and Tuzla 
made a critical difference between armed aggressors and civilian members of 
ethnic groups. This is illustrated by Interviewee 12, who said: «I have never 
equated the one who was targeting me from the mountain with an Orthodox 
person living in Tuzla».  
Furthermore, the analysis of the discourses from the two oases of peace 
demonstrates that their inhabitants considered  the entire community of their 
region / city as a community under threat of violence, and saw nationalism of 
any ethnic group as a contributor to violence, as their “enemy”. Therefore, their 
alternative definitions of parties in conflict included concepts such as those 
living in peace versus those promoting violence, rationality versus irrationality, 
those who ran amok and pursued individual interests versus common people, 
tribalism versus civilization, and so forth. Challenging the discourse on inter-
ethnic intolerance, Horvat from Gorski kotar (2003, p. 21) summarized this 
alternative approach in a simple statement: «Our only intolerance was towards 
the war». 
 
Positive inter-ethnic experiences from the past were proactively recalled 
While dominant discourses of war were consistently recalling negative inter-
group experiences from the past, in the two oases of peace the authorities and 
the media challenged those dominant discourses by being eloquent on the 
abundant positive inter-group past experiences. While strengthening the 
common group identity of those communities, narratives of mutual support of 
ethnic groups in the past were also used to prevent fear from the ethnic others 
instigated by dominant discourses, as well as to inspire hope that positive inter-
group relations and unity of the citizens would prevail once more just like on 
many other occasions in the past.  
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There was high level of awareness of human inter-dependence  
The cross-case comparison further indicates that both communities showed 
high levels of awareness of inter-dependence of human beings and groups. 
This is clearly reflected in the statement of the mayor of Tuzla (Beslagic, 1998, 
p. 24):  
«We are deeply aware of the fact that our society cannot be good for 
Muslims if it isn’t good for Serbs, Croats and others who live here. 
Conversely, it cannot be good for Serbs and Croats if it isn’t good for 
Muslims». 
 It is equally visible in the statement of a Serb from Gorski kotar (Tatalovic, 
1996, p. 328):  
«We knew that everything would be solved easily if no blood was shed. 
But when even a drop of blood is spilt, it is hard to get back to how it 
was before» 
The last quote also explains why the populations of both communities 
considered that it was too late to apply their own model of multi-ethnic non-
violent coexistence in those places of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina where 
the threshold of violence had been crossed. 
Challenging the ethnicity based zero-sum thinking and win-lose solutions 
promoted by dominant discourses, whereby the achievement of the goals of 
one ethnic group was conditioned by the defeat of the other group, the 
communities of Gorski kotar and Tuzla were clearly pursuing solutions that 
would accommodate the interests and well-being of all their members, 
recognizing that this was the only possible way to lasting peace. Therefore, 
they were resistant to accepting the war or ethnic divisions as a “shortcut” to 
any alleged solutions for any ethnic group. In that resistance, they were guided 
by their leadership, which played a critical role in removing the threat of 
generalized violence from those communities, as we shall see in the next 
section.  
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9.1.3. Governance: challenging dominant discourses and practices which were 
instigating fear and chaos, and the role of nationalist leaders as saviours 
There is broad evidence that the salience of specific traits of social identity 
depends on the context. In the context of an organized state, such was 
Yugoslavia until the late 1980s, providing security and safety to the citizens 
was a duty performed by the state, therefore there was no need to rely on 
one’s ethnic group for that purpose. However, in the context of the crisis and 
breakdown of the state, traditional structures ensuring safety disappeared and 
ethnic leaders portrayed themselves as saviours and exclusive providers of 
security, as we have seen in Chapter 5. At the same time they were instigating 
fear of ethnic out-groups. With such discourse, nationalist leaders secured the 
1990 electoral victory in most of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and, out of 
fear and lack of other options, most citizens of the two countries started 
seeking safety within their own ethnic group, embracing the discourse of inter-
ethnic conflict. 
 In Gorski kotar and in Tuzla this was not the case. My research found 
several governance-related commonalities in the two oases of peace which 
might have contributed to the prevention of broader buy-in into the discourse 
of inter-ethnic conflict and consequently to the prevention of violence in those 
two communities. 
 
Citizens elected non-nationalist local authorities 
While in most Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina it was the nationalist parties 
that won the 1990 elections, the communities of Gorski kotar and Tuzla elected 
non-nationalist moderate leadership. In the case of Gorski kotar it was the 
reformed communist party LCC-PDR, while Tuzla was the only city in Bosnia-
Herzegovina which gave majority vote to the non-nationalist Union of Reform 
Forces and became governed by the coalition of this party with the Communist 
Party and the Democratic Party. Electing non-nationalist leaders was certainly 
a pre-condition and a critical first step which enabled the two communities for 
successful resistance to nationalist discourses and practices. However, this 
step alone would not have been sufficient for preventing the violence, as 
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proved by the experiences of a number of other towns and regions initially run 
by moderates which gradually succumbed to ethnic fracturing and other forms 
of inter-group violence.  
 
Local authorities were reducing uncertainty by enforcing rule of law and 
giving equal treatment to all citizens 
 As discussed by Oberschall (2000), one of the views on the Yugoslav 
conflict is that its driving motivation was not ethnic hatred but fear and 
insecurity. Reducing uncertainty was of critical importance for preventing 
violence. Furthermore, Brewer (2011) recognizes that group identity is only 
one of many possible modes of reducing social uncertainty, while roles, values 
and laws can serve the same purpose. These three components, namely 
clearly defined roles and responsibilities of all citizens strategically defined and 
wisely communicated by the leadership, attachment to the values such as 
tolerance or preserving human life, accompanied by an uncompromised 
respect for the rule of law, were clearly observed in both oases of peace, as 
elaborated in the two case studies, reducing social uncertainty of their 
inhabitants.  
Unlike in the rest of the two countries, in the oases of peace communal order 
was strictly enforced, with the most outstanding examples being the protection 
of private property of all citizens equally. While breaking into houses, stealing 
and destroying the properties of citizens of “enemy ethnic group” became the 
new norm in the rest of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the local 
governments in Gorski kotar and Tuzla did not allow such practices to take 
place in areas under their control. In addition to that, they prevented the 
dismissal from work of members of the “enemy ethnic group”, another new 
norm that was spreading fast in the rest of the two countries, preserving in this 
way ethnic diversity in some key functions and ensuring a minimum of living 
conditions – such as housing and salary – for all citizens. 
Challenging the discourse put forth by nationalist leaders in which they 
portrayed themselves as saviours, the local authorities in the two oases of 
peace became examples of good governance protecting equally all citizens on 
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their territory regardless of the mounting violence in the rest of the two 
countries. The case of the mayor of Tuzla standing up for Serb citizens while 
the city was under attack by Serbian military forces, or the care of the crisis 
cell in Delnice, in Gorski kotar, for the well-being of a Yugoslav National Army 
(YNA) soldier wounded on their territory, while YNA was attacking other places 
in Croatia, are just two examples of uncompromised efforts of the local 
authorities in both communities to prevent fear and chaos by protecting all 
citizens on their territory from any violence.  
The results of my study point at the attitude of the local authorities in Gorski 
kotar and Tuzla as managers accountable to all citizens of their community, 
rather than saviours of the ethnic majority on their territory. With extraordinary 
efforts invested in preventing the spread of fear, chaos and illegal structures 
of governance, as we saw in Chapters 7 and 8, these two local authorities 
succeeded in maintaining order and safety, therefore the inhabitants did not 
feel the urgency of turning to their ethnic leaders for protection, as in other 
parts of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
 
Local authorities were successfully navigating though the broader 
nationalist context and weakening nationalist voices in own communities 
It is important to note that, in their efforts to prevent violence, local 
governments in Gorski kotar and Tuzla did not attempt to supress or deny 
ethnic or national identification by their inhabitants, but rather engaged with 
them, embraced inter-dependence and multi-ethnicity as a solution and not a 
problem. The plea of the mayor of Tuzla to President Clinton not allow «the 
completely mistaken European concept of the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
along ethnic lines to be implemented, [as] [t]his would lead to […] lasting, still 
bloodier conflict» (Beslagic, 1998, p. 81) or the decision of Croatian local 
leadership from Gorski kotar, in particular Franjo Starcevic, to proactively visit 
and engage with Serb leaders in their villages, are just two examples of this 
approach.  
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With such attitude local governments of both oases of peace also weakened 
the nationalist voices in their own communities, who could not make any 
accusations of discrimination, and demonstrated the highest levels of 
responsibility and capacity to respond to the war situation in an ethical way. 
This also contributed to preventing the establishment of para-governance and 
para-military forces, which were the main triggers of chaos and violence in the 
rest of the two countries.  
In their efforts to preserve peace, both local governments were frequently 
faced with instructions and orders from central (capital) level which were 
hampering their own strategies of violence prevention, such as the order 
received in Delnice to withdraw all services to YNA barracks, or the public letter 
from the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina endorsing the forcible evictions of 
non-Muslim citizens in Tuzla. In dealing with such requests local governments 
applied balanced and creative approaches, in most cases strategically 
avoiding direct confrontation with much more powerful nationalist leaders at 
central level.  
Another type of clash that had to be avoided was the confrontation with YNA, 
which had already caused armed violence and loss of human lives in other 
places. Both oases of peace were faced with the high risk of violence due to 
presence of military infrastructure, personnel and weaponry of YNA on their 
territories. The local leaderships in the two communities undertook strategic 
negotiations and attempted to remove this risk without precipitating open 
clashes. The leadership in Gorski kotar was successful in that effort, while in 
Tuzla the armed violence did break out during the withdrawal of the YNA from 
the city, under circumstances which remain controversial.  
 
Partnerships were built and regular and constructive communication upheld 
to mitigate risks and prevent violence 
In their efforts to prevent inter-ethnic fracturing and violence, local 
governments in Tuzla and Gorski kotar promoted cooperation and gathered 
support of a number of important actors. This included communicating 
constructively and proactively also with those groups that presented a threat 
 273   
 
to the community, such as YNA forces in both Tuzla and Gorski kotar. My 
analysis showed that regular, moderate and constructive communication with 
all actors, coupled with the close cooperation with local media, police and 
military forces, leaders of political and religious organisations and civil society, 
were key in ensuring the success of the counter-discourse to the dominant 
discourse of violence. It is unlikely that such resistance would have been 
possible without this communication and collaboration, as the two communities 
were “swimming against the stream” of much more powerful dominant 
discourses promoted by high level elites.  
The role of the local media proved to be crucial in both oases of peace. 
Curle (1995) stresses that, rather than by bad people, violence is performed 
by confused and misdirected people, which was often the case in Croatia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. However in the two oases of peace the local media - local 
radio in the case of Gorski kotar, and local TV, radio and newspaper Front 
Slobode in the case of Tuzla -  paid great attention to providing citizens with 
regular and accurate information. In doing so they also provided a counter-
balance to the nationalist discourses of other media with balanced, 
constructive and hope-inspiring media content and tone.  
 
Peace was preserved with perseverance, wisdom and courage  
In the two communities in the focus of this study moderate politics was 
combined with numerous extraordinary efforts, wise governance and 
cooperation of a number of actors aiming at achieving the same goal – 
preserving lives and the multi-ethnic structure of their communities. These 
efforts required high levels of wisdom and courage, as they were directly 
undermining the goals of nationalist leaders.  
During the conflict in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina local governments of 
both two oases of peace were often exposed to criticism, denigrated as “red”, 
“communist” and treated as traitors of own ethnic group. However, by 
persevering in their efforts and preserving peace in their multi-ethnic 
communities, the oases of peace became a living example of counter-
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discourse to the dominant voices which were claiming that inter-group violence 
was inevitable and that divisions along ethnic lines were necessary to stop it. 
 
9.2. What made Gorski kotar and Tuzla oases of peace: a summary 
In early 2013, while preparing the design of this research, and after having 
collected only the initial information on the communities of Gorski kotar and 
Tuzla, I was searching for the preliminary concept that would best reflect the 
unique character of the two communities in the focus of my study. Having 
considered different options, I agreed with my supervisor to tentatively use the 
notions of oases of peace or oases of coexistence while conducting in-depth 
research and revisiting my initial hypothesis. When a year and a half later, in 
November 2014, I had the privilege to meet Josip Horvat, one of the key actors 
of the non-violent struggle in Gorski kotar, I learned that he had written a book 
about his wartime experience titled - Oasis of peace. He forged this concept 
with his closest colleagues during 1991, when they decided to embark on the 
path of resistance to violence. Much more than a mere coincidence, the 
realization that we came up with the same concept prior to meeting each other 
was a beautiful initial moment of mutual recognition for both of us and a 
beginning of friendship which lasted till Josip’s premature death in 2016.  
Interestingly, I also found that members of both communities disliked the 
concept of coexistence. A respondent in Tuzla told me:  
«There is no co-existence or co-living, there is only life. We don’t live 
one next to each other, we live together» (Interviewee 11)  
A similar rationale was shared in Gorski kotar:  
«I don’t want to talk about coexistence because this term implies that 
somebody forced us to live side by side, and in Moravice this is not the 
case. Peace and harmony here are natural, not a result of somebody’s 
political will» (Marinkovic, 2011).  
These considerations reconfirm a deep belief in diversity as a value, present 
in the two communities. Fully embracing the rational of the two communities, I 
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also opted to use the concept of oasis of peace when referring to them in my 
study.  
Josip Horvat (2003, p.8) defined the Oasis of peace in Gorski kotar as the 
«Rule of Peace as antipode to War, coexistence and tolerance opposed to 
hatred, as the final Good that will stop the Evil». In his unique and poetic way, 
through this definition Horvat actually described the absence of direct, 
structural and cultural violence in Gorski kotar, which corresponds to the 
academic definition of peace introduced by Galtung (1990, 1998). As we have 
seen from the case studies and cross-case synthesis, this absence of violence 
in Gorski kotar, and a very similar one in the city of Tuzla, was not a result of 
fortune or propitious circumstances. On the contrary, it had to be achieved 
through a proactive, strategic approach that required firm and tenacious 
resistance to the generalized acceptance and promotion of violence as a 
shortcut to the goal of putting one’s own ethnic group in a dominant position.   
I am using the concept of oasis of peace for both Gorski kotar and Tuzla 
because as I have shown in the thesis the three types of violence identified by 
Galtung were proactively and successfully prevented within those 
communities. Therefore, I am referring to the communal peace, in full 
awareness that both communities, and particularly the one in Tuzla, were 
subjected to external violent attacks, which made the preservation of the 
communal non-violence even more challenging. 
As a result of the prevention of direct violence in the two communities 
citizens were not harmed, harassed or evicted on the basis of their ethnicity, 
unlike what was happening in other parts of the two countries. Structural 
violence was prevented by ensuring equality for all citizens in principle and in 
practice. For instance, the structure of the relationships was such that 
members of ethnic majorities and ethnic minorities had a say in decision-
making processes and were genuinely consulted through different fora. Also, 
differing from other parts of the two countries, in Gorski kotar and in Tuzla 
citizens were not losing their jobs for belonging to the minority groups. Cultural 
violence was prevented through discourses and actions of the leadership and 
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local media, who continued promoting and valuing diversity and resisted ethnic 
identity-based stereotypes reinforced by nationalist elites.  
With the above efforts, fears of individual citizens from all ethnic groups in 
the two oases of peace were reduced, their arguments taken into account 
during decision-making processes, therefore they did not feel the urgency to 
seek protection from their ethnic leaders or to resort to the use of violence to 
get control of their own lives and to protect their own interests. Therefore, 
peace was maintained with deliberate efforts and at risk of ethnic ostracism for 
all those promoting inter-ethnic cooperation as a social counter-practice during 
war.  
Embracing diversity as a value and as a shield against violence was one of 
the keys to the success of the two oases of peace. Jabri (2006, p. 157) states 
that «the legitimation of war is situated in discursive practices based on 
exclusionist identities» and asks if it is «therefore possible to conceive of peace 
as situated in a critical discursive process which, rather than reifying exclusion, 
incorporates difference». The experiences of the two oases of peace provide 
a positive answer to this question.  
Although differing in ethnic composition of their population and some other 
demographic aspects, Tuzla having an urban population and Gorski kotar a 
more rural one, the comparative analysis of the two case studies shows strong 
similarities of the two oases of peace in terms of norms, values and 
experiences.  Even though these experiences had very positive effects on the 
lives of the citizens of the two communities, their remained «endemic» or 
restricted to those two specific areas during wartimes in Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina. However, they continue challenging dominant discourses of the 
past and present, as will be elaborated in the next section.  
 
9.3. Challenging discourses of violence then and now: the persistence of 
the two oases of peace 
Exploring the experiences of the two areas which preserved a multi-ethnic 
character and inter-ethnic cooperation, I attempted to discern the extent to 
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which dominant discourses of violence were challenged by the existence and 
persistence of the two oases of peace. To answer this secondary question of 
my study, I looked into the influence of the oases of peace on the realities 
elsewhere in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina during the war, but also into the 
sustained impact that they continue to have in the societies of the two 
countries. The analysis shows that, despite their limited influence on the 
immediate wartime realities during 1991-1995, the oases of peace seem to be 
having a prolonged impact in challenging dominant discourses of violence and 
contesting the ethnicization of the problem and solutions in the two countries.  
 
9.3.1. Limited impact of the counter-discourses from the two oases of peace 
on 1991-1995 wartime realities 
The analysis of the available data revealed that, despite their success in 
preventing violence at the local level, the two oases of peace did not cause a 
domino effect that would spread the resistance to violence to other areas of 
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina during wartime. While exploring the collected 
data I identified three elements that might have contributed to such an 
outcome.  
Firstly, as elaborated in Chapter 6, nationalist elites made sure to silence, 
marginalize or discredit the alternative voices which were challenging 
discourses of violence and putting at risk the elites’ interests. In the context of 
the two oases of peace, numerous and sometimes overt attempts of nationalist 
elites to discredit or obstruct the local violence prevention efforts were 
observed both in Tuzla and in Gorski kotar. For instance, as we have seen in 
Chapters 7 and 8, the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina Izetbegovic publically 
criticized the attempts of the mayor of Tuzla to guarantee the right to private 
property equally to all citizens, and in Gorski kotar Radio Delnice was 
continuously denounced for rejecting to change its name into Croatian Radio 
Delnice and local authorities criticized for apologizing to the parents of the 
wounded YNA soldier.  
Secondly, although they made extraordinary efforts to keep communal 
peace in the areas under their governance, the authorities of Gorski kotar and 
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the Tuzla authorities were not pacifist per se. The analysis of the experience 
in the two oases of peace shows that preventing the creation of the whirlwind 
of violence from the earliest moments of war was key to their success. The two 
communities remained unique in preserving inter-ethnic peace, as other areas 
were getting dragged into violence. In such context the citizens of Tuzla and 
Gorski kotar adopted a certain level of what Jabri (1996) calls «double moral 
standard», according to which some behaviours are acceptable on the 
battlefield, but not in private life. Many inhabitants of the two oases of peace 
participated in the war in other areas of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 
role of soldiers, but adjusted their behaviour to «peace mode» when returning 
to their oasis of peace as citizens. While in other areas of the two countries the 
«war mode» also invaded the civilian life, which translated into killing of 
civilians or occupying empty houses, this type of behaviour was not imaginable 
in the oases of peace, and the distinction between civilians and soldiers from 
all ethnic groups was preserved.  
Further analysis of the discourses and practices from the two oases of 
peace confirms that their authorities and citizens made a clear distinction 
between the areas where they considered peace was feasible and other areas 
where they believed that armed struggle was the only option. As stated by 
Horvat (2003, p.71):  
«For the strategy like ours we needed some “lucky stars”. The 
resistance in all parts of Croatia could not have been organized in the 
same way, as many have been directly caught into the whirlwind of war, 
whereby the only alternatives were to take up the arms against the 
enemy or to put your belongings into a plastic bag and leave towards 
places such as Gorski kotar».  
I agree with Horvat that once the armed violence starts taking place, the 
choices become extremely limited and the return to non-violent solutions, 
particularly if only promoted at the local level, seems almost impossible. I also 
agree that there might have been some «lucky stars» on the side of Gorski 
kotar inhabitants and their authorities, such as the fact that this area was on 
the edge of the imaginary map of the «Greater Serbia», therefore maybe not 
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strategically crucial for Milosevic and his collaborators.  However, I believe that 
it is important to complement Horvat’s thinking with an additional reflexion that 
challenges to a certain extent the paradigm of unviability of non-violent options 
in other areas. 
 It is crucial to keep in mind that the above mentioned «whirlwind of war» in 
most of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina did not start out of the blue sky, but 
rather required some internal forces that helped it build into a storm. The fear 
of local inhabitants, divisions, revived negative past experiences, exclusion 
and other «contributing winds» that were so prudently prevented in Gorski 
kotar and Tuzla, were at the basis of the creation of the whirlwind of violence 
in the rest of the two countries. Galtung (1990, 1996) describes this as an 
iceberg of violence, in which direct violence is only the top of the iceberg made 
possible by the existence and fomenting of structural and cultural violence. In 
order to promote structural and cultural violence at sub-national level, 
dominant nationalist voices of violence needed local support or local 
passiveness.  Therefore, the whirlwind of war in many other places of Croatia 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina may well have been prevented or at least curtailed 
had there been – following practices in the two oases of peace - systemic and 
determined local efforts that sought to prevent cultural and structural violence 
at the very early stages of conflict.  
Thirdly, the oases of peace had a limited impact on the wartime realities 
because their efforts and voices were not given adequate attention by the 
actors in the international community who were involved in the peacebuilding 
processes. Numerous efforts by the Tuzlan authorities to influence the 
perceptions and behaviours of the international community with regard to the 
«Bosnian solution», insisting on the need to consider options beyond nation 
states, were analysed in Chapter 8. Those efforts are visible particularly from 
the correspondence of the Tuzlan authorities with actors from the international 
community, in which they warned about the devastating effects that any 
territorial divisions along ethnic lines would have. Nevertheless, the 
international community kept dialogue exclusively with nationalist leaders as 
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representatives of ethnic groups, and in so doing helped to marginalize any 
alternative options.  
In summary, the two oases of peace had limited influence on broader 
wartime realities, which can be closely linked to the dominant identity politics 
during wartime. As indicated by Jabri (1996, p. 131), which expression of 
identity dominates or prevails is dependent on the degree of control different 
social groups exercise over discursive and institutional practices. The 
authorities in Tuzla and Gorski kotar had high levels of control over discursive 
and institutional practices in their areas of control (city, municipality), but very 
little influence on the broader context, where the ethnic identity logic was 
imposed. However, the achievements in those two areas, preserving their 
multi-ethnic character and accomplishing non-violent conflict resolution at a 
local level, are admirable taking into account the huge power asymmetry 
between them and the dominant discourses that prevailed at that time. 
Moreover, as their experiences continue challenging over-simplified narratives 
about the past, the two oases of peace remain “a pebble in the shoe” of 
nationalist discourses until present. The level of challenge that those 
achievements continue presenting to dominant discourses can be perceived, 
for example, from the ongoing pressure and criticism to which counter-
discourses are being exposed still today, more than twenty years after the war. 
The evolution of the dynamics between dominant discourses of violence and 
their counter-discourses in the two oases of peace is briefly analysed below.  
 
9.3.2. Resistance goes on: Gorski kotar and Tuzla in post-war times 
Preserving inter-ethnic cooperation and preventing violence during wartime 
proved to be highly beneficial for the communities of Gorski kotar and Tuzla. 
Having saved from destruction not only their infrastructure, but even more 
importantly the pre-existing social networks, after the war the two areas soon 
reached the top of the list of development and well-being of their populations 
in the two countries. Unlike other regions and cities of Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina which were struggling, and still struggle, with the rehabilitation of 
the physical and social infrastructure and reconciliation difficulties, Tuzla and 
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Gorski kotar were able to move on.  As such, the two oases of peace are a 
living proof that war is not the fastest, but the most costly option, for which the 
price is being paid by multiple generations in war-torn areas.   
After the war the two oases of peace continued strengthening their multi-
ethnic character, positive inter-ethnic relations and good governance. As a 
counter-narrative to dominant discourses of violence, and as a living example 
of benefits of multiple identities and inter-ethnic cooperation, the two 
communities are sites in which conventional thinking concerning the war in 
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina is contested. As such, they continue to be 
exposed to criticism and scepticism by advocates of those dominant 
discourses, who continue to attempt to deny or denigrate the experiences of 
Gorski kotar and Tuzla even two decades after the end of the war. Some of 
those efforts, such as attempts to deny that peace was maintained in Gorski 
kotar, were analysed in Chapters 7 and 8. In both communities I was told by 
those I interviewed that they are still questioned about which side they were 
on during the war, and being openly «accused» of lacking Croat-hood, 
Bosniak-hood and Serb-hood during and after the war. I also witnesses the 
ongoing debates about the wartime experiences in the media of both local 
communities. 
This persistent challenging of the counter-discourses of non-violence 
developed in Gorski kotar and Tuzla should be considered in the context of 
post-war realities in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Firstly, as demonstrated 
by Sekulic et al. (2002), although the levels of ethnic intolerance in the 
Yugoslav republics were not high before the war, they did grow significantly 
after the war, as a consequence of dominant discourses and practices of 
violence. This means that seeking recourse or refuge in ethnic groups 
continued and was further strengthened in post-war times. Nationalist 
discourses in both countries remained dominant, proactively reducing the 
space for alternative, supra-ethnic and bottom-up group identification 
processes.  
In Bosnia-Herzegovina the entire state infrastructure remains based on 
three separate nations. A clear example of the continued marginalization and 
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de-legitimation of supra-ethnic identification processes was observed in 2013, 
during the first post-war census in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the testing phase of 
the census, 35 per cent of the population self-identified as Bosnians, using a 
supra-ethnic category of belonging to the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina rather 
than a national category. Just like in 1990, the nationalist parties got alarmed 
and swiftly reacted with intensive campaigns instructing the population to 
declare using one of the three national categories, and not some «inexistent» 
category such as Bosnian. The main argument that the leadership of all three 
ethnic groups used to support ethnic identification during the census was that 
the remaining two groups would outnumber one’s own group therefore putting 
at risk its rights and interests. However, it is evident that supra-ethnic identities 
or a potential decline in the salience of ethnic identities undermine the political 
«logic» on which the current Bosnia-Herzegovina is built, and puts at risk the 
interests of the ruling elites who remain in power.  
Secondly, the attempts to diminish positive inter-ethnic experiences in the 
two oases of peace are closely linked to the struggle for the collective 
memories. As expressed by Elcheroth and Spini (2010) the battle over 
memories is at the same time a battle over the definition of identities, and those 
who win the symbolic struggle over the definition of a common identity are in 
a privileged position to guide the behaviour of the group. The dominant 
discourses in the three ethnic groups are promoting collective memories which 
justify own ethnic group violence as a defence against other groups, 
celebrating one’s own group actors who engaged in violence as national 
heroes and denouncing actors of violence from other groups as war criminals. 
While this is causing continuous tensions in the region, it also feeds the 
national pride and sense of belonging of many individuals and diverts the 
attention of the population from many other substantial problems. In such a 
context, the experiences of the two oases of peace blur the simplified 
narratives of all ethnic groups, challenging their discourses of victims / 
victimizers and on other related in-group / out-group dynamics. 
 Gorski kotar and Tuzla are a living example that violence was evitable, that 
it didn’t bring any good for most of the population, and that multi-ethnic society 
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is possible and can thrive and prosper. This is why their experiences are still a 
great source of disturbance to the nationalist discourses in Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina. For these experiences to continue contributing to the complexity 
of collective memories and fomenting critical thinking about group identification 
processes and inter-group relationships in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 
the past, present and future, it is necessary to further strengthen the body of 
knowledge on these and similar community counter-discourses to discourses 
of violence. Some of the possible directions of further study are explored in the 
final section of this study.  
 
9.4 Research implications and possible directions for future research 
As elaborated in Chapters 1 and 2, the currently existing body of research 
looking into the discourses and lived practices of non-violence in war-torn 
countries is very limited. While there are historical examples of the ferocity and 
pervasiveness of politically-driven violent conflicts in which identity is thought 
to have had a causative role, such as in the former Yugoslavia or Lebanon, for 
example, there are also cases of pockets of inter-ethnic cooperation or oases 
of peace, as they were named in this study, which are outcomes of deliberate 
and determined efforts of resistance. As these oases problematize the 
generalized knowledge that exists on the conflicts in those countries and 
contribute to the complexity of their understanding with new narratives, I 
believe that it is of outmost importance to continue documenting and analysing 
the experiences of community resistance to identity-based violence and 
learning from them. To increase our understanding of the resistance processes 
and effects in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere, it is also necessary to 
establish and analyse the links between types of resistance at a community 
level and other types of resistance to violence. 
The experiences of Gorski kotar and Tuzla show us that the preserved 
narratives and collective memories of positive inter-group relations from the 
past, particularly from WWII, were very beneficial and wisely used by the local 
authorities for reducing group-based fears and for promoting cooperation 
among citizens of different ethnic groups in the oases of peace once the violent 
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conflict started in other parts of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is therefore 
possible to expect that further documentation and dissemination of narratives 
of inter-ethnic cooperation and other positive inter-group experiences from 
1991-1995 war might help mitigate the risks of future identity-based conflict on 
the same territory. The same applies to other countries and regions where 
group identities are being frequently abused to instigate inter-group 
resentments in the interest of the elites pursuing their own political and 
economic goals.  
An additional gap in the knowledge that I observed during the elaboration 
of this study is related to the currently limited understanding of the sudden 
change in the levels of acceptance and legitimation of violence among the 
population of the former Yugoslavia. As elaborated in Chapter 5, from best 
friends, good neighbours or close colleagues sharing decades of joint life, 
many people from different ethnic groups overnight turned into enemies ready 
to kill each other. Although there are numerous hypotheses about the 
sequence of events and the cause-effect process that led to such change, the 
body of knowledge related to this sudden shift is still limited. I believe that 
further research of discourses and practices related to this topic could 
contribute to better understanding of these highly important dynamics.
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 
List of interviewees 
 
 Community Municipality Sex Nationality 
 
Type of 
engagement 
Interviewee 
1 
Gorski kotar 
(CRO) 
Mrkopalj M Croat Military 
Interviewee 
2 
Gorski kotar 
(CRO) 
Vrbovsko M Serb Political 
Interviewee 
3 
Gorski kotar 
(CRO) 
Delnice M Croat Political 
Interviewee 
4 
Gorski kotar 
(CRO) 
Delnice F Croat Media 
Interviewee 
5 
Gorski kotar 
(CRO) 
Mrkopalj F Croat Civil Society 
Interviewee 
6 
Gorski kotar 
(CRO) 
Vrbovsko M Serb Civil Society 
Interviewee 
7 
Gorski kotar 
(CRO) 
Vrbovsko M Serb Religious 
Interviewee 
8 
Gorski kotar 
(CRO) 
Delnice M Croat Police 
Interviewee 
9 
Gorski kotar 
(CRO) 
Mrkopalj F Serb Civil Society 
Interviewee 
10 
Tuzla (B-H) N/A M Croat Political 
Interviewee 
11 
Tuzla (B-H) N/A M Muslim Political 
Interviewee 
12 
Tuzla (B-H) N/A F Muslim Media 
Interviewee 
13 
Tuzla (B-H) N/A F Serb Political 
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Interviewee 
14 
Tuzla (B-H) N/A F Muslim Civil Society 
Interviewee 
15 
Tuzla (B-H) N/A M Other Media 
Interviewee 
16 
Tuzla (B-H) N/A M Croat Religious 
Interviewee 
17 
Tuzla (B-H) N/A F Serb Civil Society 
Interviewee 
18 
Tuzla (B-H) N/A M Croat Military 
Interviewee 
19 
Tuzla (B-H) N/A F Serb Political 
Interviewee 
20 
Tuzla (B-H) N/A M Muslim Military 
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Appendix 2  
Minutes from the meeting of Gorski kotar community leaders held in 
September 1992 
 
«On September 16 [1992] a meeting was held in Vojni Tuk, with participation 
of: 
1. Djuro Trbovic, president of the Community of Partizanska Dreznica 
2. Lazo Mamula, president of the Community of Gomirje 
3. Milan Mamua, president of the Community of Jasenak 
4. Anto Breljak, president of the Community of Ravna Gora 
5. Franjo Starcevic, president of the Community of Mrkopalj 
6. Dragutin Crnic, Community of Mrkopalj 
7. Vlado Kovacic, secretary of the Community of Mrkopalj 
8. Rade Mrvos, representative of Tuk 
9. Jovan Dragic, commander of the Police branch Jasenak 
10. Robert Jurisic, commander of the Police Station of Vrbovsko 
11. Ivica Briski, commander of the Police Station of Delnice 
12. Davorin Racki, president of the Assembly of the Municipality of 
Vrbovsko 
13. Davorin Pocrnic, president of the Executive Council of the Assembly of 
the Municipality of Vrbovsko, and 
14. Josip Horvat, president of the Executive Council of the Assembly of the 
Municipality of Delnice 
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Due to an oversight by the organizers of the meeting - communities of Mrkopalj 
and Gomirje - the meeting was not attended by the representatives of the 
Municipality of Ogulin. 
The topic of the meeting was: Peace to all who inhabit the area of Bjelolasica, 
regardless of their national or religious feelings; the peace that we managed 
to preserve, with the exception of some deadly accidents and individual bad 
intentions which could not be controlled. The merit for this achievement 
belongs to all – the people, the leadership of the communities of Bjelolasica 
area, the leadership of all of the three municipalities of Bjelolasica area, 
Croatian army and police. We knew how to think of peace in the moments 
when – it’s too hard to even say it – maybe it was psychologically easier to get 
into war against one another.  
At the meeting we all agreed – and the leadership of Municipality of Ogulin (to 
which we apologize once again) is kindly asked to accept our agreement – to 
continue holding the meetings in the same spirit and with the same purpose 
as this first one, held in Tuk. This purpose is: 
Active peace among us 
As a sign of peace, we agreed to mark the peak of Bjelolasica, and that the 
paths leading to Bjelolasica be marked in such way; so that Bjelolasica can 
overgrow itself and grow into a monument. 
We agreed that we should get better connected – by better roads. 
We agreed to work together so that already this winter we would have a 
functional ski center in Vrelo and that the municipalities of Delnice, Ogulin and 
Vrbovsko will agree on the access to Bjelolasica from the side of Delnice and 
Razdolje. 
Finally, we need to talk to the leadership of the Republic [of Croatia] about 
everything that we think about and that will be maturing for application and 
implementation, with the aim of gaining their approval and support. 
The next meeting might be held in Jasenak in mid-November, after the return 
from Austria of prof. Franjo Starcevic, who will participate on November 5 and 
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6 at the consultations on the «Paths of peace in Croatia», that will be held in 
Villach and Salzburg, discussing in particular our good «complex» of 
Bjelolasica – which of course does not mean that we could not meet even 
earlier if there would be anything important to discuss.  
Signed: 
Professor Franjo Starcevic, president of the Community of Mrkopalj and Vlado 
Kovacic, secretary of the Community of Mrkopalj 
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Appendix 3 
Schematic outline of discourses of war and their counter-discourses 
Chapter 4 Chapter 5 
(dominant discourses of 
violence) 
Chapters 6-8 
(counter-discourses) 
 
 
Complexity and fluidity 
of 
group identification 
processes 
 
Ethnic identity primacy 
Closed, exclusive 
Nationalism, majority 
rules 
“Logic” supported by 
international community 
 
 
Multiple group 
identities 
Open, inclusive 
Citizenship, equality 
Logic supported by 
local experience of 
heterogeneity  
 
 
 
Complexity and fluidity 
of 
inter-group relations 
 
 
 
Recalling negative past 
Violence against other 
groups considered as 
appropriate 
Win-Lose approach (us 
or them) 
Ethnic fracturing as 
“solution” 
 
 
Recalling positive past 
Violence not 
appropriate 
Win-Win approach 
Ethnic fracturing as a 
“problem” 
 
 
 
 
Complexity and fluidity 
of governance 
 
 
 
 
Valuing homogeneous 
political space 
Leaders as saviours of 
own ethnic group 
Parallel structures of 
command, chaos, 
fomenting fear 
 
Valuing heterogeneous 
social space 
Leaders as managers 
accountable to all 
citizens 
Clear lines of 
responsibility, rule of 
law, reducing fear 
 
